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Summary
How should social science conceptualise the informal exchange of
illicit favours in the context of the modern state? And what relation
does such exchange have to the reproduction of the social structure?
This thesis presents a new framework for the analysis of such phe-
nomena based upon the theoretical methodology of Pierre Bourdieu.
Using Bourdieu’s conceptual tools of habitus, field and capital, the
kinds of informal exchange typically analysed through the paradigms
of clientelism, corruption, or “informal institutions” are reconstructed
as a new research object - the clandestine circulation of capital - and
related to the broader “economy of practices” necessary to reproduce
the social structure.
In a considered development of Bourdieu’s initial use of the term
(which related to the clandestine circulation of cultural capital), the
thesis demonstrates how the clandestine circulation of other forms and
guises of capital can also subvert the normative intentions of merit and
equality implicit in the formal institutions of the modern state. The
thesis reconciles and expands upon various of Bourdieu’s theoretical
writings to develop a theory identifying both the objective resources of
such circulation and the principles structuring it as a social practice.
This new theory is then applied in detail to the field site of urban
Beirut (the capital of Lebanon), and specifically in relation to the
phenomenon of wasta (an Arabic word used to refer to all kinds of social
influence). Through a detailed empirical study of the field site, the
thesis attempts to demonstrate how clandestine circulation operates
as a mechanism for the transformation and accumulation of capitals,
and hence comes to play a determinant role in the reproduction of the
social order, in a manner intimately connected to the specific nature
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shifts as detailed in table 1 below. Further, vowels tend to shift from A to 3
- hence ‘lubnan’ (Lebanon) is typically pronounced ‘libnen’.
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) and also for pharyngeal ha (h
˙
), and a left half ring ↪a for ayn to
distinguish it from hamza, for which I use an apostrophe.
I make a distinction for words such as wasta which through their notori-
ety have been widely latinised, and for which it would seem not only overly
worthy to transliterate as wa¯sit
˙
a, but also encourage unwelcome associations
by linking the word to its classical or elevated root, which can reinforce a
timeless conception of such phenomena which empirical analysis does not
bear out. Similarly, when using terms of an almost purely academic nature
(such as ↪as
˙
abiyah, which derives from the usage of Ibn Khaldun) I apply
the classical transliteration.




tha H sin , ta H
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This thesis attempts to demonstrate how the illicit exchange of favours may,
in certain conditions, become a mechanism for the reproduction of an un-
equal society.
It seeks to do so through the application of a Bourdieusian theoretical
framework, in which the same question may be rephrased in a somewhat
different manner. How, in a social space supposedly reproduced through the
objectified, institutionalised mechanisms of the modern state, can a principle
of reproduction based upon the elementary mode of domination, and in
particular the circulation of embodied social capital, become determinant in
the reproduction of part or all of that space?
Answering this question has involved considering several related issues,
not least the paradigms of corruption and clientelism. Part of my contention
in this thesis is that the prevailing academic construction of these research
objects has come to represent a hurdle which must first be overcome in
order to engage in a truly objective analysis of such phenomena. As such,
this thesis proposes a new framework of analysis: the clandestine circulation
of capital.
This new approach finds its roots in a perhaps unexpected place: the
reproduction of inequality within the French educational system. Bourdieu’s
analysis of the ways in which inequalities based upon inherited cultural
capital came to be both reproduced and legitimated through this system
prompted him to describe the process as “clandestine circulation”. This
thesis deepens Bourdieu’s concept of clandestine circulation, and extends his
mode of analysis to include other forms and guises of capital, the intention
being to offer a ‘new way of thinking’ about the problem of informal and
illicit exchange in the modern state.
To develop this new way of thinking further the field site of Lebanon -
and, more specifically, the Lebanese capital, Beirut - was chosen for extended
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analysis. As such, the thesis may be read in part also as a study of Lebanon;
it may also be read, in part, as a study of the phenomenon of wasta, a concept
- or at least a word - familiar across much of the Arab world.1 However, I
would emphasise in both cases the qualification “in part”: it has not been
my intention at any point to make a contribution to the regional studies
canon. Rather, I have sought to find examples of the general within the
particular. In this sense, the use of a single field site is intended to provide
greater empirical depth to what are extremely complex phenomena.2 I have,
however, included further case-studies from within the literature to add both
greater robustness and generalisability to my theoretical claims.
Concerning structure, the organisation of this thesis reflects the nature
of the argument being made. It is not intended to recreate, ex post, the sci-
entific method of the research process (an approach I believe to be generally
unsuitable for the social sciences). For information regarding the research
method, an elaboration may be found in the appendix;3 the body of the
thesis is rather given over to a thorough explication of the argument.
This emphasis is derived from the centrality of theory, and in particular
Bourdieusian theory, to the thesis. Locating one’s work within a Bourdieu-
sian framework offers, I believe, certain advantages which are not to be
discounted. Among them is the chance to integrate quite different aspects
of human behaviour (both social and individual) within a unified theoretical
framework. However, I freely acknowledge that such a choice is not without
cost. As a framework, it tends toward exclusivity and - to its detractors -
claims an unmerited exhaustivity in terms of explanatory power.
Regarding the first point, it is not my intention in this work to “trans-
1I should emphasise that no empirical claims regarding wasta as an instance of clandes-
tine circulation beyond the Lebanese context are made in this thesis. Indeed, it is perhaps
well to recall here the warning of Leca and Schemeil (1983, p. 461):
Les meˆmes mots ne se retrouvent pas dans tout le monde arabe ou se retrou-
vent avec des sens diffe´rents selon les re´gions; le mot change de sens et de
valeur dans le temps; le sens commun ne se donne pas imme´diatement, il est
lui-meˆme construit par l’informant quand celui-ci fait appel a` sa me´moire
et a` son ide´ologie, par l’informateur au second degre´ qui interpre`te ce dis-
cours pour le chercheur, enfin par le chercheur lui-meˆme quand il travaille
sur documents[. . . ]
2See Flyvbjerg (2006) for a defence of investigating a single, paradigmatic case in detail.
3As distinct from the praxeology (or methodological philosophy) driving the thesis,
which is given special consideration in chapter 3, owing to its important role in recon-
structing the research object.
xxi
late” Bourdieu into other academic niches; concerning the second, neither
shall I Bowdlerise the theory by restricting my use of it to certain elements.
This latter “bits and pieces”4 approach - whereby enterprising academics
appropriate concepts such as habitus or field without a care for their status
as elements within a unified theory - has done much to discredit Bourdieu
in wider academic circles.5 To be sure, Bourdieusian theory does not lend
itself well to the sort of theorising of the “middle-range”; I do not, however,
see this as a failing.
Nonetheless, two points must be acknowledged: using a particular the-
oretical approach does not absolve the researcher from engaging with the
broader universe of research covering the same field; and theoretical sophis-
tication should not be an excuse for theoretical obfuscation.
It is with these points in mind that the thesis is organised. On the
one hand, I engage with the existing literature in those fields related to the
research object so as to emphasise the distinctive utility of Bourdieusian
theory, and the differing approach to concept formation it entails. Second,
as this thesis makes its own addition to that theoretical tradition, a separate
theoretical exegesis serves to highlight the original contribution of the thesis
to the field of Bourdieusian theory.6 Finally, as a practical theory (that is,
one derived from observation in the field, and concerning a scientific object
with an existence in social reality) a section devoted to the operationalisation
of the theory within the field site (urban Beirut) is included as a separate
element.
Thus, the main contribution of the thesis may be seen as falling broadly
into three sections. The first section outlines the contours of the research,
4The same expression is also used by Wacquant (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 4).
5Indeed, in relation to the study of practices similar to wasta, both Ledeneva (1998)
(blat) and Smart (1993) (guanxi) have attempted the partial integration of Bourdieusian
concepts, with results which I would consider, by extension, to be limited (see chapter 6).
6At this point I should add that specialists in Bourdieusian theory may feel I have
drawn too freely from across what was a constantly evolving body of work. While it
is true that Bourdieu’s use of concepts evolved over time (see Wacquant’s discussion in
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 6)), to my knowledge Bourdieu did not repudiate any of
his prior findings, but rather considered all his concepts as, to some extent, intermediate
propositions. Certainly, I do not attempt a complete reconciliation of all competing terms
and uses within this thesis; in developing my own theory however, and in order for that
theory to capture as much as possible the totality of clandestine circulation (in both
structures and practices), I have at times been obliged to attempt to reconcile certain
concepts (for instance social libido, interest, illusio, symbolic force) whose true relation to
each other, and to the related concepts of field, habitus and capital, remains somewhat
obscure.
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including the research problem, and places particular emphasis on concept
formation, highlighting the different existing literatures relating to the re-
search object, before proposing a new formation based upon Bourdieusian
praxeology. This section also includes a justification of the field site, urban
Beirut. The second section consists of a detailed exposition of the theoreti-
cal contribution of the thesis, while the third section provides an empirical
elaboration of the field site. Although serving discrete functions, these two
sections are intended to closely complement each other. The thesis ends
with a conclusion summarising the main findings of the research.
Clandestine Circulation




Some years ago, while living an itinerant existence in Beirut, I was told a
rather commonplace anecdote. As often happens, what at first seemed a
mundane and insignificant little story somehow lingered in the back of my
mind, slowly pushing itself forward over time until, eventually, it came to
dominate my thinking.
It concerned a young Lebanese woman, a qualified professional who had
lived almost all her life in Paris, and who had returned to Beirut in her late
twenties to rediscover something of her heritage. Being well-qualified, finding
work did not prove difficult for her; yet in order to practice her profession
legally in Lebanon, her French qualifications needed to be validated by the
relevant Lebanese ministry. Which is where the fun began.
She proceeded by doings things as one would in France: calling the
ministry; discovering the correct procedure; filling in the necessary forms;
copying the correct documents; certifying the copies; delivering everything
to the ministry; calling the ministry to check on progress; calling again;
faxing the ministry more documents; calling the ministry; calling again; and
again; and again. Eventually, in her exasperation she told her mother all
her troubles, to which she replied: “Why, of course; we need to find you a
connection.”
And so, acquaintances were called and enquiries made. Presently, a
contact in the relevant ministry was found, and an appointment set.
When the time came, the ministry contact - a mid-ranking female ad-
ministrator - was effusive in her welcome, and most apologetic for all the
inconvenience which had been caused. She reassured the young professional
that everything would be done to expedite the procedure, and that she need
1
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not have any further worries. Grateful - though slightly baﬄed - the pro-
fessional thanked the bureaucrat, shook hands and made to leave. It was
then that the bureaucrat’s face darkened, and the last thing the profes-
sional heard as she walked out of the door was the slam of a drawer in the
bureaucrat’s desk behind her.
When she returned home, the professional told her mother what had
happened, to which she rolled her eyes, saying - “now we’ll have to send
someone else to sort it out.” It was at this point that the professional, as
she was recounting the story to me, must have noticed I was looking a little
puzzled. “I was supposed to go behind the woman’s desk and drop the bribe
in the drawer before I left,” she told me. Oh, I said, really? “I mean, it’s
wasta, you know?” she said, although she sounded a little unsure. And then
she told me something else, which is what stayed with me. “I mean, I knew
I was supposed to do it, and I wanted to do it, and I knew as soon as I heard
the drawer slam that it meant she wouldn’t help me. But it just felt weird.
I mean, going behind someone’s desk and dropping money in it?”1
The episode came to linger in my thoughts because of the challenge
it seemed to present to some of the assumptions which govern academic
understandings of phenomena such as corruption, bribery and clientelism.
In the case of the young professional, it was for her entirely rational (in the
sense of maximising her utility) to bribe the bureaucrat. She knew this. The
bureaucrat also knew this. In this case, the professional also knew what was
expected of her, in the sense of the appropriate manner of paying the bribe.
Everything pointed toward a successful outcome for both parties. And yet
the result was a ‘botched bribe’ - a faux pas in the etiquette of corruption
which would necessitate a good deal of additional labour to set right.
Speaking of a similar ‘botched bribe’ in the context of northern India,
Gupta noted that “[t]he ‘practice’ of bribe giving was not, as the young men
learned, simply an economic transaction but a cultural practice that required
a great degree of performative competence” (Gupta, 1995, p. 381, emphasis
mine). Certainly, in the case of the young professional, conscious knowledge
of the role was not enough;“being” Lebanese in this context required an
almost pre-reflexive understanding of the part needed to be played to effect
1As the exchange upon which this anecdote is based took place before the commence-
ment of my field work (and indeed my doctoral studies), I have relied upon memory and
a minimum degree of licence to reconstruct it.
3the desired outcome.
In this sense, a ‘rational’, calculating approach to the situation may
even have proved a hinderance - for in what respect does it make sense to
describe the act of giving a bribe as a simple act of coordination between
rational actors? In their study of corruption in tangentopoli -era Italy, Della
Porta and Vannucci concluded by describing corruption as “an emergent
normative system” (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999, pp. 249-255) - wherein
many of those implicated claimed “to have had no choice when paying or
receiving bribes; to have been nothing more than victims of a ‘system’ that
imposed its ‘will’ upon them” (ibid., p. 249). Describing the “tranquil and
unembarrassed atmosphere” (ibid., p.250) that prevailed in that system,
Della Porta and Vannucci seem ultimately to echo the findings of Gupta -
There are no negotiations or demands; no suspicions or worries
arise. To conclude the transaction successfully with a minimum
of risk, it is sufficient to follow the etiquette of corruption. (ibid.,
p. 250)
Through the course of my research, I began to think more deeply about this
‘etiquette’ of corruption, and how far removed it seemed from the predomi-
nately rational models constructed by academics to explain such phenomena.
How does such an etiquette emerge? For Della Porta and Vannucci, the an-
swer was to quote Hayek, and claim “the spontaneous evolution of rules of
conduct” (ibid., p. 250). Such social norms are, according to Elster, “in-
dividually useful in that they help people to economize on decision costs.
A simple mechanical decision rule may, on the whole and in the long run,
have better consequences for the individual than the fine-tuned search for
optimal decision.”2
While describing why such rules may be ‘useful’ to the individual, note
that Elster’s account falls short of explaining how they actually emerge. One
may well understand the rational choice reticence: if such norms are indeed
‘social’, then this suggests a social process is involved in their generation. In
this sense, simply describing their utility to the individual bears the same
relation to proper explanation as describing that my left foot is for standing
on does to the theory of evolution. There is, though, an even deeper lacuna
deriving from this approach: by using the framework of methodological
2As quoted in Della Porta and Vannucci (1999, p. 252)
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individualism to describe the functioning of such ‘rules’ we commit a gross
act of distortion regarding the forces in play. Transforming ‘victims’ into
freely transacting actors is ultimately to replace coercion with an imagined
voluntarism.
Hence, it is the search for a social explanation of such ‘etiquette’ which
forms the basis of this thesis. How does it emerge? How does it evolve
over time? How does it persist, despite efforts to expose and eradicate it?
And, at root, how should we best conceptualise it? For if such practices are
indeed ‘rule-bound’, what does it mean to follow a rule that is unwritten,
involves varying expectations, and generates varying strategies?
Most importantly though, this thesis is about how such ‘norms and reg-
ularities’ (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65) as govern the exchange of illicit favours
may relate to the production of the broader social structure, and in a man-
ner quite at odds with the ‘official’ intentions of the state. If such ‘etiquette’
is not the product of a conscious voluntarism; if it leads to regularised out-
comes which are, by their nature, unequal; then what role does it play in
the (re)production of the social structure, and in particular, to the repro-
duction of inequality? Not only the young professional’s botched bribe, but
the constant act of living day by day in Lebanon and witnessing the varying
stratagems employed - sometimes to get ahead, sometimes just to get by -
provoked such a mode of enquiry.
In particular, the ubiquitousness of wasta - a word never far from one’s
lips when needing to explain how certain things must be done - led me
to think deeply about such modes of regulation, in terms both of their
subjective ambiguity and their apparent autonomy from the ‘formal’ rules
of the state. As Alena Ledeneva noted of blat in Soviet Russia - everyone
in Lebanon knows what wasta is, but finds it difficult to define. No-one,
least of all academics,3 seems able to agree what does or does not constitute
wasta, let alone whether it is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing; instead, rather like
pornography for Justice Stewart,4 we suffice with a kind of lay Bayesianism
- “I know it when I see it”.
Wasta, like blat in Russia, guanxi in China, and no doubt countless other
culturally-specific terms, operates as a kind of etiquette: for the informal
3Compare, for example, the title of Al-Ramahi (2008) - “Wasta in Jordan: A Distinct
Feature of (and Benefit for) Middle Eastern Society” - with Mohamed and Hamdy (2008)
- “The Stigma of Wasta”.
4See Gewirtz (1996) for an overview.
5exchange of favours and benefits; for the subversion of public interests to
private ones; for the mobilisation of influence. It is thus both a practice
and a disposition toward practice, and hence has an existence at once both
objective and subjective - that is, in the performance of certain acts and
the power relations they engender, and in the attitudes and points of view
which such practices provoke as social phenomena. To fully understand an
‘etiquette’ such as wasta thus entails taking seriously both aspects of its
existence: i.e., as regularity of practice and ambiguity of norm. It involves
going beyond catch-all definitions of corruption, where outcome and motive
are viewed as synonymous (and hence the bad-faith of actors is taken for
granted), and instead taking seriously (though not necessarily believing)
those actors who say “wasta is not the same as a bribe”.
Thus, in addressing these issues, it is a guiding principle of this thesis
that the research object must be reintegrated within the larger order of social
practices of which it forms a part. The real is relational (Bourdieu, 1998,
p. 3), and it is only by properly reflecting on the relation of the ‘etiquette’
governing corruption - “synthesising both norms and regularities”, to quote
Bourdieu - to the totality of the principles of regulation existing in a society,
that its true modus operandi may be adequately grasped, and its broader
effects unveiled. One man’s bribe is another man’s gift; nepotism is a ‘favour’
between friends. As we shall see, reducing the complexity of such practice to
a singular viewpoint (as academic models frequently do) involves the loss of
precisely that quality which gives practice its most significant social effects.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to say that this thesis is about corrup-
tion. It is rather about “the different modes of existence of the principles
of regulation and the regularity of different forms of practice” (Bourdieu,
1990b, p. 65). It is about, in particular, those modes of regulation which
persist in spite of the state, or in the state’s shadow, and which go against
the supposed normative principles of the state’s rules. In order to grasp
the operation of such principles however, I believe what is first called for
is a new conception of the research object itself - that is, of our scientific
assumptions about the very thing being studied. The nature of the task in
hand is perhaps best described by Wittgenstein:-
Getting hold of the difficulty deep down is what is hard. Because
it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the difficulty it
was. It has to be pulled out by the roots; and that involves
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our beginning to think in a new way. The change is as decisive
as, for example, that from the alchemical to the chemical way
of thinking. The new way of thinking is what is so hard to
establish. Once the new way of thinking has been established,
the old problems vanish; indeed, they become hard to recapture.
For they go with our way of expressing ourselves and, if we clothe
ourselves in the new form of expression, the old problems are
discarded along with the old garment. (Wittgenstein, 1977, p.
48)5
It is the aim of this research to get hold of the difficulty deep down; to come to
a new way of thinking which no longer views corruption, bribery, clientelism
and the informal exchange of favours as separate, bounded phenomena, but
which reintegrates them within a general science of practices and power
relations running contrary to the formal norms of the state. An economy,
to borrow a phrase from Bourdieu, of “clandestine circulation” (Bourdieu,
1986b, p. 255) - in which symbolic goods play as much of a role as material
ones.
In doing so, the thesis thus seeks to provide answers to the following
interrelated questions:6
- How is clandestine circulation to be defined according to Bourdieu-
sian theory, and how is it positioned in relation to existing academic
literature on similar practices?
- How is it to be theorised in terms of emergence, effects, and variance?
- How should it be conceptualised in relation to the state, the social order,
and the everyday practices of social agents?
- How can it be best observed in the field, and its potential effects on the
(re)production of the social order discerned?
In seeking to address these questions the thesis proceeds in the following
fashion. The first section concerns “getting hold of the difficulty” - that is,
it addresses how best we should conceptualise the research object. I begin
in chapter 2 by reviewing the various academic literatures which have at
5Also quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 1).
6The research questions briefly stated here are elaborated in more detail at the end of
chapter 3, following the reconstruction of the research object.
7different times attempted to grasp some aspect or other of the social reality
under consideration, and to relate it to the broader social structure. In doing
so, I seek to draw attention to what I believe to be some of the strengths
and shortcomings of these different approaches, and to demonstrate the
emerging utility of a “new way of thinking” - that is, a new approach toward
constructing the research object.
I introduce this new approach in chapter 3, beginning with the specific
methodological philosophy (or praxeology) upon which it is founded, before
elaborating the new research object - clandestine circulation - it entails. In
the process, I try to highlight the contribution I believe such a new con-
ceptualisation offers, and the ways in which it builds on prior approaches.
Having thus positioned the research, I then recap in greater detail the re-
search questions which arise from this new object, and which guide the work
that follows, as well as the scope and limitations of the thesis. Finally, this
first section concludes with a chapter introducing the field site, urban Beirut,
including a brief justification for its suitability as an empirical case study.
The second part of the thesis presents the main theoretical contribution
of the research. Having outlined clandestine circulation as a research object
in part one, in this section I seek to integrate it within a robust Bourdieusian
theoretical framework, addressing in the process a number of the research
questions arising at the end of chapter 3. In particular, the theoretical
outline attempts to explain: how clandestine circulation may emerge from
within processes of state formation (and by extension, how we must conceive
of the state in order to capture such processes); how it may function as a
mode of reproduction of the social structure; and how clandestine circulation
is itself structured as a social practice. In the process of outlining this theory
of clandestine circulation, I make reference to commonalities and differences
with some of the prior academic approaches mentioned in chapter 2, as
well as establishing where my own theory differs from other contemporary
Bourdieusian scholarship. Having outlined what I consider to be the main
elements of the theory, I then conclude this section by presenting some of
the key heuristic tools which emerge from it, and which guide the empirical
analysis that follows.
The third part of the thesis consists of an empirical analysis of clandes-
tine circulation in practice in the field site of urban Beirut, and is divided
into two chapters, corresponding to the two research ‘moments’ of Bour-
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dieusian praxeology. Together they represent a ‘state of the field’, whereby
the theoretical framework developed in part two is applied to material gath-
ered from field work. In this section I attempt to prove that the principles of
clandestine circulation outlined in the theory section can be seen in action in
the Lebanese context, and serve not only to structure practice, but in doing
so to play a significant role in reproducing the social order. The thesis then
concludes with a chapter summarising the main findings and contributions,
as well as potential directions for future research.
Finally, it should be noted that sections 2 and 3 are not intended to
be read as indicative of a deductive research model in the theory-testing
mode. The division between theoretical and empirical is a purely structural
one, intended to highlight the separate contribution of the thesis in each
area. Rather, an outline of the research methodology (in the practical sense)
which guided this project may be found in the appendix, alongside a list of
respondents, a sample of the questionnaire used to conduct the structured
interviews, and data relating to coding and analysis of results.


In order to construct a model of
the game, which will not be the
mere recording of explicit norms,
nor a statement of regularities,
while synthesising both norms and
regularities, one has to reflect on
the different modes of existence of
the principles of regulation and the
regularity of different forms of
practice[. . . ]







Interestingly, every Russian knows
what blat is, but finds it difficult to
define
Alena Ledeneva, Continuity and
Change of Blat
The academic attempt to systematise personalistic social phenomena
such as the informal exchange of favours, support, goods or even money
has always created conceptual difficulties. Even when located within sup-
posedly “primordial” societies, conceptualising such exchanges presents an
intellectual challenge, falling as they do precisely on the fault line between
micro and macro phenomena - that is, highly personalistic practices which
are nonetheless to be found reproduced throughout society. As a result,
they often lead to broad structural effects which seemingly create the very
conditions which cause them - a puzzling endogeneity often explained away
as ‘recursive’.
When such behaviour continues even in the midst of societies where
exchange is supposedly governed by principles of Weberian rationality reg-
ulated by the modern state, the challenge to classify and explain such phe-
nomena (now typically rendered ‘illicit’, depending on their context) be-
comes still harder, particularly for teleological theories of social develop-
ment. Why does such behaviour persist in some contexts, but apparently
not in others? And how does it relate to the social structure?
By way of an introduction to the problem, let us return briefly to the
anecdote of the young professional. How might we best conceptualise it?
One way of looking at the situation is as follows. We have a citizen in
13
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need of certification by the state in order to legally practice her profession.
However, when proceeding through formal channels, she is unable to obtain
the necessary certificate. Instead, a personal connection is sought - in this
case, through the additional intermediation of an unseen broker or brokers.
Beyond a personal connection, however, it would seem that the exchange of
money - a bribe - is also required to successfully complete the procedure.
For some reason though (a failure of communication, a misunderstanding,
or perhaps even a deeper cause), the bribe is not paid. And so the deadlock
continues.
Such a specification immediately throws up a host of questions. Why is
the bribe not paid? Indeed, why can it not even be named? The expectation
of the bribe (on both sides) suggests the existence of some kind of a norm
which differs from the proper procedure, from the formal rules, of the state.
Where did that norm come from? And, if it is widespread, what are its ef-
fects? Is it the same as that (seemingly vague) expression, wasta, mentioned
by the professional? How do we explain the role of personal connections in
this context, and are they more significant than the formal relations (citizen,
public servant) supposedly specified by the state for such interactions? If
so, why?
While far from capturing the full scope of the research object, such anec-
dotes and the questions they pose are nonetheless useful in demonstrating
the breadth of the conceptual framework necessary to properly study that
object as a totality (or unity) of practice.1 That is, a conceptual framework
able to identify the different theoretical elements of which the research ob-
ject consists, and to explain how they relate to each other. Only then are
we able to build generalisable hypotheses which may in turn explain cause
and effect at the broader social level.
Within the existing literature, four different (though in some cases, re-
lated) fields each offer a partial framework for conceptualising this episode.
To begin with, the basic exchange relation (or relations) have been exten-
sively theorised in the academic literature on clientelism (which includes
works in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, political science and even
economics). However, whereas the framework of clientelism may enable a
1See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 26-27), “sociology must be a total science. It
must construct “total social facts” (Mauss) that preserve the fundamental unity of human
practice across the mutilating scissures of disciplines, empirical domains, and techniques
of observation and analysis.”
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detailed conceptualisation of the form of exchange, and in particular its
relation to the broader social structure, as a theoretical paradigm it tends
to be weak in explaining the formation of power relations upon which the
exchange depends (which are either exogenous, in which case requiring an
additional theoretical paradigm to explain them, or endogenous, in which
case creating ontological difficulties).
Second, the literature on corruption - while in some cases overlapping
with clientelism - tends to do a somewhat better job of theorising the re-
sources being exchanged, as well as (in the bureaucratic setting) the objec-
tive power relations (and hence the limitations) determining the outcome of
such exchanges. However, studies of corruption frequently leave obscure or
unsaid the subjective nature of the exchange involved, in the specific sense
of the (often varying) symbolic force attaching to such exchanges. For ex-
ample, a bribe and a ‘favour’ carry quite different subjective weight, and
even a bribe may be seen in more or less instrumental terms; yet in order
to account for such differences we must be able to theorise the relation of
norms to laws, of informality to formality, and hence the possibility that
“normative systems” may carry more coercive force than written rules.
In order to capture the contingency of such norms, or perhaps their em-
beddedness within the supposed formality of the Weberian state, we must
turn thirdly to theories of the state, state formation and state development.
Such theories provide a rich conceptual framework for explaining the emer-
gence of normative concepts such as bureaucratic rationalism (and associ-
ated concepts such as formality and informality), as well as their historical
contingency, and their relation to other normative systems such as kinship
or friendship. However, as macro theories they tend to move in teleological
fashion, and frequently lack the capacity to capture the micro-exchanges
upon which much of the logic of this episode seems to depend, and in which
a clash of norms and rules, mediated power and misunderstanding, figure
prominently.
In this sense institutional theory, which focusses precisely on these as-
pects of micro-exchange, may help to uncover some of the principles guiding
such encounters, in particular how they emerge and how they persist. In-
deed, an institutional approach has already been applied in many of the
literatures mentioned above, and in recent years the informal institutions
research agenda has attempted to conceptually marry the clash of formal
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rules and informal norms which seems to predominate in cases such as ours.
However, the informal institutions approach still suffers from some basic
epistemological flaws, conflating the separate existence of norms, written
rules and statistical regularities under a singular, deterministic logic which
owes much to methodological individualism.
It is my argument that none of these frameworks or paradigms provides,
on its own, sufficient scope for fully grasping the complex social phenomena
under consideration, and reconciling them within a single research object.
As a result, research conducted within these paradigms has failed to capture
the full relation of these phenomena to the broader social structure. The
purpose of this first section therefore is to demonstrate the emerging utility
of a different conceptualisation, founded upon the methodological philos-
ophy advocated by Pierre Bourdieu. Such an approach (or praxeology),
I argue, does enable us to grasp the totality of practices involved in such
phenomena, as well as the theoretical unity of the various elements relating
to those practices, and hence their potential relation to the (re)production
of the social order. The reconceptualisation of the research object which
follows from such a process I have chosen to call clandestine circulation,
a term originating in Bourdieu (1986b, p. 255), and which (with further
elaboration) I believe offers the potential for substantial theoretical gains.
This section is therefore divided into three chapters. First, in this chapter
I discuss the various literatures relating to the four frameworks highlighted
above. In doing so, I hope to draw out from each some important aspects
relating to the conceptualisation of the research object, while also demon-
strating the limitations which each approach places on such a broader con-
ceptualisation. In the second chapter, I introduce the most salient features
of Bourdieusian praxeology, as a means both for reconciling those previous
insights, and overcoming the limitations associated with them. Having in-
troduced this new approach to concept formation, I then outline the new
conceptualisation of the research object - clandestine circulation - which it
entails, hence laying the ground for the theoretical outline which follows in
the second part of the thesis. The final chapter in this section introduces
the field site, urban Beirut, and explains its suitability as a case study for
clandestine circulation.
Finally, before proceeding it should be emphasised here that the re-
view of the various literatures which follows in this chapter also constitutes
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in itself an important aspect of Bourdieusian praxeology, corresponding to
the “reflexive return” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 42) in scientific
research. Such a process requires that we analyse “the organizational and
cognitive structure of the discipline” in order to unearth its “epistemological
unconscious” (ibid., p. 41), and hence provide a more objective foundation
for new scholarly enquiry.2
2.1 Clientelism
The paradigm of clientelism has proved particularly enduring across a num-
ber of social science disciplines as a means of conceptualising, in the ag-
gregate, the practice of personalistic exchange between individuals (or even
groups), generally involving power relations. The intellectual standing of
clientelism has waxed and waned over the years, depending to a large extent
on its capacity to be integrated within the dominant theoretical model(s).
From this, it may also be easily understood how the shortcomings of clien-
telism as a paradigm have also tended to closely mirror those of the broader
theoretical approaches to which it has been put to serve.3
While patron-client relations had been studied in a variety of contexts
prior to the 1960s,4 it was only toward the end of that decade that a sep-
arate theoretical paradigm of clientelism began to properly emerge. Am-
biguity clouded the subject from the onset. Indeed, the term ‘clientelism’
itself seems to have emerged only slowly from the shadows of its older sibling
‘patronage’, with which it was to remain for a long time after almost syn-
onymous.5 Among early contentions within the literature were arguments
2“What has to be constantly scrutinized and neutralized, in the very act of construction
of the object, is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and
(especially national) categories of scholarly judgement” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992,
p. 40). Such reflexivity, we may add, differs strongly from the narcissistic reflexivity of
the subject on the subject favoured in certain schools of ethnography and anthropology
(with which Bourdieu is often, unfortunately, confounded) (ibid., pp. 36-46).
3Indeed Leenders (2004c, p. 33), following Clapham (1982), argues clientelism is merely
a medium-range concept that only gains explanatory power “when placed within or com-
plemented by a broader approach”.
4For a thorough bibliography of the early field of patron-client relations see Eisenstadt
and Roniger (1980, p. 43)
5Tarrow (1967) seems to have been among the first to use the term academically,
apparently translating it directly from the Italian clientelismo. Powell (1970, p. 416) was
probably the first to prefer the term ahead of patronage, which he seems to restrict only
to vertical ties within the political system. Roniger (1983) has noted that both patronage
and clientelism are ultimately derived from the Latin terminology for Ancient Roman
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over whether patron-client relations should be defined as purely dyadic or
also triadic (that is, including brokers);6 whether they involved only indi-
viduals or also groups;7 whether they were freely entered into or coercive;
and binding or non-binding.
Within Europe, initial theorisations of the patron-client nexus were strongly
flavoured by anthropological studies, first of the Italian mezzogiorno, and
then the wider Mediterranean;8 while in the US, Latin America and South-
East Asia were more often the starting point.9 Although culturally quite
different, these regions nonetheless shared the questionable distinction of
being defined by academia as ‘under-developed’. Once established, this cor-
relation between clientelism and under-development frequently led - either
implicitly or explicitly - to clientelism being placed in some type of causal
relation (either as an independent variable or a theoretical paradigm) to
explain this seemingly paradoxical condition.
As Kaufman (1972) - who provides a useful summary of this early ap-
proach - noted, when wedded to the emerging theory of dependent de-
velopment, clientelism suggested “an essentially rational component in be-
haviors which, from other perspectives, might be viewed as extreme cases
of culturally-induced irrationality”; in other words, patron-client relations
could be seen as “rational coping devices by which low-status actors max-
imize their security within a hostile environment” (ibid., p. 286). This
functional emphasis on patron-client relations may be seen clearly in some
of the earliest theoretical works, both in political science (e.g., Powell) and
practices.
6Foster (1963, p. 1281) argued that patron-client relations are only dyadic, and thus
the overlapping of networks has “no functional significance.”Boissevain (1966, p. 25)
disagreed, and saw the addition of brokers as the only reason we can speak of “a system
of patronage”. Lande (1973), who proved influential in the US, followed Foster, while
later economistic models of corruption rely on triadic principal/agent theories (e.g., Rose-
Ackerman (1975), Della Porta and Vannucci (1999)).
7Political scientists such as Scott (1972) and Lande (1973) were happy to extend patron-
client relations to “quasi-groups” in bargaining for particularistic goods in the political
sphere. Anthropologists following the original theories of Simmel (1950) and Mauss (1954)
have been more reticent to extend the relation beyond individual, personal relations.
8For examples of the former see in particular Boissevain (1966), and Pitt-Rivers (1954)
(whence the famous expression “lop-sided friendship”), while the latter is best exemplified
by Gellner and Waterbury (1977)
9See Scott (1972) and Lande (1973) for the latter; for the former, Wolf (1956) was
one of the first to take Latin America as an example. It should be noted however that
the differing foci hardly represent exclusive categories: for example Tarrow (1967), an
American academic, also looked extensively at Italy.
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anthropology (e.g, Boissevain). Such an approach created theoretical prob-
lems though, not least regarding the endogeneity of clientelist practices to
the environments that spawned them. As Boissevain noted, “It is obvi-
ous that many of the conditions which give rise to the need for protection,
and hence patronage, are simply the result of the successful operation of
the patronage system” (Boissevain, 1966, p. 30).10 In the face of such en-
dogeneity, the supposedly ‘rational’ basis of clientelist behaviour becomes
perilously thin. Boissevain, perhaps the first to address this shortcoming,
would speak for many in falling back on culture as the ultimate explanation
- “Patronage is, to a very large extent, a self-perpetuating system of belief
and action grounded in the society’s value system” (ibid., p. 30).11
A further difficulty with the functionalist approach was that, given patron-
client ties could be found at various stages of socio-economic development,
in order for the argument to hold it would need to be proven that these
ties could be functional at each of these stages. In a highly synthetic argu-
ment, Lemarchand and Legg (1972) placed clientelist (or “clientage”) sys-
tems within a teleological framework related to the wider structural vari-
ables at given stages of development. Essentially treating patron-client
ties as a superstructure (or sub-system) of the deeper socio-economic struc-
ture, Lemarchand and Legg seemed to demonstrate that patron-client ties
changed according to the degree of development, moving from “affective”
lord-vassal ties in feudal systems, to the eventual “pragmatic”, “official”
ties between state employees, political parties and group representatives in
industrial polities.
In this scenario, clientelism could remain ‘functional’ in a number of re-
spects: it could foster the “severance of familistic or kinship ties and their
replacement with more universalistic loyalties”, thus acting as an “agent of
modernisation” (ibid., p. 170).12 Alternatively, clientelism could enable the
maintenance of “social and political equilibrium” (ibid., p. 172) in the midst
10See also Lemarchand and Legg (1972, p. 158), who note the “process of circular
causation that links clientelism to the political and socioeconomic environment. Thus,
if there is any plausibility to the argument that clientelism develops out of the sense
of generalized insecurity that presumably exists in so-called “stateless” or segmentary
societies, it is equally reasonable to view both insecurity and clientelism as by-products
of the development of state structures.”
11See also Powell (1970, p. 423), who speaks of environments “Where the political
culture is a carrier of patron-client patterns of behaviour” (emphasis mine.)
12According to Lemarchand and Legg, this represents the ‘anthropological’ view.
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of inequality - enabling the elite to extract a surplus without the breakdown
of social order, and acting as a “functional alternative to the [welfare] state”
(Lemarchand and Legg, 1972, pp. 156-162). A third possibility as to how
clientelism may be functional is provided by Weingrod (1968), who relates
party-directed patronage to the integration of the state (thus making institu-
tionalised patronage different to personalistic patron-client ties, a distinction
we will return to.)
Hence, in more ways than one clientelism could be made to serve a
function within a teleological theory of state development, whereby societies
progress through different ‘ideal’ types - moving from personalistic ties to
universalism, and from feudal to industrial polities, via the mid-point of
‘patrimonial’ systems. And if clientelism should be found to persist despite
a society reaching the ‘end’ stage of ‘industrial polity’, the reason could only
be that “modernization is discontinuous” (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972, p.
168).
Unfortunately however, as academic studies moved beyond the narrow
confines of the developmentalist paradigm, it became apparent that there
was not always a clear-cut relation between socio-economic development
and clientelism: to be sure, modernisation could prompt older forms of
clientelism to evolve, but, particularly as the curtain was lifted on the in-
ner workings of the Soviet Union, it became equally apparent that entirely
new forms of patron-client relations could emerge as a result of modernisa-
tion.13 Thus, the early academic focus on the teleological-functionalist role
of clientelism - doomed to die out with the modernisation of society - came
to suggest either selection bias, or even wishful thinking.14
In the absence of a teleological narrative in which to place clientelism,
scholars began instead to pay more attention to patron-client relations in
13Early reports of patron-client relations in the Soviet Union began to emerge in the
late 1950s (see for example Berliner (1957) and Crankshaw (1956)), however it was not
until the late 1970s and early 1980s that serious academic studies into the organisation
of these relations were conducted (see Lomnitz-Adler (1988, pp. 49-52), who provides a
summary focussing in particular on the work of Altman (1983)). The informal exchange
of favours in the Soviet Union (known as blat) forms an important part of this study,
and will be addressed in detail in the theoretical section. More recently Collins (2006)
has shown how post-Communist transition in central Asia also led to a resurgence in
clan-based clientelism.
14See Theobald (1992) for an obituary of the teleological-functionalist argument and
an attempt to explain the persistence of clientelism despite modernisation - Theobald’s
arguments in turn incorporate elements of institutional theory, which will be covered in
the section below.
2.1. CLIENTELISM 21
their own right as a specific form of exchange. Graziano (1976) was, like
Lemarchand and Legg, interested in the potential for a conceptual frame-
work that could unite personalistic peasant-notable relations with the kinds
of “horizontal” clientelism operating between (categorical) groups that pre-
vailed in some modern party-political systems. Drawing on the previously
mentioned works of Scott (1972) and Lande (1973) concerning dyadic ties,
Graziano expanded this framework by synthesising the theories of the sociol-
ogist Georg Simmel15 with the increasingly fashionable approach of Mancur
Olson (1971) on the rationality of collective action, and finally with the
“exchange paradigm” developed by Homans (1958) and Blau (1964).
Graziano’s innovation was to argue that clientelism represented a specific
form of dyadic direct exchange - that is, a personalistic exchange in which
the benefits are limited to the individuals involved. As a form of exchange
it is therefore in contrast to indirect exchange, which (following Homans
and Blau) should be mediated by some form of social norm leading to the
generation of a group benefit. Graziano argued that Olson’s theory of the
“selective incentives” of collective action (i.e., that a part of all collective
action must involve the provision of individual benefits) was simply another
way of describing this direct exchange within groups.
The benefit of Graziano’s specification of clientelism is that it enables
a general model of clientelist exchange to be developed which can encom-
pass both individual and group structures, and which is predicated on the
notion of a personalistic (i.e., self-interested) benefit. Contrary to previous
approaches, this model was able to define clientelist exchange against other
kinds of exchange based on the type of symbolic force it generated. Thus,
whereas dyadic direct exchange may generate individual obligations and
loyalties, because it does not generate group benefits it cannot lead to the
development and institutionalisation of legitimate authority within a society.
It is therefore opposed not to group exchange per se, but to the specific form
of group exchange which generates intrinsic benefits, such as group expecta-
tions of common rights (Graziano, 1976, p. 167). Furthermore, according to
Graziano it is the absence of this latter exchange which prevents the accu-
mulation of capital in a society, understood in Homans’ sense as the greater
15It is interesting that Graziano made note of how Scott and Lande both ignored Simmel
(p. 153), yet Graziano himself seems unaware of Lemarchand and Legg’s work, which did
(if only cursorily) draw on Simmel.
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tendency toward actions leading to a deferred reward (Graziano, 1976, p.
169). In other words, rather than being a super-structural effect generated
by environmental (or ‘deep’) structural variables, clientelist exchange can
itself be responsible for the presence or absence of structural features in a
society.
Graziano’s approach to concept formation owed much to Sartori (1970).
On the one hand, this enabled him to break out of the functionalist impasse
- to discard from the clientelist paradigm purely cosmetic similarities, while
beginning to identify previously unseen structural commonalities by care-
fully synthesising elements from several different theoretical perspectives.
On the other hand, the necessity of always moving up and down the ladder
of abstraction, of placing conceptual elements in a fixed relation reduced to
a single dimension, does not always allow the full force of those relations
to be captured. In particular, Graziano placed the symbolic forces gener-
ated by the different forms of exchange in a teleological relation akin to the
Weberian gemeinschaft/gesellschaft paradigm - i.e., where societies move
from one ‘ideal’ type to the other. Missing from Graziano’s analysis was
an awareness of the frequently messy simultaneous existence of direct and
indirect exchange - of personal and public loyalties rubbing side by side and
frequently clashing. In viewing subjective categories from the fixed, mono-
dimensional perspective of the scholastic gaze,16 the ambiguities upon which
so much of practice rests were hidden from view, as were the profits accruing
to those able to skilfully transform and transact the different symbolic forces
which concentrate at different intersections in society.
The study of clientelism thus moved on from functionalist and develop-
mentalist approaches and instead towards seeing patron-client relations as
- in the words of Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) - “a distinct mode of reg-
ulating crucial aspects of institutional order: the structuring of the flow of
resources, exchange and power relations and their legitimation in society”
(ibid., p. 49). This “institutional” approach saw in clientelism “a part or
manifestation of the central mode of regulation of the flow of resources and
processes of interpersonal and institutional exchange and interaction in a
society or a sector thereof” (ibid., p. 49). That is, rather than a simple
structural emanation of the social order, clientelism was now seen as part of
the order of practices necessary to produce that social order, and indeed to
16Bourdieu’s elaboration of this phenomenon is outlined in the next chapter.
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reproduce it in a regulated fashion.
This institutionalist way of thinking would take different directions - each
hinted at by Graziano. Whereas Eisenstadt and Roniger (ibid.) followed
the more sociological route, drawing upon Mauss (1954) and Levi-Strauss
(1969),17 others would instead follow the more economistic route prefigured
by Olson, and given greater articulation by North (1990).18 Still others,
rejecting the voluntarism of neo-institutionalism, would follow Neo-Marxist
or Gramscian approaches, highlighting the role of clientelist exchange in
reproducing the class structure, and also the hegemonic aspects of patron-
client relations.19
Limiting ourselves here to the first of these directions, what Auyero
(1999, p. 330) refers to as the “clientelist impasse”20 was quickly reached.
Transforming clientelism into a mode of regulation begged the question as to
in what sense clientelism itself could be said to exist. Rather than escaping
the larger epistemological divide which separated the (phenomenological)
subjectivism of Lemarchand (1972) from the (structuralist) objectivism of
Powell (1970),21 these works were condemned instead to oscillate endlessly
between the two, finding the generative principles of clientelism either in
“a syndrome of norms and role expectations located within the personality
systems of individual actors” (Kaufman, 1972, p. 288, emphasis mine),
or in “an ‘objective’ power and exchange relationship” which is grounded
more in the larger structural processes at work in a society - namely, state
centralization and market expansion (Powell, 1970, p. 413).
The problem was ultimately the rigorously ascriptive nature of the scholas-
tic vision used to define the various elements relating to the patron-client
exchange - a monolithic perspective capable of identifying correlations and
17Graziano (1976) drew upon Mauss’s work concerning the gift, which would also be
fundamental to the development of Bourdieu’s theory of practice (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 3-
15). Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) argued that their approach differed from Graziano’s,
but in fact there is remarkably little difference between their conception of ‘generalized’
and ‘specific’ exchange, and Graziano’s ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ exchange.
18See the edited volume of Piattoni (2001) and Grzymala-Busse (2007); Robinson and
Verdier (2002) offer a more economistic approach.
19See in particular Bodeman (1988).
20Auyero includes older works such as Lande (1973) and Gellner and Waterbury (1977)
in this impasse, yet this seems unfair. In terms of a ‘dead-end’ in clientelist research I
would limit the period to between Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) and Roniger and Gu¨nes-
Ayata (1994)
21See Kaufman (1972, p. 288) - although he does not recognise the distinction as such
(he calls it a ‘levels of analysis’ problem.)
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oppositions (such as clientelism/social exchange vs. bureaucratic rational-
ism/indirect exchange), yet incapable of capturing the generative princi-
ples (or mechanisms) responsible for these relations, and hence their full
force. Instead, such accounts would frequently become bogged down in ster-
ile structure/agency debates, or would slip from analysis into sermonising.22
Hence, as a mode of academic enquiry clientelism fell somewhat out of
fashion. Instead, the phenomena it encompassed came steadily to be ab-
sorbed by different approaches. In the sense of clientelism as a “mode of
regulating crucial aspects of institutional order” we find it returning to the
academic agenda under the informal institutions approach, which will be
dealt with in the institutional theory section below. In another sense, how-
ever, the contrasting symbolic force which Graziano observed between direct
and indirect exchange, and in particular the role of the latter in instituting
legitimate authority, meant that clientelist-type exchanges were increasingly
prone to being constructed from the (negative) perspective of that legiti-
mate authority, otherwise known as the state. Hence we turn now to the
academic study of corruption.23
2.2 Corruption
Corruption has been a subject of philosophical enquiry at least since Aris-
totle, capturing the attention of political thinkers including Cicero, Machi-
avelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau.24 However, whereas classical approaches
toward corruption tended to view it in secular terms as the decay of an entire
political system from its ideal type (in the Aristotelian sense, from monar-
chy to tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, and ‘timocracy’, or constitutional
government, to democracy),25 modern academic approaches have focussed
22A good example of this problem may be found in Roniger (1994, p. 15), who argues in
the academic optative that “In view of the persistence of patronage in modern democratic
polities, [i]t might be in the public interest to recognize it, demanding that it be exercised
openly, and as such that it be subject to public evaluation and accountability.” There is
no sense of awareness that the symbolic force responsible for generating the clientelistic
exchange may in fact preclude the possibility of such an exchange being publicly evaluated.
The same lack of theoretical insight may also be found in Gu¨nes-Ayata (1994).
23A third direction of research on clientelism, the relational approach, has also emerged
in recent years, and includes Auyero, 1999; Auyero, 2000; Auyero, Lapegna, and Poma,
2009, as well as Rutten (2006) and Berenschot (2010). This approach will be dealt with
in the following chapter on Bourdieusian praxeology.
24See Friedrich (1972, pp.127-141) for a brief historical overview.
25Aristotle (1926) VIII. x. 1-6
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instead on the behavioural aspect of corruption: that is, as the deviation of
an action from a particular norm.26
Indeed, perhaps the most commonly cited definition of corruption in
modern academia - that of Nye (1967) - is of this type, and defines corrup-
tion as “behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role
because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecu-
niary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of
private-regarding influence” (ibid., p. 419). The public/private distinction
is a crucial one, as while opinions vary over whether corruption is necessar-
ily immoral, illegal, or even entirely undesireable,27 most accounts seem to
accept that the violation of a public duty lies at the core of corruption.28
According to Nye, corruption thus includes: “bribery (use of a reward to
pervert the judgement of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal
of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and mis-
appropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding
uses)” (ibid., p. 419). The inclusion of nepotism is significant: it suggests
that patron-client relations, when conducted under the guise of the modern,
rational state, are a form of corruption - involving as they do the substitu-
tion of universalistic criteria (“merit”) for ascriptive, personalistic criteria.
Also significant is what Nye’s definition does not include: “behaviour that
might nonetheless be regarded as offensive to moral standards”, and also
“any consideration of whether the behaviour is in the public interest” (ibid.,
p. 419).29
These exceptions, as well as the title of the article from which Nye’s
definition is taken - “Corruption and Political Development” - tell us some-
26The distinction is also noted by Johnston (1996) and Heidenheimer and Johnston
(2002, pp. 3-6).
27Bardhan (1997, p. 1321), for example, argues that “not all illegal transactions are
corrupt, nor are all instances of corruption or bribery illegal.” Concerning varying norma-
tive attitudes to corruption, see Johnston (1986). More recent constructivist approaches
(such as Pardo (2004b), Anders and Nuijten (2007) and Graaf, Wagenaar, and Hoender-
boom (2010)) will be dealt with below, as they no longer attempt to define corruption in
a singular, absolute sense.
28Even recent expansionary projects in the realm of anti-corruption seem to accept the
sine qua non of public duty for definitional purposes. See Sampson (2005, p. 121), who
notes that Transparency International have expanded their definition of corruption to
include ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’.
29Regarding the latter point, according to Nye to include the effects of corrupt be-
haviour within the definition would make analysing the relation between corruption and
development difficult.
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thing regarding the transformation which the modern study of corruption
had made in relation to classical approaches. Whereas classical political
thinkers considered corruption as the antithesis of development, and indeed
as homologous to physical or moral corruption (and hence a kind of de-
cay), academics such as Nye wondered if a degree of public corruption - i.e.,
the subordination of public duty to private interests - might not in fact be
functional in certain contexts in developing the state: encouraging capital
formation, elite integration, and even improving government capacity (Nye,
1967, p. 419-421).30
This developmentalist perspective (to be found also in Leys (1965) and
Scott (1969)), despite its functionalist overtones, nonetheless served to high-
light (often implicitly rather than explicitly) the historicity of the very con-
cept of ‘public interest’ - that is, the normative values which corrupt be-
haviour is supposed to go against. In contrast to the ‘moralising’ approach
of earlier scholarship such as Wraith and Simpkins (1963) - who used pur-
ple prose to describe“the scarlet thread of bribery and corruption” and the
“jungle of nepotism and temptation” to be found in the colonies31 - Leys
emphasised the contingency of normative standards regarding this ‘public
interest’, not least in the history of the ‘civilised’ West. Recalling the ap-
parent decline of corruption in Britain during the 19th century, Leys argued
that society did not “pass from a corrupt condition to a very pure one; rather
it passed from one set of standards to another, through a period in which
behaviour patterns which were acceptable by the old standards came to be
regarded as corrupt according to the new” (Leys, 1965, p. 227). It wasn’t
corruption which changed, so much as the perception of what constituted
the ‘public interest’.
The somewhat fungible nature of the norms underpinning perceptions of
corruption thus presented a problem. When studying corruption empirically,
whose standards should one apply to define corrupt behaviour? As Leys
noted, the moralists could hardly be faulted because “near the heart of
[their] concern is the idea that the public interest is opposed to anything
that heightens inequality”; yet as Leys observed, “we also have to ask how
far equality and development are themselves compatible ideals” (ibid., p. 220,
30It should be noted that Nye also lists potential costs of corruption in the development
process.
31Wraith and Simpkins, cited in Leys (1965, p. 216)
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emphasis mine). Such potential contradictions between ends and means was
the specific reason why Nye limited his own definition of corrupt behaviour to
the deviation of a public role (rather than the more general public interest).
Yet such an academic sleight of hand simply shifts the burden of blame (so
to speak) onto the bureaucrat or civil servant, and implies that Weberian
bureaucratic rationality is itself an absolute, rather than contingent, set of
norms.
This deeply normative aspect of corruption means that its formation as
an academic research object has been particularly sensitive to broader histor-
ical forces. The standard taxonomy of Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002, p.
7-9) divides academic approaches to corruption into three categories: Nye’s
limited public office definition; Friedrich’s broader public interest approach;
and ‘market-centred’ definitions (in which norms are not clearly articulated,
and individuals simply act to maximise their utility.)32
While Heidenheimer and Johnston do not attempt to contextualise these
divergent trends, Zinn (2005, p. 230-231) offers some useful observations,
noting that during the 1960s and 1970s “an academic division of labour was
consolidated”, whereby political scientists would focus on “the ‘political’
side of corruption as a problem of the implementation and functioning of
democratic institutions in ‘complex’ societies”, while forsaking the sorts of
issues which (with the exception of Scott (1972)) “attracted the interest of
anthropologists of patronage.”33
Zinn maintains that, following this division (and the gradual petering
out of patronage as a field of anthropological interest during the 1980s), “a
discursive transformation” took place within academia. By the 1980s and
1990s, although many of the societies which were once the object of ethno-
graphic studies on patronage had joined the ranks of (imperfectly) ‘devel-
oped’ states, some of the behavioural aspects associated with patronage in
those societies nonetheless persisted (as noted in the previous section). Ac-
32We may include under such ‘market-centred’ approaches the works of Rose-Ackerman
(1975), Acemoglu (2001) and Dreher and Schneider (2009), as well as some aspects of
Della Porta and Vannucci (1999). Leenders (2004c, p. 14-28) gives a detailed overview of
this approach, sub-dividing the economistic approach into New Political Economy, rent-
seeking, New Institutional Economics, and Principal-Agent models.
33As an aside, we may note that this ‘division of labour’ finds its precise correlation in the
changing use (in English) of the terms ‘clientelism’ and ‘patronage’, with the former coming
to be applied exclusively by political scientists to behaviour within the Western context,
and the latter generally used by anthropologists in relation to developing countries.
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cording to Zinn, rather than continuing to be studied under the framework of
patronage, instead “the most negative features of these social interactions
are now described as ‘corruption’, which has itself become an important
heuristic device for the analysis of ‘problematic’ development or persistent
underdevelopment,” (Zinn, 2005, p. 230-231).
An empirical survey of the academic topicality of corruption tends to
support this thesis. Walsh (2005, p. 172) notes (uncritically) that “Publish-
ing output [on corruption] remained well below fifty books per year until the
mid 1970s. In 1990, a dramatic rise in output began that peaked in 2000,
when 287 books in English were published. Although output has declined in
recent years, it is still twice that of the pre-90’s era.” Such a timeline neatly
ties together a boom in corruption studies with the collapse of communism
and the reintegration of the former Eastern bloc into the global capitalist
economy.
In the absence of a competing vision for economic development, ‘anti-
corruption’ seems to have emerged under the ‘good governance’ umbrella
as a useful paradigm through which to analyse Second and Third World
economies, and (perhaps) to bind them more readily to the Washington
consensus.34 Sampson (2005, p. 116), for example, has noted how “Anti-
corruption” is viewed by some in the Third World as “a political tactic to
keep Third World recipient countries in line, as the latest incarnation of the
[World] Bank’s structural adjustment programme.”
The academic reconstruction of ‘patronage’ as ‘corruption’ may also be
seen, in this light, as part of the broader discursive move towards the so-
called ‘criminalization of the state,’ (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou, 1999; Bayart,
2004; Botte, 2004): a means by which practices such as the privatisation
of government services in Third World states may be justified on the basis
of sound policy, something which Briquet and Favarel-Garrigues (2010, pp.
1-15) have argued is even being extended to the West.
Thus, rather than a neutral, disinterested research object, constructed
with the intention of empirically observing an element of social behaviour,
the study of corruption came to reflect aspects of the more complicated re-
lationship between knowledge and power (and hence, ultimately, the state).
34Theobald (1999, p. 498-499) also comments on this tendency, while adding that
“At a more sophisticated level, the theory of the neo-patrimonial state is in danger of
following the same logic [...] achieving little more than describing a salient feature of
social organisation in a context of underdevelopment.”
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In the attempt to overcome such normative issues, two broad approaches
have recently evolved. On the one hand (and in common with clientelism,
as we have already noted), the “market-centred” approaches mentioned by
Heidenheimer and Johnston (2002) and pioneered by Rose-Ackerman (1975)
have been refined and deepened through the addition of an institutionalist
perspective, as popularised by North (1990). The second strand of literature
is less easily grouped within a single paradigm; yet one may nonetheless find
a unifying principle in the shared sense that corruption itself is no longer
regarded as a discrete, bounded object. Interpretivist, post-structural, rela-
tional and constructivist approaches all stress the contingency of the norms
relating to the perception of corruption, as well as the importance of sym-
bolic (i.e., ‘non-rational’) elements in the constitution of corruption as a
social practice.
Dealing first with those works influenced by the New Institutional Eco-
nomics (NIE), the normative dilemma is dealt with essentially through sup-
pression. The framework of methodological individualism and its goal of
utility maximisation are instead used as the theoretical lodestone, with ac-
tors assumed to be equally predisposed toward corruption, and corruption
itself dependent upon the institutional setting. Although such a conceit
presents problems, these works have nonetheless proved valuable in captur-
ing some of the varying constraints different institutional environments place
upon the potential for corrupt behaviour, as well as the different resources
for corruption which these configurations offer.
The roots of this approach may be traced back as far as Rose-Ackerman’s
first contribution on The Economics of Corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1975),
whereby varying probabilities for corruption were postulated on the basis of
differing institutional configurations (without yet being described as such).35
It is not until the late 1990s however that NIE-style approaches came to be
applied to the issue of corruption in a systematic way. In particular, Della
Porta and Vannucci (1999) defined corruption as a sub-set of the principal-
agent problem (ibid., p. 17), whereby the principal is the state, and the
configuration of the political system creates the ‘resources of corruption’
- e.g., political rent, restricted information, as well as subsidiary markets
35Rose-Ackerman would also cite (in passing) Williamson’s work on vertical integration
(Williamson, 1971), which prefigured the rehabilitation of Coase’s theory of transaction
costs that would prove so important to the NIE school.
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such as (criminal) protection for the enforcement of corrupt contracts (Della
Porta and Vannucci, 1999, pp. 33-67).36 More recently, Leenders (2004c)
has demonstrate how the broader structural features of institutional design
(in the sense of Ostrom (1990)) may contribute to the emergence of elite
corruption.
The psychological implications of rationality however remain an issue,
as the mechanisms responsible for generating normative structures such as
bureaucratic rationality remain unaddressed.37 Indeed, recent attempts to
integrate corrupt transactions within Williamson’s later theories of incom-
plete or ‘relational’ contracting (Williamson, 1985), and its connection to the
problems of trust and reputation, have (perhaps unwittingly) highlighted
such limits of rational choice.38
These become readily apparent in attempts to ‘rationalise’ the competing
claims of friendship or kinship with those of public office - a common problem
when attempting to define corruption, given the frequency with which actors
will deny the corruptness of an act, arguing instead that it was a ‘favour’, or
that they were otherwise compelled through bonds of friendship, kinship or
other alternative normative systems. The intractability of these different sets
of norms - and the absence of voluntarism implied - results in a theoretical
impasse for these NIE-style approaches not so dissimilar to that which faced
clientelism. As Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2002) demonstrate, such an impasse
can only be resolved in two ways: either vague imprecations in the academic
optative (“Friendship belongs to the private sphere of a public servant and
should not overshadow his duties”), or a false inversion of symbolic and
normative codes (“friendship allows to camouflage a bribe as a gift, obfuscate
the quid pro quo, allow reciprocity even years after a favor has been given
and thus helps to enforce a corrupt agreement”)(ibid., p. 18).
In contrast to the problems of methodological individualism, several new
research trends have emerged in recent years which have sought to contex-
36See also Rose-Ackerman (1999), who analysed corruption from a (quasi) institution-
alist perspective in the separate fields of economics, politics, and culture, albeit in a less
thorough-going way.
37See also Collier (2002), whose attempt to synthesise (institutional) structure with
(constructivist) agency seems to lend further weight to Theobald’s critique mentioned
above, resulting in a schema of institutional configurations and corruption which is rather
more descriptive than explanatory.
38See Lambsdorff and Teksoz (2002) and Schramm and Taube (2002), followed by an
edited volume by Lambsdorff, Taube, and Schramm (2005).
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tualise corruption as a social practice, including the discourse which sur-
rounds it. While reflecting a variety of different approaches, these trends
are nonetheless united by the fact that they no longer consider corruption
itself to be a bounded, discrete object, but rather a product of the inter-
action of larger structural forces and discursive practices. Friedrich (1972)
was among the first to take a constructivist approach toward corruption
as a historical concept. His theory regarding the evolution of a ‘public in-
terest’ was however enlarged somewhat by Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996),
who also took into account the reverse side of the coin: the evolution of
‘anti-corruption’ - that is, of the different ideologies which emerged, and the
different worldviews they reflected, concerning the nature of corruption and
the best means to combat it (ibid., p. 18-28).
At more or less the same time, anthropologists such as Gupta (1995)
and Lomnitz-Adler (1995) were placing corruption within an interpretivist
framework which emphasised the discursive nature of the phenomenon, and
its particular relation to popular conceptions of the state and state power.
Building on these insights, an edited volume by Haller and Shore (2005) on
the anthropology of corruption included both the earlier-mentioned contri-
bution of Sampson regarding the ‘projectisation’ of anti-corruption, as well
as research by Rivkin-Fish on the evolution of social attitudes toward ‘unoffi-
cial payments’ in post-Soviet Russia. Within the field of legal anthropology,
the edited volume of Pardo (2004a) also drew attention to the frequently
contested boundary between legality and illegality, morality and immorality
with regard to perceptions of corruption. While the interpretivist approach
contains certain limitations,39 it nonetheless highlights the frequently con-
tested nature of supposedly corrupt exchanges, and the less than clear-cut
normative framework in which they take place.
Perhaps the most encouraging developments however have been those
recent works which have attempted to integrate insights from relational and
critical sociology into the study of corruption. Working from both an anthro-
pological and legal pluralist perspective, Anders and Nuijten (2007) offer a
comprehensive framework for the analysis of corruption. By attempting to
move beyond “binary oppositions” (ibid., p. 11) such as law and corrup-
tion, Anders and Nuijten attempt to demonstrate what they see as “the
39These limitations will be addressed below in the section on Bourdieusian praxeology,
yet see Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 9-10).
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hidden continuities between the law and its opposite” (Anders and Nuijten,
2007, p. 11). Such an approach involves first and foremost a reintegration
of the norms governing corruption with the historical processes responsible
for their formation (and in particular the emergence of the state). Anders
and Nuijten identify a number of theoretical perspectives which can assist
in this task, including de Sousa Santos’ “interlegality” (Santos, 1995), which
focusses on “the interrelation between norms and actual practices” (Anders
and Nuijten, 2007, p. 13), as well as Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of “state
thought” (Bourdieu, 1999) - that is, the problem of transcending social cat-
egories which have themselves been constructed by the state. Similarly, de
Graaf (2007) has suggested that Bourdieu’s relational sociology could be
the methodological foundation for a new ‘contextual’ theory of corruption
- a suggestion repeated in de Graaf, Maravic, and Wagenaar (2010), yet
without much by way of concrete application.
Arguably, the thread which unifies these latest developments is an en-
larged conception of corruption as a research object. Whereas NIE-style ap-
proaches tended to take for granted that corruption should be studied purely
as a dependent or independent variable (i.e., what causes corruption? What
are its effects on efficiency equilibria or growth?), constructivist, relational,
interpretivist and critical approaches take a wider view, best summarised by
Anders and Nuijten (2007, p. 2): “The study of corruption cannot be an end
in itself but should rather be a field of inquiry to understand power relations
in society at large. Even the pettiest forms of corruption reflect structural
power relations.” It is indeed this relational approach - attempting to reinte-
grate corruption and the norms governing it with the production of unequal
power relations - which informs the theoretical basis for this thesis, and
which will be expanded upon in the next chapter.
However, if we are to study such structural power relations objectively,
it follows that we must look beyond the narrow paradigm of corruption, and
address the larger historical forces responsible for the different normative
and symbolic systems governing them. Hence, we turn now to theories of
the state, and in particular to the question of how we theorise the exis-
tence of the state in relation to the research object - that is, as a social
fact, providing both the context or backdrop for illicit exchanges, as well as
the very symbolic categories (through normative frameworks of legality and
bureaucratic rationality) by which such exchanges are first defined as illicit.
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2.3 Theories of the State
It is safe to say that the state constitutes a wide field of enquiry in the social
sciences. Thus, in seeking to apply theories of the state to the work of con-
ceptualising the research object, it is perhaps wise to begin by recalling the
advice of Hay and Lister (2006, p. 10), and to ask, what precise analytical
purchase the concept of the state may offer us in the analysis at hand.40
Given that we are interested in personalised exchanges and their relation
to the reproduction of the social structure in the context of the modern
state, an adequate theory of the state will of itself naturally be necessary
to any explanation. More specifically, any such theory must be capable of
accounting for the state as a social fact - that is, as a force structuring both
the (unequal) organisation of society, as well as the behaviour of individual
agents within society (through their perceptions and dispositions).
Such a force is of course contingent. It is the product of a historical
trajectory - the formation of the state - itself driven by (historical) mecha-
nisms. In this section we will thus review some of the theories regarding the
mechanisms driving state formation as a historical process, insofar as these
relate to the production (or entrenchment) of a determinate social structure.
Just as important though is the role of the state (as a historically consti-
tuted force) in structuring the dispositions and perceptions of social actors.
Many of our most basic categories of thought are a legacy of the norma-
tive force of the state (including, not least, how we perceive ‘the state’
itself). In particular, antonyms such as ‘legal/illegal’, ‘formal/informal’,
and ‘written/unwritten’ - all fundamental to our academic understanding of
personalised exchange - are themselves intimately bound up with the pro-
cess of state formation, whereby the state comes to be both defined by its
legitimacy, and, through its symbolic power, abrogates the authority to de-
termine the legitimacy of all other things (as we have seen already through
the changing definition of the ‘public interest’ in relation to corruption.)
To begin though, we should acknowledge that there is no true consensus
40Hay and Lister themselves cite two ‘elements’ concerning the analytical usefulness of
the state as a concept: institutional contextualisation (i.e. the state structuring the “pat-
tern of opportunities and constraints” faced by actors), and historical contextualisation
(the persistence of the state “as an institutional ensemble” over time) (Hay and Lister,
2006, pp. 10-13). However, the distinction between these two ‘contextualisations’ seems
underdeveloped, and (in my opinion) is much better theorised by Bourdieu, as we will see
below.
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as to what the state is. By far the most famous definition - that of Weber41
- is notable as much for what it leaves out as for what it contains. According
to Weber, “Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends,”
because the variety of ends to which political associations have been put are
too various. Rather, “one can define the modern state sociologically only in
terms of the specific means peculiar to it” - i.e., the monopoly of (legitimate)
physical force.
This rather procedural definition of the state at least has the analytic
virtue of avoiding purely normative explanations.42 Indeed, in some cases
theorists following in Weber’s trail have proceeded to discard almost all
normative baggage associated with the state, and have seen in the process of
state formation little more than a byproduct of the concentration of violence,
extraction and accumulation. Tilly (1985) took this disenchanted analysis
to its extreme (yet logical) conclusion by explicitly comparing war making
and state making to organised crime:
Power holders’ pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the ex-
traction of resources for war-making from the populations over
which they had control and in the promotion of capital accu-
mulation by those who could help them borrow and buy. War
making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape
European state making. Power holders did not undertake those
three momentous activities with the intention of creating na-
tional states - centralized, differentiated, autonomous, extensive
political organizations. Nor did they ordinarily foresee that na-
tional states would emerge from war making, extraction and cap-
ital accumulation. (ibid., p. 172).
Tilly’s description of the process of state formation corresponds quite
closely to Weber’s, in the sense that he attributes no specific ‘ends’ (or in-
tentions) to that process, other than the self-interest of ‘power holders’ in
extracting and accumulating capital. For Tilly though, legitimacy is some-
thing of a canard or game of bad faith. The legitimacy of rulers to exercise
41Weber (1946) - the state is “a human community that (successfully) claims the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”.
42‘Pluralism’, for example, is described by Smith (2006, p. 21) as both “one of the most
dominant frameworks” and also “curiously non-theoretical”, based as it is on a rather
normative understanding of the role of the state.
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violence becomes ‘credible’ (ibid., p. 173) (rather than truly ‘legitimate’) as
a function of the gradual disappearance of rivals and the centralisation of
command structures.
Tilly’s theory of state formation has the advantage of avoiding teleo-
logical or functionalist explanations: the modern nation state emerges as a
contingent and arbitrary product of the gradual concentration of physical
violence, extractive capacity, and capital accumulation within specific or-
ganisations over a given territory. A similarly unromantic account of state
formation is provided by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), who view the
history of state formation through two paradigms: limited and open-access
orders. In limited-access orders, overt violence is converted into privileged
interests through the creation of stable rents (the appropriation of which is
limited to those same privileged groups). Such limited-access orders repre-
sent the majority of states through human history (which North, Wallis and
Weingast call “natural states”). “Open entry” states, by contrast, are sus-
tained by competition rather than rent creation, and hence are characterised
by institutions such as free markets and civil associations.
Rather like prior studies of corruption, which identified the emergence
of norms of ‘public interest’ alongside the modern state, North, Wallis and
Weingast argue for the importance of impersonal norms to open-access
states. They also emphasise the need for ‘permanently lived organisations’,
as providing the necessary continuity and amplification for such norms. In
this sense (as Bates (2010) also notes) they are treading ground already
familiar to students of Olson (1971);43 their conclusions concerning the re-
lation of impersonal norms to open organisations and economic growth (as
opposed to ascriptive norms, kinship or client groups, and limited growth)
also closely echo Graziano (1976).
Both Tilly’s somewhat coy use of ‘power holders’ to describe those bene-
fitting from state formation, and North, Wallis and Weingast’s preference for
‘social order’ (rather than class), are understandable techniques to distance
their theories from (functionalist) Marxist approaches which, variously, saw
the state as either the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie, an instrument of
the ruling class, an ideal collective capitalist, or a ‘factor of cohesion’ within
43As Bates (2010, p. 754) also notes, their assumptions concerning “open-access” states
fall squarely in the pluralist tradition, without addressing the notable criticisms recently
made of that school.
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the social formation.44
However, while Marxist theories of the state were indeed functionalist,
they did at least (eventually) take seriously the subjective element of dom-
ination which is implied in the continued exercise of legitimate violence -
considerations largely absent in the previously-mentioned theories. As Hay
(2006, p. 69) summarises, the question Marxist theorists of the state even-
tually had to pose was, what gives capital the capacity to reproduce and
reassert its dominance over time despite its inherent contradictions?
Early Marxist theory (beginning with Engels) argued that the super-
structure (the state and ‘cultural forms’) produced, through the effect of
ideology, a ‘false consciousness’ - that is, a contradiction between objec-
tive social existence and the subjective understanding of that existence.45
However, early Marxist theorists restricted the existence of this ‘false con-
sciousness’ purely to the bourgeoisie: the proletariat laboured under no such
illusions.
It was not until the twentieth century that Lukacs and Gramsci extended
the idea of false consciousness to the working classes (and indeed society
as a whole).46 For ideological communists such as Gramsci, Marxist theory
needed to be expanded to explain the failure of the proletariat to rise up and
seize the means of production for themselves. Indeed, rather than seeking
to overthrow capitalism, many members of the proletariat fought to defend
and maintain it. For Gramsci, the answer could only be that, in some cases,
capitalist domination was exercised indirectly, through subjective hegemony,
rather than direct force.
To account for this hegemonic form of domination, rather than limiting
the state to its (overtly) repressive apparatus, Gramsci saw it more broadly
as “something reflected in the social relations between all members of soci-
ety” (Eyerman, 1981, p. 46). Hence, he saw institutions and organisations
of ‘civil life’ - such as the church, the media - no less than the formal insti-
44This taxonomy is taken from Hay (2006, pp. 60-62).
45For an overview of the theoretical development of false consciousness see Eyerman
(1981, p. 44).
46Lukacs’ approach (technically the first) was developed further by the Frankfurt school.
False consciousness is not presented in quite so functionalist a manner as Gramsci and the
structuralist Marxists, but rather is seen as “a form of consciousness produced in the very
life practices of capitalist society” (ibid., p. 49). The more benign implications of this the-
oretical approach eventually work themselves out in Habermas’ theories of communicative
action and the public sphere.
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tutions of the state, as engaged in producing legitimate domination through
the effects of ideology.47
This broad-based understanding of the state usefully deepens Weber’s
definition by problematising the question of how legitimate rule is produced,
particularly in societies which seem to be based upon large, structural in-
equalities. It includes within the state all those mechanisms which serve to
legitimate the authority of the state (qua determinate social order), and it
takes seriously the concept of legitimacy itself - as being more than simply
the credibility of physical force, but rather that adherance to a particular
social order (in the sense of a deep-rooted, psychological acceptance of it as
‘natural’) which states seem able to produce.
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony would be developed further by French
‘structuralist’ Marxists such as Louis Althusser, who divided the institutions
responsible for producing such subjective domination into various ‘ideolog-
ical state apparatuses’ (ISAs), which included not only the church and the
media, but also political parties, the educational system, and even the family
(Althusser, 1971). Such a conceptualisation effectively extended the state (in
the classical Marxist sense of the repressive apparatus of the ruling classes)
into all aspects of society and the social order.
Pierre Bourdieu objected to such reasoning as merely “fonctionnalisme
du pire”,48 observing that one learns nothing of a mechanism when it is
interrogated purely according to its functions (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 19). By
conceiving of the state in functional terms as a kind of diabolus in machina
or executive arm of the ruling classes, any objective structure involved in
the reproduction of the larger social order (and, by extension, its particular
form of inequality) becomes, for Althusser, an ideological arm of the state.
In such fashion agency is removed from social actors, and granted instead
to an omnipotent state.49
Such limitations aside, Althusser is at least useful in his manner of posing
questions. Recalling Marx’s observation that “every child knows that a
social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the
47Gramsci defined hegemony as first and foremost a ‘pedagogic relation’ (rapporto ped-
agogico) (Gramsci, 2007, p. 1331-32). See also Gramsci (ibid., p. 1636-38, 1566).
48See Bourdieu (2012, p. 18-19).
49Bourdieu cited this tendency as a further example of the functionalist fallacy, which
slips too easily from the academic model constructed to explain reality to reality itself,
in the process creating of society a ‘dead structure of “empty places”’ (Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992, p. 19), which lacks a generative mechanism for the effects it describes.
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same time as it produced would not last a year” (Althusser, 1971, p. 1), he
argued that a successful social formation must not only reproduce the means
of production, but also the relations of production (ibid., p. 22). While
his own, functionalist, solution (the ISAs) is untenable, the question itself
still stands: through what mechanisms does the state reproduce the social
formation of which it is the organising principle, such that the (unequal)
relations upon which that formation is based remain legitimate?
Such a question follows on naturally from Weber’s initial definition. For
if the state represents a ‘human community’ (in Weber’s terms), then one
must assume that such a community has a determinate structure (whatever
it may be). Reproducing that community is not merely a question of re-
producing its physical needs, but also the power relations through which
those needs are sufficed. Such relations, as we have seen, are not simply
produced and reproduced through overt coercion, but are rather produced
and reproduced as (subjectively) legitimate. For this reason Bourdieu (1998,
p. 40) extended Weber’s definition of the state to include the monopoly not
only of legitimate physical violence, but also symbolic violence - that is, the
creation of sufficient consent such that the structure of relations upon which
the state rests appears natural.
This symbolic aspect of the state is fundamental to any academic under-
standing of its modus operandi as a ‘social fact’ - i.e., that which produces
the very norms of “public interest” against which personalistic exchange is
frequently defined - and taking it fully into account leads us in a number
of different directions. First of all, it implies (as Mitchell (1999, p. 76) has
noted) that the state exists at two levels: as both a ‘material substance’ of
institutional arrangements and political practice, and a ‘public imagery’ of
ideological constructs.50
In Mitchell’s view, “the phenomenon we name ‘the state’ arises from
techniques that enable mundane material practices to take on the appear-
ance of an abstract, nonmaterial form” (ibid., p. 77). What Mitchell calls
the “state effect” is thus this very tendency for the state to be viewed as
an apparently autonomous entity, whereas in practice “the boundary of the
state (or political system) never marks a real exterior. [T]he line between
50Bourdieu (1998, p. 40) makes the same observation: “If the state is able to exert
symbolic violence, it is because it incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the
form of specific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectivity, in the
form of mental structures and categories of perception and thought.”
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state and society [. . . ] is a line drawn internally, within the network of in-
stitutional mechanisms through which a certain social and political order is
maintained” (ibid., p. 83).51
For Mitchell, this apparent autonomy of the state (i.e. as the appearance
of an autonomous structure) was the product largely of a historical process
grounded in attempts to represent it (and in particular, its economy) statis-
tically.52 In the very act of observing and measuring other abstractions such
as the economy, the ‘state’ comes to constitute both itself and the thing it
sees in a subject/object relationship (ibid., p. 94).
While undoubtedly grasping important aspects of the state as an ob-
ject of study (and avoiding the functionalist trap of Althusser and others),
Mitchell’s theory nonetheless has its limitations. His description of the pro-
cess of state formation (understood now as both an objective and subjective
phenomenon) is primarily Foucauldian, in that he argues we should address
the state as “an effect of mundane processes of spatial organization, tempo-
ral arrangement, functional specification, supervision and surveillance, and
representation that create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided
into state and society or state and economy” (ibid., p. 95). However (as
Wacquant notes of Foucault)53 there is no mechanism driving these “mun-
dane processes”: that is, no theory which can explain why agents of the
state should be motivated to so organise themselves, and to produce such
representations. There is, in brief, no understanding of the emergence of
the state - both objectively and as a subjective “effect” - as a dynamic,
relational process, involving social actors with specific interests.54
The “state effect” is nonetheless a valuable conceptual tool to avoid
51In this sense, Mitchell’s theory of the state effect also comes close to de Sousa Santos’
theory of “abyssal lines” in Western thinking, as “a system of visible and invisible dis-
tinctions, the invisible ones being the foundation of the visible ones” (Santos, 2007, p. 1).
The concept of abyssal lines and its relevance to the current research will be elaborated
further in the theoretical section.
52The same conclusion is drawn by Scott (1998), who argues that this particular mode
of “seeing” by the state is the cause of many of the world’s present troubles.
53See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 25) - “[Foucault] lacks the dispositional concept
of habitus to link the objective structures bequeathed by history to the historical practices
of agents and, therefore, a mechanism to account for the social patterning and objective
meaning of strategies.”
54We may also add, as an aside, that the absence of a relational, strategic understanding
in Mitchell’s concept of the “state effect” results in a failure to account for the role of the
academic field (as a dominated fraction of the field of power) in helping to produce this
very “state effect”. See Bourdieu (1990d), Bourdieu (1990b, p. 140-149).
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falling into the substantialist error of Skocpol (1985) and others - that is, of
viewing the state as an autonomous actor or institution in and of itself. In
such approaches the state is all too readily treated merely as a “machinery of
intentions” (Mitchell, 1999, p. 82) (one thinks in particular of rational choice
institutionalism and other approaches associated with methodological indi-
vidualism). As Mitchell notes, in this way the state/society divide is all too
easily ‘mapped’ onto other popular antonyms such as subjective/objective,
ideological/material, and even meaning and reality (ibid., p. 82).55
Rather than seeking to attribute volition to an abstract concept such
as the state, we should instead enquire into the historical processes which
produce the appearance of characteristics such as volition, autonomy and
determinacy. As Bourdieu (1985, p. 118) notes, “our perception and our
practice, especially our perception of the social world, are guided by prac-
tical taxonomies, oppositions between high and low, masculine (or manly)
and feminine, etc.” Given that it is the state (or perhaps more accurately,
“the state effect”) which seems to lie on the ‘other side’ (in the sense of de
Sousa Santos’ “abyssal lines”)56 of many of the oppositions most relevant
to classifying our research object - one thinks of oppositions such as private
interest/public interest, formal and informal, written and unwritten - then
accounting theoretically for the emergence of those oppositions through the
historical processes of the formation of the state (indeed, as subsidiary as-
pects of the “state effect”) would seem paramount in enabling us to address
the contrasting (and often contradictory) symbolic aspects of personalistic
exchange in the modern context.
Turning now from the macro-processes responsible for the normative
context of our research object, we come to the logic governing the micro-
exchanges which constitute it as an everyday social practice. If such ex-
changes (as later studies of clientelism claimed) are a mode of regulation,
or ‘etiquette’ in the words of Della Porta and Vannucci, then what princi-
ples could govern them, given that they are supposedly ‘informal’, and cut
against the formal, rule-bound nature of the state’s laws? Hence, in the fol-
55As we shall see in the next section, the recent informal institutions research agenda
has readily absorbed and reified the “state effect” by attributing to the “machinery of
intentions” of the state the monopoly of producing ‘formal institutions’. By contrast,
the non-state (i.e. society) has a matching, mirror-image machinery of its own producing
‘informal institutions’. In this way, the “state effect” - the illusion of autonomy - has
spread even to analysis of the non-state.
56See Santos (2007, p. 1-2), which is elaborated further in the first theory chapter.
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lowing section we address institutional theory, and see what epistemological
implications there may be in considering the research object as a rule-bound
social practice.
2.4 Institutional Theory
I am inclined to think that, in the
social sciences, the language of
rules is often the refuge of
ignorance.
Bourdieu (ibid., p. 118)
Individuals do not transact in a vacuum. This much is clear. Social
interactions are often constrained in such a way as to enable expectations
to be formed about another’s behaviour. Equally, when interactions lead to
regularised outcomes which can be observed, we tend to assume that some
kind of a covering rule, or regularity, is governing them.
Such lines of reasoning have deep roots in the social sciences.57 In recent
years, however, several new approaches have emerged which take the study
of such rules and regularities as their primary focus, under the category
of institutions. Following Hall and Taylor (1996), three such schools are
generally accepted as forming this “New Institutionalism”: Historical Insti-
tutionalism (HI); Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI); and Sociological
Institutionalism (SI).
If we return to the idea of an ‘etiquette’ governing corruption, bribery
and the informal exchange of favours, then these New Institutionalisms
would seem particularly relevant in helping to specify such an ‘etiquette’:
where it comes from; how it constrains or enables certain behaviour; how
it relates to other rules; and what kind of social outcomes it may lead to.
Indeed, as we have seen, in both clientelism and corruption there has already
been a ‘turn’ in recent years toward such institutionalist approaches. Most
57In their influential overview of New Institutionalism, Powell and DiMaggio (1991)
trace these roots as far back as Durkheim’s precept to “treat social facts as things”. It
is interesting to note that Bourdieu (1989, p. 14) made reference to the same quote, at-
tributing it to the objectivist tradition in social science which seeks to explain social life
through “deep causes which lie outside of consciousness” (another Durkheim reference).
The issue of consciousness however (with respect to the degree to which agents are con-
scious of the rules they are following) is a deeply vexed issue in institutional theory, and
one to which we will return.
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recently a new research programme has emerged which would seem partic-
ularly suited to addressing such an object as the ‘etiquette’ of personalistic
exchange: the informal institutions agenda, dealing with “socially shared
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced out-
side of officially sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).
However, these approaches - and in particular, the informal institutions
agenda - contain certain epistemological shortcomings which I believe limit
their usefulness in conceptualising (and hence explaining) the phenomena
in question. In this section I therefore provide a brief summary of the main
contributions of the various institutional theories, and the ways in which
they relate to the research object, with the goal of elaborating some of these
shortcomings. This latter undertaking is intended especially to highlight the
utility of a Bourdieusian (i.e., relational) approach, an elaboration of which
follows in the next chapter.
The different institutionalisms identified by Hall and Taylor each emerged,
in relative isolation from one other, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. De-
spite some recent attempts to find common ground,58 each maintains a fairly
distinct view of what constitutes an institution. Such differences are a reflec-
tion not only of a deep epistemological divide concerning the (theoretical)
determinants of practice, but also of the differing research interests of each
school, which have played perhaps the most significant role in forming atti-
tudes and concepts regarding the way institutions function.
In the case of historical institutionalism, this research agenda has tended
to focus on the kind of ‘big picture’ analysis of states popularised by the
earlier structural-functionalist school. States are viewed as complete macro
systems of interacting parts which follow varying trajectories.59 In RCI, by
contrast, research has tended to focus on the procedural rules of individual
organisations, such as the US Congress or the European Commission, to
see how such rules structure strategic interactions and informational flows,
and enable collective action problems to be overcome.60 Sociological In-
58Including Hall and Taylor (1996) and the edited volume of Katznelson and Weingast
(2005) (which focuses exclusively on reconciling RCI with HI). Constructivism, which
has entered mostly through international relations, offers a potentially fruitful point of
engagement between all three schools, yet has so far been applied in only a limited way
(See Wendt (1999), Culpepper (2008), and Hay (2008)). Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (2004,
pp. 239-242) also attempt an intriguing reconciliation of RCI and SI approaches.
59Cf. Hall and Taylor (1996, p. 6). In this sense, Steinmo (2008) places HI in the same
vein of enquiry as Polanyi (1944) and Skocpol (1979).
60See Riker (1980) for the seminal text on the US Congress, and Tsebelis (1994) for a
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stitutionalism meanwhile has followed a more practice-oriented approach,
which seeks to reintegrate culture into the terms of organisational analysis,
and explain why certain organisations take on particular institutional (and
symbolic) forms.61
What, then, constitutes an institution for each school? In HI, institutions
are conceived of broadly, as “formal or informal procedures, routines, norms
and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or
political economy” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 6). In HI, a change in the
configuration of such institutions may lead to unexpected consequences else-
where in the institutional order, while ‘critical junctures’ frequently create
path dependency, constraining future outcomes and limiting the potential
direction of institutional change.62 How, precisely, do institutions influence
behaviour in this approach? HI can be rather agnostic in this regard.63 Hall
and Taylor (ibid., p. 7-8) argue in favour of two different approaches: the
‘calculus’ approach, whereby institutions provide a greater or lesser degree
of certainty about the future behaviour of actors, thus altering expecta-
tions; and the ‘cultural’ approach, whereby actors behave less in a strategic
than a sufficing manner, and institutions serve to structure an individual’s
worldview.
In this sense, HI straddles the ontological divide which separates RCI
approaches to institutions from Sociological Institutionalism. The ‘cultural’
approach, for example, chimes with the cognitive or practice-oriented mod-
els of human action favoured by SI, whereby institutions provide not just
the formal rules, procedures or norms, “but the symbol systems, cognitive
scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding
human action” (ibid., p. 14). Hence, in SI institutions guide human action
according to a ‘logic of social appropriateness’ rather than an instrumental
calculus (Campbell, 1998).64
The ‘calculus’ approach, by contrast, resembles RCI presumptions of
similar approach to the European Parliament.
61See for example Meyer and Rowan (1977).
62See Thelen and Steinmo (1992) and Steinmo (2008) for an overview, and Collier and
Collier (1991) for the concept of critical juncture.
63See Steinmo (2008, p. 126); this ‘agnosticism’ likely results from HI’s origins as an
inductive method.
64The SI approach to institutions shares some similarities with Bourdieu’s concept of
habitus, as noted by Powell and DiMaggio (1991). However, habitus is a much more
rigorous conceptual tool than the idea of an institution in SI, as will be demonstrated in
the next chapter.
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individuals as utility maximisers, and institutions as structuring strategic
interactions between individuals with fixed preferences. The antecedents to
this mode of reasoning are to be found in the New Institutional Economics
(NIE),65 and in particular in the transactions costs approach pioneered by
Coase (1937), resurrected by Williamson (1971), and then applied to the
development of political institutions by North (1990).
While the NIE approach to institutions frequently mirrors the induc-
tive agnosticism of HI (happily confounding norms and regularities), RCI
tends to be more thorough-going in its embrace of instrumentalism. Hence,
whereas North, for example, defined institutions as “regularities in repet-
itive actions [. . . ], customs and rules that provide a set of incentives and
disincentives for individuals” (North, 1986, p. 231), Ostrom (1986), by
contrast, was more specific, describing ‘rules’ (rather than institutions) as
“potentially linguistic entities [. . . ] that refer to prescriptions commonly
known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent
relationships” (ibid., p. 5). Such rules not only define positions, they also
structure the sequence of strategic interactions, as well as provide prescrip-
tions about which actions and outcomes are required, prohibited or permitted
(ibid., p. 5). For Ostrom, rather than directly affecting behaviour, rules in-
stead affect the structure of a situation in which actions are selected. Hence
“rules can be formally represented as relations, whose domain are the set of
physically possible variables and their values, and whose range are the val-
ues of the variables, in the situation under analysis” (ibid., p. 7). They are
thus separate from “physical laws” and “behavioural laws” (ibid., p. 22).
We see from Ostrom’s definition that RCI favours a deductive/functionalist
approach to institutions. As Hall and Taylor note, Rational Choice Insti-
tutionalists typically “begin by using deduction to arrive at a stylized spec-
ification of the functions that an institution performs. They then explain
the existence of the institution by reference to the value those functions
have for the actors affected by the institutions” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.
13). Academic debate thus tends to revolve around “whether the functions
performed by the institution at hand are specified correctly” (ibid., p. 13).
As many critics of the functionalist approach have noted,66 it relies ulti-
65Mentioned earlier in relation to corruption.
66See the previously mentioned Kaufman (1972, p. 304-305) (who references Flanagan
and Fogelman (1967)) in relation to functionalist accounts of clientelism, and Hall and
Taylor (1996, p. 19) (who reference Bates (1988)) with regard to the RCI iteration of this
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mately on an heroic assumption: that of almost perfect human instrumen-
tality and intentionality, enabling one to deduce the cause of a thing purely
from the effect (or function) it produces. On the one hand, such assumptions
encourage a form of voluntarism as the motivating factor behind human ac-
tion;67 while on the other hand, the assumption that actors always negotiate
efficiently (hence producing a Nash equilibrium) can lead to difficulties in
explaining institutional change.68
Whereas this ‘functionalist fallacy’ is to some extent sustainable when
dealing with the formal institutional rules of organisations (particularly
places such as legislatures which involve highly stylised strategic interac-
tions), it becomes harder to maintain when dealing with the kind of ‘un-
written rules’ which structure much of social life, and which relate most
closely to the object of interest in this research. The reason is hinted at
in Ostrom’s ontologically uncomfortable definition of rules as “potentially
linguistic entities”. Such a construction appears aimed at acknowledging
that, indeed, not all ‘rules’ are written down; yet, as RCI requires actors
to be perfectly cognisant of the rules constraining them, it must follow that
they therefore could be written down (or otherwise communicated) if need
be. Hence they are potentially linguistic.69
Such a sleight of hand is easy to maintain when one is focussed primarily
on correctly specifying outcomes in highly formal scenarios; yet when it
comes to so-called informal institutions the task is somewhat harder.
The study of informality is by no means novel, and it overlaps with much
material covered in previous sections. Lomnitz-Adler (1988) was among the
first to address informality as a specific quality, noting that “informal modes
of exchange” often emerge “within the interstices of the formal system” as
a product of bureaucratic modernism. However, she was also careful to
emphasise that “Informal activities are socially embedded transactions that
obey a symbolic-cultural logic that differs from (and often clashes with) eco-
nomic rationality or the formal ideology of the state” (ibid., p. 43, emphasis
mine). The study of informal institutions, by contrast, emerged gradually
fallacy. See also Bourdieu (2012, p. 19) - “on n’apprend rien sur le me´canisme quand on
s’interroge seulement sur les fonctions”.
67Although see Knight (1992) for an attempt to integrate unequal power relations
68More recently both RCI and HI have turned to emergent or evolutionary explanations
for institutional change. See Steinmo (2010) and Blyth et al. (2011) for HI and Heritier
(2007, p. 10-11) for RCI.
69See Carey (2000) for a literalist approach to overcoming such a problem.
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from the mid-1990s, beginning with economistic analyses70 before becoming
incorporated within social science around the turn of the century.71
In this approach, informal institutions are “socially shared rules, usually
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially
sanctioned channels” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727); they are thus
opposed to ‘formal’ or ‘officially sanctioned’ rules, to which they stand in a
fixed relation that can be either complementary, substitutive, accommodat-
ing or competing (ibid., p. 728).
We see from this model that the informal institutions approach effec-
tively ‘reverse-engineers’ the logic of unwritten rules from that of written
ones. The result is an ontology which treats the two classes of phenomena
as equivalent, constructing a binary vision of reality which is divided into for-
mal and informal. This not only tends toward the reification of formal rules,
it also means that informal institutions must possess the same attributes as
formal ones, namely: means of communication; autonomous enforcement
and sanctioning mechanisms; and clear intentionality (as evinced by the
shared expectations of actors concerning the constraints they face).
Yet does this approach reflect the reality of such informal practices, or
capture their most important aspects? For instance, Helmke and Levinsky
specifically discount “informal behavioural regularities” from analysis, due
to the fact that they may not be in open conformity with “an established
rule or guideline”, may not be visibly enforced by “some kind of exter-
nal sanction”, and (presumably) may not be actively communicated among
participants (ibid., p. 727). Rather, they argue that “not all patterned
behaviour is rule-bound or rooted in shared expectations about others’ be-
haviour” (ibid., p. 727). Thus, removing one’s hat in church is an informal
institution, whereas removing one’s jacket in a restaurant is simply a be-
havioural regularity (ibid., p. 727).
The limitations of such an approach are self-evident. It corresponds in
effect to ‘spontaneous sociology’: taking for granted those ‘commonsense’
categories of perception which agents have of the social world and simply
reproducing them in analysis - begging the question as to how such cat-
egories are themselves produced.72 Meanwhile, any such behaviour which
70Such as Assaad (1993) and Stiglitz (1999).
71See Pejovich (1999), Lauth (2000), Helmke and Levitsky (2004), and more recently
Holger (2009) and Etzold et al. (2009).
72The implications of such ‘spontaneous’ analysis are dealt with more thoroughly in the
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does not fall under the “shared expectations” of actors is dismissed as simply
“patterned”, rather than rule-bound.
The informal institutions agenda thus throws into particular relief an is-
sue which (to some extent) concerns all the New Institutionalisms, which are
united in taking a substantialist approach towards institutions themselves.
That is, institutions, as rules or regularities, are treated as ontologically
bounded research objects, which stand in a causal relationship to social
outcomes (typically, as the independent variable).
This approach has its strengths; yet it also invariably leads to an implicit
reification of institutions, qua rules and regularities, as empirical things.
Such an approach can rapidly fall into what Bourdieu termed “the scholas-
tic fallacy”:73 making of individual practice the mere execution of a model
built by the analyst. To be sure, institutionalism always offers an objectivity
of the second order,74 by making of institutions the reference rules or scripts
which become the basis for strategic action. Yet, by subsuming norms, ref-
erence rules and regularities under a single category, we make a fundamental
error concerning the generative principles of action. Rather, social science
must have an understanding of the social game which is sufficiently nuanced,
as Bourdieu notes, to synthesise both norms and regularities, and to take
account of all the different possible principles of regulation. The problem is
perhaps best summarised by Wittgenstein:
What do I call ‘the rule by which he proceeds’? - The hypothesis
that satisfactorily describes his use of words, which we observe;
or the rule which he looks up, when he uses signs; or the one
which he gives us in reply when we ask what his rule is? - But
if observation does not enable us to see any clear rule, and the
question brings none to light? - For he did indeed give me a
definition when I asked him what he understood by ‘N’, but he
was prepared to withdraw and alter it. So how am I to determine
the rule by which he is playing? He does not know it himself.
- Or, to ask a better question: What meaning is the expression
‘the rule by which he proceeds’ supposed to have left to it here?
next chapter.
73This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter; for an outline see Bourdieu
(1990c, p. 30-41).
74See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 9).
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(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 38-9)75
Wittgenstein’s observation finds its echo in the empirical observation
made by Ledeneva concerning blat which frames this chapter - i.e., that ev-
eryone knows what it is, but finds it difficult to define. Instead of accounting
for this indeterminacy, institutionalist approaches all too frequently crush
it. Rather than a parsimonious conceptual tool,76 an institution is all too
frequently the unchallenged reproduction of a taken-for-granted representa-
tion of the social world - a “layman’s term” which, according to Durkheim,77
it is the first principle of sociological research to repudiate. By confounding
the separate existence of norms, reference rules and regularities within a sin-
gle analytical category, we fail to grasp the fundamental difference between
the subjective and objective existence of the principles of regulation. Hav-
ing failed to grasp this divide at the initial moment of analysis, it becomes
impossible to reintegrate the two within a complete “model of the game”,
and hence to place practice in the correct causal relation to broader (social)
effects.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter attempted to chart the progress of the current state of the art
in conceptualising personalistic exchange within the modern state, and how
it can be related to the (re)production of the broader social structure. In
doing so, I aimed to draw out some of the most pertinent conceptual and
epistemological problems relating to this particular research object, as well
as (in the words of Bourdieu) the ‘epistemological unconscious’ underlying
the discipline. It is possible to draw certain conclusions from our overview.
First, it seems a well-established principle that phenomena of person-
alistic exchange are closely related to the structure of inequality within a
given society, because (as Eisenstadt and Roniger observed) such forms of
exchange mark “a distinct mode of regulating crucial aspects of institutional
order: the structuring of the flow of resources, exchange and power relations
and their legitimation in society” (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980, p. 49).
75Also quoted in Bourdieu (1990c, p. 39).
76The phrase is taken from Wacqaunt’s description of Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts
such as field, habitus and capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5).
77See Bourdieu and Wacquant (ibid., p. 11, n. 22).
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Equally clearly, such forms of exchange are closely related to the presence
or absence of certain symbolic forces in a society. According to Graziano, the
institution of legitimate authority is itself the product of indirect exchange
(i.e., exchange which generates a group benefit, and hence the expectation
of common rights). Such exchange embeds the concept of deferred reward,
and hence ultimately contributes to the accumulation of capital in a soci-
ety. Thus, the principle of a ‘public interest’, which in the Western context
emerged alongside the modern, bureaucratic state in the nineteenth century,
can also be seen as a product of the institutionalisation of such indirect ex-
change.
However, if personalistic exchange is indeed a mode of regulation which
has a structuring effect upon a society, how do other types of exchange
emerge which might compete with it? As we have seen with the various
institutional theories, explaining the emergence of new institutions becomes
problematic when institutions themselves are explained according to func-
tionalist criteria. If a given mode of exchange is functional in a given social
context, then change must come either from exogenous criteria (the punc-
tuated equilibria model), or else be somehow inherent within the model (as
in recent so-called ‘evolutionary’ approaches) - begging the question as to
which mechanisms are responsible for such change.
Moreover, experience demonstrates that, rather than a smooth transi-
tion from Weberian gemeinschaft to gesellschaft systems, in many parts of
the modern world both types of exchange often survive in messy coexistence,
with some individuals even thriving in entrepreneurial positions by exploit-
ing the potential for arbitrage between the differing regulations of these two
normative ‘markets’.
The principle conceptual difficulty concerns the epistemological status
of regulation itself. If personalistic exchange is indeed a ‘distinct mode of
regulation’, that is, distinct from other kinds of regulation, and in particular
from the formal regulation of the state, then precisely how does it regulate
behaviour? What does it mean, exactly, to follow a rule that is unwritten?
It is at this point that we must consider the question of rules as categories
of academic explanation, and their affinity to the production of formality
as a part of the “state effect” noted by Mitchell. For instance, the formal,
indirect exchange which leads to the generation of a ‘public interest’ is highly
conducive to a certain form of legalistic analysis, i.e. that which reduces
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regularity in outcomes to the simple operation of a rule, which then takes
on the character of a law.
However, such a mode of analysis misses entirely the fact that, if le-
gitimate authority is a product of indirect exchange, then the state itself
(qua legitimate authority) is also, to a large extent, a product of the in-
stitutionalisation of such exchange - that is, of the historical processes of
codification and formalisation which convert the benefits of such exchange
into legal rights.
It follows that, if Weber’s maxim concerning the state is true, then laws
make states (rather than the other way around), in the sense that the power
of form (vis formae) is a broad symbolic power to define that which is
legitimate, which includes both that which is moral and that which is logical;
the normative and the rational.78 Thus, rules that describe social reality
are embedded in the same historical processes (codification, canonisation,
etc.) as those that define appropriate normative outcomes.
Ultimately, this means that -
...to get to the bottom of the enterprise, one must pose in all
its generality the question of the social conditions necessary for
those activities of codification and theorisation, and the social
effects of theoretical activity, of which the work of the social
scientist itself represents a particular form.79
Which is to say that, studying informal, personalistic, direct exchange
according to the same epistemological perspective as formal, codified ex-
change - i.e., that of a rule - amounts to reproducing such exchange through
the (negative) vision of the state. The effects of such a mode of analysis
may vary. On the one hand, the state perspective can be reproduced in the
normative construction of the research object itself - thus, as Zinn noted,
‘clientelism’ easily becomes ‘corruption’. On the other hand, the state per-
spective may be reproduced in second-order theoretical abstractions - that
is, in the mode of analysing the object, leading to a kind of ‘spontaneous’ or
78As Bourdieu notes, “la vis formae est toujours une force a` la fois logique et sociale”
(Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 43). See also Bourdieu (1985, p. 115, emphasis mine) - “One needs
to construct a theory of the work of formulation and codification, on the properly symbolic
effect which the codification produces. There is a connection between juridical formulas
and mathematical formulas.”
79Bourdieu (1986a, p. 44), my translation.
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‘common sense’ sociology of the type which encourages Helmke and Levit-
sky to disavow ‘informal behavioural regularities’ when they are not in open
conformity with an ‘established rule or guideline’.
How do we analyse such norms as govern personalistic exchange, taking
account of the existence of the state and its ‘public interest’, without simply
reproducing the vision of the state? And how do we explain regularities that
are not the product of explicit rules? Moreover, how do we overcome the
debilitating academic antinomy between structure and agency (which has
bogged down institutionalism as surely as it bogged down clientelism), and
uncover instead generative principles (or mechanisms) for social practices -
principles which are able to relate such practices back to the production of
the social structure in a non-functionalist manner? To address these issues,
we turn now to the new conceptualisation of the research object, and the
research methodology which informs it.

Chapter 3
A New Research Object
As the previous chapter attempted to demonstrate, prior academic modes
of thinking about personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state
have produced some important theoretical insights, including a number of
commonalities across different fields. Yet these approaches also have their
limits, which I attempted to demonstrate were as much a product of episte-
mological problems in how the research object is conceptualised, as of purely
theoretical shortcomings concerning causal inferences. Equally, where rele-
vant I also attempted to highlight new directions in research which offer a
way beyond such limits.
In this chapter I attempt to engage both with those shortcomings and
new directions by proposing a new research design based upon the rela-
tional sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. I begin by outlining the key features of
this approach (or praxeology), and how it differs in its conceptualisation of
research objects from some of the approaches already mentioned. In partic-
ular, I introduce some of the “conceptual tools” (Bourdieu and Wacquant,
1992, p. 5 ) used by this method to construct objects. I then proceed to
outline the new conceptualisation of the research object particular to this
thesis - the clandestine circulation of capital - which I believe the Bour-
dieusian approach necessitates. Having attempted to outline this “new way
of thinking” (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), I then conclude the chapter by
outlining in greater detail the new ‘problems’ or research questions (both
theoretical and empirical) which this conceptualisation prompts, and which
it will be the business of the remainder of this thesis to address. As part of
outlining the research questions, I also include a brief section on the scope
and limits of the research.
53
54 CHAPTER 3. A NEW RESEARCH OBJECT
3.1 Breaking with the Scholastic Gaze - A Rela-
tional Approach
As we have seen, up to this point the prevailing trend within the social
sciences has been to construct the phenomenon of personalistic exchange
in the context of the modern state according to certain (relatively) discrete
categories. Clientelism and corruption, for instance, are both bounded re-
search objects used to describe specific social practices as they relate to
other bounded objects, such as the state.
By framing practice in such a way, it becomes possible to place such
objects as variables in a causal relationship, and hence to ask research ques-
tions about social causality. Yet this begs the simple question, driven at by
Wittgenstein: are the analytical categories we use to describe practice nec-
essarily the same as the generative principles which explain it? Or do they
rather merely reflect some artefact created by our relation to that practice as
observers? Or (which is perhaps worse) are they categorisations determined
instead by the power relations operating on us as members of the academic
field?
Both of these concerns are repeatedly raised by Pierre Bourdieu in those
works which form the theoretical underpinning of his methodological ap-
proach. On the one hand, he argues, there is the epistemological fallacy
produced by the “scholastic gaze” - i.e., that which, situated at an artifi-
cial remove from practice, constructs objects without accounting for its own
(privileged) relation to them.1 Being removed from the immanent necessity
of practice, the researcher may create of practice an object of study, yet
this epistemic posture - of “being able to withdraw from the world so as to
think it” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 49) - may lead the researcher to misidentify
the generative principles of practice:
Projecting his theoretical thinking into the heads of acting agents,
the researcher presents the world as he thinks it (that is, as an
object of contemplation, a representation, a spectacle) as if it
were the world as it presents itself to those who do not have the
leisure (or the desire) to withdraw from it in order to think it.
1See Bourdieu (1998, pp. 127-140), and Bourdieu (1990d), and also the introductory
sections to earlier works, Bourdieu (1977, pp. 1-9, 16-30.), and Bourdieu (1990c, pp.
25-51).
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He sets at the origin of their practices, that is to say, in their
‘consciousness’, his own spontaneous or elaborated representa-
tions, or, worse, the models he has had to construct (sometimes
against his own naive experience) to account for their practices.
(ibid., p. 51).
By failing to reflect on his relation to practice (and the perspective upon
practice which it affords), the analyst may fall into one of two fallacies: either
the subjectivist, which projects into the social agent the capacity to freely
determine those symbolic categories or “representations” through which he
perceives the social world; or else the objectivist, which makes of the social
agent a kind of automaton, mindlessly fulfilling the model brought to light
by the analyst, all the while unbeknownst to himself.2
Beyond this epistemological fallacy of the scholastic gaze, there is also
the “epistemological unconsciousness” produced by the academic field to
contend with. The effect of this “collective scientific unconsciousness embed-
ded in theories, problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly
judgement” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 40), may result in categories
of analysis which reflect the symbolic stakes at play within the academy,
rather than a truly objective representation of social practice. As a mem-
ber of the scholastic field, the researcher is engaged not merely in acts of
(objective) classification, but also in classification struggles, i.e. struggles
over categories of perception in which the social agents inhabiting the (aca-
demic) field have a specific interest in defending or defeating - “Systems
of classification constitute a stake in the struggles that oppose individuals
and groups in the routine interactions of daily life as well as in the solitary
and collective contests that take place in the fields of politics and cultural
production” (ibid., p. 14).3
We can see the effects of these two problems in some of the prior con-
ceptualisations of the research object we have previously encountered. For
example, the endless oscillation in studies of clientelism, which variously lo-
cated the generative principles of the phenomenon either in “a syndrome of
norms and role expectations located within the personality systems of indi-
2See Bourdieu (2000, pp. 135-142), and especially p. 135: “To understand practi-
cal understanding, one has to move beyond the alternatives of thing and consciousness,
mechanistic materialism and constructivist idealism”.
3See also Bourdieu (1989).
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vidual actors” (Kaufman, 1972, p. 288, emphasis mine) or in “an ‘objective’
power and exchange relationship” grounded in the larger structural processes
at work in a society (Powell, 1970, p. 413). Equally, the “fonctionnalisme
du pire” (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 18-19) implicit in Althusser’s Ideological State
Apparatuses, which endows these structures “with the ability to ‘act’ in
the manner of historical agents” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 8), is
likewise guilty of the same “scholastic fallacy” - constructing a model of
practice against the commonsense experience agents have of it, only to then
reconstitute practice as the mere mechanical execution of that model.
Nor are these problems restricted to the structural-functionalist ap-
proaches of the 1960s and 1970s; rather, they have tended to recur across
paradigms and through different periods.4 We have seen, for example,
how academic interest in corruption surged in recent decades in correlation
with the fall of communism and the preeminence of Washington consensus-
inspired paradigms such as “good governance”. The tendency to take a
policy-oriented approach toward the phenomenon (i.e., constructing it as a
discrete dependent variable whose likelihood as an outcome is conditioned
by other variables) tends to reify the “spontaneous” representation of it
given by (interested) social agents - in effect to ‘unask’ what corruption is,
in order to ask ‘how is it caused?’.
When presented with such ‘commonsense’ categorisations of practice,
it is no surprise that, in treating with personalistic exchange, social science
came eventually to favour epistemological approaches predicated on the sub-
ject. In a 180◦ turn from the structural-functionalist approach, rational
choice placed the subjective representations of the social agent (in the sense
of his fixed preferences and propensity toward maximising his utility) as the
generative principle of practice. In the case of rational choice institutional-
ism, this subjective basis was modified by the superimposition of an objec-
tivity of the second order in the form of ‘common knowledge’ rules (hence the
emphasis on the communicability of institutions).5 However, the elevation
4As Bourdieu notes (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 179, emphasis mine), such
an eventuality is to be expected - “There are antinomies [. . . ] which are devoid of any
meaning and have been destroyed a thousand times in the course of scientific history. But
they can easily be brought back to life and - this is very important - those who revive them
gain great profits from doing so.”
5See Culpepper (2008) for an example of the theoretical implications of this imposition
of an objective order above a subjective (the precise opposite to Bourdieu’s approach, as
outlined below). Culpepper’s “Common knowledge events” are an attempt to maintain
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of ‘homo œconomicus’ to the status of a universal subject is in its way little
different to the totalising principle behind structural-functionalism: placing
the privileged relation to practice enjoyed by the analyst in the causal driv-
ing seat, in either passive or active mode.6 The definitive example of this
tendency in the rational mode is provided by Piattoni (2001), who considers
clientelism and patronage as “always a question of choice” (ibid., p. 2) -
that is, “quid pro quo relations, ruled by economic principles”, the “real
nature” of which “is somewhat obscured by its being projected externally as
a personal and almost affective relationship” (ibid., p. 11, emphasis mine).
Even some recent attempts to break with these academic conventions
have proven limited - and ultimately served to reproduce the same anti-
nomies. Rivkin-Fish (2005), for instance, provides an example of the in-
terpretivist approach toward the phenomenon of corruption - that is, at-
tempting to analyse it as a socially-constituted practice, rather than merely
an independent variable. Yet by limiting her theoretical analysis simply to
the representations agents make of their own practice, she is incapable of
accounting for systemic variations in those representations, thus presenting
her with illogical ‘paradoxes’ that must be reconciled through ex post justi-
fications, and leaving her unable to identify any underlying mechanism that
might generate such practices.7
the absolute volition necessary for rational choice, by suggesting that the intersubjective
categories upon which core preferences are based are the emergent product of a (conscious)
process of negotiation.
6As Bourdieu notes, the lack of epistemological vigour in rational choice approaches
enables its proponents to variously offer either mechanistic or subjectivist explanations:
It is not unusual for the advocates of ‘rational action theory’ to claim al-
legiance alternately, in the same text, with the mechanist vision, which is
implied in their recourse to models borrowed from physics, and with the
teleological vision, each being rooted in the scholastic opposition between
pure consciousness and the body-as-thing [. . . ] It is thus possible for them
to explain the rationality of practices, indifferently, by the hypothesis that
agents act under the direct constraint of causes that the scientist is able to
identify, or by the apparently quite opposite hypothesis that agents act with
complete knowledge of the situation [. . . ] and are capable of doing by them-
selves what the scientist does in their place in the mechanist hypothesis.
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 139)
7See, for example, the case of ‘Valya’ (Rivkin-Fish, 2005, pp.47-49) who, when asked
whether it was ‘appropriate’ for her to pay a bribe to the doctor, “answered immediately
and without ambivalence: ‘oh, definitely, [...] we have to get over that Soviet nonsense
that people should work for free. I feel that I should pay, I have the money, and so
it’s right that I pay for their professionalism and time’.” For Rivkin-Fish, while there
may be a “paradox” regarding the “unofficial way” in which Valya makes such a payment
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How does one overcome such problems in the process of conducting re-
search? According to Lo¨ıc Wacquant,8 The works of Pierre Bourdieu offer
the researcher in social science “not a theory stricto sensu so much as a
sociological method consisting essentially in a manner of posing problems,
in a parsimonious set of conceptual tools and procedures for constructing
objects and for transferring knowledge gleaned in one area of inquiry into
another” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5, additional emphasis mine).
For Bourdieu, the “false antinomy” of objectivist and subjectivist ap-
proaches does not originate simply in the epistemic posture engendered by
the academy; rather, such antinomies find their correspondence in the fact
that social structures themselves lead a “double life”,9 the paradox of which
is captured by Pascal: “By space the universe comprehends and swallows
me up like an atom; by thought I comprehend the world.”10 That is, the
researcher must contend with the fact that the social world is an object of
knowledge perceived by social agents, yet as social agents, we are ourselves
also objects of knowledge produced by that world. We both construct the
world and are constructed by it, and any true account of social practice must
be able to reconcile this innate recursiveness; otherwise, it is doomed to lo-
cate the generative principles of practice in incomplete accounts predicated
either on structure or agency.
In order to account for this “intrinsically double reality of the social
world” (ibid., p. 11), Bourdieu proposed an epistemological posture - or
(going through an intermediary rather than the “official channels”), given that “the official
framework of fee-for-service health care [...] is perceived to reflect the continuing injustice
of Russian bureaucratic institutions”, it is in fact less “ethically problematic and unjust”
for her to simply give an unofficial payment. This emphasis on representations (above and
beyond objective power relations) leaves her however unable to account for the doctor
who could graciously accept a bribe/gift from one (socially equal) patient, while scornfully
disdaining the bribe/gift of another (socially inferior) patient shortly after (Rivkin-Fish,
2005, pp.56-60). This episode and its implications are discussed in greater detail in the
second theoretical chapter.
8See The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu’s Sociology (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992,
pp. 2-59), which remains the best general overview of Bourdieu’s sociological approach,
and which I have tended to favour in this section for the introduction of key concepts due
to its greater clarity in comparison to some of Bourdieu’s own writings.
9As Bourdieu notes, “these [academic] antinomies are enormously costly to demolish
because they are inscribed in social reality” (ibid., p. 179, emphasis mine).
10A favourite aphorism for Bourdieu taken from the Pense´es (348), and quoted in
Bourdieu (2000, p. 130). He goes on to add his own gloss: “The world encompasses
me, comprehends me as a thing among things, but I, as a thing for which there are things,
comprehend this world. And I do so (must it be added?) because it encompasses and
comprehends me.”
3.1. A RELATIONAL APPROACH 59
“third-order knowledge”11 - which he called “genetic structuralism”:12 a
methodology which translates the two forms of scientific knowledge cap-
tured by subjectivism and objectivism into different research ‘moments’ in
a unified theory of practice.
The approach entails two levels of analysis: on the one hand, we attend to
the “objectivity of the first order” - that materiality of things, of structures,
in which we ourselves participate and form a part, and which is governed
by “the distribution of material resources and means of appropriation of
socially scarce goods and values (species of capital, in Bourdieu’s technical
language)” (ibid., p. 7). Following this there is the “objectivity of the second
order,” in the form of “systems of classification, the mental and bodily
schemata that function as symbolic templates for the practical activities -
conduct, thoughts, feelings, and judgements - of social agents” (ibid., p. 7).
As Wacquant explains:
The resulting social praxeology weaves together a “structuralist”
and a “constructivist” approach. First, we push aside mundane
representations to construct the objective structures (spaces of
positions), the distribution of socially efficient resources that de-
fine the external restraints bearing on interactions and represen-
tations. Second, we reintroduce the immediate, lived experience
of agents in order to explicate the categories of perception and
appreciation (dispositions) that structure their action from in-
side. (ibid., p. 11)
However, these two ‘moments’ of analysis do not carry the same episte-
mological weight, as Wacquant makes clear:
It should be stressed that, although the two moments of anal-
ysis are equally necessary, they are not equal: epistemological
priority is granted to objectivist rupture over subjectivist un-
derstanding. Application of Durkheim’s first principle of the
11See Bourdieu (1977, pp.1-9)
12The label “genetic structuralism” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 14) was applied by Bourdieu
to his approach only relatively late in his career. He also favoured the term “construc-
tivist structuralism” or “structuralist constructivism” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 14) to indicate
both stages of the ‘double reading’ necessary for scientific enquiry. Other terms used
to describe Bourdieu’s approach include “reflexive sociology” (the title of Bourdieu and
Wacquant’s methodological primer (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992)), and practice theory
(See Bourdieu (1977)).
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“sociological method,” the systematic rejections of preconcep-
tions, must come before analysis of the practical apprehension
of the world from the subjective standpoint. For the viewpoints
of agents will vary systematically with the point they occupy in
objective social space. (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 11,
emphasis mine).13
To emphasise: a complete account of social practice requires the analyst
to integrate both the objectivist and subjectivist modes of analysis. Only by
doing this can the analyst recover the complete truth of practice from the
partial truths which each mode reveals. However, while the analyst recog-
nises that at the level of generative principles the objective and subjective
exist in a dialectic relationship (each both producing and being produced
by the other), when it comes to a practical methodology for analysing such
structures, epistemological precedence must be given to the objectivist ‘mo-
ment’ of constructing the (objective) relations of agents in Social Space.
That is: positions before dispositions.
A ‘break’ with commonsense notions and constructions about the social
world, achieved through analysing the distribution of “socially efficient re-
sources”, is thus the necessary first step. The objective social space which
such a mode of analysis uncovers may then be used as a basis for locating
the varying (subjective) dispositions of social agents. This modus operandi
is both possible and necessary owing to perhaps the key “foundational hy-
pothesis” (to again borrow from Bourdieu and Wacquant (ibid., p. 12)) of
Bourdieu’s methodological approach:
There exists a correspondence between social structures and men-
tal structures, between the objective divisions of the social world
- particularly into dominant and dominated in the various fields
- and the principles of vision and division that agents apply to
it. (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 7)14
This idea of a correspondence between social and mental structures be-
13As already noted, this is precisely the opposite of the approach advocated by rational
choice institutionalism, which conversely constructs a second objective order after the
subjective.
14Also quoted in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 12). See also Bourdieu and Wac-
quant (ibid., pp. 12-15) for how Bourdieu’s theory differs from Durkheim’s thesis of the
correspondence between cognitive and social structures.
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comes feasible only once we transcend the substantialist mode of analy-
sis which both objectivism and subjectivism favour, and instead accept a
mode of analysis based upon the primacy of relations. Dispositions, far
from being the product of an individual’s volition, are in fact linked to the
distribution of socially efficient resources in a given society. Yet, in order
to visualise such a distribution (and thus the correspondence between ob-
jective resources and subjective dispositions), one must do away with the
substantialist vision of ‘society’ as a structure (or structures) - “a seamless
totality integrated by systemic functions” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992,
p. 16) - and instead consider it as a social space consisting of various rela-
tively autonomous fields. The perceptions and dispositions which constitute
a particular social agent’s subjective habitus are the product of occupying
a determinate position within that social space (i.e. within one or many
fields). Field and habitus are thus both relational concepts:
A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between
positions anchored in certain forms of power (capital), while
habitus consists of a set of historical relations ‘deposited’ within
individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata
of perception, appreciation, and action. (ibid., p. 16)
Both habitus and field “designate bundles of relations” (ibid., p. 16),
and the two concepts are further relational in the additional sense that
“they function fully only in relation to one another” (ibid., p. 19). Thus, in
place of the antinomy of structure and agency, we have instead the historical
processes of objectification of structures in the form of fields, and their em-
bodiment in the form of habitus. It is through this dialectic of objectification
and embodiment (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 87-95) that the structured structures
of habitus and field come to function also as structuring structures (hence
the label “genetic structuralism”). Thus, in contrast to the “dead structure”
and “empty places”15 of traditional structuralist approaches, Bourdieu em-
phasises fields as spaces of play, in which agents engage in struggles over
specific stakes, employing the improvisatory quality of habitus. Instead of
15Bourdieu’s description of Althusserian structuralism, which can equally be applied
to all structuralist approaches. See Bourdieu and Wacquant (ibid., p. 19) and Bourdieu
(2012, p. ref).
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their actions being governed by rules,16 social agents follow strategies,17
whose means and ends are adjusted to probabilities governed by the objec-
tive resources available to them through their position in social space.
By reconciling, on the one hand, the two forms of academic knowledge as
separate ‘moments’ in a unified mode of analysis (or ‘praxeology’), and on
the other, the “double life” of social structures into the relational concepts
of habitus and field, Bourdieu argues we may better fulfil the true task of
sociology: “to uncover the most profoundly buried structures of the various
social worlds which constitute the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’
which tend to ensure their reproduction or their transformation” (Bourdieu,
1996, p. 7). In this research, I hope to make use of Bourdieu’s methodolog-
ical approach to uncover the deeply buried structures which perpetuate the
phenomenon of personalistic exchange in the context of the modern state,
and to identify the ‘mechanisms’ which link this practice to the reproduc-
tion of the broader social structure. Before doing so however, it becomes
necessary - through the initial break with commonsense - to call into ques-
tion even the initial categories of analysis,18 and to reconstruct the research
object according to the relational approach proposed by Pierre Bourdieu. It
now falls to explain in more detail the specific “conceptual tools” through
which - following the Bourdieusian method - that reconstruction is effected.
16“It is important finally to emphasise that the lines of action engendered by habitus
do not, indeed cannot, have the neat regularity of conduct deduced from a normative or
juridical principle” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 22).
17Though it should be emphasised that Bourdieu does not intend, by “strategy”, a
necessarily conscious adjustment:
“The language of strategy, which one is forced to use in order to designate the
sequences of actions objectively oriented towards an end that are observed
in all fields, must not mislead us: the most effective strategies, especially
in fields dominated by values of disinterestedness, are those which, being
the product of dispositions shaped by the immanent necessity of the field,
tend to adjust themselves spontaneously to that necessity, without express
intention or calculation. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 138)
18A difficulty alluded to by Bourdieu himself when attempting to define the state -
which, he noted, is an object which stands a good chance of having produced the very
structures of conscience through which we perceive it (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 13). Hence, the
need for a new ‘metalanguage’ to break with such categories of thought (ibid., p. 19).
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3.2 New Conceptual Tools
In the previous section the case was made for an epistemological approach
which unites objectivism and subjectivism, structure and agency, in a single
method predicated on the primacy of relations. By way of justifying this
approach, reference was made to some of the epistemological weaknesses of
prior conceptualisations of the research object. In this section, I introduce
the conceptual tools advocated by Pierre Bourdieu in constructing new ob-
jects designed to overcome such weaknesses - an approach which involves,
in the words of Lo¨ıc Wacquant quoted above, “push[ing] aside mundane
representations” in order to first construct the objective structures bearing
upon interactions and representations, before reintegrating the subjective
categorisations of agents into these structures. The purpose of this section
is twofold: on the one hand, to provide an introduction to concepts that
will be referred to extensively in the theoretical chapters, and on the other,
to demonstrate the utility of such tools in comparison with other methods.
Having outlined these different tools, I then proceed in the next section to
apply them in (re)constructing the research object.
The two most fundamental tools in Bourdieusian praxeology have al-
ready been mentioned: habitus and field (which we may extend to include
the larger concept of social space). A third, capital, has also been men-
tioned in passing. Further key concepts to be introduced in this section are:
Illusio, Misrecognition, Doxa, and Symbolic Violence. It should be empha-
sised that these concepts (like the methodology which prompted them) are
relational : they function only in relation to each other as part of a unified
theory of social practice. Applying them individually without care for their
status as parts of a larger unified theory will thus render any derived analysis
meaningless.
Habitus is “an acquired system of generative schemes objectively ad-
justed to the particular conditions in which it is constituted”; as such, it
“engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consis-
tent with those conditions, and no others” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95). It is a
“practical sense”, enabling one “to act as one ‘should’ (oˆs dei, as Aristotle
put it) without positing or executing a Kantian ‘should’, a rule of conduct”
(Bourdieu, 2000, p. 139); moreover, “being the product of incorporation of
the structures and tendencies of the world,” the habitus makes it possible
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“to adapt endlessly to partially modified contexts”, and to engage “in a
practical operation of quasi-bodily anticipation of the immanent tendencies
of the field” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 139).
For Bourdieu, this notion of habitus - opposed to both the “mechanism”
of structuralist approaches and the “finalism” of rational choice (ibid., p.
138) - “restores to the agent a generating, unifying, constructing, classifying
power, while recalling that this capacity to construct social reality, itself so-
cially constructed, is not that of a transcendental subject but of a socialized
body, investing in its practice socially constructed organizing principles that
are acquired in the course of a situated and dated social experience” (ibid.,
p. 136).
As a concept in Bourdieusian theory, habitus predates field, yet the sec-
tion of Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977) which introduces
habitus nonetheless emphasises the dialectic of objectification and embodi-
ment: the habitus which is embodied is the product of the internalisation of
systems of classification and objective relations which have an existence in
external reality (and not simply in the ‘shared representations’ agents may
make of that reality).
Field is thus the name given to the objective configuration of those rela-
tions, as they pertain to a specific interest or social game. Fields, as spaces
of play, produce their own logic, such that “the external determinations that
bear on agents situated in a given field [. . . ] never apply to them directly,
but affect them only through the specific mediation of the specific forms
and forces of the field, after having undergone a re-structuring that is all
the more important the more autonomous the field, that is, the more it is
capable of imposing its specific logic, the cumulative product of its partic-
ular history” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 105). In other words, “a
field is a patterned system of objective forces (much in the manner of a mag-
netic field), a relational configuration endowed with a specific gravity which
it imposes on all the objects and agents which enter in it” (ibid., p. 17).
To emphasise once again that the determinations engendered by an ob-
jective field are more than simply the ‘shared representations’ of the sub-
jectivist or phenomenological approaches, Bourdieu makes clear that fields
comprise “systems of relations that are independent of the populations which
these relations define” (ibid., p. 106, emphasis mine). Thus, the notion of
field “reminds us that the true object of social science is not the individual”
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- rather, individuals exist as social agents “and not as biological individu-
als, actors, or subjects”. Social agents are “socially constituted as active
and acting in the field under consideration by the fact that they possess the
necessary properties to be effective, to produce effects, in this field. And
it is knowledge of the field itself in which they evolve that allows us best
to grasp the roots of their singularity, their point of view or position (in a
field) from which their particular vision of the world (and of the field itself)
is constructed” (ibid., p. 107).
In analysis, a field is composed of two ‘moments’ - first, that of “the
objective structure of the relations between the positions occupied by the
agents or institutions” which compose that field, and second, the “prises de
position” (position-takings, subjective stances) taken by those agents, i.e.
“the structured system of practices and expressions” (ibid., p. 105) which
agents exhibit in a field. Whereas the second moment - that of practices and
expressions - falls under the realm of habitus, the first moment - an agent
or institution’s position in the objective structure of the field - is governed
by the volume of capital specific to that field possessed by the agent or
institution.
Capital may be understood, for the purposes of analysis, as “socially
efficient resources”. It is a fully relational concept, in the sense that any
socially efficient resource is a store of social value (and a marker of social
position) only in the sense that other social agents and institutions recognise
it as such. The tendency for social agents to give value to the specific kinds
of social resources produced by a given field is an effect of the illusio, or
social libido (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 76-79) - the sense of investment in, or
attachment to, a given social game.19 This sense of being invested in the
social game is far-removed from the idea of a freely-contracting rational
actor or homo œconomicus; rather, to take part in the game is to be fully
drawn into its determinacies -
“The perpetual motion which runs through the field does not
stem from some motionless prime mover [. . . ] but from the strug-
gle itself, which is produced by the structures of the field and in
19The concept of illusio was a relatively late refinement in Bourdieu’s theory, replacing
the more general term ‘interest’ (see Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 6, n.10)). Ac-
cording to Bourdieu, “one of the tasks of sociology is to determine how the social world
constitutes the biological libido, an undifferentiated impulse, as a specific social libido”
(Bourdieu, 1998, p. 78).
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turn reproduces its structures, i.e. its hierarchies. It springs
from the actions and reactions of the agents, who, short of opt-
ing out of the game and falling into oblivion, have no choice but
to struggle to keep up or improve their position in the field, i.e.
to conserve or increase the specific capital which is only created
within the field. In so doing, each one helps to subject all the
others to the often intolerable constraints arising from the com-
petition. In short, no one can take advantage of the game, not
even those who dominate it, without being taken up and taken
in by it” (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 307-308).
According to Bourdieu, “in highly differentiated societies, the social cos-
mos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social micro-
cosms, i.e., spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a
necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). Delineating the limits of a given
field is frequently a difficult proposition, owing to the fact that such limits
are “always a stake in the field itself” (ibid., p. 100); yet, rather than think-
ing of fields as discrete, bounded entities, Bourdieu invites us to consider
them as centres of mass exerting an influence on agents and objects within or
near them.20 As well as the various specific and irreducible relations which
comprise individual fields, there is also the field of power - a “meta-field”,
“not situated on the same level as other fields [. . . ] since it encompasses
them in part” (ibid., p. 18, n. 32) - in which the rate of conversion between
all forms of authority (capital) is established.
The totality of these effects of influence within a given social contin-
uum comprises social space, and it is an agent’s position in social space (a
function of the structure and volume of his capital) which structures the
habitus that determines both his own practice and his interpretation of oth-
ers’ practice. In turn, the practical logic, or ‘sense’, of habitus tends toward
the pre-reflexive reproduction of those structures (categories of perception,
systems of classification, etc.) which constitute the social space in which
it was formed.21 This “implicit collusion” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 145) be-
20See Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992, p. 100): “We may think of a field as a space within
which an effect of field is exercised, so that what happens to any object that traverses this
space cannot be explained solely by the intrinsic properties of the object in question. The
limits of the field are situated at the point where the effects of the field cease.”
21See Bourdieu (2000, p. 144): “Habitus constructs the world by a certain way of ori-
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tween objective and embodied structures, field and habitus, “is the basis of
a practical, mutual understanding, the paradigm of which might be the one
established between members of the same team, or, despite the antagonism,
all the players engaged in a game” (ibid., p. 145). It is “an immediate
agreement in ways of judging and acting which does not presuppose either
the communication of consciousness, still less a contractual decision” (ibid.,
p. 145).
In this sense, the practical logic of habitus is far removed from the
assumptions which underly institutionalist approaches. Rather than con-
sciously following an expressly communicable rule, or a norm or ‘decision
rule’ which holds the weight of a juridical law, the habitus engages in a regu-
lated improvisation: the product of a bodily comprehension formed through
consistent exposure to the structure of relations bearing down upon the
agent as a result of his position in social space, which conditions the agent
to actions consistent with a deontic modality of appropriateness within the
given field, rather than the necessity of unmediated determinations. Indeed,
the re-structuring effect of field often converts the necessities apparently
revealed by the objective moment of analysis into seemingly paradoxical
practices that go against the (objective) ‘interest’ of the agent: as Bourdieu
was fond of repeating, the logic of practice is not the logic of logic.
In contrast to the Bourdieusian approach (which we may call ‘complex
relationalism’, taking as it does a highly differentiated view of social rela-
tions), in which the improvisations of habitus in the struggle to reproduce
positions within a field or fields produce a perpetual motion (Bourdieu, 1981,
p. 307), most institutionalist approaches instead describe static relations,
wherein a rule defines a fixed position in a single dimension - a substantialist
logic lacking generative principles.22
The fundamental difference in the vision of the social world which each
approach implies can perhaps best be captured through the quantitative
tools which each tends to favour. A given part of social space may be rep-
resented visually through the methods of multiple correspondence analysis
enting itself towards it” - a bodily, non-conscious orientation akin to that of the athlete
involved in sport; an anticipation, which avoids making of practice a “Cartesian disconti-
nuity of successive moments” (ibid., p. 144).
22See the previously quoted statement of Ostrom: “rules can be formally represented
as relations, whose domain are the set of physically possible variables and their values,
and whose range are the values of the variables, in the situation under analysis” (Ostrom,
1986, p. 7)
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(MCA) or, more recently, geometric data analysis (GDA). Through the use
of carefully designed questionnaires reflecting both the objective and sub-
jective moments of analysis (that is, capital structure and position takings),
it becomes possible to derive eigenvalues which may be used to locate the
position of agents and their practices in a low dimensional space (the co-
ordinates of which are described according to the volume and structure of
capital).
In correspondence analysis “the statistical procedures readily follow from
the mathematical theory, which carries the burden of proof” (Le Roux and
Rouanet, 2004, p. 8). Not only does this represent, in the words of Le Roux,
“a fantastic saving in intellectual investment”, it is also a method which re-
mains “impervious to the expectations and prejudices of researchers”,23 and
from which patterns or structures latent within the data naturally emerge.24
By contrast, data-fitting techniques such as regression analysis begin from
the assumption of a fixed relation between two or more variables to which
data are then fitted (assuming either a linear, curvi-linear, quadratic or other
type of fixed relation), the goal being to demonstrate correlations (and imply
causal relations) between pre-selected variables.25
Bourdieu provided a powerful example of his relational mode of analy-
sis in Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste (Bourdieu,
1984).26 In this work, he was able to demonstrate a statistical correlation
between artistic taste (a position taking) and social background (capital
structure, or position in objective relations); furthermore, however, he was
able to demonstrate not only that artistic taste varied consistently accord-
ing to the amount of capital possessed by an agent, but also according to
23Benzecri, quoted in Le Roux and Rouanet (2004, p. 10).
24As Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000, p. 8) note, Bourdieu’s use of MCA
(rather than, for example, regression analysis) amounted to more than simple preference,
and was indeed closer to an elective affinity. As Bourdieu himself makes clear - “I use
Correspondence Analysis very much, because I think that it is essentially a relational
procedure whose philosophy fully expresses what in my view constitutes social reality.
It is a procedure that ‘thinks’ in relations, as I try to do it with the concept of field.”
(from the Foreword to the German edition of Le Me´tier du Sociologue, quoted in Rouanet,
Ackermann, and Le Roux (ibid., p. 8)).
25See also Lebaron (2003, p. 564 n.24) on this comparison.
26The famous diagram (p. 122-123) is in fact heuristic and not statistical: it consists
of a synthesis of different MCAs brought together in a single social space. Improvements
in statistical methodology and computing power however have now made such analysis
feasible within a fully statistical representation (see Hjellbrekke, Le Roux, and Korsnes
(2007) for a recent example).
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the structure of that capital - that is, whether it was primarily economic or
cultural.
Through this work and other empirical research like it, Bourdieu at-
tempted to demonstrate his principle hypothesis: that mental structures and
social structures are intrinsically linked, and thus that an agent’s habitus is
the product of occupying a determinate position within the social structure
- a position, that is, determined not only by membership of a given field or
fields, but also further triply determined by the volume (i), and structure
(ii) of capital possessed by the agent at given historical moments (trajectory,
iii).27
According to Bourdieu, a given social practice should therefore be under-
stood as a product of the interaction of these three basic theoretical elements
of habitus, capital and field, as represented by the formula:
[(habitus)(capital)] + field = practice28
The relation between an agent’s position in social space and his practice
brings us to the second ‘moment’ of Bourdieusian analysis: that of the
analysis of subjective (or symbolic) structures, which is in turn fundamental
to understanding Bourdieu’s theory of domination. Bourdieu developed the
concept of misrecognition to explain the symbolic transformation of relations
which occurs within specific fields. For Bourdieu, while the initial moment
of analysis may uncover the objective “truth” of a particular practice (that
is, in its relation to the broader structure of inequality in a given field), by
27These three dimensions are initially specified in Bourdieu (1984, p. 108).
28Bourdieu (ibid., p. 101). Not everyone is convinced by this neat synthesis of field,
habitus and capital. Warde (2004), for instance, argues that, rather than representing a
theoretical unity, Bourdieu’s early preoccupation with practice (of which habitus forms
the key theoretical component) and later interest in field mark a rupture which cannot
be easily reconciled. For Warde, Bourdieu’s attempt to reconcile these different elements
within the above formula stands as an impenetrable testament to the broader theoretical
inadequacies of the transitional work (Distinction) from which it is taken (ibid., p. 4).
However, Bourdieu surely intended his formula to be understood as an expression of a
logical (rather than mathematical) relation: i.e., that practice can only be ‘made sense of’
when it is considered as a product of both the improvisatory nature of habitus and the
constraints on that habitus resulting from differences in the availability of socially efficient
resources (capital). The interaction of these factors must then be considered in relation
to the field in which they are located, not only because practices exist in relation to other
practices (and may therefore change their signification in accordance with changes in the
state of the broader field), but also because the field itself exerts a structuring effect on
agents and objects passing through it.
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neglecting the additional symbolic force associated with such practice, the
objective mode of analysis also destroys the logic particular to practice -
that is, the mechanisms which make such unequal structures so persistent
by tending to naturalise their very arbitrariness.
As already mentioned, the “collusion” previously referred to between
habitus and field, wherein each both structures and is structured by the
other, serves to mediate external determinacies into a specific practical logic -
a deontic modality of appropriateness, which structures action not according
to the absolute necessities of human existence, but toward the immanent
necessities of the field. The state of being ignorant to the arbitrariness of
such necessities - of ‘forgetting’, if one likes, the act of being in the game
whilst playing the game, of being ‘caught up’ in the game - is doxa: the
social world become self-evident.
And yet the maintenance of doxa, or rather of a doxic modality between
habitus and field, between agents and the social space which they inhabit,
is not the product of a blind obedience to an established order.29 Rather, in
the same way that fields serve to mediate external determinacies into forms
specific to the logic of the field, so too the objective inequalities revealed
in the first moment of analysis are frequently mediated by the field into
new forms, primarily as symbolic struggles over symbolic capital .30 It is the
stakes in these symbolic struggles, and the symbolic force they generate,
which tend to prevent the opportunity for agents to entertain the kind of
radical doubt which would be necessary to unveil the objective structure of
inequalities to which they are subject. This collusion between habitus and
field, between agents and the unequal social space they inhabit, in effecting
the perpetuation of domination, is called symbolic violence.
Symbolic violence, according to Bourdieu “is the violence which is exer-
cised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu and Wac-
quant, 1992, p. 167). As Bourdieu explains:
[s]ocial agents are knowing agents who, even when they are sub-
29In this sense (though not only) Bourdieu differs from Marxist-inspired theories of
domination such as false consciousness and hegemony. C.f. Bourdieu and Wacquant
(1992, p. 106 n. 59): “At the core of Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic domination is the
notion that ideological legitimation (or “naturalization”) of class inequality [i.e. doxa]
operates via a correspondence which is effected only between systems [i.e. fields]. It does
not require that cultural producers intentionally endeavor to mask or to serve the interests
of the dominant [. . . ]”.
30See in particular Bourdieu (1989).
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ject to determinisms, contribute to producing the efficacy of that
which determines them insofar as they structure what determines
them. And it is almost always in the “fit” between determinants
and the categories of perception that constitute them as such
that the effect of domination arises. [. . . ] I call misrecognition
the fact of recognising a violence which is wielded precisely inas-
much as one does not perceive it as such. (ibid., p. 167-168)
Thus, an exchange carried out within the context of a field is not a sim-
ple transaction, but carries with it an additional symbolic force.31 It is this
force which binds agents to the logic of the field, and to the logic of the
capital produced by that field (which becomes in turn a symbolic32 capital);
it is also this force which generates the illusio that places agents in an ‘en-
chanted’ relation to the (unequal) structures of the field, and causes them to
be misrecognised. The exchange of symbolic goods, and the constraints im-
posed upon such exchange by the differing logics of particular fields, reveals,
in the final analysis (that is, that which reincorporates the subjective with
the objective), nothing less than a symbolic economy - a “general science
of the economy of practices” in which “profits in one area are necessarily
paid for by costs in another” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 254).33 The “univer-
sal equivalent” in this economy is nothing other than “labor-time” - “and
the conservation of social energy through all its conversions is verified if, in
each case, one takes into account both the labor-time accumulated in the
31See Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, p. 4): “Every power to exert symbolic violence,
i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by
concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically
symbolic force to those power relations.”
32On this point concerning symbolic capital, it is useful to quote a short passage from
Pascalian Meditations, which clarifies a good deal of potential ambiguity: “Every kind
of capital (economic, cultural, social) tends (to different degrees) to function as symbolic
capital (so that it might be better to speak, in rigorous terms, of the symbolic effects of
capital) when it obtains an explicit or practical recognition, that of a habitus structured
according to the very structures of the space in which it has been engendered.” The next
sentence is very important in clarifying an ambiguity in relation to Bourdieu’s earlier use
of the term in Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977): “In other words, symbolic
capital (male honour in Mediterranean societies, the honourability of the notable or the
Chinese mandarin, the prestige of the celebrated writer, etc.) is not a particular kind of
capital but what every kind of capital becomes when it is misrecognized as capital [. . . ]
and therefore recognized as legitimate” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 242).
33Bourdieu adds here that the “concept of wastage has no meaning in a general science
of the economy of practices” owing to a principle which is “the equivalent of the principle
of the conservation of energy”.
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form of capital and the labor-time needed to transform it from one type
into another” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 254) - that is, to transform both the
capital itself, and the symbolic force which causes agents to misrecognise
it. In such a way, the observation made by Graziano (1976) concerning
the varying effects of direct and indirect exchange can be incorporated into
a non-deterministic theoretical framework capable both of explaining their
differing social genesis (in the sense of generative principles) and their con-
tinued coexistence.
Before moving on, it is worth mentioning at this point certain critiques
of Bourdieu, which tend to advance the criticism that his theory is “reduc-
tionistic and deterministic”, and which typically do so by emphasising one
‘moment’ of the research process above the other. Alexander (1995), for
instance, argues that Bourdieu’s conceptual tools of habitus and field are
materialist throwbacks to Marxist theory, which allow no space for the cre-
ative role of subjective agency - the “voluntaristic, self- or value-generated
dimension of critical change” (ibid., p. 148).
While there will always be genuine academic disagreement as to whether
objective structures should underpin subjective representations, or vice versa,
the weakness of such criticisms lies in their somewhat stylised approach to
Bourdieu’s theory. Alexander, for instance, addresses each of Bourdieu’s the-
oretical concepts in turn and in isolation, rather than considering them in a
comprehensive, relational manner. Thus, his criticism of Bourdieu’s theory
of field (ibid., pp. 157-164) lacks an appreciation of the role of (symbolic)
capital in determining a field’s internal logic, hence providing precisely “‘the
disjunctive tensions yet simultaneous interdependencies” which he claims to
be lacking (ibid., p. 163).
Rather, as Lebaron (2003, p. 558) notes, the central problem of Bour-
dieu’s theory was captured by his former collaborator Jean-Claude Passeron
(1982), and lies in “the question of the limits of the analogy” between ma-
terial, economistic concepts such as capital, interest, markets, etc. and the
symbolic domains to which Bourdieu proceeds to apply them. As Lebaron
emphasises, the problem is not because such an analogy is “sometimes em-
pirically inadequate (and useful as such) as Passeron thinks”, but “because
any economic term can be understood in either a restrictive or a ‘generalized’
meaning”. Thus, the kind of “strictly monetary or quantitative evaluations”
which apply to the economic use of such terms is too restrictive for the gen-
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eralised use Bourdieu puts them to - a point further emphasised by the fact
that, when referring to capital in the purely economic sense, Bourdieu uses
the (otherwise redundant) construction “economic capital” to emphasise this
distinction (Lebaron, 2003, p. 562).
As Lebaron notes, Bourdieu’s project amounts to an economic sociology,
which, rather than reducing all human action to ‘profit-seeking’, seeks in-
stead to apply a generalised economistic mode of analysis to the symbolic
order. Indeed, the antecedents to this mode of analysis within Bourdieu’s
own career were born out of confrontation with economists, and a desire
to challenge the prevailing economic discourse, rather than seeking to re-
inforce it (ibid., p. 563).34 This “double move”, as Lebaron describes it,
involved both “the economicization of his analysis of the symbolic order and
the symbolic explanation of the foundations of economic reality” (ibid., p.
563).
Having briefly outlined the main conceptual tools in the Bourdieusian
approach, and their relation to each other as part of a unified theory, we
begin to come near to the issues at the heart of the thesis. To expand
further, we proceed now to the new formulation of the research object.
3.3 A New Object: The Clandestine Circulation
of Capital
As Bourdieu noted, “in order to construct a model of the game [. . . ] one
has to reflect on the different modes of existence of the principles of regula-
tion” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p. 65). This chapter has so far advocated a mode
of analysis in which the principles of regulation are no longer considered as
autonomous rules or norms, but are rather seen as the product of an inter-
action between the social structures of field, capital, and habitus, with each
of these in turn being the product of a contingent social genesis.
How do we use such conceptual tools to conceive of the regulated ex-
change of favours in the context of the modern state? And what can such
a mode of analysis contribute to our understanding of the generative prin-
ciples that lie behind such practices? Further, will such tools enable us to
34See also Lebaron (2001) for a historical overview of Bourdieu’s role in this regard
as part of a long French sociological tradition in confronting the discipline of economics,
involving Durkheim, Simiand and Halbwachs.
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relate these practices to the larger order of social practices of which they
form a part, and hence (in a determinate way) to the reproduction of the
social structure?
The first and most significant break effected by Bourdieusian praxeology
is to view the research object as a form of circulation of socially efficient
resources, each the product of a field of specific relations producing their
own symbolic force. The unequal accumulation of these resources (species
of capital) is the principle through which inequality is (re)produced within
a social space. Hence, the totality of mechanisms for the unequal accumu-
lation of capital can be considered as representing a determinate mode of
domination.
Writing in The Logic of Practice (Bourdieu, 1990c), Bourdieu distin-
guished between two principal modes of domination: “Social formations in
which relations of domination are made, unmade and remade through per-
sonal interactions contrast with those in which such relations are mediated
by objective, institutionalized mechanisms” (ibid., p. 130, emphasis mine).
According to Bourdieu, the principal difference between these two modes
lies in the degree of objectification of capital (ibid., p. 130).
To paraphrase, in Bourdieusian theory personal interactions contrast
with objective, institutionalised mechanisms as distinct modes of domina-
tion, and the principle determining such difference is the degree of objectifi-
cation of capitals (socially efficient resources) which each mode reproduces.
In The Forms of Capital (Bourdieu, 1986b), Bourdieu describes capital as
existing in three forms: embodied, objectified and institutionalised. Thus,
we may conclude that personal interactions circulate (and reproduce) em-
bodied capitals, while objective, institutionalised mechanisms circulate (and
reproduce) objectified and institutionalised capitals.
At the beginning of the The Forms of Capital, Bourdieu proposed the
development of a general science of the economy of practices to “establish
the laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to
the same thing) change into one another” (ibid., p. 247). Hence, rather than
a strict teleology (in which domination evolves gradually from one mode to
the other), Bourdieu seems to invite us to consider the theoretical principles
through which other mechanisms may evolve that would enable social agents
to circulate and accumulate the different forms of capital produced by each
mode of domination.
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In particular, in the final lines of the same work Bourdieu noted - almost
as an aside - that “the more the official transmission of capital is prevented
or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine circulation of capital [. . . ]
become determinant in the reproduction of the social structure” (ibid., p.
255, emphasis mine). By clandestine circulation, Bourdieu intended those
instances when the dominant saw their (highly objectified) capital structure
threatened by changes to those “objective, institutionalized mechanisms” -
that is, mechanisms for the “official transmission of capital” typically guar-
anteed by the state - and thus sought to shift their capital into less objectified
forms through “reproduction strategies capable of ensuring better-disguised
transmission, but at the cost of a greater loss of capital, by exploiting the
greater convertibility of the types of capital” (ibid., p. 255).
This brief reference to the clandestine circulation of capital came to form
the theoretical inspiration for this thesis. When thinking about personalistic
exchange in the context of the modern state, and how it might relate to the
reproduction of the social structure, the concept of clandestine circulation
seemed to offer the beginnings of a rigorous framework through which to
construct a new research object.
The clandestine circulation of capital, being opposed to those mecha-
nisms for the “official” transmission of capital, yet still capable of maintain-
ing (albeit at the cost of a greater loss of capital) an unequal distribution
of capital, presents an objective paradigm through which practices of both
clientelism and corruption can be studied and evaluated as a part of the
broader reproduction strategies within a given social space.
Further, given (as mentioned in the previous section) that different cap-
itals produce varying symbolic forces that adjust the habitus of agents to-
ward their accumulation, such a conceptualisation also offers a framework
through which mechanisms for the circulation and accumulation of capital
can be differentiated according to the symbolic forces associated with them.
In asking how clandestine circulation may first emerge and then become
determinant in the reproduction of the social structure, we are thus in effect
asking how (under what conditions) the mode of domination associated with
personal interactions may function as a form of symbolic violence for the
reproduction of part or all of a social space otherwise reproduced through
objectified mechanisms. This involves identifying the capitals involved, the
specific mechanisms through which they are circulated, and the symbolic
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force produced.
Establishing “the laws” through which such a mode of circulation may
operate is thus the object of this thesis. It involves thinking in terms of the
interplay of habitus, field and capital, which produces regulated practices
that are neither the result of an entirely conscious strategy, nor serving to
fulfil a teleological function in a larger social ‘system’. Practice, that is,
which while arbitrary in its outcomes, is nonetheless historically contingent
in its genesis.
The decision to integrate Bourdieusian praxeology in this manner to
create a new research object represents an original contribution both to
studies of personalistic exchange and Bourdieusian theory. Previously, re-
search has been conducted which has chosen to integrate restricted elements
of Bourdieu’s approach. Rutten (2006), for example, refers to a “habi-
tus of clientelism”, without relating this to any of the generative principles
within Bourdieu’s theory (or even referring directly to Bourdieu at all). The
previously-mentioned works of Auyero (1999, 2000, et.al. 2009) make refer-
ence to Bourdieu’s relational approach, yet in a somewhat naive sense: the
‘client’s point(s) of view’ are neither reintegrated within an objective struc-
ture (social space), nor related to the agent’s habitus, or indeed viewed as
misrecognised; rather, Auyero’s primary concern seems to be normative - to
‘rescue’ clients from the scholastic point of view by returning to them their
own perspective, an approach Bourdieu would have considered phenomeno-
logical.
Likewise Berenschot (2010) attempts to integrate the Bourdieusian con-
cept of field within the study of clientelist practices in India, and in particular
their relation to the state; however, his application of Bourdieu’s framework
makes no reference to the symbolic aspects of domination. In her study of
Soviet-era blat, Ledeneva (1998) attempts to apply the Bourdieusian concept
of misrecognition to explain the varying symbolic forces surrounding such
exchanges, yet she misconstrues Bourdieu’s theory of practice: rather than
relating misrecognition to the symbolic forces acting upon agents within a
field, she avoids concepts such as field and habitus, and instead applies a
rational choice framework to misrecognition, seeing agents as following spe-
cific ‘strategies’ of misrecognition in order to disguise their exchanges (ibid.,
p. 65). When related to the study of corruption, the application of Bour-
dieusian praxeology is even more limited, and has thus far been presented
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primarily in the form of research agendas (see Graaf (2007) and Anders and
Nuijten (2007)).
More promising is the contribution of Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley
(1998), who applied the concepts of capital and habitus to post-Communist
transformation in Eastern Europe, and noted the variations in dominant
capital structures underlying different regime types (ibid., p. 23). While
their observations concerning the trajectory (ibid., p. 45) of these capital
structures, and their effects on agents’ habitus, reflect in some respects a
similar approach to mine, their research object (transition) is quite different,
and their level of analysis much more macro; they also make no reference
to the important distinction between embodiment and objectification which
(as I will argue in the theory chapters) forms the basis of clandestine circu-
lation. Thus, the decision to address personalistic exchange in the context
of the modern state through the prism of clandestine circulation is a project
which finds its only correspondence in the works of Bourdieu himself, and
in particular those relating to the state (of which the collected lectures Sur
L’Etat (Bourdieu, 2012) are the most comprehensive).
3.4 The Research Questions
Having outlined the new research object, it is now possible to define in
greater detail the research questions which will inform the theoretical and
empirical work which follows.
• Definition and Theory:
- What is clandestine circulation? (Defined according to Bourdieu-
sian conceptual tools)
- How does it emerge? (In relation to the genesis of social space)
- What are its effects? (In terms of social reproduction)
- How can it vary? (In the sense of the capitals involved)
• Clandestine Circulation and the State:
- How do we conceptualise the state in relation to clandestine cir-
culation?
- How does the genesis and nature of the state affect the type and
extent of clandestine circulation?
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• Historical Genesis:
- How do changes in the structure of social space affect clandestine
circulation?
- Through what historical processes does clandestine circulation be-
come more or less determinant as a mode of reproduction?
• Clandestine Circulation as Practice:
- How does clandestine circulation function at the level of practice;
what principles regulate it?
- How is such practice embodied in the dispositions of habitus?
- What are the factors limiting such circulation?
• Observing Clandestine Circulation:
- How can clandestine circulation be studied in the field? (Concep-
tual tools and measurement)
- What are the socially efficient resources involved, and how do we
recognise them?
- How do we account for ambiguity and indeterminacy with regard
to clandestine circulation?
- How do we reconcile theoretical constructs with ‘folk terms’ such
as wasta?
3.5 Scope and Limitations of the Research
As mentioned earlier in both the preface and the introduction, this thesis
attempts to provide a contribution on three different levels: conceptual (of
which this first part has been the primary contribution); theoretical (of
which the next part will be the primary contribution); and empirical (of
which the third part is the primary contribution).
In terms of an original contribution based upon research conducted in the
field, the thesis is limited to the study of a single case, that of urban Beirut,
the capital of Lebanon. The decision to restrict fieldwork to a single case was
based upon the demands of the methodology chosen. In his own large-scale
works, Bourdieu most frequently limited himself to a single, highly detailed
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case study. Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984), for instance, was limited to the
structure of cultural consumption within France, while The State Nobility
(Bourdieu, 1996) was limited to the study of the French higher education
system; equally, theoretical works such as Outline of a Theory of Practice
(Bourdieu, 1977) and The Logic of Practice (Bourdieu, 1990c) used fieldwork
conducted in Algeria as the basis for producing generaliseable hypotheses
concerning the predicates of social action.
In each of these cases, the use of a single case study was justified by the
nature of the conceptual tools developed by Bourdieu, whose purpose, as
Wacquant emphasises, is “for transferring knowledge gleaned in one area of
inquiry into another” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 5). Indeed, one
might even argue that a comparative research design within the Bourdieu-
sian framework presents particular difficulties, as the relational approach of
Bourdieu denies the simple transferral of objects from one case to another,
but rather requires for each case the construction of a social space, the iden-
tification of power relations, and the location of objects within the structure
of those relations - a very laborious process which can be easily undermined
through the unthinking “borrowing” of objects from one case to another.35
Hence, the purpose of the case study in this thesis is to provide a detailed
empirical demonstration of the theoretical framework outlined in chapters
5 and 6. I prefer “demonstrate” to “test”, as I do not wish to mislead the
reader into assuming that a hermetic division occurred in the process be-
tween building the theory, generating causal hypotheses, and testing these
in the field. While such a post-positivist method - and its allied goal of fal-
sification - may be of value in certain fields of social research, I believe that
in qualitative sociology it is too easily subverted. Rather, in epistemolog-
ical terms the research model followed in this thesis was largely abductive
(Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009), and may be understood as a research
programme (Lakatos, 1978), in which the postulates of Bourdieusian theory
represent the “hard core”, and the development of a theory of clandestine
circulation the “protective belt”.36
Thus, the theoretical framework of clandestine circulation was conceived
35Consider for example the role of money, which can vary significantly from one social
space to another, being in some cases a taboo in gift exchange, and in others highly
esteemed (as noted by Kipnis (1996, p.294) in the case of China).
36See also Burawoy (1989) for a defence of the research programme as against falsifica-
tionism, through an analytical comparison of practical examples of the two.
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with generaliseability in mind, as the references to phenomena such as blat
and guanxi in the following chapters demonstrate. Applying this theoretical
framework to a specific empirical field site however requires constructing the
social space of that site, and in particular the structure of relations within it.
This produces knowledge which is not directly transferrable, and insofar as
a social space may vary even within the same country, claims relating to the
specific structure of relations made with regard to the field site (Ras Beirut)
cannot be considered as directly transferrable beyond it (for example, to
Tripoli, or within Beirut, to Dahiyeh) without first applying the same work
of constructing the social space of that new site.
To emphasise again: the theoretical framework of clandestine circulation
is intended to be generaliseable, in the Bourdieusian manner, through the
transferability of concepts; the detailed investigation of the field site is an
example of the practical application of that framework, and its results can-
not be transferred or generalised without first going back to and applying
the same framework. The role of the case study thus lies in demonstrat-
ing the utility of that theoretical framework in producing useful knowledge
about social phenomena in an empirical setting, rather than in testing (in a
falsifiable sense) the theoretical framework itself, per se.37
A final observation concerns the scope of the thesis. In order to ad-
dress the most important aspects of the research question I considered it
necessary to focus the empirical section on the current state of the field in
Beirut, in order to properly explore the complexity of the structures and
practices involved. It was therefore not possible to provide a separate exam-
ination of all the historical processes responsible for the particular genesis
of Lebanese social space, in particular in terms of the trajectory of dom-
inant capital structures and the historical emergence of specific forms of
clandestine circulation. Such analysis is included within the theoretical sec-
tion from the perspective of similar kinds of clandestine circulation in other
contexts. Moreover, where possible I have indicated within the empirical
section those historical trends which I believe to have been most significant
in the Lebanese context, in keeping with the mode of analysis developed in
the theoretical chapters.
37Again, see Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, p.) - “Standard scientific methods maxi-
mize all sorts of important values, such as logical coherence and rigor, but they do a poor
job when it comes to the decisive purpose of human cognition: the efficient and efficacious
production of useful knowledge”.
Chapter 4
The Field Site
I think that wasta exists
everywhere in the world. It’s just
that in some parts of the world it’s
for elites, for example [. . . ] where
here it’s available for everyone.
Informant, Lebanese male
university student, early 20s
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general introduction to the
field site chosen as the empirical case study for this research, urban Beirut.
It thus serves a double purpose as both an overview and a justification, and
while observations of a historical and empirical nature are made, it contains
no claims of a causal nature. All claims of a substantive and original nature
relating to the field site are made in the empirical section (chapters 7 and
8).
The chapter begins with an outline of historical factors which have
shaped Lebanon (and Beirut in particular), and then proceeds to outline
some of the most salient features of contemporary Lebanese society, in terms
both of socio-demographic structure and social practices. The chapter at-
tempts to demonstrate how these factors provide a compelling opportu-
nity for empirical observation of the research object, clandestine circulation,
through the application of a transferrable theoretical framework.
4.1 Lebanon
The Republic of Lebanon is a small state located on the eastern coast of
the Mediterranean. It borders Syria to the north and east, and Israel to
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the south (a state which the Lebanese government does not recognise). It
has a land mass of 10,452 sq. km (the smallest in continental Asia), and a
population of 5.5 million (2009).1
Geographically, Lebanon is dominated by the mountain range which
bears its name, and which begins at the Syrian border in the north, run-
ning parallel to the coast for some 170km (almost the entire length of the
country). To the east of the Mount Lebanon range and running parallel to
it is the narrow Bekaa valley, while to the east of the Bekaa is the Anti-
Lebanon range, which marks the border with Syria. The presence of these
two ranges within Lebanese territory leads to a high level of precipitation by
regional standards (661mm in 2009 according to the World Bank),2 provid-
ing the country with much greater water security than its neighbours. The
Lebanese capital, Beirut, is located roughly halfway along the coast on a
knuckle-like promontory, and as such follows an east/west axis (in contrast
to the largely north/south orientation of the rest of the country). The city
and its suburbs have a population of around 2 million (35% of the total
population).
The modern Republic of Lebanon has endured a complicated nativity, a
fact well reflected in its equally complex social structure. The geographical
scope (not to mention political constitution) of Lebanon has been extremely
discontinuous: from 1516 until 1920 the territories currently constituting the
modern republic formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and were regularly
redivided into different administrative structures.3
According to Traboulsi (2007, pp. 3-23), the history of modern Lebanon
as a polity begins with the Emirate of Mount Lebanon in the 1520s, estab-
lished following the Ottoman conquest of Syria in 1516. During this period
the Druze Ma’an family were appointed mu¨ltezim (tax-farmers) of the Shouf
(the part of the Mount Lebanon range to the south of Beirut). This was a
common means employed by the Ottomans for bringing a degree of imperial




3The brief synopsis of Lebanese history which follows draws chiefly from Traboulsi
(2007) and Salibi (1988). The former follows a more materialist, the latter a more con-
structivist approach to Lebanon’s historical development. More recent works, such as
Makdisi (2000) and Weiss (2010), have filled in notable gaps regarding, respectively, Eu-
ropean colonial influences and the often over-looked role of the Shia. For the purposes of
the current overview however, I consider Traboulsi and Salibi to be adequate guides.
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control to mountainous or desert regions. Following the apparent success of
the Ma’ans in this task one of their number, Fakhr al-Din, was in around
1590 appointed Emir (or Sanjak-bay) of the two sanjaks of Beirut and Sidon
(the latter of which included Mount Kisrawan to the north of Beirut).
This marked the first point when the two mountains were administered
under the same authority, and despite the misadventures of Fakhr al-Din (he
was exiled to Tuscany before eventually being executed by the Ottomans in
1635),4 the Shouf and Kisrawan would become steadily more integrated -
particularly as the Druze landlords of the Shouf increasingly encouraged the
Maronite Christians of Kisrawan to emigrate to work in the nascent silk
industry established by Fakhr al-Din.
However, as Salibi (1988, p. 65) emphasises, it was not until the early
decades of the nineteenth century that the whole of the Lebanon range came
to be referred to locally as a unity. Following the massacres of 1860 (in which
the Druze expelled many Maronites from the Shouf, killing between 900 and
2,000 in the village of Deir al Qamar (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 34)), the European
powers intervened to demand a special status for Mount Lebanon, granted
by the Sublime Porte in 1861.
For the first time the northern and southern parts of the Lebanon range
were integrated into a single, semi-autonomous mutasarrifiya (the first sub-
division of a wilaya, or province); however, the piecemeal nature of Lebanon’s
integration was demonstrable from the fact that Beirut continued to lie out-
side the borders of the mutasarrifiya of Mount Lebanon. Rather, the thriv-
ing port became the capital of its own coastal wilaya in 1887, stretching to
encompass Latakia in the north and Nablus in the south, and yet cut off
from these territories by the mutasarrifiya which now completely encircled
it.
Already the future Lebanese capital was beginning to function as a key
site of capitalist integration between Europe and the Syrian hinterland.
This tension between Beirut (and in a more general sense the whole of
the Lebanese coast) as a site of European (capitalist) exploitation, and the
mountains as a site of European (religious) protection, established a division
within modern Lebanon between cosmopolitanism and sectarianism that en-
dures to this day, and which continues to find its expression within the very
4For an account of the fascinating life of Fakhr al-Din, including his stay in Renaissance
Florence, see Gorton (2013).
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institutions of the Lebanese state. For example, the (Sunni) Prime Minis-
ter’s office is located in the former Ottoman Saray in the heart of downtown
Beirut, while the (Maronite) Presidential Palace is to be found outside of
the centre in Ba↪abda, formerly part of the old mutasarrifiya.5
From 1920 (following the defeat of Ottoman Turkey in World War I)
Lebanon came under the administration of France thanks to a League of
Nations mandate, a position bolstered by secret wartime negotiations with
the British formalised in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In a similar move to
British policy in Palestine (where, following the Balfour Declaration, it had
become a declared intention of the colonial authorities to create “a home-
land for the Jews”), the French set about partitioning Lebanon from Syria,
ostensibly in order to protect the minority interests of the local Christian
population.
The French decided, however, that the territory of the former mutasar-
rifiya would be insufficient to sustain an independent state, and therefore
annexed additional territory to create a “Greater Lebanon”. The new ter-
ritories included not only Beirut and the coastal cities of Tripoli, Sidon and
Tyre, but also the Bekaa valley and parts of the Anti-Lebanon range. In-
deed, the annexed territories contained a greater population than Mount
Lebanon (380,000 to 330,000), including large numbers of Shia and Sunni
muslims who were largely pro-Syrian or pan-Arab in sympathy, as well as
greater financial resources than the mutasarrifiya - resources which were
soon monopolised for the benefit of the Mountain (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 81).
The Republic of Lebanon was thus established in 1926, with a slim Chris-
tian majority, and a large number of citizens at best apathetic to their new
state, and at worst openly hostile to it. The new republic remained under
French tutelage until 1943, when independence was formally declared in the
midst of the Second World War. In order to strike an agreement acceptable
to all sides however, prior to independence the National Pact was signed.
This agreement (which does not carry the force of law) is in effect Lebanon’s
true constitution, as it doles out positions in the country’s administration
according to a strict sectarian formula; there are 18 officially recognised
5According to the National Pact (Lebanon’s informal constitutional agreement for di-
viding government offices along sectarian lines) the Prime Minister of Lebanon must be
a Sunni Muslim (a community typically established in Lebanon’s coastal towns), while
the President must be a Maronite Christian (a community historically associated with the
mountain).
4.2. BEIRUT 85
religious communities in Lebanon.6
Since then Lebanon has endured mixed fortunes: during the 1950s and
1960s it was a fashionable and wealthy regional entrepoˆt, functioning as
banker to the newly rich oil states of the Gulf. Large inequalities flourished
however, and the commanding heights of the economy were controlled by a
relatively small clique (ibid., pp. 115-120). Moreover, Lebanon harboured
a large, poorly integrated community of Palestinian refugees, who had fled
their homeland in 1948, and who lived in camps administered by their own
political representation, the PLO. Growing tensions between the PLO and
the Maronite-dominated Lebanese administration eventually escalated into
a brutal civil war (1975-1990), which split the country in two along largely
sectarian lines which ran straight through the middle of the capital, Beirut.
Since 1990 Lebanon has technically been at peace with itself; yet it has
struggled to establish its autonomy from more powerful neighbours (being
occupied by Syria between 1976 and 2005), and has remained riven by sec-
tarian divisions and insecurity.
4.2 The Field Site: Urban Beirut
As already mentioned, Beirut is the capital of Lebanon and by far its largest
city, with an official population of around 2 million underestimating the
extent to which the coastal and mountain regions surrounding the city are
absorbed within its economy.
The city has had an intriguing history. Most likely founded as a settle-
ment in Phoenician times, it achieved prominence from the third century
onwards as a (Latin) centre of Roman law, in what remained a predominately
Hellenic region.7 However, while Beirut’s prominent role in the development
of the Justinian Code was to have important ramifications in the later his-
tory of European jurisprudence, Roman Beirut was largely wiped out by a
catastrophic earthquake in 551.
In the centuries that followed (save for an interlude of some 170 years
during the crusades) Beirut fell firmly within the orbit of the Islamic world.
6For the record, these are: Alawite, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian,
Chaldean (Catholic), Coptic, Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Isma’ili, Jewish,
Latin Catholic, Maronite, Protestant, Sunni, Shia, Syriac Catholic, and Syriac Orthodox.
7The establishment of the Roman colony of Berytus (either in 27 BC or by Agrippa in
14 BC with veterans from the Second Triumvirate Wars) gave the city a special status in
Roman Syria under the ius italicum. See Kassir (2010, pp. 42-55).
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While no longer playing so important a political role, Beirut nonetheless
seems to have maintained its strategic importance as both a trading post
and shipyard. Under the Ottomans it initially held a subsidiary role to
Sidon as the principle Damascene port, yet in the nineteenth century the
city’s population exploded (from between 4,000-6,000 to more than 100,000)
as port activity flourished and Beirut became the principle port of Syria.
Beirut’s unexpected transformation was a strange (and perhaps fated)
echo of its Roman origins, as the modern coastal city became the key site of
European economic and cultural penetration of the Arab world. The con-
struction of a new port by Ibrahim Pasha (son of Muhammad ↪Ali, ruler of
Egypt) during that dynasty’s brief period of suzerainty (1831-1841) certainly
helped matters, as did Beirut’s later promotion to capital of the wilaya of
Sidon in 1842. Beirut was also chosen (alongside Bursa and Adrianople) as
a ‘model city’ by the Ottoman adminstration during the Tanzimat reforms
(Hanssen, 2005, p. 33-34).
Yet of equal importance were the various missions which accompanied
the West’s economic expansion in the region. Beirut was chosen as the
site for both the first Protestant and Catholic universities in the Middle
East, with the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University
of Beirut) founded in 1866, and the Universite´ Saint-Joseph opening nine
years later under the joint auspices of France and the Holy See. These two
seats of higher learning were in addition to the dozens of smaller mission
schools which opened in the same period, and which were to result in the
Lebanese bourgeoisie’s famous trilingualism and which - in the thesis of
Antonius (1938) - contributed greatly to the broader cultural and political
renaissance in the Arab world in the late 19th century.
Beirut was to change still further in the 20th century. Not only did its
position as capital of the new Lebanese Republic attract waves of substan-
tial urban migration, but the city would also find its communal structure
significantly transformed. While historically home to large communities of
Sunni Muslim and Greek Orthodox, with smaller numbers of Maronite and
Druze, both the Armenian Genocide during WWI and the Arab defeat in
1948 were to create large new communities of Armenian and Palestinian
refugees. Added to these were large numbers of Shia Muslims migrating to
Beirut from the south and the Bekaa to work in the new industries which
sprang up after WWII. By the 1960s these different communities - living
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in both camps and suburbs - had formed a ‘poverty belt’ of some 400,000
inhabitants (of a population of around one million) which ringed the city
(Traboulsi, 2007, p. 161).
The growing contradictions of Lebanon’s liberal, open markets controlled
by a powerful elite and the relative poverty of the rest of the population be-
came increasingly difficult to reconcile in the run-up to the civil war. As
Traboulsi notes, “while successive waves of migrants from the rural areas
crammed into shantytowns and squats and ravaged entire suburbs”, Beirut
also contained no fewer than 40-50,000 empty luxury apartments - the prod-
uct of rampant speculation from Gulf sheikhs and wealthy e´migre´s (ibid., p.
160).
When it came in 1975, the civil war would see the relatively mixed
sectarian geography of the city divided firmly into Christian east and Muslim
west, with much of the historic centre falling along the infamous ‘green line’
between the two. The degree of destruction and disorganisation created by
the war was substantial, and its effects are still very much visible to this
day. The two urban hubs of Hamra to the west and Ashrafieh to the east
continue to display the vivid signs of unregulated expansion encouraged by
the war years, while the redeveloped ‘Beirut Central District’ (BCD, often
simply called ‘Solidere’ after the private company charged with redeveloping
it) contains all the hallmarks of empty luxury which marked pre-war Beirut,





iyeh, a word meaning simply ‘suburb’ in Arabic) have meanwhile become
the tightly-controlled strongholds of the (armed) Shia political movements
Hezbollah and Amal.
4.3 Socio-demographic Characteristics: the Struc-
ture of Inequality
Data on Lebanon are notoriously poor;8 official government statistics are
unreliable, private polling companies often use suspect methodology, and
8As one respondent (a research officer in an anti-corruption NGO) described the sit-
uation: “the figures in Lebanon are really points of view”. In his opinion, the Lebanese
government’s statistics agency has been “sabotaged” by vested interests - “like many of
the public administrations it’s over-staffed where you don’t need staff and it’s very seri-
ously under-staffed where you need the staff. And this is done to the benefit of the private
sector, which is the same as the people who own, who are, the government.”
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datasets generated by NGOs and international agencies (such as the United
Nations) tend to lack the necessary detail to draw precise conclusions. Data
presented here have thus been chosen for primarily illustrative purposes, and
clearly erroneous data have been rejected. I have also tried, where possible,
to present data from a number of different sources, in the hope that the
general trend may be better discerned, and individual errors more easily
compensated for.
At first glance, and particularly in comparison with its neighbours, Lebanon
seems relatively prosperous. According to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), GDP per capita at purchasing power parity is US$15,986 (World Eco-
nomic Outlook, 2012). This compares favourably with Egypt (US$6,594),
Jordan (US$6,002), and Syria (US$5,041, 2010 figures). Lebanon also scores
relatively highly in human development indicators, with a score of 0.745 in
the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index
(HDI) for 2012, putting it in 72nd place overall. Lebanon’s score is well
above the global average (0.694), which is itself above the Arab average
(0.652), and falls only slightly below the standard for high human develop-
ment (0.758).
In subjective terms, the Lebanese also seem to have a relatively evenly
distributed class structure (table 4.1). As the figures (taken from a UNDP
study) show, in Lebanon as a whole around two-thirds of the population
define themselves as either “middle class” or “middle class to poor”, with
around a quarter defining themselves as poor, and around 5% placing them-
selves at either extreme (“financially comfortable” or “hopeless”). Within
Beirut there is a significantly larger percentage defining themselves as “mid-
dle class” (almost half of the sample), and fewer defining themselves as
“poor”. The subjective figures for Beirut seem to be supported by the
UNDP’s own objective findings, which recorded a “very low prevalence of
extreme poverty (below 2%) and overall poverty (5% to 8%)” in the capital,
as opposed to high levels of poverty in the south and north (UNDP, 2007,
p. 47).
While the statistics seem to demonstrate that Lebanon is a relatively
wealthy nation, with high levels of human development and (in Beirut at
least) comparatively low levels of poverty, closer examination of the data
reveals high degrees of inequality. As the UNDP’s figures illustrate (figure
4.1), consumption in Lebanon is heavily skewed toward the top two deciles,
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Table 4.1: Lebanese Citizens’ Subjective Class
Lebanon Beirut (difference)
Financially comfortable 4.78% 5.07% +0.29
Middle class 31.21% 44.79% +13.58
Middle class to Poor 33.84% 34.02% +0.18
Poor 24.93% 11.85% -13.08
Hopeless 5.24% 4.27% -0.97
Source: UNDP (ibid., p. 23)
which account for 43.55% of total expenditures. Indeed, the UNDP most
likely underestimates the extent of economic inequality within Lebanon, as
its findings are based on a combination of its own survey data and govern-
ment household budget data. Such methods (reliability aside) are poor at
capturing extreme concentrations of wealth, a fact well illustrated by the
UNDP’s estimates of the GINI coefficient in Lebanon. At only 0.361 for
all Lebanon (0.341 for Beirut),9 the UNDP found inequality in Lebanon to
be “comparable to other middle-income countries”, and “much lower” than
Latin America (ibid., p. 43).
However, the UNDP based its GINI measurement on per capita con-
sumption at average national prices.10 Regardless of reliability of data, such
a method accounts neither for inequalities in income nor wealth. A bet-
ter measurement of the long-term structure of economic inequality can be
garnered from a GINI coefficient extrapolated from this latter category.11
Credit Suisse, a financial services company, publishes a report on patterns
of global wealth every year through its research arm. The GINI coefficient
produced by Credit Suisse is designed precisely to capture those instances
of extreme concentrations of wealth which are otherwise missed by panel
surveys. In the two most recent reports (2012 and 2013), Lebanon’s GINI
ranks (respectively) as the 5th and 4th highest in the world, at 0.857 (2012)
9See UNDP (2007, p. 44). The GINI coefficient is a measure of inequality, with 1
representing perfect inequality, and 0 perfect equality.
10It is interesting to note that the usual sources for comparative GINI figures (such as
the World Bank) do not contain entries for Lebanon.
11The advantage of using wealth over income for deriving a GINI coefficient is not
merely that it accounts for the accumulated assets of individuals and families, but that it
also better captures the extent of economic capture by the extremely rich, whose nominal
income from year to year may, by comparison, be relatively small.
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Consumption in Lebanon (2004-2005)



















Source: UNDP (ibid., p. 109)
and 0.863 (2013).12 In either year the only nations to score higher are the
off-shore tax havens of Belize and St. Kitts and Nevis, and the former Soviet
republics of Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan. In data extrapolated from
the Credit Suisse findings, Lebanese business magazine Executive estimated
that 48% of Lebanon’s private wealth of $91bn is held by 0.3% of the popu-
lation (8,900 individuals),13 a disparity further emphasised by the difference
between mean wealth per adult ($30,868 in 2013) and median wealth per
adult ($6,076).
As well as extreme inequalities in wealth, Lebanese society also demon-
strates extremely low levels of social mobility. While objective data on social
mobility in Lebanon are nonexistent, Panizza and El-Khoury (2001) have
12See Credit Suisse Research Institute (2012, pp. 93-97) and Credit Suisse Research
Institute (2013, pp. 98-102).
13See http://www.executive-magazine.com/millionaires-own-half-lebanese-
wealth/ (accessed 15/11/2013). The Executive findings are a further argument against
using panel data to derive GINI coefficients: almost half of Lebanon’s wealth would
appear to be concentrated in a percentage of the population so small it would not be
captured by normal confidence intervals under assumptions of regular distribution. Such
a concentration of wealth is further supported by analysis of Lebanese bank deposits,
where half of accumulated bank deposits ($62bn) are concentrated in 0.8% of accounts
(fewer than 500). See http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/how-lebanese-banks-
are-getting-rich-citizens-expense (accessed 10/07/2014).
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applied a proxy developed by Dahan and Gaviria (2001)14 to the Lebanese
Population and Housing Survey conducted between 1994 and 1996 to de-
velop an estimate. Their results showed that social mobility in Lebanon
was “similar to the levels of the most unequal Latin American countries”
(Panizza and El-Khoury, 2001, p. 16), and almost three times as high as
the US (ibid., p. 12), with 55% of the variance in socioeconomic failure
explainable by household-specific factors.15 They also found that mobility
is highly dependent on economic status, with poor households having “ex-
tremely low levels of social mobility”, and rich households having levels of
social mobility comparable to those in the US (ibid., p. 13).16
The extreme extent to which wealth and opportunity in Lebanon has
apparently been captured by a narrow elite is one of the principle objec-
tive criteria making Beirut such a compelling case study for clandestine
circulation. In countries with a high incidence of poverty it is by no means
unusual to see relatively small elites place themselves in rent-capturing posi-
tions. However, what is especially intriguing about Lebanon (and specifically
Beirut, where Lebanese economic activity is to a large extent concentrated)
is the degree to which wealth has been captured in a highly developed, os-
tensibly democratic society with a relatively large middle class. Neither has
the country’s prolonged civil war affected matters (war being, according to
the recent thesis of Piketty (2014), one of the chief mechanisms for level-
ling inequalities in wealth). Indeed, when Lebanon is compared to nearby
countries of a similar size and level of human development, the contrast is
particularly stark: according to Credit Suisse (2013) Georgia, which has a
population of 3.2 million and a HDI score the same as Lebanon (0.745 in
2012) has a wealth-derived GINI of 0.680; while Jordan (population 3.9m,
HDI 0.700) has a GINI of 0.659.17
14The index is based on intergenerational schooling mobility, and enables social mobility
to be estimated without needing to rely on longitudinal data.
15It should be noted that Panizza and El Khoury designed their dataset to examine
variations in social mobility between different religious groups, and hence excluded data
from Beirut (which did not contain disaggregated data). However, their results controlled
for urban/rural areas, and did not find any difference in social mobility between the two.
16Panizza and El-Khoury (2001) use an index of social mobility - P - originally derived
from Robinson (1950), as corrected by Kremer and Maskin (1996), which gives a value of
between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating family background plays a more important
role. Lebanon scored 0.55, well above the Latin American average of 0.49, and 0.20 for
the US (Panizza and El-Khoury, 2001, p. 10-12).
17It is worth including the World Bank GINI figures of both for purposes of comparison
with the Credit Suisse figures. The World Bank GINI coefficient is derived primarily from
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Whatever the mechanisms which have enabled the Lebanese elite to place
themselves in such successful rent-capturing positions, they have not been
overcome by economic, educational, or political development, but rather
appear more entrenched than ever. Indeed, the only counterparts to the
Lebanese kleptocracy seem to be either the post-Soviet oligarchies of Russia,
the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, or tax-haven enclaves of the global elite such as
Belize and St. Kitts and Nevis. As we shall see, the former cases in particular
share further affinities with Lebanon, not least in blat-like practices which
follow a similar logic to Lebanese wasta.
However, this is not to suggest that extreme wealth capture should be
considered as the dependent variable of this thesis; rather, I consider the ex-
treme concentration of wealth and opportunity within Lebanon to be merely
the most visible symptom of a complex of inequalities, the production and
reproduction of which can be best captured through the paradigm of clan-
destine circulation.
4.4 Social Insecurity: Corruption, Clientelism and
Wasta
The last, and strongest, justification for choosing Lebanon concerns the well-
noted prevalence of corruption, clientelism, cronyism and nepotism, all of
which seem to be instrumental in reproducing the particular structure of
inequality noted above, and which contribute to a social fabric in which the
public interest is notable chiefly by its absence.
Table 4.2 compares perceptions of corruption in Lebanon with nearby
Jordan,18 a fellow Levantine Arab nation which - as mentioned previously -
shares a similar level of human development and population to Lebanon, but
has a GDP per capita almost one-third the size. The results demonstrate a
stark contrast: whereas only 12% of Jordanians surveyed considered corrup-
tion to have increased “a lot” in the previous two years, in Lebanon the figure
was 61%; 71% of Lebanese surveyed considered public sector corruption to
household survey data, and is based upon “income or consumption” as opposed to wealth,
leaving it open to the same criticisms as the UNDP data. The latest figure for Georgia is
0.413 (2008), and for Jordan 0.354 (2010). See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SI.POV.GINI (accessed 15/11/2013).
18Data available at http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=
lebanon and http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=jordan (ac-
cessed 21/05/2014); sample = 1,000 for each country.
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Table 4.2: Comparing Corruption in Lebanon and Jordan (2013, %)
- - - -/+ + + +
Overall Levela
Leb 2 3 10 24 61
Jor 5 13 44 27 12
Public Sectorb
Leb 1 1 5 22 71
Jor 4 10 25 31 30
State Capturec
Leb 1 3 7 39 50
Jor 6 24 37 28 5
Anti-Corruptiond
Leb 1 11 11 29 48
Jor 7 21 22 31 19
a“Over the past two years, has the level of corruption in this country/territory
changed?” decreased a lot; decreased a little; stayed the same; increased a little;
increased a lot
b“To what extent do you think corruption is a problem in the public sector
in this country/territory?” not a problem at all; not really a problem; a slight
problem; a problem; a serious problem
c“To what extent is this government run by a few big entities acting in their
own best interests?” not at all; limited extent; somewhat; large extent; entirely
d“How effective do you think your government’s actions are in the fight against
corruption?” very effective; effective; neither effective nor ineffective; ineffective;
very ineffective
(Source: Transparency International)
be “a serious problem”, against 30% in Jordan; 89% of Lebanese consid-
ered their government to have been captured either “entirely” or to a “large
extent” by vested interests, against 33% in Jordan; and 77% of Lebanese
considered government anti-corruption strategies to be either “very ineffec-
tive” or “ineffective”, against 50% in Jordan.
The same survey also attempted to disaggregate perceptions of corrup-
tion according to individual institutions; in Lebanon, however, lack of faith
in public institutions appears to be relatively uniform: the ‘best’ scoring
institutions were the military and NGOs, which ‘only’ 63% of respondents
considered to be either corrupt or extremely corrupt; by contrast, 69% con-
sidered the judiciary to be corrupt or extremely corrupt, and 68% political
parties and parliament. Public servants (68%), doctors and health profes-
sionals (68%) and the education system (67%) did not escape censure, while
even religious bodies were considered corrupt by 65% of respondents.
94 CHAPTER 4. THE FIELD SITE
Comparing these scores with Tunisia,19 we find a much greater contrast
across institutions: only 14% of Tunisians believe the military to be corrupt,
rising to 33% for NGOs and health workers, 40% for parliament, 49% for
civil servants, and 56% for the judiciary. Indeed, the only public institution
in Tunisia to score higher in terms of perceptions of corruption than its
Lebanese counterpart is the police force (69% to 65%) - hardly surprising
considering the role of the police in attempting to suppress the Tunisian
revolution in 2010/11.
This generalised lack of trust in Lebanon’s public institutions sits along-
side a more widespread sense of insecurity. When interviewing young peo-
ple from three low-income communities about their perceptions of trust,
Khawaja et al. (2006, p. 1310) discovered that 86% agreed with the state-
ment “one must be vigilant and cautious when dealing with people”, with
a significantly higher percentage in the predominantly Lebanese neighbour-
hoods of Hay el Sellom and Naba↪a (92.9% and 95.7% respectively) than the
Palestinian neighbourhood of Burj el Barajneh (72%).
These figures are supported by Hanf (2007, p. 7), who noted that distrust
in general in Lebanon had risen from 78% in 2002 to 84% in 2006, with
no statistically significant differences across religious communities.20 By
contrast, Hanf noted that, over the same period, “the increase in trust in
members of the same religious community is nothing less than spectacular”,
with the figure jumping from 20% in 2002 to 41% in 2006 (ibid., p. 8).
This return to sectarian solidarity is also observed by Yassin (2012), who
found in focus groups held with young Beirutis that “symbolic boundaries”
between sects were substantial, and frequently predicated on anxiety and
fear. A closer analysis of the statistics in Khawaja et al. (2006) seems to
bear out a similar conclusion: nearly all measures of trust were higher in
Burj el Barajneh than Hay el Sellom and Naba↪a. As Khawaja et al. (ibid., p.
1312) note, such higher levels of solidarity (despite higher relative depriva-
tion in the Palestinian community) “might be a direct result of experiencing
economic and political exclusion in the mainstream Lebanese society”. By
19None were available for Jordan, and Tunisia represents the next best regional compari-
son in terms of population size, economy and human development. Figures for Tunisia may
be found online at http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country?country=tunisia
(accessed 21/05/2014).
20Hanf’s precise question was “You should always be careful. You cannot trust the
people you live or work with.”
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contrast, the more homogenous sectarian profile of Hay el Sellom (“99.9%
Muslim” according to Khawaja et. al.) compared with Naba↪a (“77% Chris-
tian”) may explain why levels of trust in the former were generally higher
than the latter.21
At the qualitative level Das and Davidson (2011, pp. 323-332) discov-
ered a similar situation in the mixed neighbourhood of Karm el Zeitoun.22
They reported that “perceptions regarding social connectedness within the
community vary quite significantly”, with older residents in particular com-
paring the current situation negatively with that existing prior to the war.
As one resident noted: “The neighbours were better before. [Now] peo-
ple talk a lot about each other and I don’t like this.” Similarly, a female
from the minority Muslim community claimed that, despite there being “no
racism”, nonetheless “you can’t depend on your neighbours for help. They
stand and look at each other.” In general, Das and Davidson noted that
“the social capital23 that residents have tends to come from smaller geo-
graphically defined areas within Karm el Zeitoun”, compared with a “lack
of strong relationships on a wider community level”.
Rising perceptions of corruption, falling levels of generalised trust, and
an apparent retreat to sectarian solidarity appear to be symptoms of a much
broader sense of alienation within Lebanese society, further manifested in
the decline of civic values of coexistence and in the physical deterioration
of public space. Khalaf (2012, p. 139-143), for example, discusses at some
length Lebanon’s current ‘anomie’ which, following Durkheim, he defines
as “a social state in which society’s norms can no longer impose effective
control over people’s impulses”, and in which the Lebanese “rather than
being released from their prewar excesses, have discovered insatiable desires
for extravagant consumerism, acquisitiveness and longing for immoderate
forms of leisure and sterile recreation” (ibid., p. 139-140). Khalaf notes
that -
Even the ordinary courtesies and decencies, a modicum of atten-
tion to the needs and expectations of others, are overlooked, of-
ten with callous indifference [. . . ] Queuing for one’s turn, waiting
2138.8% of respondents in Naba↪a claimed they could trust “‘no-one”, as against 26.7%
in Hay el Sellom (Khawaja et al., 2006, p. 1310).
22Found in east Beirut and more or less adjacent to Naba↪a.
23In the Putnam sense.
96 CHAPTER 4. THE FIELD SITE
in line, geniality, showing some deference to those in need of as-
sistance, are all readily neglected [. . . ] Reckless driving, strident
and boisterous street conduct, deafening car horns, excessive
smoking and littering in public spaces and the violation of ordi-
nances regulating public hygiene and civil conduct are much too
apparent. They are also committed with much bravado, swag-
gering display of defiance and vain machismo. (Khalaf, 2012, p.
139-140)
While something of a Jeremiad, Khalaf’s observations are to a large ex-
tent echoed by Seidman (2012), who in his description of the neighbourhood
of Hamra describes a “crippling civic indifference and paranoia” (ibid., p.
12) - an “almost studied indifference to others”, which seems the antithesis
of the ‘civil inattention’ theorised by Goffman (1963) to describe civic coex-
istence in mid-century USA. Similarly Yassin (2012, p. 216) concludes that
young Lebanese live in a state of “coexistence without empathy”, restricting
their social trust to “a small circle of relatives and close friends”, and confin-
ing their social mixing to ‘banal’ spaces which carry little meaning beyond
their primary function of “shopping, leisure or work” (ibid., p. 212).
The spatial and topographical effects of Lebanon’s ‘anomie’ - briefly
touched on here by Yassin - are quite profound and extensive, and certainly
represent the most visible aspect of the country’s current predicament. Sei-
dman, for instance, notes how in Hamra “A cityscape dotted with empty
lots, deserted squares, abandoned buildings, vacated galleries and cinemas,
and the commercialization of almost all common areas underscores a dete-
riorating public space” -
Sidewalks suddenly break off, forcing pedestrians to walk on the
street or a dirt walkway [. . . ] Many streets lack any green space
[. . . ] there are no traffic lights, and while there are stop signs,
no one obeys them. Cars routinely ignore one-way directional
traffic rules; motor scooters and motorcycles freely move between
crowded streets and sidewalks; parking space is expanded by
using sidewalks [. . . ] (Seidman, 2012, p. 9)
Environmental degradation and the widespread ineffectiveness of plan-
ning regulations have also been a recurring theme in Khalaf’s research;24
24See for example Khalaf and Kongstad, 1973; Khalaf, 1985; Khalaf, 1993. In Lebanon’s
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however, these effects are by no means consistent across Beirut’s urban en-
vironment. Rather, recent research from Fawaz, 2009a; Fawaz, 2009b, Krij-
nen and Fawaz (2010), and Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (2012) has analysed
how broader inequalities in power are deeply implicated in the production
of space in contemporary Beirut.
In particular, the ‘informalization’ of decision-making, coupled with the
relative absence of the state in regulating construction, has benefitted capital
at the expense of the general population. For instance, in the informal
settlement of Hayy el Sellom, Fawaz (2009a, p. 101-102) noted that, despite
severe problems relating to structural soundness and the failure of developers
to meet contractual obligations, only eight cases had been brought to court
in a complex of 1,500 housing units - and indeed, all of the eight cases were
raised by absentee landlords (rather than residents), many of whom lived
abroad.
By contrast, Krijnen and Fawaz (2010) have noted how, in the case of
high-end developments (which can command a price of up to $10,000 per
square metre), not only were new regulations such as the 2004 Building Law
“drafted by a handful of developers” (ibid., p. 123), but exemptions pushed
through in the 1990s to promote investment meant that local municipalities
seldom had a say in the issuing of building permits for such developments
(ibid., p. 123-124).
The result is an even more pronounced discrepancy than that noted
by Traboulsi, between, on the one hand, the (largely empty) “high-end”
developments of global capital, and on the other, the over-crowded, often
poorly-maintained and under-serviced neighbourhoods of the general popu-
lation. The clearest expression of the former is found in Solidere, where the
complete liquidation of prior holdings (and their conversion into corporate
stock) has created a satellite of global capital in the middle of the city: a
privatised space where development is carried out under a separate legal
framework to the rest of Beirut, and where public order is monitored by
private security contractors.
Beyond Solidere, by contrast, Beirut’s neighbourhoods tend to remain
divided between the varying sectarian militias - save for isolated islands of
Predicament, Khalaf claims that not more than 7% of Lebanese built environment has been
constructed according to predetermined physical planning (Khalaf, 1987, p. 235), while
his reflections on pre-war planning are a useful rejoinder to anyone who might consider
the current situation to be purely a product of the civil war (Khalaf, 1993, pp. 18-18).
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state security around government institutions or the homes of prominent
politicians.25 Unlike Solidere, these spaces remain under the hold of pre-
existing planning, tenency and inheritance laws, the unequal application of
which conspires to create an urban landscape of extreme paradox: crumbling
tenements from the 1920s and 1930s are wedged between vacant lots and
20+ storey condominiums of dubious legal provenance.
Alongside “old rent” (which can, like rent control in New York, be passed
down through generations), the issue of Lebanon’s complicated inheritance
laws means that ownership of some older properties in these neighbourhoods
may be divided among dozens of heirs spread throughout the world, with
no resolution (and hence repair or redevelopment) possible without a joint
agreement. Court cases concerning such properties - i.e. abandoned, with
multiple owners, or involving “old rent” - may typically drag on for years
without resolution, while the perceived absence of order and structure within
state institutions requires applicants either to accept the deadlock or resort
to alternative measures.
In all such cases involving interactions with the state or society in gen-
eral, the principal which makes the ultimate difference - that is, between
an individual’s opportunities and his or her ability to capitalise on them -
is wasta. Much more so than the formal rules of the state (which may be
at best obscure and at worst used as an active barrier), wasta becomes the
etiquette necessary to successfully resolve difficulties.
For instance, in the struggle between landlord and tenant under the “old
rent” system, each side may resort to various tricks to try to gain an ad-
vantage. In the case of one tenant in the neighbourhood of Gemmayze,26
an attempt by the landlord to buy out and redevelop the property was ap-
parently foiled through a wasta in the Ministry of Culture. Despite many
much older buildings in the neighbourhood being bulldozed every year to
make way for new condominiums, the Ministry of Culture designated this
25For a geographical representation of Beirut’s various “security zones” see Fawaz, Harb,
and Gharbieh (2012, p. 178). One might further add that, alongside the dubious legal
status of militias and private security firms, unlicensed ‘private valet’ companies have also
sprung up in Beirut’s popular nightlife destinations. Often having the appearance of a
legitimate operation, including uniformed staff, these companies essentially commandeer
the street and extort protection money from drivers to use public parking spaces. See
chapter 7 on the qabaday phenomenon.
26A predominately Christian neighbourhood bordering the east of BCD, and which falls
outside of the remit of Solidere.
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particular house a protected building, preventing any work from being car-
ried out on it, and granting the tenant an effective stay of execution on his
lease.27
Landlords, by contrast, may often resort to vandalising their own prop-
erties: blocking drains or sabotaging power supplies in an attempt to force
out the legal tenants. Alternatively, one sure way of obtaining a resolution
is to offer the tenants a share of the proceeds from the sale of the land for
redevelopment; in such instances, delay typically revolves around haggling
over the precise share of the proceeds. At any stage of the process, either
side may seek recourse to wasta: either in the form of social contacts (a
stock of capital deriving from personal prestige which an individual may at-
tempt, more or less successfully, to mobilise on his own or another’s behalf)
or, in a more transparently ‘corrupt’ manner, a paid ‘go-between’ or ‘fixer’,
whose role it is to ‘get things done’, to free up the sclerotic bureaucratic
machinery.
This tendency for power relations predicated on the unequal distribu-
tion of wasta to determine outcomes - as opposed to the legal specification
of such relations as defined by the state - penetrates almost all aspects of
Lebanese society, and has enabled massive predation by the Lebanese elite.
In his recent work on corruption in the Lebanese state, Leenders (2012) -
while not directly referring to such practices as wasta - describes extensive
corruption, bribery, fraud and cronyism in, among others, the health sec-
tor (including the importing of forged pharmaceuticals), the management of
publicly-owned corporations such as Middle East Airlines and the Port of
Beirut, the energy sector (specifically price-fixing through importers cartels),
quarrying, and reconstruction and development (including the awarding of
contracts for road works and waste management, and most significantly in
the setting up of Solidere and the Council for Development and Reconstruc-
tion).
In common with much other recent research, Leenders has understand-
ably tended to focus on the legacy of the civil war, the consequent breakdown
of the Lebanese state, and the post-Ta’if political settlement in explaining
such outcomes;28 however, older research, as well as more recent historically-
27Interview 12/2.
28As well as the aforementioned Spoils of Truce see also Leenders, 2004c; Leenders,
2004a; Leenders, 2004b, as well as Gebara (2007). See Hamdan (2012) for a recent overview
of the state of the Ta’if settlement.
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minded reviews, have demonstrated that such problems also long pre-dated
the war. For instance Khalaf (1968), Farsoun (1970), Johnson (1986) and
Hamzeh (2001) demonstrated the historical dimensions (and extensiveness)
of Lebanese clientelism, while Traboulsi (2007, pp. 115-119) makes it clear
that nepotism and cronyism were defining characteristics of the early de-
velopment of the Lebanese state. Furthermore Makdisi (1996, p. 26), Dib
(2004, p. 290) and, most recently Baumann (2012, p. 134), have all noted
how post-war trends in political leadership all tended ultimately to revert
back to the “politics of the past”, in Makdisi’s words.
In light of these various factors, Lebanon presents an ideal case for in-
depth analysis of clandestine circulation, and for addressing in an empirical
context a number of the research questions outlined in the previous chapter.




The more the official transmission
of capital is prevented or hindered,
the more the effects of the
clandestine circulation of capital
[. . . ] become determinant in the
reproduction of the social
structure.







This outline attempts to define a theory of clandestine circulation, and how it
may function as a mode of reproduction of the social structure in opposition
to the official perspective of the modern state. In particular, it seeks to
explain the conditions in which clandestine circulation may emerge, and
how it operates in practice at the level of objective and embodied structures
(social space and habitus).
The outline is thus divided into two chapters: the first (following Bour-
dieusian praxeology) deals with objective structures, and traces the particu-
lar genesis of social space necessary for clandestine circulation to emerge, and
the effect of different configurations on the potential for clandestine circula-
tion. The second chapter then looks at embodied structures: in particular,
how specific mechanisms of clandestine circulation manifest themselves in
agents’ reproduction strategies, and how they operate at the level of habitus
to transform and accumulate different capitals.
The first chapter begins by introducing a break with “state thought”
(Bourdieu, 1999) - that is, with accounts of practice predicated upon prin-
ciples of vision and division (such as corruption) which form part of the cat-
egories of perception through which the state constitutes the social world.
Rather than thinking like the state, one must instead treat the state as a
social object, and seek to theorise its effects as arbitrary, historically con-
tingent factors structuring social space.
This process involves reconstituting the genesis of the state (in terms
both of objective and subjective structures) as a historical trajectory of the
legitimate, dominant capital structure. In the Western context, it is argued
that this trajectory can be understood according to Bourdieu’s distinction
between the different forms of capital: the Western state effect moves from
a mode of domination predicated upon mechanisms for the reproduction of
embodied capitals (‘the King’s House’), to one predicated upon mechanisms
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for the reproduction of objectified and institutionalised capitals (‘the Reason
of State’), while the dominant guise of capital moves from social to cultural.
By expressing this trajectory as a dimension within social space, it becomes
possible to specify the state effect as a contingent structuring factor which,
in conjunction with transformations to the field of power, determines the
likelihood (and form) of clandestine circulation to emerge as a mode of
reproduction.
The second theoretical chapter analyses clandestine circulation at the
level of practice - specifically as manifested through agents’ reproduction
strategies. The chapter attempts to theorise the different forms of clan-
destine circulation which may emerge, the factors limiting such circulation,
and the variable appropriation such circulation may entail (hence having the
potential effect of reproducing the given structure of inequality in a social
space). To assist in this task, three instances of clandestine circulation are
analysed: blat, guanxi and wasta.
The chapter continues by relating clandestine circulation to Bourdieu’s
conceptualisation of a general science of the economy of practices, in which
the total labour required to convert capitals is a product of the symbolic
force associated with them. Not only does this wider economism constitute a
structuring principle of clandestine circulation, it also enables such practices
as constitute clandestine circulation to be linked to the broader structure of
social space, through the dispositions embodied in agents’ habitus.
The chapter concludes by discussing the complexity of the second-order
effects produced by clandestine circulation, in the sense of variations in
agents’ subjective misrecognition of such practices, and the implications of
such effects on empirical analysis in the field.
Chapter 5
The Genesis of Clandestine
Circulation
5.1 From “State Thought” to the State Effect
Any analysis which seeks to incorporate, as part of its object, effects relat-
ing to the modern state, must begin by acknowledging that many of the
analytical categories associated with such analysis are themselves the prod-
uct of what Bourdieu termed “state thought” (Bourdieu, 1999). That is,
when dealing with the state, we are dealing with an object which stands a
good chance of having produced the very structures of consciousness through
which we perceive it (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 13).
One sees most clearly the effects of this process in the construction (in
the form of research objects) of those practices most antithetical to the logic
of the state. As we have seen, modern definitions of corruption (such as
Nye’s public office, or Friedrich’s public interest) differ substantially from
their classical antecedents. Whereas for Aristotle corruption could only be
understood in terms of the degeneration of a complete political system,
in modern definitions the state stands above corruption as, (in Bourdieu’s
words) Leibniz’s God - “qu’il est le lieu ge´ome´trique de toutes les perspectives
antagonistes” (ibid., p. 16).1
1“who is the geometric locus of all antagonistic perspectives” (author’s translation).
In Bourdieu (1989, p. 22) it is translated “the geometral locus of all perspectives”. In
their recent intellectual history of political corruption Buchan and Hill (2014) dispute that
the difference between the two conceptions (degeneration and public office) represents a
historical ‘shift’, but is rather an ‘oscillation’, with even ancient definitions of corruption
including an understanding of the subversion of public office for private gain. However,
even Buchan and Hall conclude that these two conceptions became definitively separated
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Even the language typically used to describe the state betrays the legacy
of this process. For when we speak of ‘the state’, we should not mean any-
thing other than the sum total of agents charged with perceiving the state,
whose perceptions have been formed through the institutions of the state,
and who struggle over the means to obtain an advantage within those in-
stitutions. The language of the state however is both singular and deter-
ministic. As Bourdieu noted, it encourages the structural functionalism of a
Parsons, or the “fonctionnalisme du pire” of an Althusser, where the state
is either deus or diabolus in machina, executing its will through a conscious
voluntarism (Bourdieu, 2012, p. 18).
However, to overcome such a legacy requires an instrument of analysis
able to objectify the state, and to chart its genesis in both objective and
subjective structures. As Hay and Lister (2006, p. 14) observe - “[. . . ] if
theorists of the state are not to reproduce its mythology, they must give
rather more attention to the processes through which the state is conceived
of on the one hand, and the relationship between such conceptions and the
institutions, processes and practices of the state on the other.” To put it
another way, analysis of the state must recognise that -
“If the state is able to exert symbolic violence, it is because it
incarnates itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of spe-
cific organizational structures and mechanisms, and in subjectiv-
ity, in the form of mental structures and categories of perception
and thought. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 40)
What is thus required is a means of distinguishing “state thought” (the
contingent and arbitrary principles of vision and division embodied in habi-
tus that have emerged through the state’s historical genesis), from what we
might call the state effect - the contingent, arbitrary manner in which ‘that
thing we call the state’ (to borrow from Bourdieu) structures a given social
space.2
The first step in this process of objectivisation is to recognise that “state
thought” - as a system of classification of the social world - operates through
by the end of the 18th century, with the individual subversion of a public office for private
gain viewed as distinct from the (moral) degeneration of an entire political system - a
development which surely confirms the present argument (Buchan and Hill, 2014, pp.
170-171).
2This use of the term “state effect” should not be confused with that of Mitchell (1991),
whose meaning is rather closer to Bourdieu’s definition of “state thought”.
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the production of a practical taxonomy (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 118) which, in
the Western context at least, tends to distinguish social practice according
to its relation to what Bourdieu described as “the interest in disinterest”
(Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 35-63). This ‘paradoxical’ interest in a general, rather
than specific, good may be considered equivalent to Friedrich’s definition of
the “public interest”, and, in the study of clientelism, to Graziano’s con-
ception of the legitimate authority emerging from the institutionalisation
of indirect (as opposed to direct) exchange, or the ‘generalised’ interest de-
scribed by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980).
In accordance with this taxonomy, practices may be legal or illegal, de-
pending on whether they conform to the laws of the state; the economy may
be formal or informal, depending on whether it is measured and taxed by
the state; and that which is ‘good’ may be either public or private - the
social appropriateness of each being confined to those parts of social space
defined as either interior or exterior to the state.
What such a taxonomy produces, in the sense of an ordered system for
interpreting the social world, is the very first thing which must be overcome
in order to succeed in an objective analysis of precisely those practices which
go against that ordered system. The nature of the challenge is perhaps best
grasped by de Sousa Santos’ conception of “abyssal lines” -
Modern Western thinking is an abyssal thinking. It consists of a
system of visible and invisible distinctions, the invisible ones be-
ing the foundation of the visible ones. The invisible distinctions
are established through radical lines that divide social reality into
two realms, the realm of “this side of the line” and the realm of
“the other side of the line.” The division is such that “the other
side of the line” vanishes as reality, becomes nonexistent, and is
indeed produced as nonexistent. (Santos, 2007, p. 1-2)
Many of the state’s most significant effects (in the sense of arbitrary, con-
tingent outcomes which could not exist without the state, however we choose
to define it) are, owing to the system of classification produced through
“state thought”, frequently placed on the other side of such an “abyssal
line”, and seen instead as an absence of the state. Wacquant (2008), for
example, has demonstrated how the black ghetto of Chicago - a product
of state planning policy - reproduces a form of inequality which is instead
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(mis)recognised as the ‘fault’ of the people living there. In the same way,
explanations predicated on state ‘weakness’ typically take for granted as-
sumptions of state strength themselves derived from the perspective of the
state - that is, of what the state would have itself be.3 The possibility that
those malaises most firmly embedded within a society may require, for their
reproduction, effects deriving from the state - and hence, indicating in a
sociological sense a ‘strong’ state - is, through the practical taxonomy of
“state thought”, rendered ‘unthinkable’.
Unveiling the abyssal lines which constitute “state thought” (what Bour-
dieu would describe as its doxa, and what Anders and Nuijten (2007, p. 11)
described as the “hidden continuities between the law and its opposite”) is
however insufficient. Rather, what must be unveiled is the genesis of those
objective structures responsible for enabling the state to have effects (ob-
jective and subjective) in the first place - including, as one element of those
effects, the production of “state thought”. This ‘new way of thinking’ (as
Wittgenstein says) will then enable us to shift our analysis from corruption
(a product of state thought), to the clandestine circulation of capital - a
product of the state effect.
5.2 Bourdieu and the Genesis of the State
According to Bourdieu,4 the emergence of the state in the Western context
occurred as a corollary to the gradual concentration and objectification of
capitals within the household of the dominant ruler,5 represented symboli-
cally by the transition from the ‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’ (or
‘Raison d’Etat’ ).
In the ‘King’s House’, accumulation initially followed the logic of social
relations, and was limited accordingly; the ‘Reason of State’ however follows
the logic of a universal interest, and thus constitutes “a field of forces and
a field of struggles oriented towards the monopoly of the legitimate manip-
3See Bhuta (2012) for a critical assessment of the emergence of “state fragility” as a
developmental paradigm reflecting power relations.
4See Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field (Bourdieu
and Wacquant, 1999) and From the King’s House to the Reason of State (Bourdieu, 2004)
for an elaboration of Bourdieu’s theory of the genesis of the state. Sur L’Etat (Bourdieu,
2012) collects his various lectures on the state.
5“The state is the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of
capitals.” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 41, emphasis in original).
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ulation of public goods” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 16). As a corollary, within the
‘Reason of State’ the field of power is no longer dominated by a royal court,
but by a bureaucratic field driven by the seemingly paradoxical illusio of an
“interest in disinterest”.
For Bourdieu, the emergence of this disinterested illusio occurred as a
result - at least in the French case - of struggles for power (that is, effects of
field) taking place within the King’s House, where the labour of domination
gradually came to be divided between hereditary and non-hereditary prin-
ciples - that is, between nobles and clerks. The ‘universal’ interest emerged
(according to Bourdieu) as a fictio juris (juridic fiction) within these non-
hereditary agents of the state, who monopolised the symbolic profits ac-
cruing from the monopolistic control of public goods (Bourdieu, 1998, pp.
35-63; Bourdieu, 2004, pp. 31-34).
This gradual process involved a “series of infinitesimal and yet all equally
decisive inventions”, including “the bureau, signature, stamp, decree of ap-
pointment, certificate, register, circular, etc.”, all of which ultimately led “to
the establishment of a properly bureaucratic logic” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 31).
As such, while contingent, there was nothing necessary about the transition.
The principal difference between the two models would seem to conform
with the distinction noted by Bourdieu in earlier works between the two
fundamental modes of domination. According to Bourdieu -
The principle of the pertinent differences between the modes of
domination lies in the degree of objectification of capital. Social
formations in which relations of domination are made, unmade
and remade in and through personal interactions contrast with
those in which such relations are mediated by objective, insti-
tutionalized mechanisms. (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 130, emphasis
mine)6
“Elementary forms of domination” are predicated upon “the direct dom-
ination of one person over another” (ibid., p. 129). According to Bourdieu,
such forms of domination do not, typically, contain within them the princi-
ples of their own reproduction, but must rather be “kept up by nothing less
than a process of continuous creation” (ibid., p. 130), whereby the dominant
“ties” the dominated to him through gifts, services, time and obligations.
6This distinction is repeated in Bourdieu (1994, p. 8).
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This “soft” domination requires a “personal” price - the labour of repress-
ing economic interests into personal ties. When combined with “objective
obstacles linked to the weakness of the means of production”, this additional
labour was probably sufficient “to hinder or even forbid the concentration
of material capital”. As Bourdieu notes of Kabylia (the field site in Alge-
ria where he developed many of his early theories), such limitations meant
that “It was no doubt exceptional [. . . ] to order a man to ‘stop getting any
richer’,” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 128).
The necessity for the “circular circulation” of goods and favours to bind
individuals and groups - from which “the legitimation of power arises as
a symbolic surplus value” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 195) - thus initially limited
the extent of material accumulation through the constant labour required
to legitimate and reproduce power relations.7 This constant labour differs
from the latter mode of domination by the absence of any mediation through
objectified mechanisms, which “automatically ensure the reproduction of the
established order” (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 129). As Bourdieu observes:
Objectification in institutions guarantees the permanence and
cumulativity of material and symbolic acquisitions which can
then subsist without the agents having to recreate them contin-
uously and in their entirety by deliberate actions [. . . ] because
the profits provided by these institutions are subject to differ-
ential appropriation, objectification also and inseparably tends
to ensure the reproduction of the structure of the distribution of
capital. (ibid., p. 130, emhpasis mine)
Applying this transition to Bourdieu’s model of state formation, we see
that within the field of power the embodied, social relations corresponding to
the ‘King’s House’ gradually gave way to the institutionalised, bureaucratic
relations corresponding to the ‘Reason of State’, while beyond the field of
power the reproduction of (unequal) distributions of capital moved from a
constant, uncertain labour to an automatic process, in which the structure of
that unequal distribution came to be embedded in the very institutions of the
state - the school system, the bureaucracy, even physical institutions such as
7According to Bourdieu, this process of circular circulation moves in an unbroken
progression from symmetry to asymmetry of exchange, converting economic capital into
symbolic capital, and producing relations of dependence that have an economic basis, but
which are disguised under a veil of moral relations (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 122-123).
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the distribution of public housing. In the process, a decrease in “objective
obstacles” resulted in a greater capacity for the overall accumulation of
capital. A correlate of this process was the emergence, within the field of
power, of the bureaucratic field. This cadre of public servants maintained
a monopoly over public goods which was legitimised through the logic of
a public interest : an “interest in disinterest” defined against the personal
interest of the King’s House.
The coterminous transition from elementary to objectified modes of dom-
ination, and from a ‘specific’ to a ‘generalised’ interest (Eisenstadt and
Roniger, 1980) legitimising the field of power, thus suggests a causal re-
lation between mechanisms of domination and the symbolic forces which
legitimate them. To interrogate this link further we must turn to another
transition which will be fundamental to the understanding of clandestine
circulation: the transformation in the form of capital through which domi-
nation is effected in each model - from embodied, to institutionalised.
5.3 The Forms of Capital
As we have already observed, according to Bourdieu “the principle of the
pertinent differences between the modes of domination lies in the degree of
objectification of capital”. What though, in theoretical terms, does such a
basis of difference as ‘the degree of objectification of capital’ consist in?
It is at this point that a common misreading concerning Bourdieusian
theory must be addressed. In The Forms of Capital (Bourdieu, 1986b),
Bourdieu proposed that the understanding of social inequality be governed
not only by an assessment of the amount of economic capital possessed by an
agent, but also by the extent and type of social and cultural assets which he
or she may draw upon. Indeed, he proposed these latter two be considered
as separate types of capital: that is, social capital and cultural capital.
This initial division of capital, allied with the title of the larger work, has
led to a confusion concerning the theoretical labour performed by Bourdieu’s
conceptualisation. To clarify: the division of capital between social, cultural
and economic does not relate to the form of capital; rather, social, cultural
and economic capital are different guises of capital, a distinction relating to
the field in which a capital is produced. The distinction between the forms
of capital rather relates to the different states in which those capitals may
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be rendered. Of these, Bourdieu mentions only three: embodied, objectified,
and institutionalised.8
In many respects, the distinction between the different forms of capital
relates to the same dialectic of embodiment and objectification which runs
throughout Bourdieu’s work. Embodied capitals follow a logic of inalien-
ability which, “like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a suntan [. . . ]
cannot be done at second hand” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 248). Objectified cap-
itals, by contrast, are “transmissible in [their] materiality” (ibid., p. 250),
holding an alienable value which is guaranteed by the symbolic appreciation
of a wider field (for example, the cultural field). Finally, institutionalised
capitals are, according to Bourdieu, a specific form of objectification (ibid.,
p. 247) tending to be legally guaranteed by the state and thus “formally
independent of the person of their bearer” (ibid., p. 250).
This latter form of capital is, in Bourdieu’s words, “a form of objecti-
fication which must be set apart because [. . . ] it confers entirely original
properties” (ibid., p. 247). Given the affinities which run throughout Bour-
dieu’s works, we may attribute these “original properties” to certain effects
of the state: institutionalised forms of capital are, generally speaking, guar-
anteed by the state; they are thus products of the same genesis responsible -
in the context of the ‘Reason of State’ - for the emergence of the “interest in
disinterest” and “state thought”. They are also that form of capital through
which objectified mechanisms reproduce the social structure.
To give an example of the interplay between forms and guises of capital,
and the relation of each to the labour of reproduction, we may turn to Bour-
dieu’s analysis of the cultural field within The Forms of Capital. According
to Bourdieu, embodied cultural capital takes the form of “what is called cul-
ture, cultivation, Bildung” (ibid., p. 248); it can only be acquired through
a personal investment in time and effort, which presupposes sufficient eco-
nomic capital to offset such an investment. However, “because the social
conditions of its transmission and acquisition are more disguised than those
of economic capital, it is predisposed to function as symbolic capital, i.e.,
to be unrecognised as capital and recognised as legitimate competence, as
authority” (ibid., p. 249), and hence - according to Bourdieu - to play a sig-
8The initial specification is found in Bourdieu (1986b, p. 247). This important distinc-
tion has been overlooked by some scholars, most noticeably in the case of Smart (1993),
who curiously goes on to reinvent the same distinction.
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nificant role in reproduction strategies9 (for example, matrimonial markets),
where economic capital is “not fully recognised” (ibid., p. 249).
Embodied capital, we may therefore argue, is the first step in the emer-
gence of an autonomous field - that is, a field in which power relations are
not determined purely by overt coercion, but rather are misrecognised as
“legitimate competence” or “authority”.10
Objectified cultural capital, by contrast, takes the form of “material
objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments,
etc.” (ibid., p. 250). Such goods may be possessed (and transmitted)
materially, yet Bourdieu also makes clear that full possession presupposes
also the symbolic means to consume such goods (i.e. embodied cultural
capital). Thus, objectified cultural capital may make the acquisition of
embodied cultural capital a more secure process, without doing away entirely
with the need to invest time and effort in its acquisition. This added security
of objectified cultural capital is, it may be argued, a product of the mode of
domination it emanates from:
Cultural capital in its objectified state presents itself with all
the appearances of an autonomous, coherent universe which, al-
though the product of historical action, has its own laws, tran-
scending individual wills. (ibid., p. 250)
This “autonomous, coherent universe”, we may argue, is none other than
the cultural field itself. Thus, as fields increase their (objective) autonomy
vis a` vis other fields, so too the capacity of such fields to materialise profits
in the form of objects with a commonly agreed-upon value also increases.
Finally, cultural capital in its institutionalised form, according to Bour-
dieu, takes the shape of academic qualifications. Such capital is guaranteed
by the state, and has an autonomy from its bearer sufficient that such gains
as represented by its acquisition may be held securely - as opposed to the
simplest embodied cultural capital, which “is constantly required to prove
9The analysis of reproduction strategies will form an important part of the next chapter,
where they will be explained in greater detail.
10At this point it is worth noting that it is highly unlikely pure overt coercion ever con-
stituted the basis of an actual power relation. As Bourdieu notes: “The logical construct
of a power relation manifesting itself nakedly has no more sociological existence than
does the logical construct of meanings that are only cultural arbitrariness [. . . ] There is
no power relation, however mechanical and ruthless, which does not additionally exert a
symbolic effect.” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, p. 10-11).
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itself” (Bourdieu, 1986b, p. 251). Thus, we may see that, by the time a
capital has been institutionalised, it has reached the stage where not only
is it produced by an autonomous field, but that field is itself dominated by
an autonomous entity or institution - typically the state, which exercises a
symbolic violence that acts as the ultimate guarantor of all distinctions.
We may note that, while the emergence of the different forms of capital
must occur in a teleological fashion - from embodied to objectified to insti-
tutionalised, owing to the complexity of the social structures which produce
and guarantee them - the emergence of a new form of capital does not pre-
suppose the complete disappearance of its antecedent stage. Rather, as we
may see with cultural capital, in the complete system of strategies of Social
Reproduction each form of capital may play its role. Thus, in the case of
institutionalised cultural capital, the complete labour of reproduction pre-
supposes a prolonged investment in embodied cultural capital (which, as
Bourdieu notes, also typically continues to gain its recognition through the
school system), an investment which is naturally made more secure through
further investment in the right objectified cultural capitals (museum visits,
the number of books at home, etc.), which is eventually converted into an
academic qualification - enabling in turn a further conversion in the labour
market, which ultimately enables a material profit to be drawn, and a higher
integration in social space (ibid., p. 251).
5.4 The Genesis of the State as Capital Trajectory
If we accept that the pertinent distinction between the modes of domina-
tion relates to the degree of objectification of capitals, and if we accept
further that the pertinent distinction between the degree of objectification
of capitals relates to the relative autonomy and regulation of the fields which
produce them, then we may present the degree of objectification of capitals
not only as a trajectory running through each guise of capital, but also as
a trajectory, in and of itself, running through social space, the correlate of
which is none other than the process described by Bourdieu concerning the
genesis of the state - the transition from the ‘King’s house’ to the ‘Reason
of State’.
Table 5.1 attempts to demonstrate this trajectory across the different
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Table 5.1: The Guises and Forms of Capital
GUISES FORM
Economic Social Cultural
Labour, Time Obligations Talent EMBODIED
Money Social Goods Cultural Goods OBJECTIFIED
Property Rights Titles; Qualifications INSTITUTION-
Positions ALISED
time
guises of capital.11 In each case, as the fields producing the different guises
of capital gain greater autonomy, the capacity for value to be objectified in
a recognised hierarchy of objects distinct from their bearers increases. The
ultimate form of objectification - that which bears the highest legitimacy -
is institutionalisation: capital produced within a field that is regulated by
an entity claiming a symbolic monopoly over significations.12
The distinction between the different forms of capital and their practical
role in the reproduction of the social structure will be discussed in the next
chapter. At this point however I wish to emphasise the connection between
the increasing capacity of the field of power to objectify capitals (generally
under the auspices of ‘that something we call the state’), the absolute volume
of capital which can be accumulated, and the logic governing this mode of
domination. In other words, in the Western context we can visualise the
11References to specific guises and forms are drawn from The Forms of Capital (Bour-
dieu, 1986b). For institutionalised social capital, I take Bourdieu’s initial specification
(titles of nobility) as referring to institutionalised social capital under the logic of the
‘King’s House’. For institutionalised social capital under the logic of the ‘Reason of State’
I modify the proposal of Denord et al. (2011), who consider board positions, membership
of organisations, etc. as instances of objectified social capital. Following Bourdieu’s own
specification (i.e., that objectified capitals are “transmissible in [their] materiality”, and
that institutionalised capitals are (rather) “formally independent of the person of their
bearer”) I would consider such forms of social capital to be institutionalised. I rather
consider what I have labelled ‘social goods’ to represent social capital in its objectified
form. These may be thought of (in the sense of symbolic capital in Outline of a Theory of
Practice (Bourdieu, 1977)) as objectified status markers recognised within a given social
space. They thus bear some relation to objectified cultural capital. Finally, we must also
make reference to inherited social capital (also mentioned by Bourdieu and Denord et.
al.), which will be referred to in the empirical chapters owing to its effects in the field,
and which may be understood as a form of embodied social capital which is passed on to
agents through the family structure (or household).
12On struggles over this specifically symbolic power of ‘consecration’ - making such
distinctions legitimate - see Bourdieu (1989, pp. 21-24). The implications of such struggles
for the clandestine circulation of capital are discussed in the following section.
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genesis of state formation as a trajectory of the dominant, legitimate capital
structure in social space.13
Figure 5.1 demonstrates this trajectory (and the structure of social space
in which it occurs), in a manner which will be recognisable to those familiar
with the model of social space proposed by Bourdieu in Distinction (Bour-
dieu, 1984). As with Distinction, the vertical (y) axis represents the total
volume of capital of agents or objects in social space. In contrast to the Dis-
tinction model, however, the horizontal (x) axis represents a division based
not on different guises of capital, but rather different forms. The axis moves
from embodied (on the right) to institutionalised (on the left), and should
be understood as a trajectory (hence also including objectified capitals as
an intermediary stage).
In the ‘King’s House’ domination is effected through mechanisms of ‘cir-
cular circulation’. The limitations of such mechanisms act as a barrier to
the overall volume of capital which can be accumulated within the field of
power, and further restrict that capital to certain forms and guises. How-
ever, with the gradual emergence of institutionalised mechanisms for the
reproduction of capital, not only are the prevailing forms of capital (i.e.
objectified, institutionalised) more securely reproduced, but the absolute
volume of capital which can be accumulated through such mechanisms also
increases. As the dominant capital structure (that is, the capital structure
relating to the field of power) shifts from embodied to objectified and insti-
tutionalised capitals,14 so too the logic governing that field also shifts, from
the specific interest of the ‘King’s House’, to the generalised interest (the
‘interest in disinterest’) governing the bureaucratic ‘Reason of State’.
Were it possible to add a third axis, we might also see that the dominant
capital structure in most Western contexts further shifted from institution-
alised social capital (titles of nobility), to institutionalised cultural capital
(qualifications), a further transition to which we will return. Ultimately,
13This mode of analysis fits within Bourdieu’s own conception of the analysis of social
agents (and, by extension, all social objects) within the broader structure of social space.
Writing in Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 108), Bourdieu argued that “endeavouring to
reconstitute the units most homogenous from the point of view of the conditions of the
production of habitus [. . . ] one can construct a space whose three fundamental dimensions
are defined by volume of capital, composition of capital, and change in these two properties
over time (manifested by past and potential trajectory in social space).”
14Without, it should be added, these prior forms ever entirely disappearing (the axis
represents the dominant, rather than sole, form of capital).
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Figure 5.1: State Formation as Capital Trajectory
Volume of Capital +




State formation as a trajectory of the dominant legitimate capital
structure in social space, illustrating the varying configurations of
the most important dimensions in each case (absolute volume of
capital, degree of objectification, trajectory).
the field of power in much of Europe became a bureaucratic field, able to
concentrate enormous volumes of capital through objectified mechanisms.15
The benefit in presenting state formation as a capital trajectory within
social space lies in the possibility it provides for conceptualising the state
effect as a contingent, arbitrary product whose social genesis can be traced.
Hence, if we are to objectify the state effect - understood as the totality of
the social effects of ‘that something we call the state’16 - then it should be
as a social object akin to the habitus. That is, the effects produced by the
state - the state effect - are akin to the effects produced by the habitus, in
15It may be noted that Graziano (1976), in his observation concerning the limits to
the accumulation of capital under direct exchange, is essentially making the same point.
As noted in the previous section however, without the additional theoretical framework
provided by the Bourdieusian conceptual tools of field, capital and habitus he lacks a
mechanism to account for this transition from direct to indirect exchange.
16That is, rather than analysing the ‘state’ per se - a product of “state thought”.
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the sense that they consist of perceptions (“state thought”) and dispositions
(the tendency to accumulate certain types of capital) which are themselves
determined in a relational sense, a sense structured according to a position
in social space defined by those three dimensions.17
Thus, if we encompass within the state effect all those mechanisms for
the production of legitimate domination - through both the reproduction
of capital and the production of symbolic adherence - we will find that the
specific nature of those mechanisms (the form and guises of the capitals being
reproduced; the nature of the doxa produced) is the legacy of a historical
trajectory within the field of power, and the field of power within larger social
space. It is thus arbitrary, in the Weberian sense that it serves no determined
end, and in the Bourdieusian sense that it produces no determined symbolic
force. It may therefore, depending upon that trajectory, equally produce
either a specific interest (in the case of the ‘King’s House’), or a generalised
interest (in the case of the ‘Reason of State’).18
Further, the state effect itself structures social space (in the sense of a
structuring structure - a structure which has been structured and in turn
structures other social objects) by favouring the accumulation of certain
capital structures, the transformation of certain forms and guises of capital,
and the privileging of certain trajectories over others. This in turn has
contingent effects on the habitus of social agents, such that the state effect
- while contingent for its genesis upon the historical trajectory of the field
of power - is nonetheless also the producer of its own determinisms.
In particular, the state effect may produce effects of hysteresis. For in-
stance, changes in the field of power (e.g. bifurcation of capital structures
and trajectories) may not be met with corresponding changes in the state
effect, owing to the nature of the logic of formalisation.19 Likewise, changes
in the state effect - in the sense of new or different mechanisms for ac-
cumulation, and the logics attendant upon them - may also meet with the
17It is important to add that this comparison of the state effect with the effects produced
by habitus should not be mistaken for an attempt to advocate a ‘habitus of the state’:
such a project would merely reify those tendencies, noted earlier in the chapter, of “state
thought” to produce the state as a kind of transcendent, historical agent.
18In this sense the state effect may be considered in similar terms to the pedagogic
action (PA) outlined in Reproduction (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990), in particular to
those propositions outlined in 1.2, 1.2.1, and 1.2.2. concerning the arbitrariness of the
cultural arbitrary imposed by such a PA.
19See the conclusion to the section on concept formation, and also Bourdieu (1986a).
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embodiment of prior iterations of the state effect embedded in the habitus of
social agents (in the sense of established norms of behaviour, an eventuality
which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter).
5.5 The Emergence of Clandestine Circulation
Presenting the genesis of the state effect as a trajectory of the legitimate,
dominant capital structure allows analysis to overcome precisely those as-
sumptions (embedded within “state thought”) concerning the inevitabil-
ity (or necessity) of such a genesis. Rather, in examining particular in-
stances of hysteresis of the state effect (and in particular, hysteresis in “state
thought”), we reveal a process driven by the generative principles of field
and capital.
We may see the effects of this process in the example previously men-
tioned in chapter 2 concerning the evolution of attitudes toward corruption
in 19th century Britain. According to Leys, rather than an objective increase
in corrupt behaviour, society passed “through a period in which behaviour
patterns which were acceptable by the old standards came to be regarded
as corrupt according to the new” (Leys, 1965, p. 227).
Here, hysteresis constitutes the continuing embodiment, in the habitus
of certain agents, of an earlier state effect adjusted toward the circulation
and accumulation of a determinate capital structure, in a period in which
struggles within the field of power were diverting the trajectory of the dom-
inant capital structure toward a new configuration, and hence a different
interest or illusio.
This same transition in doxa is captured by Collini (2011), who observes
that -
One of the most fascinating yet elusive aspects of cultural change
is the way certain ideals and arguments acquire an almost self-
evident power at particular times, just as others come to seem
irrelevant or antiquated and largely disappear from public de-
bate. In the middle of the 18th century, to describe a measure
as ‘displaying the respect that is due to rank’ was a common-
place commendation; in the middle of the 19th, affirming that
a proposal contributed to ‘the building of character’ would have
been part of the mood music of public discourse. (ibid., p. 9)
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The ‘self-evidence’ (or doxic modality) attributed to measures displaying
“the respect that is due to rank” in the mid-18th century related principally
to that category of “state thought” produced by a state effect adjusted
toward the reproduction of a (hierarchically ordered) institutionalised social
capital. By contrast, a century later “state thought” had progressed toward
measures favouring the institutionalisation of cultural capital (‘building of
character’), suggesting a state effect now adjusted toward the reproduction
of this new capital structure.
Hence, in the interim between these two points, the principle of circula-
tion through social capital (running from embodied to institutionalised),
which had previously dominated transactions within the field of power,
would have come to be usurped by the type of objectified, institutionalised
mechanisms (generally predicated on institutionalised cultural capital) de-
scribed by Bourdieu. This suggests a bifurcation within the field of power,
between agents whose habitus remained adjusted toward the dispositions
and interests of the prior structure, and those whose interest was rather
adjusted toward the new.
According to Bourdieu (1989, p. 23), “the struggle over classifications is
a fundamental dimension of class struggle”. In the sense that the struggle
for dominance between nobles and bureaucrats within the field of power
increasingly took on (through the effects of field) the form of a class struggle,
accusations of corruption represented not only varying doxa (in the sense of
a tendency to misrecognise certain transactions differently as either ‘favours’
or ‘corruption’, depending upon one’s habitus and position in social space),
but also position-takings - that is, stakes in the struggle for dominance within
the field of power.
Thus, far from being a teleological movement, the transition from the
‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’ involved a clash of agents with con-
trasting interests: either in the ‘specific interest’ of circular circulation, or
the ‘universal interest’ of objectified, institutionalised mechanisms. The
norm of a ‘public interest’ which emerged out of these struggles was thus
the dominant logic of the (newly) dominant class.
In the Western context, however, the emergence of this logic was em-
bedded not merely in the transition from a mode of domination predicated
on embodied capitals to one predicated on institutionalised capitals; rather,
there was a double shift involving first the transition from hierarchical, em-
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bodied social capital to hierarchical, institutionalised social capital; and then
from social capital to cultural capital (in both cases hierarchical and insti-
tutionalised).
The first transition may be recognised by the increasing elaboration of
systems of titles and court etiquette, whereas the second may be recog-
nised by the transition from a system of reproduction effected through the
inheritance of positions and titles (and hence laws of inheritance), to one
effected through the acquisition of qualifications (and hence the educational
system).20 In the Western context, these two movements (toward greater in-
stitutionalisation and toward cultural capital) are equally inseparable from
the emergence of that particular symbolic force known as the public inter-
est - a force which, while never entirely reducible to economic interests, is
nonetheless attributable to the historical effects of material struggles within
the field of power.
It is in the context of this double transition that we must read Bourdieu’s
initial specification of clandestine circulation, which deserves quoting in full.
According to Bourdieu -
[e]very reproduction strategy is at the same time a legitimation
strategy aimed at consecrating both an exclusive appropriation
and its reproduction. When the subversive critique which aims
to weaken the dominant class through the principle of its perpet-
uation by bringing to light the arbitrariness of the entitlements
transmitted and of their transmission (such as the critique which
the Enlightenment philosophes directed, in the name of nature,
20This transition is described explicitly by Bourdieu in Strate´gies de Reproduction et
Modes de Domination (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 7) as a “struggle” between two principles of
reproduction:
“toute la longue pe´riode de transition de l’E´tat dynastique a` l’E´tat bureau-
cratique est marque´e, tant en France qu’en Angleterre, par la lutte entre
ceux qui ne veulent connaˆıtre et reconnaˆıtre que les strate´gies de reproduc-
tion a` base familiale (les fre`res du roi), fonde´es sur les liens du sang, et ceux
qui invoquent les strate´gies de reproduction bureaucratiques (les ministres
du roi), fonde´es sur la transmission scolaire du capital culturel.”
(“The long transition from the dynastic state to the bureaucratic state [i.e. the ‘King’s
House’ to the ‘Reason of State’] is marked, both in France and England, by the struggle
between those who wish to know and recognise strategies of reproduction based on the
family (brothers of the king), founded on bloodlines, and those who invoke strategies of
bureaucratic reproduction (the ministers of the king), founded on the school transmission
of cultural capital.” author’s translation.)
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against the arbitrariness of birth) is incorporated in institution-
alized mechanisms (for example, laws of inheritance) aimed at
controlling the official, direct transmission of power and privi-
leges [i.e. capital], the holders of capital have an even greater
interest in resorting to reproduction strategies capable of ensur-
ing better-disguised transmission, but at the cost of greater loss
of capital, by exploiting the convertibility of the types of capital.
Thus, the more the official transmission of capital is prevented
or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine circulation
of capital in the form of cultural capital become determinant in
the reproduction of the social structure. As an instrument of
reproduction capable of disguising its own function, the scope of
the educational system tends to increase, and together with this
increase is the unification of the market in social qualifications
which gives rights to occupy rare positions. (Bourdieu, 1986b,
p. 255)
Thus, Bourdieu seems to argue that the archetypal instance of clan-
destine circulation (which we must assume holds only for the French and
English, or at best Western European, cases) is precisely that shift effected
from a mode of reproduction predicated upon hierarchical institutionalised
social capital, to a mode of reproduction predicated upon hierarchical in-
stitutionalised cultural capital, owing to the capacity for the new institu-
tionalised mechanism of reproduction (the educational system) to disguise
that same correlation between social background and qualifications which it
tends to reproduce.21 From Bourdieu’s work on the French school system
(specifically Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (Bourdieu and
Passeron, 1990) and The State Nobility (Bourdieu, 1996)) we can judge that
21It is at this point that a distinction should be made between the clandestine circulation
of capital and the related Bourdieusian concept of reconversion strategies (see Bourdieu,
Boltanski, and de Saint Martin (1973), Bourdieu (1994, p. 8) and de Saint Martin (2011)).
According to de Saint Martin (ibid., p. 436), reconversions “imply a move of some sort
in the social field”, and further “also imply the relinquishing or loss of the former type of
resource, a form of break with one’s inheritance, the disappearance of former resources and
their recomposition on different bases.” Hence, the secular transition from reproduction
based upon institutionalised social capital to institutionalised cultural capital may repre-
sent (when conducted within and by a particular class or class fraction) an instance of
reconversion. By contrast, in this case clandestine circulation relates to the (continuous)
reproduction of a position in social space through the disguised transmission of embodied
cultural capital into institutionalised cultural capital through the educational system.
5.6. “STATE THOUGHT” AND CLANDESTINE CIRCULATION 125
the ‘clandestine’ or hidden element of this circulation is the degree to which
(as mentioned earlier) the embodied cultural capital recognised (and hence
institutionalised) by the educational system is, to a large extent, merely a
transformation of that which is inherited through the household.22
Perhaps most fundamentally, the transformation in institutionalised mech-
anism (from inheritance laws to the educational system) for the reproduc-
tion of the “exclusive appropriation” of the elite ensured that the symbolic
force associated with the universal interest was maintained: the misrecog-
nised conversion of embodied cultural capital to institutionalised cultural
capital enabled holders of that capital to claim their position based upon
the principle of merit (rather than inheritance) - hence in Bourdieu’s terms
functioning as a legitimation strategy as well as a reproduction strategy. We
may argue that this effect of misrecognition is essentially what enables these
particular mechanisms for the reproduction of the social structure to remain
doxic, despite the significant degrees of inequality which they enable.
5.6 “State Thought” and Clandestine Circulation
Thus, if we accept that there exists a relation between the different symbolic
forces embedded within “state thought” (in the sense of the different illusio
of the ‘specific’ and ‘generalised’ interests), and the historic genesis of the
state effect (in the sense of the dominant capital structure), then it must also
hold that the ways in which transformations between the different species
of capitals are misrecognised will also be determined according to that same
objective, historical genesis.
To elaborate: we see that at each stage of its development, the dominant
capital structure of the field of power produces a logic and an interest - a
logic, that is, favouring a certain mode of accumulation (involving certain
kinds of power relations, capitals and mechanisms), and an interest (or per-
spective) which defends that mode of accumulation against all others. The
articulation and defence of this interest in turn becomes a symbolic point
22A point also emphasised by Bourdieu: “one must always guard against reducing the
opposition between the two modes of reproduction to that between the family and the
State. Rather, the difference consists in a management of reproduction strategies con-
ducted entirely through the family, and one in which the family makes a certain [addi-
tional] use of the education system in reproduction strategies” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 10,
author’s translation).
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of honour for agents engaged in struggles within and between the different
fields.23
Figure 5.2 presents these different interests in the form of social libidos,
and illustrates their current constitution in Western “state thought” - that
is, in the context of the modern ‘Reason of State’. The social libido of
the ‘specific’ interest (which initially constituted the logic of the ‘King’s
House’) is represented as the “other side” of an abyssal line, owing to the
fact that the embodied capitals typically associated with this libido (social
or cultural) are frequently unrecognised with regards to their role in social
reproduction (that is, when their circulation is primarily restricted to the
household, and their basis as a principle of difference is disguised through
legitimate mechanisms such as the educational system).
As we have seen, the ‘specific’ interest is produced through the elemen-
tary mode of domination: that is, through principles of reproduction based
upon embodied capitals, typically taking the form of favours and obliga-
tions, and constituted in the form of affective relations. Its point of honour
revolves around reciprocity: agents must defend particularly against charges
of ingratitude or instrumentalism. In the sense that modern “state thought”
constitutes this ‘specific’ interest, it is typically not through opposition, but
rather absence. The informality of the social is a space lacking the vis formae
(Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 43), the structure or formality, of the state. Indeed,
the legitimate (legal) monopoly over the reproduction of this interest is,
generally speaking, given over to the household - now typically understood
(and officially reproduced) in the most minimal sense.
When it is recognised, clandestine circulation between the two sides of
this abyssal line is typically classified as nepotism (that is, when embod-
ied or inherited social capital is converted into positions in the economic,
cultural or political field, without first undergoing an intermediary transmis-
sion through an objectified mechanism, such as the educational system, to
legitimate it).24 However, the capacity for such conversions to be recognised
23The ‘point of honour’ (‘nif ’ ) is referred to in Outline of a Theory of Practice (Bour-
dieu, 1977) and The Logic of Practice (Bourdieu, 1990c) as the locus toward which chal-
lenges and ripostes are addressed in Kabylia society. I extend the idea here to refer to
the locus of any symbolic system of interests (i.e. the ‘universal’ interest; the ‘specific’
interest; the profit motive).
24Bourdieu also seems to imply that nepotism and favouritism are the legacy of this
specific interest carried over into the domain of the modern state. See Bourdieu (1994,
p. 10): “l’E´tat issu d’un tel processus d’e´radication de tout vestige de liens naturels - qui
5.6. “STATE THOUGHT” AND CLANDESTINE CIRCULATION 127
as nepotism or favouritism tends to decline in proportion to the extent to
which such capitals are supported by a concomitant investment in the insti-
tutionalised capitals which - in the ‘Reason of State’ - legitimise otherwise
arbitrary social distinctions. Hence, the abyssal line also represents the
manner in which the ‘specific’ and ‘generalised’ interests tend to co-exist
within the same habitus without contradiction, owing to the fact that ‘the
logic of practice’ seldom presents agents with those contradictions revealed
by theory, but rather enables the complementary mobilisation of both em-
bodied and institutionalised capitals in reproduction strategies (an aspect of
practice which will be elaborated upon further in the next chapter).25
The second, visible line divides the ‘self-interest’ or profit-motive of the
economic field, from the ‘universal’, ‘public’ or ‘generalised’ interest (typ-
ically manifested in fractions of the cultural field), and is the opposition
through which modern “state thought” tends to distinguish the division of
legitimate interests within the field of power.26 The delineation of these
spaces (often referred to, for example, as the public or private ‘sectors’ to
emphasise their limits) is enforced through the state’s monopoly of symbolic
violence. Conversions are strictly regulated, and clandestine circulation be-
tween the two lines is recognised and prevented through legal injunctions
against bribery, embezzlement, graft, etc.
It is clashes between the point of honour of these logics which tend to
dominate public discourse: the “individual” against “the state” representing
orthodoxy on the ‘private’ side of the line; and “public” against “private”
interests representing orthodoxy on the ‘public’ side. The distinction is
thus the homology produced by “state thought” to represent the current
bifurcation within the field of power - that between economic and cultural
capital (institutionalised in both cases) - a categorisation which also neatly
survivent malgre´ tout dans le ne´potisme et le favoritisme [. . . ]” (“The state issuing from
such a process of eradication of all vestiges of natural relations - which survive nonetheless
in the form of nepotism and favouritism [. . . ]”) author’s translation.
25In particular, we may note that the ‘Reason of State’ tends to restrict the legitimate
expression of the elementary mode of domination to the domain of the household, which
(being also to a significant extent regulated by the state) is the domain in which the
transmission of inherited capitals and their subsequent conversion remains doxic. See
the following chapter on reproduction mechanisms and reproduction strategies for further
analysis on this point.
26This division between economic and cultural fields equates with that presented by
Bourdieu in Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) and further refined in Social Space and Sym-
bolic Power (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 1-13). The transition from a social/cultural to a cul-
tural/economic capital distinction is also noted in Bourdieu (1994, p. 10).
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maps onto the dominant structuring factor of contemporary politics, the
left/right divide. The form of relations through which these two interests are
constituted also differs substantially: the ‘generalised’ interest is constituted
(as Graziano (1976) and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) demonstrated) by
relations based upon the expectation of common rights, such as manifested
among (and between) citizens and the state; the profit motive, on the other
hand, requires the constitution of market relations between agents which
(despite the assumptions of classical economists) are also the product of a
determinate social genesis.27 Both forms of relation (and hence the libidos
associated with them) are the product of that mode of domination relating
to objectified and institutionalised mechanisms.
Figure 5.2: “State Thought” and the Constitution of the Different Social
















27As Polanyi (1957), and more recently Graeber (2011) have demonstrated.
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In the sense that “state thought” (in the mode of the ‘Reason of State’)
represents both a logic and a set of interests, the constitution of alternative
mechanisms for circulating the various species of capital through this logic
represents in itself a stake in the struggle for domination. While everything
points towards the continuation of prior mechanisms for the circulation of
capital under the auspices of the ‘Reason of State’ (as Bourdieu’s example
of the various transformations undergone by cultural capital attests), the
mechanisms themselves stand to be recognised or misrecognised differently
according to, on the one hand, the role they play in the reproduction of the
dominant capital structure, and on the other hand, the extent to which they
encroach upon the point of honour of the logic of the dominant class.
As we have seen, this point of honour is itself determined by the capital
structure of the dominant class; or, to be more precise, divisions within the
capital structure of the field of power serve to structure the articulation and
expression of those interests deemed to be legitimate, and most importantly
the specific domains in which those interests may be legitimately brought
to bear - that is, the domain of the “official transmission” of the various
capitals. In the context of modern “state thought” in most Western con-
texts, struggles between these capital structures thus tend to fall upon the
definition of the boundary of the visible line which divides the ‘generalised’
interest from the profit motive. Thus, in most cases the current configura-
tion of the field of power results in the other division - that between the
‘generalised’ and the ‘specific’ interest (which previously represented one
part of the fundamental division in the struggle within the field of power in
the transition from the ‘King’s House’ to the ‘Reason of State’) - disappear-
ing across an abyssal line, and hence - in the Western context - favouring the
emergence of forms of clandestine circulation (typically within the restricted
domain of the household) predicated upon that ambiguity.
5.7 Conclusion
Rather than a smooth transition from gemeinshaft to gesellschaft, from the
circulation of embodied capitals to the objectified reproduction of insti-
tutionalised capitals (the ‘legitimate’ historical trajectory embedded within
“state thought”) everything points instead toward the simultaneous presence
of various different mechanisms for the accumulation and transformation of
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capitals, coexisting in lesser or greater harmony depending upon the contin-
gent nature of a given state effect, and the degree to which the articulation
of logics and interests produced by “state thought” enables such modes of
circulation to be misrecognised.
The clandestine circulation of capital is thus understood - at the objec-
tive level - as the tendency for part or parts of social space to be reproduced
according to principles of difference (forms and guises of capital) which ex-
ceed that domain of their legitimate expression - through mechanisms for
the “official” transmission of capital - as otherwise constituted by “state
thought”.
In seeking to establish which specific principles of difference may be-
come determinant in the clandestine reproduction of a given social space,
the first ‘moment’ of analysis must therefore identify three things: the dom-
inant capital structure(s) within the field of power, including its historical
trajectory; the objective structure and genesis of the state effect, in the
sense of the specific mechanisms for the “official transmission of capital”
(to quote Bourdieu); and third, the subjective structure and genesis of the
state effect, in the sense of the specific structure of “state thought” existing
within a given social space: producing and recognising different interests,
constructing the domain of their legitimate expression, and simultaneously
‘un’-recognising other interests. This third task is undoubtedly the most
complex, as the objective constitution of the various social libidos within a
given social space may differ substantially from their idealised constitution
by “state thought” - the difference between the two being indeed the space
within which clandestine circulation, as a misrecognised mode of reproduc-
tion, typically thrives.
Having analysed the genesis of the objective structures necessary to spec-
ify the social space of clandestine circulation, as well as the interests and
logics which such structures produce, the next chapter seeks to analyse the
different iterations of clandestine circulation at the level of practice, includ-
ing the principles which structure such circulation, and their embodiment
in agents’ habitus. This will involve extending the model of social repro-
duction developed thus far to the analysis of agents’ specific reproduction
strategies (Bourdieu, 1994), and the relation of such strategies to the re-
production mechanisms (i.e. mechanisms for the “official” transmission of
capital) of the state effect - themselves further defined according to their
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6.1 Reproduction Strategies and Clandestine Cir-
culation
Reproduction Strategies, mentioned in passing in the previous chapter, are
understood as the specific order of practices necessary for agents to repro-
duce their capital structure within a given social space. Taken together,
these strategies constitute a system (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 6), and accord-
ing to Bourdieu, systems vary in accordance with the same two modes of
domination outlined in the previous chapter - elementary or institutionalised
(ibid., p. 7). It follows that, in systems characterised by the institutionalised
mode of domination, agents’ reproduction strategies will be articulated in
relation to the structure of objectified, institutionalised reproduction mech-
anisms. Reproduction strategies are therefore the expression, in practice, of
agents’ responses to a given state effect.
Bourdieu developed a taxonomy of reproduction strategies and repro-
duction mechanisms which he derived from the analysis of highly diverse
societies at varying stages of social development (ibid., pp. 5-7). In this
taxonomy, reproduction strategies are divided into four “grand classes”: bi-
ological investment (further subdivided into ‘fecundity’ and ‘prophylactic’
strategies, to either reduce or increase potential offspring and inheritors);
succession strategies; educational strategies; and investment strategies (fur-
ther subdivided into social investment, matrimonial strategies, symbolic in-
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vestment and sociodicy1). Reproduction mechanisms are also divided into
four classes: the labour market; inheritance laws; property rights; and the
educational system. Figure 6.1 summarises these strategies and mechanisms,
and relates them both to clandestine circulation and the broader dialectic
of embodiment and objectification.
As mentioned in passing in the previous chapter, Bourdieu did not see the
general evolution of social reproduction as moving from one system wholly
dependent on the family to another wholly dependent on the educational
system (or, we may reason by extension, institutionalised mechanisms in
general), but rather as moving from “a purely familial management of the
problems of reproduction, to a familial management which makes a certain
use of the school system [or, by extension, all institutionalised mechanisms]
in its reproduction strategies” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 10, author’s translation).
This remains an important distinction, because (as was also observed
in the previous chapter) there is no reproduction strategy which does not
involve to some extent the putting to use of embodied or inherited capitals
in the work of reproduction. Rather, what is specific to clandestine circula-
tion is the manner in which those institutionalised reproduction mechanisms
tend to be subverted, enabling the (disguised) reproduction of a principle
of difference based upon inequalities in such embodied or inherited capitals,
rather than the normative principles of merit and equality implied by the
‘universal’ (or generalised) interest associated with modern “state thought”.
Analysis of the clandestine circulation of capital as practice thus requires
identifying, in each context, the specific reproduction strategies through
which such circulation occurs, and how those strategies interact with the
institutionalised reproduction mechanisms of the state effect, which should
(supposedly) regulate such circulation.
For example, it was noted in the previous chapter that changes to inheri-
tance laws in 18th and 19th century Europe (particularly in the French case)
pushed elite reproduction from strategies predicated on inheritance laws to
strategies predicated on the educational system. This transformation in-
volved the adoption of reproduction strategies favouring a much greater
investment in embodied (and by extension, inherited) cultural capital, of
the type which could gain official recognition within the educational system
1Sociodicy, by analogy with theodicy, is intended by Bourdieu to mean the justification
of society.
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(and hence be converted into institutionalised cultural capital).
By extension, we may argue that - over the same period - within the
total labour of reproduction, those strategies favouring a symbolic invest-
ment in inherited and embodied social capital (and which thus relied upon
mechanisms corresponding to the elementary mode of domination) tended
to become less important, as agents increasingly came to rely on institution-
alised, bureaucratic hierarchies of distinction predicated on the possession
of institutionalised cultural capital (again the product of changing repro-
duction mechanisms) in which concepts such as family honour were less
involved.
For instance, the transformation and decline in duelling in 19th cen-
tury Britain as a symbolic means of establishing masculine honour tends
to support such a hypothesis. Shoemaker (2002, p. 537) notes how, before
declining entirely, duelling ceased to become a public display of honour, and
was instead restricted to a (private) self-confirmation of one’s own courage.2
This in turn suggests a declining need for agents to publicly protect their
status through the principle of ‘circular circulation’ (challenges to masculine
honour being in many respects the equivalent to gift exchange, see Bourdieu
(1977)), relying instead on institutionalised principles of distinction.
The most relevant axes for differentiating clandestine circulation as prac-
tice are thus the specific guise and form of capital through which agents con-
nect their reproduction strategies to the reproduction mechanisms of a given
state effect. To the extent that such strategies represent a system, systems
may vary according to whether social, cultural, or indeed economic capital
is the favoured guise, and whether the form of capital is purely embod-
ied, inherited (that is, also pertaining to the household), or to some extent
objectified. Indeed, whereas in some cases reproduction strategies may be
predicated on the clandestine conversion of embodied or inherited capitals
into institutionalised capitals (as in the case of France), in others, clandes-
tine circulation may involve, to some extent, the creation of embodied social
capital from institutionalised or objectified capitals (as in the cases of blat,
guanxi and wasta below).
For example, strategies involving the conversion of (objectified) economic
2That is, representing the same transition from “the respect that is due to rank” to
“the building of character” noted by Collini, and relating in a Bourdieusian framework to
the transition from a state effect predicated on the institutionalisation of social capital to
cultural capital.
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capital into institutionalised capitals such as property rights (for example
in the paying of bribes to state officials, typically relating to inheritance or
property laws) may, when such conversion forms a necessary part of agents’
reproduction strategies, be considered as a form of clandestine circulation.
Equally, the conversion of embodied or inherited social capital into institu-
tionalised social capital (for example, in securing a position in the labour
market) may also be considered as a form of clandestine circulation, when
the effect of such strategies is the reproduction of a form of inequality within
the labour market predicated upon the variable possession of embodied or
inherited social capital.
Through such a methodology it becomes possible not only to distinguish
between specific forms of clandestine circulation (in terms of capitals circu-
lated), but also to determine the extent to which different parts of social
space are reproduced through such means, as well as the variable appropri-
ation such circulation may entail. Indeed, as Bourdieu noted, in the sense
that every reproduction strategy aims at consecrating “an exclusive appro-
priation and its reproduction”, we can conclude that it is the variable effi-
cacy with which agents may circulate capital through such strategies which
enables them to function as mechanisms of domination.
To give an example of such variation: within the same social space some
agents may employ embodied or inherited social capital (in the form of
favouritism or nepotism) as a reproduction strategy with regard to a given
reproduction mechanism (e.g. the labour market), while other agents may
employ economic capital (in the form of bribery) to the same end. When
taken together, such differences in agents’ strategies may correspond to sys-
temic differences relating to entire classes of agents and covering whole frac-
tions of social space, and hence representing a structuring feature within
that space. Furthermore, the variable efficacy of such differing modes of
circulation (in the sense of the varying rates of conversion - or loss - which
they enable) may have the effect of reproducing a determinate structure of
inequality within that space.
Finally, it should be noted that the objectified, institutionalised repro-
duction mechanisms of a given state effect may themselves vary. The con-
tingent nature of that effect (both in time and across space), and also the
equally contingent division of the legitimate social libidos (between the ‘gen-
eralised’ interest, the profit motive, and the ‘specific’ interest), may result in
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reproduction mechanisms whose impact varies within the same social space,
and which tend to favour different capitals (and hence interests) above oth-
ers.
In all cases however, the possible configurations of a given system of
reproduction strategies will remain determined by the genesis of the social
space which it in turn serves to reproduce, and which has, as one of its objec-
tive structures, the specific configuration of the reproduction mechanisms of
the state effect. In keeping with a Bourdieusian understanding of practice,
reproduction strategies should not, therefore, be considered as the product
of “a conscious and rational intention”, but rather as “the dispositions of
habitus, which tends spontaneously to reproduce the conditions of its own
production”. Reproduction strategies thus fall within the broader dialectic
of embodiment and objectification (as figure 6.1 illustrates). Such a mode
of analysis does not preclude agents employing conscious strategies, so long
as we remain aware of the primacy of the dialectical relationship between
embodied and objectified structures.3
6.2 Blat, Guanxi and Wasta : Clandestine Circu-
lation through Social Capital
Perhaps the best means of demonstrating the complex interplay of forces
involved in clandestine circulation as practice is by analysing some specific
examples of social spaces which came to be reproduced through such mech-
anisms: Soviet and post-Soviet Russia (through blat); the People’s Republic
of China (through guanxi); and varying parts of the Arab world4 (principally
through wasta).5
3As Bourdieu notes, “Reproduction strategies engendered by the dispositions toward
reproduction inherent in the habitus may be doubled by conscious strategies, individual
and sometimes collective, that, being almost always inspired by a crisis in the established
mode of reproduction, do not necessarily always contribute to the realisation of the ends
envisioned” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 6, author’s translation).
4It should be noted, once again, that the thesis does not presume a simple correspon-
dence between all the varying uses of wasta. As I will try to emphasise, not all practices
described by agents as wasta can be considered as representing the clandestine circulation
of capital (in the sense that they sometimes constitute part of the “official transmission”
of capital envisioned through a given mode of “state thought”), while in some contexts
similar practices are referred to by different terms (see the extract from Leca and Schemeil
(1983, p. 461) in the preface).
5Several prior (typically paired) comparisons of these different practices exist, using a
variety of frameworks. They include Hutchings and Weir (2006), who compared guanxi
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The case of blat in the Soviet Union is especially pertinent, and stands
as a useful riposte to all such analyses of similar phenomena (usually in
non-European contexts) which attribute purely culturalist explanations to
their emergence, function and perpetuation.
According to Ledeneva (1998, p. 11), blat was “an old word which
developed a new meaning at the beginning of the Soviet era”, when it came
to refer to the ‘economy of favours’ which emerged in the interstices of the
Soviet planned economy. Scarce goods were increasingly “obtained”, rather
than bought, and agents would attempt to circumvent the inadequacies of
the state distribution system by drawing upon their personal connections -
exchanging gifts and favours, and subverting their ‘official’ positions in the
bureaucracy or the planned economy to reward friends and contacts. By
the 1950s so-called ‘blatmeisters’ had emerged able to skillfully negotiate
(and profit from) the hidden byways of this informal economy (ibid., p. 27),
while the very functioning of the Soviet industrial system came increasingly
to rely on the capacity of tolkachi (‘pushers’) to informally barter goods and
services (Belova, 2001). As the British journalist Edward Crankshaw noted
of the late Stalin period: “the key-word, the most important word in the
language, was blat”.6
As this informal economy of favours spread throughout the Soviet sys-
tem, blat became arguably the determinate mode of reproduction, coming
to be used for a wide variety of purposes including “obtaining foodstuffs,
housing, promotion at work and influencing official decisions” (Ledeneva,
1998, p. 23). Such goals corresponded closely with Bourdieu’s taxonomy of
reproduction strategies.7 For instance, the possession and use of scarce sym-
and wasta as “traditional modes of interpersonal connections” and studied their varying
impact on business culture; Brandstaetter (2011), who compared wasta and guanxi as
“informal institutions”; and Smith et al. (2011), who considered the cultural specificity
of guanxi and wasta (along with Brazilian jeitinho and British “pulling strings”) as “in-
digenous ways of achieving influence”. Michailova and Worm (2003) compared blat and
guanxi from a social network perspective (again in terms of business impact); Hsu (2005)
considered blat and guanxi, in the context of cultural “tools”, as independent variables
explaining the varying response to market reforms in Russia and China; Ledeneva (2008)
attempted a similar comparison, however placing blat and guanxi (as “informal prac-
tices”) more in the position of a dependent variable in relation to the different pace of
reform in each context. Finally Schlumberger (2004, p. 249) (briefly) compared blat with
wasta in his work on patrimonial capitalism in the Middle East, considering the two to be
essentially equivalent.
6Crankshaw (1956), quoted in Fitzpatrick (2000, p. 168). Berliner (1957) was also
among the first in the West to note the phenomenon.
7A complete taxonomy of blat uses is provided by Ledeneva (1998, pp. 27-33).
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bolic resources (both for oneself and for entertaining others) demonstrates
an elevated position in social space, and thus corresponds to symbolic and
social investment; obtaining healthcare and other related services is a bio-
logical investment strategy; while accessing improved childcare, schooling,
and eventually job opportunities for offspring corresponds to educational
investment and succession strategies.
According to both Fitzpatrick and Ledeneva, it was only during the So-
viet period that such a profound reliance on the use of informal networks
for these purposes emerged. Rather than “mere survivals from the past” (as
official Soviet thinking would have them) “it was only in the Stalin period
that such [blat ] networks spread throughout society and became an impor-
tant associational form”; in Fitzpatrick’s view, blat was thus “a product
of the Stalinist distribution system itself, a compensatory function of the
regime of chronic scarcity and elimination of the legal market introduced at
the end of the 1920s” (Fitzpatrick, 2000, p. 178).
Blat was indeed the mechanism or means through which the social pene-
trated the bureaucratic;8 however, it would be wrong to consider these non-
economic aspects of blat as merely “a form of sociability” (ibid., p. 179), or
as a purely functional solution to problems of Soviet market coordination.
Rather, power relations were fundamental to the exercise of blat, as two
popular sayings noted by Ledeneva emphasise: “one person was sentenced
for taking a nail while the other smuggled by lorries”, and “the one with
connections is punished by reprimand, the one without - by the Criminal
Code” (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 78).
In Bourdieusian terms, the reproduction mechanisms of the Soviet state
effect were adjusted toward the legitimation and reproduction of institu-
tionalised social and cultural capital - the former represented by positions
in the bureaucracy, party or state distribution system, the latter by academic
qualifications. By contrast, those same reproduction mechanisms prevented
the variable possession of economic capital from emerging as a principle
of social difference. In the sense that “the more the official transmission
of capital is prevented or hindered, the more the effects of the clandestine
circulation of capital [. . . ] become determinant in the reproduction of the
8Ledeneva (1998, p. 46) notes that “the embeddedness of blat in both formal institu-
tions and informal relations constitutes its essential nature”, while according to Fitzpatrick
(2000, p. 177) “Soviet informal distribution mechanisms tended to convert every formal
bureaucratic transaction into a personal one”.
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social structure”, it is evident that the conversion of resources accruing to
agents through the institutionalisation of social capital (i.e. in the form of
their institutional position in the bureaucracy, party or distribution system)
came to play the role of differentiation that would otherwise be assumed by
economic capital. Thus, access to blat, or rather the efficacy with which one
could use blat, was determined according to the variable possession of this
form of institutionalised social capital - what Bourdieu has elsewhere called
“the political type of social capital” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 16).
Clandestine circulation in the form of blat thus involved the subversion
of the institutionalised mechanisms of the Soviet state effect to agents’ (or
class of agents’) particular reproduction strategies. Blat involved the con-
version of the institutionalised social capital (“political” capital) deriving
from agents’ positions in the bureaucracy, party or distribution system, to
the embodied social capital vested in personal relations, which could then
be reconverted into a principle of difference.
Over time, the variable possession of the embodied social capital accu-
mulated through blat could (through succession strategies adjusted to this
end) be inherited by offspring and converted back into institutionalised so-
cial capital through an elevated insertion in the labour market; the principle
difference now being that the reproduction of that institutionalised capital
was subordinated to the variable possession of embodied social capital, and
the logic associated with it.
By extension, inequalities in embodied capital clearly came to function
as a limiting factor in agents’ reproduction strategies, with those possessing
lower quantities of such capital disproportionately punished for attempting
strategies ‘above their station’ (a tendency expressed in the two sayings
noted above, and labelled “suspended punishment” by Zonoviev9).
In this way, variable possession of embodied social capital came to rep-
resent not merely an objective inequality, but also power relations bearing
the symbolic effects of field - hence structuring social space and producing
determinate effects in agents’ habitus. Specifically, agents whose habitus
had been formed in parts of social space dominated by such capital had
a ‘feel for the game’ which could be entirely lacking in others. As one of
Ledeneva’s respondents noted:
9See Ledeneva (1998, p. 77).
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I was brought up with principles. I can’t tell you how many
opportunities I missed [. . . ] When I was a peoples’ deputy I [. . . ]
knew those people who were engaged in all this [i.e., blat]. And
the fact that I did not use them made me even less respected. But
those days I understood everything literally, believed in every
slogan [. . . ] But the nomenclatura people I met did not pay me
any respect for that. They respected those who made them feel
powerful and helpful. [I] felt I couldn’t [engage in blat]. Not
because I was honest, just silly. I simply didn’t know the rules of
the game. (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 98, emphasis mine).
According to Ledeneva (ibid., p. 217), this respondent was a “teacher of
the elite school, [. . . ] intelligentsia background”. In Bourdieu’s reasoning,
the absence of economic capital as a principle of difference in Soviet social
space (and the subsequent elevation of political capital to this role) served
to emphasise a distinction based instead upon rivalries between academic
and political capital (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 17).10 The effects of this division,
in terms of habitus, are evident in the respondent’s account of her attempt
to transition from one side of this division to the other: “I simply didn’t
know the rules of the game”.
The social game in question - in which one gains respect not for ‘un-
derstanding literally’ the strictures of Soviet “state thought”, but rather for
making one’s superiors feel “powerful and helpful” - appears to correspond
to the social libido (the ‘specific’ interest) produced through the elementary
mode of domination. What the respondent appears most keen to emphasise
however is that playing such a game was not a question of conscious voli-
tion, but rather of possessing the right disposition. As with the Lebanese
professional in the introductory chapter, knowing a thing to be necessary
was not the same as being able to (physically) do it. In this sense, the
attempted transition of the agent from a field defined by academic capital
(elite schools) to one defined by political capital (people’s deputy of the lo-
cal Soviet (Ledeneva, 1998, p. 217)) was ultimately thwarted owing to her
inability to adapt to the dispositions necessary to succeed in the new field:
principally, an adjustment to reproduction strategies involving the conver-
10In the sense that political capital corresponds to a form of institutionalised social
capital, and academic capital to institutionalised cultural capital, we may thus abbreviate
the cleavage to a social capital/cultural capital division.
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sion of such political (i.e. institutionalised social) capital to embodied social
capital.
In sum, despite the normative pretensions of Soviet “state thought”,
the actual principles of reproduction within a significant part of Soviet so-
cial space became, within only a few decades of the October Revolution,
largely determined by the variable possession and circulation of embodied
social capital. Moreover, agents were able to reproduce that capital through
reproduction strategies corresponding to the elementary mode of domina-
tion, including, as a significant aspect of that domination, a subversion of
the social libido of the ‘generalised’ interest to the ‘specific’ interest. This
was in spite of the existence of institutionalised reproduction mechanisms
which, by contrast, were themselves often subverted to the defence of the
‘specific’ interest, through the varying application of the state’s monopoly
of legitimate violence - or “suspended punishment”.
The same analysis may be extended to the practice of guanxi in the
People’s Republic of China. According to Yang (1994), who studied the
phenomenon in the 1980s, guanxi “developed in the midst of the Cultural
Revolution and then spread rapidly until it met up with the money economy
of the 1980s when it declined in some areas of life but found new breeding
ground in others” (Yang, 2002, p. 463).
Like blat, “the guanxi gift economy [. . . ] served in many ways as a substi-
tute for market relations, which were severely curtailed by the redistributive
and planned economy of state socialism” (Yang, 1994, p. 320). Early uses
of guanxi also seem to compare closely with blat, principally the obtaining
of scarce goods and services through the informal exchange of favours. How-
ever, with the expansion of market relations, the uses to which guanxi were
put changed. Yang attributes a functionalist explanation for such a shift -
As previously scarce items such as televisions, train tickets, restau-
rant seats, lean meat and nursery school space are now easily
available through the market, ordinary people have less need
to practice guanxi. It is in the world of business where en-
trepreneurs and managers still need to engage with what remains
of the state economy, with official controls over state contracts,
access to imports, bank loans, favourable tax incentives, access
to valuable market information and influential persons, and ex-
emptions from troublesome laws and regulations. It is here that
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guanxixue [guanxi practice] finds nurture in the new economy.
(Yang, 2002, p. 464)
Similarly to Ledeneva and Fitzpatrick, Yang concludes that it is the
formalism and over-rigidity of the state which created guanxi. “Guanxixue
came to prominence in China in the middle of the Cultural Revolution as
a way for people to separate themselves from the extreme state-saturated
order” (ibid., p. 468). Indeed, at times Yang even presents guanxi as a kind
of salvation - from both statism and capitalism: “horizontal guanxi bonds
create a fabric for reconstructing civil society after state fragmentation of
social bonds” (ibid., p. 475), whereas “when guanxi is adapted to capitalism,
money loses its independence because money itself must be mediated by
symbolic capital, which is only gained through generosity” (ibid., p. 475).
Extending this theme, Yang tries to draw a fixed distinction between
guanxi and instrumental practices such as corruption or bribery, emphasis-
ing the importance of “renqing” (human feelings)11 to the practice of guanxi
- “[. . . ] there is a difference between guanxi and corruption or bribery.
Guanxi places much more emphasis on renqing and the long-term obliga-
tions and bond of the relationship than the material interest exchanged,
whereas in bribery or corruption, the social relationship is a means, not an
end, of the exchange” (ibid., p. 465).12 However, she also notes that, as
guanxi comes increasingly to be used in the business domain, “the explicit
material monetary calculations and the scale of monetary values transacted
transforms guanxi into the order of corruption” (ibid., p. 465).
Kipnis (1996) also attempted to emphasise a distinction between more
and less “instrumentalized” guanxi, again articulated - it would seem - ac-
cording to its distance from the state, with rural guanxi assumed as innately
less instrumental than urban guanxi. However, as with Yang and also Smart
(1993) (who analysed guanxi in Hong Kong), Kipnis seemed to have diffi-
culty establishing a firm line between instrumental and non-instrumental
guanxi, admitting “sometimes I would be confused” by a respondent’s fail-
ure to clearly distinguish between friendship and economic exchange in such
11As translated by Kipnis (1996, p. 285).
12Interestingly, in her initial work on guanxi, Yang appears to distinguish between guanxi
and renqing (as noted by Kipnis (ibid., p. 285)), viz. - “The art of guanxi seems more
masculine because, unlike traditional rural-derived renqing, it has emerged in a historical
postrevolutionary context [. . . ]” (Yang, 1994, p. 320).
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practices (Kipnis, 1996, p. 298).13
While focussing on agents’ accounts of practices (and in the process tend-
ing to reproduce their normative categories), these anthropological-style ap-
proaches seem relatively less interested in the propensity for guanxi to func-
tion (like blat) as a variable means of appropriation, whose efficacy appears
less determined by the form of exchange (i.e. instrumental, affective, or
something between the two) than the power relations (and class position) of
the agents involved.
For instance, Kipnis (ibid., p. 299-300) describes two weddings in the
same village, the first involving a peasant family with low educational at-
tainment (although the groom was described as “popular in the village”),
the second a family of teachers (where the bride was a college graduate).
In the first case, around 60 people gave a total of 350 yuan in gift-money,
while in the second approximately 90 gave more than 1,200 yuan. When
asked why people had given so much in the latter case, respondents would
say the bride’s father (a retired teacher) “handled his guanxi with others
especially well”, or alternatively that they were “just repaying him in the
same amounts that he had given them on various earlier occasions”.14
Kipnis had previously described the village in which these exchanges
took place (“Fengjia”) as having “a relatively equal distribution of wealth”.
Accordingly, he argued that “Fengjia’s socioeconomic situation certainly
influenced the tenor of gift giving there. A less egalitarian village would
reveal greater class tensions in patterns of guanxi management” (ibid., p.
290).
Given that he had thus already discounted Fengjia’s guanxi practices
as having any relation to the (re)production of inequality, Kipnis was thus
obliged to account for the large (and apparently class-based) inequality re-
vealed by the two weddings’ varying gift-money in purely functionalist terms:
“It appears that those whose work necessitated social networks outside of
the village (such as [. . . ] the teacher whose daughter’s marriage is discussed
above) were more likely to have this sort of expansive style [in guanxi ex-
13At one point Kipnis even asked several respondents to “help me resolve the differences”
between statements which appeared to equate handling guanxi well with achieving an
economic return in gifts equivalent to what one had already paid out. The respondents
“pointed out that there really was not any difference” (Kipnis, 1996, p. 300).
14Again, when enquiring about how these two comments could be reconciled, Kipnis
was told “there really was not any difference”: practical logic in action.
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change] than peasants whose work kept them involved mainly in village and
family social networks” (Kipnis, 1996, p. 302-303).
If anything, this tendency for guanxi to function as a variable (and in-
creasingly exclusive) means of appropriation grew more pronounced with
time. As already mentioned, market reforms in 1980s China saw guanxi
practices ‘shift’, both in terms of domain (from a widespread, “everyday”
practice to the more limited field of business and state interaction) and in de-
gree of instrumentality. In this respect it is useful to compare contemporary
guanxi with the supposed ‘evolution’ of blat following the fall of commu-
nism. In the case of post-Soviet blat, the “shock-therapy” introduction of
market relations resulted in a rapid reconfiguration of social space. As one of
Ledeneva’s respondents pithily remarked, “Market conditions have changed
personal relationships and ruined many friendships” (Ledeneva, 2000, p.
190). Where once the exchange of favours would suffice, money now became
determinant, as another respondent made clear -
Now if some questions are to be solved ‘by blat ’, via acquain-
tances, they imply, hint or even tell you directly how much it
is going to cost. The deal, they say, has to be ‘greened’ [colour
of US dollar] or ‘crocodiled’. Therefore, everything which used
to be by blat now takes the form of bribery, all sorts of bribery.
(ibid., p. 211)
According to Ledeneva, “the extent of post-Soviet reforms have changed
informal practices so much that blat has almost lost its relevance as a term”
(Ledeneva, 2008, p. 118); in China, by contrast, the “partial and rela-
tively slow” introduction of market reforms has favoured the emergence of
“a guanxi culture [. . . ] in business-government realms” (ibid., p. 131).
Differences in the evolution of blat and guanxi seem to fit within a Bour-
dieusian framework. In the case of blat, the rapid disintegration of the Soviet
state prompted agents to pursue “one-off”, conscious reconversion strategies
which, combined with the loss of the state’s monopoly of symbolic violence
and the rise in parallel structures of organised crime, favoured an increase
in the kind of instrumental exchange which tended to destroy the “socia-
bility” underlying prior blat. The relative endurance of power relations in
the Chinese case, by contrast, seems to have favoured the continuation of
guanxi as a form of clandestine circulation - that is, as a form of disguised
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reproduction based upon continuing resources (see previous chapter).
In both cases though, the introduction of economic capital (and repro-
duction mechanisms associated with such capital - specifically, property
rights) as an additional dimension structuring social space resulted in a
rapid shrinking of the extent of that space reproduced through both blat
and guanxi - specifically to the more elite fractions. Thus (in a manner per-
haps contrary to the benign, interpretivist conclusions of Yang and Kipnis)
there resulted a rising efficacy for both as a variable means of appropriation
among those agents still able to rely on such mechanisms.15
The final case study concerns wasta, and more generally those forms of
circulation which tend to reproduce intermediate, ‘traditional’, social for-
mations, above the level of the household yet below the universalism of the
state.
As we have seen with both blat and guanxi, the principle of differentiation
which formed the basis of the socially-efficient resources (capital) upon which
they were dependent was related to positions in the bureaucracy, party, or
state-run distribution system; thus, in terms of reproduction mechanisms,
both blat and guanxi were principally the products of the state organisation
of the labour market.
In the case of parts of the Middle East and Central Asia (including post-
Soviet Central Asia), forms of circulation similar to both blat and guanxi
have come to predominate, yet based however on principles of solidarity in
(apparent) contrast to the state, and the state’s reproduction mechanisms:
clans, tribes, sects, etc.
One such form of circulation is wasta, an Arabic word used throughout
the Levant and much of the Gulf to refer both to a useful contact or interme-
diary, or in a generalised sense to the store of contacts and informal favours
upon which an agent may draw (hence, agents may refer interchangeably
both to “a wasta” and “having wasta”).
Wasta has been studied from the late 1960s onwards, beginning with
Ayoub (1966) who examined it ethnographically within the context of con-
flict resolution in a Lebanese village, and Khalaf (1968), who, although not
referring directly to the term wasta, nonetheless included unmistakeable as-
15Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998) note a similar transition (in terms of capital
structures) in the case of post-Soviet transition in Eastern Europe; however, they do not
incorporate implications arising from Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the forms of capital,
or the articulation of domination through reproduction mechanisms.
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pects of the wasta system in his examination of the impact of “primordial
ties” on contemporary politics within Lebanon.
In keeping with the functionalist approach to clientelism popular at the
time,16 wasta was initially treated primarily as a structural emanation of
the social order. It performed socially integrative functions that could be
placed within a teleological framework leading to the eventual emergence of
the modern state.
A partial exception to this approach was Huxley (1978), who saw in
Lebanese wasta “a process which can function as a reward traded in social
exchange” (ibid., p. 116). In particular, Huxley distinguished between re-
ciprocated wasta, which led to “mutual relationships”, and non-reciprocal
wasta, which led to “power relationships” (ibid., p. 115). This was arguably
the first attempt to take a socially-differentiated approach toward wasta,
and its potential role in (producing) the structure of inequality. In partic-
ular, Huxley’s observation that “informants belonging both to the upper
class and the younger subgroup tended to find economic senses of meaning”
for wasta-like transactions (as opposed to affective meanings) was a signif-
icant - though under-explored - finding, suggesting (within a Bourdieusian
framework) that wasta involves varying power relations and different effects
of misrecognition depending upon agents’ position in social space.
Another approach to highlight the role of power relations in wasta was
Johnson (1986), who in his study of Class and Client in Beirut applied a
materialist, neo-Marxist critique to Lebanese clientelism, and treated wasta
as a particular mechanism of “clientelism as a system” (ibid., p. 97). More
recently Hamzeh (2001) and Makhoul (2004) have both rehabilitated wasta
for the clientelist paradigm, with Hamzeh in particular defining wasta as
“the ability to attract a client group and attain access to a power broker”
(Hamzeh, 2001, p. 170). However, these somewhat structuralist interpreta-
tions of wasta (that is, as a super-structure or second-order manifestation of
deeper-lying class relations) tend to underplay its affective or emotional as-
pects (as Johnson (2001, p. 5) himself has acknowledged), and can reduce it
to a somewhat instrumental exchange relation. Moreover, such approaches
16See the previously mentioned works by Boissevain (1966) and Weingrod (1968) on
networks of patronage and clientelism in Sicily and Sardinia. Indeed, in the edited volume
of Gellner and Waterbury (1977) on Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, con-
tributions by all three authors were to be found together alongside a chapter by Farrag
(1977) on “wastah” among Jordanian villagers.
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fall into the structure/agency trap previously noted by Kaufman (1972, p.
288). In either reading, there is no mechanism to account for how prac-
tices such as wasta emerge and then “evolve” (rather than die out) with the
changing structure of class relations.
In contrast with the USSR or the People’s Republic of China, the Arab
societies in which wasta is prevalent have always included a significant role
for market relations;17 while wasta sometimes plays an additional role in
obtaining scarce (material) goods, in some contexts its ubiquity spreads to
incorporate every reproduction strategy, as Farsoun elaborates -
One needs a wastah in order not to be cheated in the market
place, in locating and acquiring a job, in resolving conflict and
legal litigation, in winning a court decision, in speeding govern-
mental action and in establishing and maintaining political influ-
ence, bureaucratic procedures, in finding a bride [. . . ] (Farsoun,
1970, p. 270).
While precise wasta usage varies from place to place (and agent to agent),
it nonetheless tends to be considered as the continuing manifestation of a
principle (or structure) of group solidarity opposed to the state: be it the
tribe, the sect, or something between the two.18 Yet how convincing is such
17The extent of market relations has varied over time and space: Lebanon, for instance,
has consistently followed a laissez-faire economic system (notwithstanding national owner-
ship of some utilities, and state-granted monopolies in some industries); Syria and Egypt,
by contrast, passed through periods of ‘Arab’ socialist rule, which typically involved the
nationalisation of many industries and a system of extensive subsidies for common goods.
Jordan and Saudi Arabia, by contrast, while always following an essentially free-market
orthodoxy, nonetheless kept many large industries and utilities within state ownership,
and tended to subsidise housing, energy and food to a greater or lesser extent. From the
1970s onwards (following various current account crises) most non-oil Arab economies,
starting with Egypt, began pursuing “infitah
˙
” (“opening-up”) reforms aimed at some de-
gree of liberalisation and the expansion of market relations. In the past decade these
reforms have (arguably) even begun reaching oil economies such as Saudi Arabia, where
subventions in fields such as housing have been markedly reduced. See Richards and Wa-
terbury (2008) for a general overview, and Hinnebusch (1993) and Hinnebusch (1995) for,
respectively, discussion of “infitah
˙
” reforms in Egypt and Syria.
18See, for example, Farsoun (1970, p.270) in reference to Lebanon - “The wastah system
is generalised in the society and performs important functions within the family and
clan as well as outside it.” Also Al-Ramahi (2008, p. 36) and Ronsin (2010, p. 2) in
reference to Jordan - wasta is “a personal exchange system between members of society
that is entrenched in the tribal structure of the country”, and “modern use of wasta is
a combination of both tribal practice and modernization.” Barnett, Yandle, and Naufal
(2013) meanwhile apply a transaction costs approach in which they consider the tribe “as
a firm” (Bardhan, 1997, p. 44), and wasta as a tribal norm which remains functional
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an analysis? In the cases of both blat and guanxi, we have seen the emer-
gence of forms of clandestine circulation which rely upon the transmission of
embodied social capital and which were entirely the product of transforma-
tions in the state effect. As Roy (1996) has demonstrated, the permanence
of supposedly pre-modern solidarity groups within the context of the mod-
ern state is, rather than a manifestation of the weakness of the state, always
“the effect of a recomposition by the state factor”, giving such groups “a
complex relation with the state, far from its negation.” In all cases, the
state is the “unsurpassable horizon of political recompositions” (ibid., p. 5,
author’s translation).
In treating of the persistence or resurgence of patronage politics in the
Middle East and Central Asia, and the supposedly “traditional” solidarity
groups upon which such patronage is based, Roy argues that we are dealing
not with timeless or unchanging social objects, but rather a type of relation
to politics (ibid., p. 6). Following the 14th century Arab political scientist
Ibn Khaldun, Roy uses the Arabic word ↪as
˙
abiyah - which can be trans-
lated as “solidarity” - to describe this relation, and he demonstrates that
the ‘modern’ ↪as
˙
abiyah “emerge from the virtual disappearance of the socio-
logical structures of the traditional society (village, tribal and even ethnic)”
(Roy, 1994, p. 274, emphasis mine). Rather, in instances where modern
↪as
˙
abiyah takes the form of traditional solidarity groups (i.e. tribes, etc.),
such a development is the product of a retraditionalization: that is, modern
groups, reconstituted by the state, which define themselves “with reference
to the codes” of the traditional ↪as
˙
abiyah (ibid., p. 274).19
We may argue - in keeping with the framework thus far developed - that
the type of relation which characterises ↪as
˙
abiyah groups is the product of
a mode of circulation predicated on the dominance of institutionalised and
embodied social capital.20 In this sense, there are clearly instances where
the reproduction mechanisms of the state effect can be said to actively en-
through processes of state development. While most accounts seem to accept that “new”
wasta need not be always and everywhere a product of tribal relations, the tribal structure
is still typically viewed as the originator or carrier of such practices (see also Cunningham
and Sarayrah (1993) and Kilani and Sakijha (2002)).
19Roy notes the same tendency in post-Soviet Central Asia (Roy, 1996), which Collins
(2006) also studies.
20This would seem especially the case in the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia,
where as Roy notes “the reformation of these [solidarity] groups has nothing to do with
monopolozing the state apparatus [for economic gain] for the state coffers are empty, and
the holding of prebends quite meaningless” (Roy, 1994, p. 276-77).
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courage such circulation, in that they both produce (qua institutionalise),
and discriminate according to the possession of, such capitals.21 Whether
intentional or not, the recomposition which results is the same. Hence, as
Roy notes, modern ↪as
˙
abiyah “may be formed initially on a modern soci-
ological foundation (the new intelligentsia as opposed to the old families,
for example)” (ibid., p. 272), or they may be formed through possession
of the state apparatus (Roy, 1996, p. 12); in either case, the basis of their
power comes to be reconstituted into embodied social capital through the
elementary mode of domination, in a manner similar to blat.
In these cases we may say that the state effect - in the sense of the ca-
pacity for the field of power to produce domination through reproduction
mechanisms adjusted toward the objectification (and concentration) of the
various capitals - more closely approximates that of the ‘King’s House’ than
the ‘Reason of State’: that is, domination is both less objectified and de-
pendent upon the reproduction of social (rather than cultural) capital. In
most cases, this transformation of the mode of reproduction tends to follow
on from a crisis in the prior, established mode as a result of the effects of de-
colonisation: in both the Middle East (France and Britain) and Central Asia
(the Soviet Union), the concentration and objectification of capitals achieved
through the colonial state was maintained through external enforcement.
The end of that enforcement, and the absence of domestically-sited mech-
anisms sufficient to continue such concentration and objectification within
and through the state - in the sense both of the means of economic and
cultural production - ensured that the circulation of social capital was thus
more likely to emerge as the determinant principle of differentiation.
We should therefore be careful to distinguish between social spaces in
which reproduction based upon the circulation of social capital is a legiti-
mate principle (that is, an ‘official’ form of circulation encouraged by the
reproduction mechanisms of the state effect), and those in which it is a clan-
destine form of circulation. To be sure, there are circumstances in which
distinguishing between the two is far from clear cut; however, it is easy to
see similarities between the mode of domination produced in Jordan - where
the Hashemite monarchy reproduces a form of tribalism subordinate to the
21Saudi Arabia and Jordan in particular may be considered as examples of societies in
which the state effect (in the sense of reproduction mechanisms) and “state thought” (in
the sense of the legitimate expression of the varying social libidos) actively encourage such
a mode of circulation.
152 CHAPTER 6. CLANDESTINE CIRCULATION IN PRACTICE
state - and that produced in a former Soviet Republic such as Tajikistan -
where, as Roy (1994, p. 276-280) demonstrates, the renewal of localism and
the emergence of new “kolkhoz apparatchiks” as notables is a continuation
of the collective system and apparatus established by the Soviets (albeit un-
der the ‘specific’ interest, and motivated by a crisis in accumulation). These
cases may be contrasted (for example) with Lebanon and Syria, where wasta
is not embedded in any particular ‘traditional’ solidarity group,22 but rather
- in a way similar to blat and guanxi - involves a subversion of the ‘official’
reproduction mechanisms of the state effect.23 In all cases, however, it is the
state effect which plays the determinant role in structuring such circulation,
regardless of the (culturally arbitrary) format in which such circulation is
manifested (at the level of practice) and misrecognised (at the level of struc-
ture).
6.3 Clandestine Circulation and the Economy of
Practices
As the various examples discussed have demonstrated, the clandestine cir-
culation of capital may take a variety of different forms depending upon
the particular genesis of a given social space, and the contingent state effect
structuring that space. Not only may clandestine circulation vary according
to the guise of capital transacted (primarily cultural in the case of France,
and social in the cases detailed above), but also according to the form of
capital employed.
For instance, in the initial French and British cases detailed by Bourdieu,
the transmission of inherited and embodied cultural capital was aligned to
reproduction strategies restricted in their scope to the household (specifically
parents to children), and aimed at a final conversion into institutionalised
cultural capital. By contrast, in the Soviet case the conversion of political
(or institutionalised) social capital to embodied social capital (and hence
to other scarce socially-efficient resources) entailed reproduction strategies
22I do not consider instances of wasta derived from power obtained through the conso-
ciational political system to represent an ‘official’ form of circulation, though others may
disagree.
23Again, the distinction is not always absolute: in Jordan several accounts have com-
mented on “new” wasta which does not rely upon tribal solidarity; such developments
underline the fact that, in dealing with practices of informal exchange, one should be
wary of reifying ‘folk terms’ as consistent social objects.
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which made use of much more extensive social links, and a principle of
reproduction based upon the elementary mode of domination.
As a result, the prevailing form of capital circulated in each case also
tended to involve different effects of misrecognition. In the case of France,
the clandestine circulation of cultural capital within the household tended
to defend a point of honour predicated on the ‘universal’ or ‘generalised’
interest, corresponding to the principle of merit. By contrast, examples in-
volving the extensive clandestine circulation of embodied social capital be-
yond the household tended (though not universally)24 to defend a point of
honour predicated on the ‘specific’ interest, corresponding to the obligations
of friendship (for horizontal relations), or the feelings of power and helpful-
ness (for vertical relations). At times, however, such circulation appeared to
be entirely disenchanted, with agents following purely instrumental goals.
To account for this variance, and grasp its significance as a factor struc-
turing clandestine circulation, we must integrate a theoretical principle de-
riving from Bourdieu’s proposal of a general science of the economy of prac-
tices.
According to Bourdieu, practice constitutes an economy, in which the
conversion of capital follows general principles of conservation similar to
those exhibited by energy in the physical sciences:
In accordance with a principle which is the equivalent of the prin-
ciple of the conservation of energy, profits in one area are neces-
sarily paid for by costs in another (so that a concept like wastage
has no meaning in a general science of the economy of prac-
tices). The universal equivalent, the measure of all equivalences,
is nothing other than labour-time (in the widest sense); and the
conservation of social energy through all its conversions is veri-
fied if, in each case, one takes into account both the labour-time
24For instance, the 1950s Harvard Project (as quoted in Fitzpatrick (2000, p. 167))
noted that “If the principles of blat were recorded in terms of participants, they would
likely coincide with the Moral Code of the Communist, the most important principle of
which was ‘One is a friend, comrade and brother to another’.” This variation in terms
of misrecognition (which also includes those agents with an entirely disenchanted view
of blat) is considered by Lovell, Ledeneva, and Rogachevskii (2000, p. 59) as proof that
the blat misrecognition “game” was “incomplete”. Variations in misrecognition concern-
ing clandestine circulation are undoubtedly the hardest aspect of practice to grasp, and
Lovell et.al. are not helped by failing to apply the concept in a relational manner. This
distributed nature of misrecognition regarding clandestine circulation is in fact a function
of the prevailing structure of social space, as we shall see.
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accumulated in the form of capital and the labour-time needed to
transform it from one type into another. (Bourdieu, 1986b, p.
254, emphasis mine.)
Such a conception of practice is extremely useful in identifying the con-
straints structuring the conversion of capital in a given social context. How-
ever, it is only analytically useful if we are able to adequately specify of
what, precisely, ‘social energy’ consists.
In this sense, we must turn to one of Bourdieu’s earliest works on the
concept of social reproduction:
Every power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which
manages to impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate
by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force,
adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.
(Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990, p. 4, emphasis mine.)
This “symbolic force” can be understood as “the symbolic strengthening
of power relations (rapports de force) that is implied in the recognition by
the dominated of the legitimacy of domination” (ibid., p. 5). Thus, when
we consider any symbolic capital25 qua ‘social energy’, we must distinguish
between the power represented by that capital (in the sense of its utility as
a socially efficient resource) and the symbolic force associated with it, which
legitimises that power and tends to conceal the power relations which are
the basis of its force.26
The additional symbolic force associated with (symbolic) capital is what
lends to practices of clandestine circulation a wider economism. That is,
analysis of the total labour involved in the clandestine circulation of capitals
reveals not merely the labour-time accumulated in the capitals themselves,
25Symbolic, that is, in the sense discussed in chapter 3 in relation to “the symbolic
effects of capital” noted by Bourdieu in Pascalian Meditations (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 242).
26In the interests of avoiding more theoretical complication than is strictly necessary,
the symbolic force described by Bourdieu in Reproduction is understood as essentially
equivalent to the illusio binding agents to a field, and the interest, or social libido, which
makes social games ‘worth the candle’. The distinction between the different terms results,
no doubt, not only from the general evolution in Bourdieu’s conceptual framework, but
also the analysis of the different research objects from which they emerged. Thus, it is
perhaps best to think of the symbolic force as what emerges (in terms of habitus) from
possession and circulation of symbolic capital; when constituted into subjective position-
takings (through effects of field) this force takes the form of a specific social libido.
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but also (through the additional labour-time required to transform such
capitals), the precise nature and strength of the symbolic force associated
with those capitals, which must also be conserved if the power relations
which are the basis of their force are to maintain their ‘social energy’ - that
is, to remain misrecognised.
The implications of this principle to the study of clandestine circulation
are profound. It suggests that agents are constrained not by ‘reference
rules’ or cultural norms, but according to the interest generated by the
capitals which they possess. The symbolic force associated with capital is
thus the principle which limits and determines a given practice of clandestine
circulation, and structures it in relation to the broader configuration of
power relations within social space.
The contribution of such a mode of analysis may be grasped most clearly
when considering those forms of clandestine circulation predicated upon the
elementary mode of domination - i.e. involving the misrecognised exchange
of gifts and favours - and particularly in comparison with theoretical ap-
proaches which tend to reduce the significance of such exchange to a purely
communicative function.
In such analyses, agents will have succeeded in increasing their guanxi,
blat or wasta provided they are capable of correctly communicating the
appropriate form or expression of their gift or favour; by extension, rejection
of a gift, or failure to return an obligation, is typically considered as evidence
of no more than an agent’s lack of ‘performative’ skill.27
In reality, while there is always an additional necessity to observe sym-
bolic codes concerning the correct form or expression of exchange (itself a
culturally arbitrary factor), the social significance of such exchange lies in
the production or reproduction of power relations, whose existence or po-
27This focus on the primacy of agency or ‘performative’ competence in determining the
outcome of an exchange may be found, in one form or another, in various theoretical
approaches. Smart (1993, p. 394), for example, though purportedly working in a Bour-
dieusian framework, argues that “the distinguishing feature of gifting is found more in
the kind of performance involved than in the character of the social relations implicated
in the exchange”. Similarly, Gupta (1995, p. 381) has argued that paying a bribe in
India was not simply an economic transaction, but “a cultural practice that required a
great degree of performative competence”. Rivkin-Fish (2005, p. 59) seems likewise to
emphasise a phenomenological understanding of exchange in post-Soviet Russia, whereby
“subtle distinctions in the way objects were presented became signifiers for the kind of
exchange being conducted.” Regarding rural guanxi, Kipnis (1996, p. 286) framed his
research question specifically as “what does the gift communicate about the guanxi in
question?”, focusing on “how gifts speak”.
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tential existence transcends the specific gift or favour itself. As Bourdieu
noted -
To reduce to the function of communication - albeit by the trans-
fer of borrowed concepts - phenomena such as the dialectic of
challenge and riposte and, more generally, the exchange of gifts,
words, or women, is to ignore the structural ambivalence which
predisposes them to fulfil a political function of domination in
and through performance of the communication function. (Bour-
dieu, 1977, p. 14).
The “structural ambivalence” of an exchange is precisely that indeter-
minacy arising from its position in an open-ended sequence. That is, any
single exchange between two agents takes its meaning not only from the sum
of all previous exchanges between them, but also stands to be reinterpreted
on the basis of future responses. As was noted in the previous chapter, it
is this dialectic of challenge and riposte through which economic capital is
converted into symbolic capital, and through which relations of dependence
(which in the initial analysis have an economic basis) come to be misrecog-
nised under a veil of moral relations, such that they can no longer be reduced
to a purely economic basis (Bourdieu, 1990c, p. 122-123).
The “circular circulation” of gift exchange - functioning as an elementary
mode of domination - thus represents the additional labour through which
the (enduring) symbolic force of the ‘specific’ interest is established, which
in turn strengthens the power relations which bind agents under a veil of
(misrecognised) moral relations. Reducing any one part of that circulation
to a single act of communication - i.e., to an act in which all the information
necessary to comprehend the significance of such exchange is included within
the form of the exchange itself - is thus to destroy the enduring nature of
the forces generated through such exchange, and hence to create of such
exchange the possibility of a simple, reversible transaction, adjusted toward
a specific goal, and having as a result a corresponding finality.28
While it is true that such purely instrumental exchanges do occur, the
problem with a mode of analysis predicated on a purely communicative
understanding of exchange is that it lacks analytical principles by which to
28Thus Smart (1993, p. 393), for example, may conclude: “Obligation is always poten-
tial: once it has been used, it does not exist anymore.”
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discriminate between such exchanges. Rather, it is only by analysis of the
additional labour undertaken by agents (manifested in their reproduction
strategies) that the objective determinacies bearing down on such circulation
- and hence structuring it - can be ascertained.29
Such determinacies naturally transcend the mere “structural ambiva-
lence” of a given exchange between two agents considered in relative isola-
tion. Rather, in social spaces in which power relations exist within relatively
stable systems of objective relations - i.e. fields - the complete structure of
determinacies bearing down upon a given interaction will be a broader func-
tion of an agent’s position within that space. Such determinacies will thus
tend to constrain or enable clandestine circulation to certain conversions,
involving certain capitals and following certain reproduction strategies.30
Table 6.1 attempts to summarise - in the broadest sense possible - the
different objective determinacies structuring the varying forms of clandestine
circulation which we have thus far encountered. In each case, the dominant
inequality through which clandestine circulation is effected (in the sense of
socially-efficient resources) is the product of a contingent division within
the field of power reproduced through a determinate state effect. In each
29An example of such principles in operation can be found in the related concepts of
mianzi (face) and ganqing (feeling) in Chinese society, as described by Kipnis (1996, p.
307) -
“without a preexisting relationship, unrelated rural families lacked mianzi
to face each other and allow ganqing to flow. Hence intermediaries must be
used. By establishing obligations that took time to fulfill, the extensive giv-
ing at the beginning of relationships created a period of indebtedness during
which flows of ganqing could begin. In this sense such giving created mianzi,
which in turn acted as a starting point for guanxi. After the establishment
of affinal guanxi, the intermediaries could be bypassed.”
As described here, mianzi, ganqing and guanxi are almost the exact correlates of (re-
spectively) symbolic force, power relations and symbolic capital. Needless to say, in such
a system the form or communication function of the gifts exchanged is coincidental in
comparison with the importance of the structure of objective determinacies (i.e. the rel-
ative position of the two families in social space) which determines the possibility of such
exchange establishing power relations.
30Empirical justification for such an approach is provided by Denord et al. (2011), who
note that:
“the potential conversion of social capital into other forms of capital is of
particular interest. Our results may hint at diverging conversion tendencies:
that institutionalised social capital may, relatively speaking, be more read-
ily converted into economic capital than into cultural capital, but that the
capacity for capital conversion also varies according to the agents’ capital
composition.” (ibid., p. 105-106, emphasis mine)
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case a specific reproduction mechanism of that state effect tends to become
dominant in the allocation of resources which forms the basis of the under-
lying inequality. Finally, practices of clandestine circulation (in the sense of
the additional labour undertaken by agents) tend to be structured in each
case toward the defence of a different point of honour or principle of legiti-
mation - the exception being forms of direct domination which produce no
additional symbolic force (hence leading to disenchantment) and where the
additional labour may be considered in terms of the coercion required to
extract a surplus.31
The table describes such forms as “ideal types” - that is, as reflecting ab-
solute structuring principles which in practice are inevitably more complex.
The intention of presenting the various forms of clandestine circulation in
such a way is to encourage a mode of empirical analysis in which clandestine
circulation is considered in a relational sense. That is, a given social space
may feature all or none of these forms of clandestine circulation, and each
to varying degrees, depending upon the extent to which different fractions
of that space are structured according to the divisions noted.




























The table also demonstrates how changes in the state effect can gener-
ate new forms of clandestine circulation, which (owing to affinities produced
through the improvisatory nature of habitus) may result in the appropria-
31Such an outcome implies a commensurate weakening in the state’s monopoly of overt
violence, in much the same way that clandestine circulation through the elementary mode
of domination entails a weakening in the state’s monopoly of symbolic violence.
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tion of ‘folk terms’ (such as occurred with guanxi and wasta) to cover such
practices. It is only objective analysis however which reveals that such cir-
culation represents a new “exclusive appropriation”, the result of changes
to the underlying mode of production, for instance through the institution
of reproduction mechanisms producing market relations and leading to the
emergence of an economic field.
Having outlined the general principle of the economy of practices, it now
falls to demonstrate how this principle (qua structuring principle or limiting
factor) is mediated - at the level of practice - through the dispositional
nature of agents’ habitus.
6.4 Habitus and Body Hexis
The habitus, as “an acquired system of generative schemes objectively ad-
justed to the particular conditions in which it is constituted”, and which,
as such, “engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the ac-
tions consistent with those conditions, and no others” (Bourdieu, 1977, p.
95), is the mechanism through which the objective economism implied in
the conversion of capital manifests itself in the regularised dispositions of
agents.
Thus, rather than the product of a conscious strategy or reference rule,
the practice of clandestine circulation is the result of the acquired disposi-
tions of habitus.32 As noted in chapter 3, such dispositions follow a deontic
logic of appropriateness, in which habitus adjusts to “the demands inscribed
as objective potentialities in the situation” (ibid., p. 78). Such adjustment
is frequently pre-reflexive, and manifests itself physically in an agent’s body
hexis - “in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and sys-
tematic, because linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body
and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values” (ibid., p.
32See specifically Bourdieu (1998, p. 97) -
One can only account for all double behaviours, without duplicity, of the
economy of symbolic exchanges by abandoning the theory of action as the
product of an intentional consciousness, an explicit project [. . . ] Most human
actions have as a basis something quite different from intention, that is,
acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and should be
oriented toward one objective or another without anyone being able to claim
that that objective was a conscious design.
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87).
In the sense that the varying forms of clandestine circulation are the
result of differences in the objective configuration of power relations within
social space, the habitus - being the sum of the durable power relations
deposited within an agent on the basis of his or her trajectory through such
space - will produce practices adjusted to the logic of that space, and will
assess the objective potentialities inherent in a given situation according to
the logic of the power relations which structure it.
In the sense that reproduction strategies are both the expression of habi-
tus and one of the principle means through which habitus is reproduced (ow-
ing to the dialectic of objectification and embodiment), transformations to
the various reproduction mechanisms are thus one of the key objective means
through which the state effect may restructure agents’ (or class of agents)
habitus toward the accumulation of different capital structures (specifically
institutionalised capitals over embodied capitals, and cultural over social
capital).
Thus, changes to reproduction mechanisms of the state effect may at-
tempt to place limits on strategies favouring the production and reproduc-
tion of embodied social capital (and hence the ‘specific’ interest), and to
effectively constrain such strategies to the domain of the immediate house-
hold, understood in the most minimal sense (i.e. the direct kinship of parents
and offspring). Such limits typically take the form of legal and statutory
instruments, which tend to recognise and privilege this particular structure
(through the design of inheritance and property laws, legal status, welfare
entitlements, etc.) By contrast, the state may disfavour the reproduction of
more extensive affective social structures (for instance clan, tribal, sectarian,
or other affective/fictive kinship groups) by mechanisms to limit the trans-
mission of capital through such groups, or by disproportionately increasing
the cost (in the sense of the labour involved) of such transmission.33
Of course, in the sense that fields are always fields of struggles and not
33Cunningham and Sarayrah (1993, p. 68), for instance, notes that “the modern wasta”
in Jordan is typically both more educated and less trusted by his clients. He has “an
apartment rather than a house, which makes it difficult for him to provide a place for
village relatives to sleep”. The result would appear to be a less affective, more instrumental
wasta/client relation, which in turn favours the concentration of power in bureaucratic
rather than tribal structures. One sees in such trends the gradual evolution in modes of
domination, owing to transformations in the underlying labour required to sustain affective
relations.
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“dead structures and empty spaces”, such transformations to reproduction
mechanisms will always be met with the improvisatory responses of habi-
tus, in the form of novel changes to former reproduction strategies, aimed
at defending as much as possible the agent’s pre-existing capital structure
(and hence investment). Kipnis (1996, p. 296, 311), for instance, notes in
passing that attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to end arranged
marriages (which in Bourdieusian typology would amount to changes in the
reproduction mechanisms concerning inheritance) resulted in the creation
of an “invented tradition” of scheduled visits by the fiance´ to her future
husband’s family. Such visits represented an additional labour in a house-
hold’s matrimonial strategies, yet served to preserve the elementary mode
of domination underlying such strategies, which required the establishment
of ‘face’ (mianzi) between the two families: a symbolic force which would
bind their future relations and serve to increase their joint store of embodied
social capital.34
Nonetheless, when the transition from one capital structure to another
- effected through alterations to the reproduction mechanisms of the state
effect - coincides with transformations in social space conforming to class or
class fraction divisions (as noted in the previous chapter), then the incentive
to adopt or adapt reproduction strategies to favour the accumulation of such
new capitals is at its strongest.35
Thus, reproduction mechanisms conforming to the mode of institution-
alised domination, and favouring the reproduction of such domination through
institutionalised cultural capital, may indeed serve to produce a social space
in which the varying social libidos are constituted according to the principles
of division corresponding, more or less accurately, to their idealised construc-
tion by “state thought”. In such instances, the function of sociodicy pro-
duced by the state effect (that is, by the varying mechanisms responsible for
constituting the various social libidos, which tend to limit their expression
to certain explicit domains) will favour the doxic - or “taken-for-granted” -
reproduction of the social structure.
34See also Bourdieu (1986a) on the relation between laws and habitus, and Bourdieu
(1990a) on the selective implementation of laws according to specific effects of field.
35Bourdieu noted this tendency (and indeed studied it intensively) in his native Be´arn,
where changes in matrimonial strategies (provoked by transformations in the underlying
social structure) rendered the sons of agricultural landowners ‘unmarriageable’ (Bourdieu,
2007).
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Indeed, such sociodicy is perhaps most effective when it is at its most
(apparently) passive. For example, as previously mentioned, in the ‘Rea-
son of State’ clandestine circulation is arguably more easily effected when
it is limited to the domain of the nuclear family which, in such a system, is
the only remaining sub-structure through which the mode of reproduction
corresponding to the elementary mode of domination may be legitimately
expressed (and hence, in effect, holds a monopoly on this mode of domina-
tion). Thus, the circulation of embodied capitals within the household (both
cultural and social) remains a legitimate reproduction strategy, endorsed by
both the subjective constitution of “state thought”, and the objective re-
production mechanisms of the state effect.36
By contrast, in cases where the historical trajectory of the state effect
(and the corresponding field of power) has not resulted in the concentration
and objectification of capitals within the institutions of the state, the state
is unlikely to enjoy the monopoly of symbolic violence implied by “state
thought”, specifically in the sense of the objective constitution of the vary-
ing social libidos - that is, in terms of their distribution in the habitus of
agents - assumed by “state thought”. In this sense, adjusting agents’ habi-
tus to the actual logic of a space (in the sense of the structure of the social
libidos constituting it, which determines the appropriate action in a given
situation, above and beyond what might be considered the ‘optative’ or ideal
logic otherwise implied by “state thought”), becomes in itself one of the most
important reproduction strategies - understood within the Bourdieusian ty-
pology as strategies of sociodicy (a form of investment strategy).37
With regard to clandestine circulation, the most important of these ‘com-
pensating’ effects of sociodicy (in the sense of legitimising or delegitimising
certain strategies in certain domains) are undoubtedly achieved within the
household, in the sense that the household - tending (within the ‘Reason of
State’) to maintain the legal monopoly over the elementary mode of dom-
ination, as previously mentioned - may reinforce or undermine any further
36The same observation holds for the (legitimate) reproduction of more extensive soli-
darity groups (tribes, clans, etc.) in systems corresponding to the logic of domination in
the ‘King’s House’.
37This form of adjustment through strategies of sociodicy is no doubt what has encour-
aged the recent academic vogue for uncovering “unwritten rules”; in reality, while serving
to adjust agents to the ‘actual’ constitution of social space, such strategies never represent
a principle of sufficient regularity to constitute a ‘rule’, but serve rather to provide a ‘feel
for the game’.
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effects of sociodicy subsequently attempted within institutions of the state.
Indeed, to the extent that state institutions may modify or alter an
agent’s dispositions (i.e. toward those reflecting an embodiment of the ‘gen-
eralised’ interest), it would seem necessary either that such dispositions re-
flect (and hence redouble) tendencies already implicit in household strategies
of sociodicy,38 or that the symbolic violence wielded through such institu-
tions be greater than that of the household.39
Hence, where the reproduction strategies of a given class fraction are ad-
justed toward the circulation of cultural capital, sociodicy within the house-
hold will tend to reinforce those dispositions finding favour in the educational
system, through “a sort of ontological complicity” (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 306)
which fits positions with dispositions, and links the ‘generalised’ interest
constituting that fraction’s point of honour to the ‘generalised’ interest of
“state thought”.
By contrast, Serre (2012) has noted that in contemporary France pos-
sessors of what she terms “school capital” (capital scolaire) find it difficult
to adapt to a mode of work ‘regulation’ perceived as “copinage” (roughly
translatable as ‘favouritism’ or ‘cronyism’) (ibid., p. 10). Copinage - which,
like blat, wasta and guanxi consists of reproduction strategies predicated on
the circulation of embodied social capital - implies a quite different set of
dispositions (and hence habitus) to those involving cultural capital. The
result is thus a class of agents who, like Ledeneva’s respondent, lack the
necessary dispositions to succeed at copinage.
38See Bourdieu (1981, p. 312) (and also Bourdieu and Passeron (1990, pp. 191-2))-
Some of the most characteristic features of the conduct of junior officials -
a tendency towards formalism, fetishism about punctuality, strict adherence
to regulations, etc. - are far from being a mechanical product of bureau-
cratic organization. They are in fact the manifestation, within the logic of
a situation particularly favourable to its implementation, of a set of disposi-
tions that also manifests itself outside the bureaucratic situation and which
would be sufficient to predispose the members of the petty bourgeoisie to
practice the virtues demanded by the bureaucratic order and exalted by the
ideology of ‘public service’: probity, meticulousness, rigour and a propensity
for moral indignation.
39For instance, in Men and Machines (Bourdieu, 1981, p. 313), Bourdieu mentions
“barracks, prisons, concentration camps” as the extreme forms of those state apparatuses
or “totalitarian institutions” which have “the physical and symbolic means of restructuring
earlier habitus” (emphasis mine). However, Bourdieu also makes clear that such eventual-
ities are the product of a shift from “the ordinary functioning of fields as fields of struggle
towards limiting-states, which are perhaps never reached, in which all struggle and all
resistance to domination have disappeared, so that the field hardens and contracts [. . . ]”
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The investigations conducted by Hjellbrekke, Le Roux, and Korsnes
(2007) and Denord et al. (2011) into the precise structure of the field of
power in Norway seem to add further support to the distributed nature of
such dispositions.40 They note that “low volumes of social and personal ed-
ucational capital constitute a structural opposition to high volumes of both
inherited social and cultural capital”, suggesting a division between “new-
comers” and “established field agents” (ibid., p. 88). For newcomers, they
hypothesise that “social capital (in Bourdieu’s sense) is the concrete basis of
political and organisational capital, which is also defined by a specific type
of symbolic capital (or public notoriety). It helps to compensate for the rela-
tive lack of educational-cultural and economic assets, which dominate among
the other fractions of the elites” (ibid., p. 105, emphasis mine). It would
seem probable therefore that “newcomers”, lacking both in institutionalised
cultural capital and the dispositions associated with such a capital profile,
profit rather from dispositions adjusted to the conversion of embodied social
capital into political and organisational capital (a kind of institutionalised
social capital).
In all cases, the dispositions of agents (whether they manifest them-
selves in pre-reflexive strategies or the “conscious strategies” provoked by
changes in the established mode of reproduction) will be a reflection of the
particular conditions in which the habitus generating those dispositions was
constituted, as adjusted to the current state of the field. As Bourdieu notes:
“[. . . ] practices can be accounted for only by relating the objec-
tive structure defining the social conditions of the production of
the habitus which engendered them to the conditions in which
this habitus is operating, that is, to the conjuncture which, short
of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this
structure” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).
In relatively stable spaces, this ontological complicity between disposi-
tions and (objective) positions will structure practice fairly precisely toward
the most efficient conversion strategies, in which the total labour under-
taken is no more and no less than that needed to conserve the social energy
associated with a given capital structure.
40They also attribute the nature of such distribution to “the long-term institutional
trajectory of the country” (Denord et al., 2011, p. 105), suggesting a genesis which may
equally be integrated within the model proposed in the previous chapter.
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For example, the rising salience of unpaid internships in western Europe
can be seen as a relatively novel form of clandestine circulation which, in
the sense of “a legitimation strategy aimed at consecrating both an exclu-
sive appropriation and its reproduction”, seems a disposition adjusted to
the protection of the symbolic force associated with the ‘generalised’ inter-
est, even at the cost of an objectively less efficient conversion than simple
copinage or “pulling strings”.41
By contrast, as we shall see in the next chapter, in social spaces where
the state’s monopoly over symbolic violence is limited and incomplete (and
where, by extension, the concentration of capitals within the state is also at
best partial), specific strategies of sociodicy may emerge within households
which have the effect of further undermining and degrading the legitimacy
of the state (in the sense of the state’s ‘public interest’), through disposi-
tions encouraging the payment of bribes or the use of connections. Indeed,
such strategies are especially notable when placed within the total order of
strategies of sociodicy effected within such households, whereby (owing to
the precise configuration of objective reproduction mechanisms) alternative
strategies may simultaneously encourage the cultivation of the ‘generalised’
interest in other domains (for instance the labour market or the educational
system). Again, the ‘efficiency’ of such strategies can only be revealed by re-
lating the habitus producing them to the particular constitution of symbolic
forces within that sector of social space, as manifested in the determinate
structuring of an agent’s point of honour.
The exception(s) to this economism which eventually prove the rule are
41Which is to say, as the relative value of institutionalised cultural capital declines
(owing to an inflation in the number of agents possessing degree-level qualifications -
representing in Bourdieu’s terms a change in the established mode of reproduction), the
rate of conversion of such capital in the labour market also falls, reducing its effectiveness
as a means of ensuring “an exclusive appropriation” in the labour market. However,
rather than reverting directly to copinage (that is, a direct conversion of inherited or
embodied social capital to a position in the labour market) a disguised form of circulation
has emerged, whereby agents pass through an intermediate stage (or stages) of unpaid
employment. The cost of absorbing such a long period of labour without income, as well
as the social connections necessary to obtain the best opportunities, tends to render such
practices a variable means of appropriation. However, the capacity for such placements
to be misrecognised as demonstrating experience and commitment (both according to the
point of honour of the ‘generalised’ interest) also renders them an effective legitimation
strategy for certain fractions of the field of power. A notable exception to this case is Italy,
where fare un posto and raccomandazione (i.e. direct conversion) remains widespread, if
rarely openly acknowledged - a product, no doubt, of the Italian state’s historically weak
monopoly of symbolic violence.
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to be found in instances where the ontological complicity between habitus
and field has broken down, owing either to changes in the mode of repro-
duction, or the destabilising of habitus through (for instance) migration. As
Bourdieu notes:
Habitus is not necessarily adapted to its situation nor necessar-
ily coherent. It has degrees of integration - which correspond in
particular to degrees of ‘crystallization’ of the position occupied.
Thus it can be observed that to contradictory positions, which
tend to exert structural ‘double binds’ on their occupants, there
often correspond destabilized habitus, torn by contradiction and
internal division, generating suffering. Moreover, even if dispo-
sitions may waste away or weaken through lack of use (linked,
in particular, to a change in social position or condition), or as
a result of heightened consciousness associated with an effort of
transformation (such as the correction of accents, manners, etc.)
there is an inertia (or hysteresis) of habitus which have a spon-
taneous tendency (based in biology) to perpetuate structures
corresponding to their conditions of production. As a result,
it can happen that, in what might be called the Don Quixote
effect, dispositions are out of line with the field and with the
‘collective expectation’ which are constitutive of its normality.
This is the case, in particular, when a field undergoes a major
crisis and its regularities (even its rules) are profoundly changed.
In contrast to what happens in situations of concordance when
the self-evidence linked to adjustment renders invisible the habi-
tus which makes it possible, the relatively autonomous principle
of legality and regularity that habitus constitutes then appears
very clearly. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 160)
Hysteresis of field or habitus is immediately recognisable through the
effects of destabilisation it produces. Tabar, Noble, and Poynting (2010,
p.170-173), for instance, have examined the effects of a radical displace-
ment in producing a “tormented” ethnic habitus among Lebanese migrants
in Australia, a phenomenon which Noble (2013) demonstrates may clearly
manifest itself in body hexis.42 Likewise, we have already seen one case of
42See the description of “Michael”, who gives the same speech in two languages, with
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destabilised habitus in relation to an attempted change of social position in
Soviet Russia; in the case of post-Soviet blat, the destabilisation of Soviet
social space (and the rapid assimilation of market relations) clearly favoured
those agents (such as tolkachi) whose prior dispositions most closely approx-
imated those of market relations;43 by contrast, those agents lacking such
dispositions (being, for instance, more accustomed to affective exchange)
quickly found the space of blat had shrunk to exclude them.
Effects of hysteresis can also account for ‘misfirings’ of habitus, such as
the “botched bribe” of our opening anecdote. Bourdieu describes habitus
as “the durably installed principle of regulated improvisations”, which “pro-
duces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the
objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while ad-
justing to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation”
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78).
In this sense, the case of the young professional demonstrates a ‘false con-
juncture’ between habitus and situation, the result of a discrepancy between
the objective conditions of the site of embodiment of habitus (France), and
the objective potentialities inscribed in the bureaucratic situation (Lebanon).
As a principle of regulated improvisations, the professional’s habitus could
produce only those dispositions ‘appropriate’ to the demands of the situation
as they would otherwise be inscribed in the French field - where, it must be
said, the capacity of the bureaucratic field to enforce a monopoly of symbolic
violence on behalf of the ‘universal’ interest of “state thought” is consider-
ably greater than in Lebanon. The inertia expressed in the professional’s
physical inability to pay the bribe is thus the continuing embodiment, in
body hexis, of the symbolic force associated with her capital structure: a
capital structure acquired in a different social space, and thus producing a
different ‘feel for the game’.
The regulating principle of habitus - enabling an improvisation which
tends to reproduce the conditions of its production - is thus the mechanism
through which the clandestine circulation of capital produces its most signif-
icant effects: specifically, the variable means of appropriation through which
radically varying hexis (Noble, 2013, pp. 341-343).
43The advantage (in terms of dispositions of habitus) for such agents is also noted by
Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (1998), while McDermott (2007) applied a similar analy-
sis (using Putnam-style social capital) to the ability of managers of firms to negotiate
transition in the Czech Republic.
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such circulation tends to reproduce a particular structure of inequality. As
the durable embodiment of the unequal power relations existing objectively
in social space (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 16), habitus will produce
dispositions regulated according to the affinities and oppositions structuring
that space.
For instance, as Denord et.al. make clear in the Norwegian case, “more
autonomous fields seem to be characterized by more internal patterns of
social capital accumulation, which we have called ‘endogamy”’ (Denord et
al., 2011, p. 105). This suggests that, as well as an “integrating principle”
(ibid., p. 105) (and hence tending to maintain the overall legitimacy of that
elite), the clandestine circulation of social capital can also (and perhaps
more significantly) function as a means for limiting the progress of “new-
comer” fractions, and ensuring that the dominant position of “inheritors” is
reproduced.
Far from a conscious exclusion, such endogamy is most effectively achieved
through the affinities of habitus formed through occupation of the same frac-
tion of social space. Rivkin-Fish (2005) seems (perhaps without realising) to
demonstrate these same affinities - and the variable means of appropriation
resulting from them - in the cases of ‘Valya’, ‘Sonia’ and ‘Liudmila’, and
their differing degrees of success in attempting to improve their standard of
maternity care in post-Soviet Russia (a biological investment strategy).
Of the three, both ‘Valya’ and ‘Sonia’ were able to obtain an improved
service, the first through a combination of affective and instrumental ex-
change (one doctor was a friend, the other a contact to whom she paid
an additional fee), the second through purely affective means (Rivkin-Fish
noted only that she gave her doctor a waﬄe to have with her tea after the
consultation). The third, ‘Liudmila’, despite offering more substantial gifts
than ‘Sonia’ to the same doctor, nonetheless received a cold and perfunctory
examination.
While (as already mentioned) Rivkin-Fish appeared to attribute the dif-
ferent responses to the form in which the varying gifts were made, a more
plausible explanation is the broader structure of power relations within
which they were nested. Both ‘Valya’ and ‘Sonia’ shared the same class
condition as the doctor;44 ‘Liudmila’, on the other hand, had pulled strings
44In the case of ‘Valya’, her Soviet-era background was one of relatively high cultural
capital (her parents were both engineers), while she herself had two degrees and had
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through the former head of department, and on first meeting the doctor
informed her she was “financially well-off”, asking “how much do we need
to pay you? [. . . ] just tell us how much it’ll cost. We can afford anything”
(ibid., p. 57). The doctor later explained to Rivkin-Fish that such a strat-
egy left her not wanting to “reach out” to ‘Liudmila’ - an apt expression,
which serves to emphasise the distance (in terms of capital structures) be-
tween the doctor’s institutional cultural capital and the economic capital of
‘Liudmila’, which evidently resulted in the doctor interpreting the latter’s
request as an attempt at overt, vertical domination, and hence a challenge
to her (professional) point of honour.
Even in situations involving an apparently instrumental use of clandes-
tine circulation, the unequal structure of power relations can be reproduced
through the effects of endogamy manifested in the affinities of habitus. Xin
and Pearce (1996, p. 1652), for instance, quote an informant admitting that
“I hired X, a high school graduate, with his father’s connections in mind” -
connections which enabled him to avoid a potentially expensive government
audit. In such cases class position and the dispositions of habitus become
inseparable aspects of clandestine circulation: employee “X” ‘fixed’ the sit-
uation through a 2,500 yuan ‘allowance’ (equivalent to half a year’s salary
for a middle manager), which he presumably passed on (or shared) with the
auditors. Like the blatmeisters of Soviet Russia, or the simsars of Lebanon,
the disposition to pay a bribe is thus inseparable from an affinity relative to
those receiving the bribe, which is ultimately sufficient to render this form
of clandestine circulation (as others) a variable means of appropriation.
established “a highly successful business in the import sector” with her husband. In this
sense, following the fall of the Soviet Union ‘Valya’ pursued a successful reconversion
strategy into the economic field. However, her continuing sense of affinity (qua class
position) with physicians as fellow professionals is demonstrated through her justification
for paying a “bribe” - “I feel that I should pay, I have the money, and so it’s right that I
pay for their professionalism and time” (Rivkin-Fish, 2005, pp. 48-50). Such justification
is the product of hysteresis (or inertia) within habitus of a prior state effect. ‘Sonia’, as a
former pharmacy student whose acquaintances “did not consist of highly placed specialists
or bureaucratic power brokers”, had an even closer affinity.
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6.5 Position Takings and The Social Space of Clan-
destine Circulation
The relational nature of the dispositions structuring clandestine circulation
brings us to the final (and most complex) aspect of practice: the second-
order effects (in the sense of agents’ subjective accounts) produced by such
circulation. As various attempts to analyse such phenomena have demon-
strated, a fundamental ambiguity clouds such practices, confounding simple
categorisations. Agents frequently disagree over what does and does not
constitute such practice; who engages in it; the degree of coercion involved;
the degree of reciprocity; and the degree of instrumentality. In the case of
guanxi, blat and wasta, such ambiguity has filtered into the theoretical ac-
counts of such practices produced by analysts, with normative assumptions
regarding the redistributive effects of such circulation mirroring agents’ vary-
ing misrecognition, resulting in particular in exchanges misrecognised under
the ‘specific’ interest tending to be viewed in benign terms (e.g. Yang (2002,
p. 475) and Kipnis (1996, p. 302-303)).
Such fundamental ambiguity is evidently the product of the varying ex-
tent to which practices of clandestine circulation are misrecognised, and
the symbolic form which such misrecognition takes. As we have seen, mis-
recognition - as a contingent effect of the symbolic force which binds power
relations - will vary depending upon the character of the relations involved
in a given social practice, and the form and guise of capitals involved. In the
sense that power relations are not merely embedded within habitus, but also
objectified within fields, we can therefore conclude that the degree and form
of misrecognition displayed by agents will, to some extent, be a contingent
product of their position in social space.
However, any direct correspondence between position (in social space)
and position-taking (on practice) is complicated by a number of factors,
which originate in the distinction between clandestine circulation as objec-
tive practice and clandestine circulation as comment-on-practice; that is,
between clandestine circulation as the dispositions engendered by habitus,
and clandestine circulation as the position-takings reflexively produced by
habitus. This distinction, and its implications, require further elaboration.
First, it is understood that agents typically restructure their accounts of
practice to place themselves in the ‘best light’ (a variant on the ‘biological
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fallacy’). As we saw in chapter 3, in such a way the determinants of practice
(i.e. the dispositions of habitus) are ex post reconstituted into conscious
agency, which is then provided with a motive. The precise nature of such a
motive may be useful in determining the agent’s immediate ‘point of honour’
in a given practice (that is, the nature of the power relations between two
agents): however, in the sense that a given practice of clandestine circulation
may be misrecognised under the specific interest, the constitution of this
‘point of honour’ may not undergo any consistent variation according to an
agent’s position in social space.
This is because, while embodied social capital varies in terms of its effi-
cacy depending upon an agent’s overall capital structure (as Bourdieu noted
in The Forms of Capital (Bourdieu, 1986b)) the symbolic force generated by
such capital will not vary according to the same matrix, in the sense that the
‘specific’ interest is generated between affective relations (friends, relatives)
which are typically consistent across social space, and produced through an
elementary mode of domination whose symbolic effects (unlike institution-
alised domination) are relatively autonomous from the distributional effects
of field. Thus, regardless of their position in the broader structure, agents
will typically view their own acts (when conducted under the ‘specific’ in-
terest) as the duties of family or friendship, or alternatively (when lacking
symbolic force, and coming closer to overt coercion) as a necessity forced
upon them by the constraints of a broader system.
The second important implication is that the objective practice of clan-
destine circulation - as the product of the dispositional sense of habitus
- represents a class condition. Hence, the objective probability of agents
engaging in practices of clandestine circulation will vary according to the
extent to which the part of social space they occupy is reproduced through
such means, as will the efficacy with which such forms of circulation function
as a means of variable appropriation.
Clandestine circulation as comment-on-practice, however, is the product
of the perceptions of habitus, and is thus the product of a class position - a
position-taking articulated in relation to other position-takings.45 It is thus
likely to depend, at any given time, on the state of the broader structure of
45This distinction - described by Wacquant as “pivotal” - Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992,
p. 6) between class condition and class position was initially made in Bourdieu (1966);
its relative absence in Distinction (Bourdieu, 1984) was in turn to become Elster’s chief
criticism of that work (Elster, 1981).
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power relations within and between fields existing in social space, and the
(sometimes arbitrary) symbolic articulation of the varying points of honour
constituted by those relations. The restructuring effects of field being what
they are, it is thus entirely feasible that a given class or class fraction may
take a strong position (in the system of position-takings) against a practice
which, by virtue of that class’s condition within social space, is in fact a vital
constituent of its reproduction strategies (and hence frequently manifested
in the dispositions of habitus of agents deriving from that class).
Thus, for instance, Guthrie (1999) based his conclusions on the (sup-
posedly declining) relevance of guanxi in China’s new capitalist economy on
formal, two-hour interviews conducted with members of the new managerial
class at their factories. As Yang (2002, p. 461) noted in her critique of
Guthrie’s work, this methodology entirely failed to take account of “guanx-
ixue’s association in public discourse with the grey areas between proper and
improper behaviour and with getting around rules and regulations”, making
it something that “few people would admit to publicly” - particularly, one
imagines, managerial members of the rising middle class speaking in a for-
mal interview setting. What Guthrie thus captured was the position-taking
of a particular fraction within China’s new field of power toward a given
social object; what he did not capture was the propensity of that fraction
to make use of guanxi as a practice.
Similarly, the previously mentioned example of copinage from Serre
(2012) demonstrates not simply the varying dispositions manifested within
a class fraction adjusted toward the clandestine circulation of cultural capi-
tal, but also, no doubt, a position-taking by that class fraction toward other
classes perceived as lacking their ‘generalised’ interest (and hence having
opposing points of honour).
Analysis of these second-order effects and their distribution is thus the
most complex aspect of clandestine circulation, and the reason behind the
frequent academic labelling of such practices as “paradoxical”. Indeed,
position-takings of agents toward clandestine circulation may alternately
vary according to whether such circulation is treated as the agent’s practice,
as objective practice, as practice restructured into folk terms such as blat
and wasta, or as practice restructured according to “state thought” (such as
corruption or patronage) - the difference in each case being the particular
point of honour which such comment-on-practice is addressed toward.
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It is thus na¨ıve to expect any direct correspondence between an agent’s
position in social space, the extent to which that position is reproduced
through clandestine circulation, and an agent’s subjective attitude toward
the practice of clandestine circulation (as revealed through interview). Nor,
indeed, is the elaboration of a precise structure of such misrecognition even
necessarily desireable, given that there is no theoretical reason why mech-
anisms of clandestine circulation should need to produce their own effects
of sociodicy (i.e., that such circulation only produces its effects provided it
is successfully misrecognised by agents - hence an absence of misrecognition
implying a less effective mode of circulation).
Rather, what is necessary is for analysis to relate agents’ misrecogni-
tion - in particular, as demonstrated through the additional labour (or lack
of it) revealed in practice by their reproduction strategies - to the mecha-
nisms responsible for constituting the various social libidos in a given social
space. That is, in the sense that misrecognition of clandestine circulation
is a distributed phenomenon, the distribution it reveals will not necessarily
be the propensity toward using such mechanisms, or indeed the extent to
which such mechanisms are responsible for reproducing a given agent’s cap-
ital structure, but rather the underlying distribution of the symbolic forces
which - when reconstituted into the dispositions of habitus - structure the
potential domain of such circulation, and the forms it will take.
6.6 Conclusion
The purpose of this section of the thesis has been to present a general theory
of the clandestine circulation of capital, structured according to the research
questions outlined at the end of chapter 3.
First, clandestine circulation was itself defined (according to Bourdieu’s
conceptual tools, and in a manner consistent with Bourdieusian theory) as
the tendency for part or parts of social space to be reproduced according
to principles of difference (forms and guises of capital) which exceed that
domain of their legitimate expression as otherwise constituted by the ‘official’
transmission of capital conceived through “state thought”. This circulation
was then distinguished according to different forms, and the emergence of
these forms related to the particular genesis of a given social space. Charting
this genesis involved expanding upon Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the
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state, and in particular the effect of different processes of state formation
on the capital structures and interests of the field of power.
Clandestine circulation was then analysed at the level of practice, in
order to determine the factors structuring (and limiting) it, and the potential
effects of such circulation in terms of the variable means of appropriation
such circulation typically entails. Clandestine circulation was identified as
manifesting itself in agents’ reproduction strategies, and as involving the
subversion of specific reproduction mechanisms of the state as the basis of
an exclusive appropriation.
Analysis then demonstrated the economism underlying such circulation
as a result of the varying symbolic forces produced by the circulation of sym-
bolic capitals. This economism, it was argued, manifests itself in the form
of the additional labour embodied in the dispositions of agents’ habitus. Fi-
nally, the ambiguity of such practices as typically constitute the clandestine
circulation of capital was considered as a second-order effect related to the
broader structure of social space, and the implications of this ambiguity to
the empirical study of clandestine circulation were briefly considered.
Having thus outlined the general theory of clandestine circulation, it now
falls to demonstrate these principles in action. The following section thus
presents a detailed investigation of the clandestine circulation of capital in
the particular case of Lebanon.
One good way of understanding
what wasta is, is when you describe
the lack of it. When you say
somebody doesn’t have wasta, the










This section presents the results of an empirical investigation into the field
site of urban Beirut. The purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate
how the principles elaborated in the theoretical section of the thesis can be
found structuring agents’ practices in an empirical context.
The section is divided into two chapters, each constituting one of the
two research ‘moments’ of Bourdieusian praxeology, as outlined in chap-
ter 3. The first moment consists of an elaboration of the most important
objective structures constituting Lebanese clandestine circulation: the re-
production mechanisms of the Lebanese state effect, and the socially-efficient
resources (species of capital) produced through those mechanisms, which in
turn structure Lebanese social space.
Having outlined these objective structures, the next chapter then ad-
dresses the second research moment, which deals with practices and rep-
resentations. The different forms of Lebanese clandestine circulation are
analysed through an investigation of agents’ reproduction strategies. In par-
ticular, the chapter attempts to demonstrate how clandestine circulation
represents a structured phenomenon. Strategies - and hence habitus - vary
according to an agent’s position in social space, and the ways in which
agents misrecognise such circulation differs according to the point of honour
produced by their capital structure.
Through this process the attempt is made to uncover both the objective
effects of clandestine circulation on the reproduction of Lebanon’s social
structure (in terms of the variable appropriation which such mechanisms
enable), as well as the factors structuring that circulation (in terms of the
structure of the varying symbolic forces, as revealed through agents’ addi-





In keeping with the mode of analysis proposed in the conceptual and the-
oretical chapters, the empirical analysis of Lebanese clandestine circulation
undertaken here begins with an evaluation of the objective structures re-
sponsible for producing the socially-efficient resources (species of capital)
which form the basis of such circulation. In accordance with the model de-
veloped in chapters 5 and 6, those structures are understood as consisting of
the reproduction mechanisms of the state effect, divided into the educational
system, the labour market, property rights and inheritance laws. Given the
interrelation of the latter two, for the purposes of this chapter they will be
treated together.
Furthermore, given the importance of sociodicy to clandestine circula-
tion, in the sense of the precise constitution of the varying social libidos and
the domain of their legitimate expression, the evaluation of the Lebanese
state effect also takes into consideration the degree to which the state is
able to maintain the monopoly of legitimate violence - understood in both
the symbolic and physical sense. When considered together, such analysis
is intended to provide an idea of the subjective structure of Lebanese “state
thought”, in the sense of the structuring of the domain of the various social
libidos, and the objective limitations to the generalised interest.
Having dealt with these aspects of the Lebanese state effect, the first
moment of analysis concludes by specifying the most important socially-
efficient resources in Lebanese social space which derive from them, in the
form of species (forms and guises) of capital, and - following on from this -
the dominant capital structures within that space.
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7.1 Specifying Lebanon’s State Effect
As Leenders (2012, p. 8) has noted, few researchers consider the Lebanese
state, or take it seriously as a research object. Why spend time enumerating
laws and bureaucratic structures, when they do not come close to describing
the true structuring principles of practice?
The answer, as already outlined in the theoretical section, is that the
state - as a social fact - produces social effects, whether or not those effects
match the normative criteria assumed by “state thought”. In analysing the
Lebanese state effect, it is these effects which we are attempting to grasp.
This may indeed involve enumerating laws which are honoured purely
in the breach, or organisations existing only on paper (the Lebanese state
railway, for example, employs 350 people; there are no functioning railways
in Lebanon).1 The purpose, however, is not to reproduce “state thought”,
but to demonstrate how such institutions - laws, organisations - structure
practice, specifically when they function as reproduction mechanisms which
play a role in the production and distribution of socially-efficient resources,
and which form the objective bases of clandestine circulation. Thus, exam-
ples are given - e.g. the higher education system, civil marriage, rental laws,
migrant labour - which trace how regulations are implemented (or not) in
practice, and thus contribute to the variable appropriation of capital. Such
analysis is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to capture the overall
dynamics of the field.
In the sections which follow the Lebanese state effect is therefore spec-
ified precisely insomuch as it presents an object (or objects) that must be
negotiated by agents with respect to their reproduction strategies. The mode
of analysis thus follows that outlined in chapters 5 and 6. The goal is to
reach the point where the most relevant socially-efficient resources struc-
turing Lebanese social space (and hence Lebanese clandestine circulation)
are identified, and related to the precise reproduction mechanisms of the
Lebanese state effect responsible for them.
Elaborating the precise nature of the Lebanese state effect also, in-
evitably, entails addressing Lebanon’s sectarian system. Sectarianism in
Lebanon has been dealt with exhaustively,2 and it is not my intention here
1See http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15778 (accessed 08/07/2014).
2For an overview of the literature see Weiss (2009).
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to engage with, or contribute to, that literature. Rather, I address sec-
tarianism purely from a sociological perspective as it relates to clandestine
circulation: that is, what effect does Lebanon’s particular system of sectari-
anism have on the production and distribution of socially-efficient resources,
and specifically through the organisation of reproduction mechanisms? In
this way I hope to avoid reifying sectarianism, without ignoring the very real
effects which the sectarian system has, as a social fact, and as a structured
structure, on the organisation of agents’ reproduction strategies.
7.1.1 The Lebanese Educational System
Statistical data produced by the government, while lacking in some areas
and inconsistent in others, nonetheless afford us a fairly clear picture of
the general structure of the Lebanese educational system, and (to a lesser
extent) its role in the transition to the labour market.
The first, general trend to note is the high number of university gradu-
ates, particularly among younger Lebanese. Figure 7.1 illustrates this fea-
ture, and especially the recent, sharp rise in graduates: among those below
the age of 30, between half and one-third now hold a degree, while among
those over 30 the figure falls steadily with age, from just over 20% to around
10% for those close to retirement.
The sharp rise in young graduates does not, however, appear to con-
form with the structure of demand for graduate-level qualifications in the
Lebanese labour market. A recent report by the government’s Central Ad-
ministration of Statistics (CAS) measures professional and managerial posi-
tions (in both public and private sectors) as representing, respectively, only
14% and 12% of the workforce (Yaacoub and Badre, 2011). While the oc-
cupational divisions used by CAS might include graduate-level jobs in other
categories (for instance “technicians and associate professionals”), it would
nonetheless seem that the current Lebanese educational system produces
many more graduates than the labour market can absorb. This argument
is further supported by levels of unemployment among graduates: at 29.7%
(2007) of the total unemployed, their representation is almost double that in
the general population (15.4%).3 Indeed, many young Lebanese graduates
3See CAS (2007, p. 225, 272). By comparison, those with only elementary education
are 22.3% of unemployed, and 28.6% of the total; intermediate 23.2% and 21.6%; and
secondary 19.6% and 16.2%.
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Figure 7.1: Lebanese University Graduates by Age Cohort, % (2009)









- unable to be absorbed by the domestic labour market - are often obliged
to emigrate to the Gulf states to find work.4
At one level, this recent trend toward a larger number of graduates has
evidently reduced the ‘conversion value’ of a degree within the Lebanese
labour market - that is, as a principle of distinction enabling an exclusive
appropriation for a given class or class fraction. As such, the declining
importance of the university, and by extension of institutionalised cultural
capital, as an investment strategy sufficient of itself to enable social repro-
duction, is similar to the situation in western Europe as previously recounted
in the theoretical section.
As with western Europe, this development is no doubt contributing fur-
ther to a significant reliance on social capital as a principle of distinction.
4See MPC Team (2013) and American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for
Sustainable Human Development (2009).
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Yet attempts to draw a simple correspondence between such developments
in the Lebanese educational system and those in Europe or the US would
miss much of the specificity of the Lebanese system, and in particular the
long-term effects of that system’s particular structure (qua reproduction
mechanism) on Lebanese social space.
Indeed, a statistical representation of the Lebanese educational system
which differentiates purely according to a hierarchy of the highest qualifica-
tion obtained will miss the most important division structuring that system:
namely, that existing between specific institutions, and above all between
the public and private provision of education.
Figure 7.2: Rate of Inscription in Lebanese School System (1991-2012)










(Source: El Amine, Adnan “De´clin de l’enseignement public au Liban”,
se´minaire IFPO, 19/02/2013)
As figure 7.2 demonstrates, the raw number of Lebanese students ed-
ucated by the Lebanese state is a declining minority. Rather, the major-
ity of students are educated in private schools, the majority of which are
fee-paying, and which are run by a variety of domestic or foreign religious
groups, charitable organisations and private companies.
184 CHAPTER 7. THE FIRST MOMENT
The private provision of education (especially according to sectarian cri-
teria) has a long history in Lebanon, pre-dating the founding of the Re-
public, and protected by article 10 of the Lebanese constitution.5 Indeed,
the provision of free or subsidised education through charitable foundations
continues to be a significant source of sectarian patronage for the Lebanese
political elite, with many established families in the varying sects able to
offer discounts or even free places in the schools they control.6
Whereas private schools are prised for the higher standard of educa-
tion they provide students, public schools, by contrast, tend to be valued
chiefly for the secure jobs they provide in the labour market. Public teach-
ing posts (particularly in Beirut) fall under the patronage of the sectarian
political elite, and as such, laws relating to public schools have favoured a
“policy of deprofessionalisation”, in which some applicants are excused from
passing the application process, or of requiring teacher training, while oth-
ers are allowed to apply without holding qualifications (Nimer, 2013).This
heavy politicisation of appointments has led to a paradoxical inflation in the
number of public teachers at the same time as student numbers enrolled in
public schools have declined. Thus, the public teaching system currently
enjoys a student/teacher ratio of 7:1, against a much higher 13:1 in the pri-
vate sector. The latter, however, nonetheless still manages to significantly
outperform public schools in terms of exam performance (Blom Investment
Bank, 2014, p. 16).7
The public/private division within the Lebanese education system has
assumed the characteristics of a variable means of appropriation, a fact most
clearly seen through an examination of geographical variation in the struc-
ture of that division. The reliance on the private sector increases according
5This states that: “Education shall be free insofar as it is not contrary to public order
and morals and does not affect the dignity of any of the religions or sects. There shall be
no violation of the right of religious communities to have their own schools provided they
follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.”
6For instance, respondent 12/3 recounted how she and her siblings had benefitted
from discounted private schooling through a family connection to the owner, a former
government minister. Likewise, both Johnson (1986) and Baumann (2012) have noted
how control of the Sunni Maqasid foundation (and its schools) enabled za’im families such
as the Salam to exercise patronage within their communities. In general, obtaining a
(private) school place for children was a major preoccupation among respondents, with
most alluding to some attempt to use family, personal or professional connections in this
process.
7According to the same Blom report, in 2013 88.3% of students passed their year in
private schools, falling to 77.2% in public schools.
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to the relative wealth of a region, with inscription rates reaching 75.4% in
the municipality of Beirut, and 72.9% in Mount Lebanon - the wealthiest
parts of the country - while falling to only 44.1% in “the most damaged
South” (an area including Nabatiyeh, Sour and Bint Jubayl).8
Further proof of this trend is found in the strong fall-off in recourse
to private education as students pass through the system.9 Figure 7.3 illus-
trates this phenomenon, which seems to suggest that the value of the private
system as a means of distinction increases through secondary and tertiary
education, as fewer and fewer households choose (or can afford) to invest in
private education.
Figure 7.3: Lebanese Students in Private Schools (free and fee-paying) by
Age Cohort, % (2007)











(Source: CAS (2007, p. 218))
This tendency can be explained if we consider the public/private divide
as the result of two distinct strategies: on the one hand, the weakness of
8The figures may be found in the Survey on Living Standards (2007) produced by the
Central Administration of Statistics (CAS, 2007, p. 219).
9The Lebanese educational system is based upon the French model. The pri-
mary cycle covers six grades, followed by the brevet (3 grades) and the baccalaureate
(3 grades). See http://www.mehe.gov.lb/equiv/english/page/lebanese-curriculum.
html (accessed 04/07/14).
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the public system tends to encourage the highest percentage possible of
households to invest in private education at the earliest stages, to ensure
their child’s mental development is not unduly retarded by poor teaching in
the public sector. However, the efficacy of the private system in this regard
represents a diminishing return the older the child becomes, particularly if
younger children within the household also come to reach school age, and
hence present their own claim for early intervention on the household’s scarce
resources.
By contrast, the efficacy of the private sector to act as an arbitrary
means of social differentiation (that is, above and beyond any biological
effect on mental development) increases precisely as (and, by extension, be-
cause) its biological effect declines. Households which can afford to maintain
the expense of privately educating their offspring (not to mention the great
variation within and between different private schools) above and beyond
the early intervention favoured by the large majority of households, stand to
have that investment recognised (or better, misrecognised) as a legitimate
principle of differentiation, and hence as part of a variable means of appro-
priation for scarce resources within both the tertiary education sector and
(eventually) the labour market.
Indeed, the importance of maintaining this educational trajectory be-
comes clearest when we consider the structure of the tertiary sector. While
it has already been noted that over half of Lebanese below the age of 25
now possess a university degree, variation in quality within Lebanese higher
education is marked.
As of 2014, the Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education
(MEHE) recognises 42 universities in Lebanon: 31 private universities, 10
private university institutes (such as business, technical or religious colleges),
and 1 public university (the Lebanese University, or LU). As might be ex-
pected, there is a distinct hierarchy within this list. The oldest universities,
as mentioned in chapter 4, are a legacy of the 19th century cultural pen-
etration of the Levant by Europe and the USA, and as such predate the
establishment of the Lebanese Republic itself. In this respect, the Ameri-
can University of Beirut (AUB, founded in the 1860s) and the Universite´
Saint-Joseph (USJ, founded in 1875) continue to hold the most prestige
for (respectively) the Anglophone and Francophone communities, with the
Lebanese American University (LAU, founded in 1924) also falling within
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this category.
The public Lebanese University (founded in 1951) is also - in comparison
with the remaining private universities - relatively well-regarded, although,
as Kassir notes, since the civil war it has to some extent been “deliberately
sacrificed in favour of the reinvigorated forces of confessionalism and mer-
cantilism” (Kassir, 2010, p. 545), with the geographical division of faculties
into different branches reducing sectarian intermixing, and hiring practices
similar to those noted in the public school system reinforcing political clien-
telism.
With over 70,000 students enrolled, the Lebanese University represents
around 40% of the Lebanese total. By contrast, the AUB (8,000 students,
of which 6,000 Lebanese), the LAU (8,000, of which 6,500 Lebanese) and
the USJ (12,000, no nationality figures) between them account for 28,000
students - only 14% of the total. While there are no recent figures available
which precisely break down the role of these private institutions on elite
reproduction in the Lebanese labour market, there is no reason to assume
that matters have changed markedly from historical trends. As Traboulsi
(2007, p. 163-164) notes,10 before the civil war a graduate of the AUB
could expect to earn a starting salary of 2,000 Lebanese lira (ll), a graduate
of USJ ll 1,500, and a graduate of LU ll 600. Similarly, Kassir (2010, p.
500) observes of the same period that the profile of LU students was drawn
exclusively from the working and lower-middle classes, while “the curriculum
offered no professional outlets other than teaching and government service.”
From the perspective of its functioning as a reproduction mechanism, the
most significant aspect of this legacy of private dominance within the higher
education sector is the relative autonomy of the most dominant institutions
from the domestic bureaucratic field. The AUB, for instance, was initially
registered (in 1863) with the New York State Education Department, and
has in recent years reaffirmed its autonomy by achieving accreditation from
the (US) NEASC and MSCHE; the USJ, meanwhile, was historically accred-
ited by the French government and the Holy See, while in recent years it has
maintained its autonomy through accreditation from the (French) AERES;
the LAU is also accredited by the NEASC, while other private universities
have attempted (with greater or lesser success) to achieve accreditation from
similar overseas bodies, including the (British) BAC.
10The figures are originally found in Gordon’s Fragmented Nation.
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This practice has essentially limited the Lebanese state to a historically
subordinate role in the regulation (and hence production) of institution-
alised cultural capital. Whereas the state has awarded itself a minimal role
(through statute) in ‘licensing’ private universities, in practice this involves
no responsibility in assessing the quality of education provided, and no sanc-
tioning mechanisms for poor performance. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that
the AUB describes the degrees it awards as being merely “recognised” by the
Lebanese state through its equivalence committee (a technical body whose
role it is to determine the correspondence - or rate of conversion - between
the varying qualifications awarded in Lebanon and overseas). Such institu-
tions thus represent a principle of reproduction more or less autonomous of
transformations within the domestic field of power, and - in the sense that
they represent the most dominant mechanisms for the institutionalisation of
cultural capital, and hence pertain to the state effect - a continuing legacy
of colonialism within the Lebanese state.
Such autonomy, as we shall see, has the important effect of ultimately
limiting the unification of the point of honour of the degree-holding bour-
geoisie, such that the generalised interest deriving from the institution award-
ing institutionalised cultural capital (the university), does not necessarily
carry forward to the identification of such an interest with the institution
supposedly regulating such capital (the state).
Indeed, we may go further and argue that, in the absence of an organic
link unifying these two interests to the point of honour of a specific frac-
tion of the elite, even the urge towards the accumulation of institutionalised
cultural capital may become a game of bad faith. Hence, the trend toward
‘purchasing’ essays prevalent among some students in Beirut’s leading pri-
vate universities suggests the absence (at least among some fractions of the
elite) of a taboo concerning the direct conversion of economic capital into
institutionalised cultural capital.11
11According to local media, essay-writing companies freely advertise on campus in
Hamra. See http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/May-17/217365-
students-buy-assignments-as-semester-ends.ashx (accessed 04/08/14).
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7.1.2 Inheritance Laws and Property Rights
As already mentioned, the interconnectedness of inheritance laws and prop-
erty rights (chiefly through the justice system) means it is easier to discuss
them concurrently within the same section.
The first observation that should be made about the Lebanese legal sys-
tem is that it is structured according to a division between religious and civil
competences, and that - from the perspective of reproduction mechanisms -
the boundary of this division falls (dependent upon sect) precisely between
the regulation of inheritance and the regulation of (real) property rights.12
Thus, for Muslims all matters pertaining to personal status (marriage,
divorce, custody, inheritance and wills) are dealt with by religious tribunals;
for non-Muslims (i.e. Jews and Christians), inheritance and wills fall under
civil jurisdiction (Mallat, 1997, p. 31). Further, whereas Muslim judges
(both Sunni and Shia) are employees of the state, Christian ecclesiasti-
cal courts are separate, and indeed Catholic churches also have an extra-
territorial right of appeal to the Vatican Rota (ibid., p. 31).13
The historical precedent for this bifurcation dates back to the Ottoman
period, and the subsequent way in which the Ottoman millet system was
incorporated into the French mandate. For current purposes, it is sufficient
to investigate through what mechanisms this bifurcation is perpetuated, and
what are its social effects.
According to the Lebanese constitution (article 7), “all Lebanese shall
be equal before the law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights
and shall equally be bound by public obligations and duties without any
distinction”. Such an article would imply a constitutional basis for citizens
to have recourse - if so desired - to a civil personal status law. Indeed,
during the French mandate those who did not belong to one of Lebanon’s
18 officially-recognised religious communities were subject to civil law in
12See Comair-Obeid (2003, p. 234) (in reference to Beirut Court of Appeal, Tenth
Division: judgement No. 235/2003, delivered 19th February 2003), regarding a decision
on the civil judicial competence over a dowry (mahr) given in the form of a real prop-
erty: “This decision is important as it distinguished between matters relating to personal
status, which are for Islamic religious courts’ jurisdiction, and matters relating to real
property, which are for the judicial courts’ jurisdiction. The criteria of this distinction
is the registration in the Real Estates Register. The said registration had a constituent
effect resulting in changing the mahr into a real property which will then be under the
judicial courts’ jurisdiction.”
13See also Shehadeh (1998) for an analysis of this dual system from the perspective of
the rights of women.
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personal status issues.14 However, article 9 of the constitution also adds
that “the state in rendering homage to the God Almighty [. . . ] guarantees
that the personal status and religious interests of the population, to whatever
religious sect they belong, shall be respected.”
Tension between the rights of individuals and the rights of communities
(religious or otherwise) is by no means unique to Lebanon; what is important
to note is the way in which such tensions are worked out in practice. In this
sense, in the legal categories pertaining to personal status, membership of
a religious community de facto precedes an individual’s membership of the
civil community: that is, in practice Lebanese citizens are born into a given
religious community, to whose personal status code they are subject; if a
Lebanese wishes to access his or her right to a civil jurisdiction over personal
status, he or she must first deregister as a member of that community.15
Such a right has always been a legal grey area, and indeed until a circular
issued by then Interior Minster Ziad Baroud in February 2009, there was no
practical means by which Lebanese could officially leave their sect. However,
even once deregistered there is the further problem that (in most areas)
Lebanon lacks a civil legal code pertaining to personal status. Thus, citizens
who deregister, while no longer beholden to their (prior) sectarian personal
status code, are left without another to take its place, and hence in a sense
extra legem.16 As one respondent (who had undertaken this procedure)





iyan - civil status law. Why? They only legitimised
our removal of the sect. By doing so we became not citizens, we became like
the Bedouins [sic] of Kuwait. Because you do not have legal status if you
remove your sect.”17
The practical implications of this state of affairs on the production of
socially-efficient resources are far-reaching, and are perhaps best demon-
14The specific instrument is decree 60 L.R. of 1936 (see http://english.al-
akhbar.com/node/18204 and http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/civil-
marriage-lebanon-time-now, accessed 08/07/2014) which also forms the basis of
the sectarian domination of personal status for those with a sect.
15Further proof for the subordinate nature of civil rights to sectarian status may be
found from proposals which occasionally surface for introducing a right to civil personal
status under the category of a “19th sect” (see for instance http://qifanabki.com/2009/
02/13/a-nineteenth-sect/, accessed 08/07/2014).
16That is, as a subject beyond the scope of the law, or not regulated by the law, rather
than ‘outlaw’.
17Respondent 12/4.
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strated through the case of civil marriage - or rather, the continuing de jure
absence of civil marriage.
As it stands, marriage is regulated domestically entirely through the
sectarian religious tribunals, with the (civil) state limiting its role to regis-
tration. This means, in practice, that Lebanese who wish to marry outside
of their sect must travel to a third country (typically Cyprus) where they
can perform a civil wedding service. Upon returning to Lebanon the newly
married couple can then have their marriage de facto recognised by the state
by registering it with the public administration; however, there is no de jure
recognition, in the sense that issues pertaining to inheritance (for Muslims)
and divorce (for all sects) continue to be covered by the religious personal
status code, meaning that Lebanese who marry through this method risk
legal limbo in the future.
On two occasions (in 1998 and 2011) draft laws were submitted to the
Lebanese parliament proposing a law on civil marriage; on both occasions
however, (owing chiefly to the sectarian basis of Lebanese politicians’ power)
the law failed to pass - indeed, on the second occasion it was not even
debated.18
In 2012, however, Kholoud Sukkarieh (a Sunni Muslim) and Nidal Dar-
wish (a Shia Muslim), following the recommendation of their lawyer, took
advantage of Baroud’s 2009 circular to cancel their sectarian registration,
and then applied to marry through a civil notary under decree 60 L.R. of
1936. They eventually found a notary willing to perform such a procedure in
November. However, the civil servants responsible for registering the mar-
riage within the public administration were not willing to set a precedent,
and so forwarded the case to the Minister of the Interior, Marwan Charbel.19
Sukkarieh and Darwish’s marriage quickly established a precedent for
other couples, with a further ten civil ceremonies being held throughout
2013.20 However, it also exposed deep rifts in a political landscape already





20See http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18204 (accessed 08/07/2014).
21Prime Minister Najib Mikati would resign in March 2013 following violence in
Tripoli resulting from the Syrian conflict. His proposed successor, Tammam Salam,
would ultimately require 10 months to form a new cabinet acceptable to all political
192 CHAPTER 7. THE FIRST MOMENT
Michel Sleiman, announced his support for the couple, and for a law on civil
marriage. In response, a few days later Lebanon’s (Sunni) mufti, Sheikh
Mohammed Rashid Qabbani, issued a fatwa (legal judgement) declaring
that “any Muslim official, be they an MP or a minister, who supports the
legalization of civil marriage, even if it is optional, is an apostate and out-
side the Islamic faith.”22 Qabbani’s announcement was followed by further
opposition from the Higher Shiite Council.
As the debate began to take on the contours of Lebanon’s political di-
visions, the Interior Ministry attempted to quash the issue by saying it had
been referred to the Ministry of Justice’s advisory panel and rejected; in re-
sponse, the Minister of Justice, Shakib Qortbawi, announced he was aware of
no such decision having been taken.23 With nowhere else to turn, and likely
in the knowledge that the Christian community (from which, as a member
of Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, he was drawn) was heavily in
favour of civil marriage, Charbel announced in April 2013 that he had ap-
proved Sukkarieh and Darwish’s marriage contract. However, he added that
he did so only on the proviso that the couple retain their sectarian status,
and follow the personal status law of their sects when it came to matters of
“inheritance, divorce and children” - in the process explicitly rejecting the
“19th sect” argument.24
Such a lukewarm endorsement was all the encouragement needed for the
Lebanese public administration to drag its heels. Of the 10 further civil
weddings conducted in 2013, none had been ratified by the beginning of
2014.25 This was in spite of a ruling in late 2013 by the Ministry of Jus-
tice’s Higher Committee for Consultations which stated that public notaries
(i.e. members of the civil judiciary) were entitled to uphold the marriage
of Lebanese citizens, provided they did not belong to a sect, or had re-
moved their sectarian affiliation from official documents. This ruling was









25See http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/18204 (accessed 08/07/2014).
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in a conference that, under article 9, Lebanese had a constitutional right to
civil marriage. Meanwhile in December 2013 (by then caretaker) Minister
of Justice Shakib Qortbawi announced that the Legislation and Advisory
Committee was preparing (yet another) draft law on civil marriage.26
In the continuing absence of such a law, however, the current ad hoc
nature of civil marriage in Lebanon perfectly suits the maintenance of the
status quo. The right of citizens to a civil procedure is not explicit, and those
who pursue a civil marriage still risk remaining extra legem with regards to
other elements of personal status law. Thus, the case of civil marriage
demonstrates how, even in reform, the dominance of the sectarian system
tends to be reproduced rather than weakened, and that the Lebanese state
effect - despite containing within its constitution formal legal principles per-
taining to the regulation of reproduction mechanisms according to universal
principles - nonetheless produces a legal order which abides by the princi-
ple of the supremacy of the sect in regulating personal status, and hence
those reproduction mechanisms relating to inheritance. The continuation of
such a system helps to ensure that institutionalised social capital - in the
form of sectarian membership - as opposed to cultural capital, remains the
principle structuring factor produced by the Lebanese state effect, as will be
elaborated further in the section on capitals and dominant capital structures
which concludes this first research moment.
From personal status we turn to property rights - a field which, although
falling under civil jurisdiction, nonetheless remains intimately linked (both
in historical development and contemporary practice) to the sectarian legal
order.
The right to own property in Lebanon is constitutionally guaranteed,
both in the preamble (F) and article 15, and is governed by the Real Prop-
erty Ownership Code of 1930 (Decree no. 339);27 however, despite the image
often promoted of Lebanon as a laissez-faire, low regulation economy (the
“Switzerland” of the East), in practice the right to property - or more specif-
ically, the right of usufruct over real property - is severely circumscribed,
26See http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jan-10/243642-
civil-marriage-is-legal-in-lebanon-experts.ashx (accessed 08/07/2014).
27See Leenders (2012, p. 108), who quotes article 228 concerning the right to register
property ownership, which derives from either 1) inheritance, 2) gifts and wills, 3) contin-
uous and uninterrupted possession, 4) right of priority between neighbours, 5) passage of
time, and 5) voluntary contracts.
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a result both of determinate factors in the historical development of legal
ownership in Lebanon, and effects of hysteresis in the Lebanese state effect,
owing chiefly to the legacy of the Civil War.
To identify such effects it is first necessary to distinguish between mech-
anisms regulating real property and those regulating the ownership of liquid
assets, such as cash and equities. Dealing with liquid assets first, the most
significant instrument for such regulation within a given state is typically
the fiat currency. In the case of Lebanon, the plight of the Lebanese lira
may thus be seen as indicative of the wider imperfect monopoly of violence
- both symbolic and physical - of the Lebanese state, both during the period
of the Civil War and in its aftermath. The lira suffered high inflation on
several occasions between 1975 and 1990, but it was a short period of hyper-
inflation after the end of the war, in 1992, which led to its value declining
to the present level of 1,500 to the dollar, having been fewer than 4 to the
dollar as recently as 1983.
Such hyperinflation has many knock-on consequences, not least in terms
of hysteresis (or inertia) regarding real property. With respect to liquid
assets, however, the effect has been to completely dollarise an economy al-
ready highly dependent on Federal Reserve policy. As a result, the Lebanese
Central Bank has emerged as the sole mechanism for ensuring the external
credibility of the Lebanese economy (through its defence of the dollar peg),
and is in fact perhaps the only Lebanese public institution to maintain a
reputation for probity.28
The Lebanese state’s limited monopoly of violence in matters fiscal is ar-
guably further demonstrated by the legal regulation of liquid assets, where
Lebanese governments have consistently favoured a light touch approach,
which began during the emergence of Beirut as an Ottoman-era entrepoˆt
dominated by a mercantile elite, and reached its zenith with the Banking
Secrecy Law of 1956 (modelled on the Swiss law). Taxation, when it is
applied, is relatively low: payroll tax rises from 2% to 20% depending on
income; personal income from dividends and interest is not taxed (and the
Banking Secrecy Law would at any rate make collection impractical); and
capital gains are taxed at 10%.29 From the perspective of variable appro-
28See Leenders (2012, pp. 225-230) on this “anomaly” of the Central Bank, and Dib
(2004) for a general overview of the role of the Central Bank.
29See http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/
dttl-tax-lebanonhighlights-2014.pdf for a summary (accessed 10/07/2014).
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priation, it should be noted that Lebanese banks are known for offering
preferential interest rates to well-connected individuals, at the expense of
the unconnected.30
Turning from liquid to fixed assets, we come to the subject of the reg-
ulation of real property. Some of the effects of Lebanon’s system of (real)
property rights were dealt with in chapter 4 (particularly in terms of the pro-
duction of urban space), where reference was especially made to the rental
system, and the distinction between ‘old’ rent and ‘new’ rent. In the sense
that rights to fixed assets represent an institutionalised form of economic
capital (as noted in chapter 5), it is this form of ownership which - being the
most objectified - is arguably also the most susceptible to transformations
in the state effect.
Indeed, analysis of real property rights in the aftermath of Lebanon’s
Civil War presents an ideal case study of hysteresis (or inertia) of the state
effect, and specifically how such hysteresis can manifest itself not only in
transformations to agents’ reproduction strategies, but also physically in
the production of urban space, as agents resort to strategies which employ
more elementary modes of domination.
Lebanese law divides the ownership of a property into 2,400 shares
(ashum).31 Given that for many sects inheritance follows a system of re-
served portion (in the sense that specific family members are entitled to
a fixed share of the deceased’s estate), ownership of properties may over
time become divided between a large number of individuals. As a result of
the Civil War, during which many hundreds of thousands of Lebanese em-
igrated, or went “missing”, the status of many properties became obscure.
Alterations, including all but the most cosmetic repairs, may only be car-
ried out on damaged buildings with the consent of all owners; however, with
the whereabouts of so many people unknown, and Lebanon’s dysfunctional
expropriation laws restricting the use of eminent domain,32 it is still not un-
30See http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/lebanons-biggest-banks-raise-
interest-rates (accessed 10/07/2014). Respondent 13/3 also reported having been
offered a higher rate of interest by a student’s mother attempting to curry favour.
31See Fawaz (2009a, p. 105) and Ghazzal (2012, p. 5 ).
32Indeed, so ineffective are the laws that many Lebanese are under the impression
there is no provision for eminent domain in Lebanon (see for instance the case of the
Ouzai Highway). The relevant expropriation law is in fact 58/91, which provides for
an Expropriation Commission to judge on the basis of individual projects, and award
compensation.
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usual to find ruined, apparently abandoned buildings across Beirut to this
day.
Moreover, the present dysfunctional system produces its own perverse
incentives. For instance, respondent 12/2 noted that in the building he
was renting it was impossible to obtain a permit to repair the collapsed
roof. 79% of the building’s shares were owned by the landlord, but the
remaining 21% were dispersed among perhaps a dozen other individuals. As
the respondent said, “nobody knows who they are or where they are, and
we even got a letter from the mukhtar in the area saying that he does not
know who they are or where they are. Everyone thinks they’re in Argentina.
But even with that letter they wouldn’t grant us the permission to do the
construction.” The result is a thriving market in bribery, with a terracotta
ardameet roof costing around $10,000 in bribes “because it’s so visible”. Not
having such resources, the respondent settled instead on “kind of a crappy
roof” of corrugated concrete boards, laid at weekends and during the night to
avoid attracting the attention of opportunistic police. Nonetheless, members
of the mukhabarat “snuck up” on them during repairs, and the respondent
was forced to pay “a couple of thousand dollars” in fines - perhaps only half
that sum being ‘official’.
A further idiosyncracy of the Lebanese system is that, owing to the
Tenancy Law of 1944, ownership of a property does not guarantee the right
of usufruct. Rather, the 1944 Law allowed for tenancy to be automatically
‘prolonged’ (tamdid), a trend further embedded by the 1974 Law (Ghazzal,
2012, p. 3-4). In practice, this limited the ability of landlords to recover their
property, unless they could demonstrate an urgent need (typically relating
to “family necessity” - that is, needing to personally occupy the property).
If such a need could be demonstrated to the satisfaction of a civil judge, the
landlord would then be required to provide compensation to the tenant for
the inconvenience of having his contract terminated (ibid., p. 4).
The most recent attempt to change this situation occurred in 1992, when
a new rental law was passed which allowed “open contracts”, in which re-
newal beyond three years was not automatic (ibid., p. 6-7). The 1992 law
did not, however, address the issue of existing contracts, which could be
inherited from one generation to the next, and which had not increased in
line with the hyperinflation of the Civil War and post-Civil War period. As
a result, by the early 1990s many tenants were in the position of paying pep-
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percorn rents on properties they could only be evicted from if they were paid
compensation measured at the market rate of the property.33 There are still
estimated to be upwards of 150,000 families in Beirut living in properties
under such ‘old’ rent agreements.34
As with court-ordered compensation, the law governing inheritance (es-
tate) tax is calculated on the basis of the market value of the property.
Thus, for those who inherit older buildings with ‘old’ rent tenants, the costs
of inheritance (between 12% and 45% of the property’s market value) may
far exceed any potential benefit in terms of rental income. Rather, in order
to obtain a rent at market value (and thus offset the cost of inheritance tax),
the inheritor would have to pay compensation in addition to the inheritance
tax - both assessed at current market rates.
In such cases the recourse to clandestine methods to reduce or obviate
either or both burdens (estate tax and compensation) is hardly surprising.
Landlords may resort to sabotaging their own property to force out ten-
ants, or use a combination of wasta and bribery to reduce the Ministry of
Finance’s assessment of the property’s value (and hence reduce the estate
tax).35
Such a situation presents an ideal case of hysteresis (or inertia) of the
Lebanese state effect. Three distinct mechanisms - one regulating the right
of usufruct to a property, one regulating the cost of tenancy, and one regu-
lating the exchange value of the Lebanese lira itself - altogether represented
a particular mode of objectified domination at a given historic state of the
field; that is, a composite mechanism through which a given part of a deter-
minate structure of power relations was able to reproduce itself, by enabling
the regulated transfer and accumulation of capital.
Hysteresis occurs, however, when one part of such a mechanism displays
greater inertia with respect both to changes in the larger field and change
33Ghazzal (2012, p. 7), for example, gives a typical example of a three-bedroom apart-
ment in west Beirut originally leased in 1971 for $4,000 a year. By 2011 the rent (not
adjusted for hyperinflation) has fallen to the equivalent of $1,282 a year. The landlord
(who lived in the US) eventually regained the right of usufruct by arguing family necessity
and paying the tenant court-awarded compensation (ta↪wid) of $355,250, equivalent to
35% of the (current) market value of the property. The proprietor then agreed a new
1-year contract with the tenant at market value ($35,000 a year). The case took three
years to reach a verdict.
34See http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/culture/2014/06/lebanon-new-rent-
law-change-demographics-beirut.html# (accessed 29/07/14).
35As noted by several older respondents who had inherited properties.
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in the other parts (which may in turn be more responsive to the field).
In keeping with the model developed in chapter 5, currency is considered a
form of objectified economic capital, whereas property and tenancy rights are
both institutionalised capitals - a form of objectification which, as Bourdieu
noted, must be set apart owing to its special properties. Institutionalisa-
tion - as a function of the vis formae, the symbolic power of codification
of the state - is in fact more prone to inertia than simple objectification.
Specifically, whereas the value of the lira is set by the market, the ‘value’
of the rights to usufruct and tenancy (in the sense of the relative degrees of
appropriation each allows) represent a state of power relations fixed within
a codified legislative document.
It is the inertia of these latter two mechanisms, in light of the hyper-
volatility of the former, which has transformed the functioning of the total
reproduction mechanism governing property rights (understood in a com-
posite sense) from a relatively stable, objectified system, to an unstable,
dysfunctional system.
Such hysteresis in an objectified mechanism of domination does not (need
it be said) necessarily result in the end of such domination; rather, where
underlying power relations remain stable, it may instead prompt new strate-
gies for reinforcing them. Thus, in the case of real estate, the dysfunctional
condition of the objectified reproduction mechanism of the Lebanese state
effect has led agents to resort to reproduction strategies involving more el-
ementary modes of domination. Specifically, the clandestine circulation of
embodied capitals - particularly through wasta, but also through physical
intimidation and other methods - has emerged as one of the principal means
through which agents attempt to regain the initiative, and thus reinforce
social distance.
Such a resort to elementary modes of domination leaves clear traces on
the physical environment. If the urban landscape represents (among other
things) the physical distribution of the different species of capital - and hence
the state of power relations - then figure 7.4 clearly demonstrates a particular
instance of this reversion to a more elementary mode of domination in light
of the hysteresis noted above.
The location of the buildings is the fashionable Clemenceau district of
west Beirut (location of the Central Bank, and lying between Hamra and
BCD). Clemenceau is home to some of Beirut’s few remaining historic build-
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ings, as well as several of its most prominent politicians. The terraced build-
ing on the left is one such building, and has been restored by a prominent
Beiruti family. Under the new rent regime, the market value for each apart-
ment is in the region of $10,000 per calendar month.36 The building on
the right, by contrast, is occupied by ‘old’ renters, and its poor condition
is testimony to the fact that its landlord derives no benefit from it in its
current state, and on the contrary has an incentive to let it fall into ruin, so
that its tenants will be eventually forced to vacate.
Given this state of objective relations, of chief interest is the curious
construction in the centre of the image: it serves no other purpose than
to prevent tenants of the building on the right from having a view onto
the balconies of the building on the left. While the first two floors of the
construction dissimulate as to its true purpose (the first seems to be a garage,
the second a faux terrace), by the third floor there can be no further doubt:
it is simply a wall. In the context of the current state of the field, this
structure thus represents an objectification of the unequal power relations
prevailing between the two sets of agents - landlord and old-renters; and
further, in the sense that securing permission to build such a wall would
have doubtless required the deployment of significant social capital, we can
consider the construction as in a sense representing the objectification of
such social capital, by means of clandestine circulation.
In other cases, hysteresis of the state effect produces perverse incentives
for tenants to act against what would ordinarily be their own interest. In
January 2012, for instance, 27 people were killed in Antakli, east Beirut,
when their building collapsed. Two months later, an engineering survey
commissioned by the landlord of a neighbouring building allegedly discov-
ered cracks in its foundations. There were two types of tenants in this build-
ing: those on fixed contracts under the new rental law, and ‘old’ renters on
indeterminate contracts. When members of the Internal Security Forces and
the Beirut Municipality arrived to evacuate the building, those on new rent
contracts (and hence not entitled to compensation) left willingly, while those
on ‘old’ rent refused, instead raising funds to carry out their own survey,
and going as far as to directly lobby the governor of Beirut to let them stay.
For the ‘old’ rent tenants, the landlord’s decision to have the building
surveyed was merely the latest strategy to try to evict them from their
36Based upon information from an informant.
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Figure 7.4: Real Estate as Power Relations: Property Rights and Hysteresis
of the State Effect
Hysteresis in the state effect (specifically between the reproduction mechanisms cov-
ering rights over real and liquid property) may result in new strategies to reinforce
social distance, and hence make the effects of domination more explicit. The sole
purpose of the construction in the centre of this image is to prevent tenants of the
building on the right (old rent) from seeing onto the balcony of the building on the
left (new rent). Clemenceau, Beirut (author’s photograph).
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homes without awarding them compensation, allowing him to demolish the
five-storey building and replace it with a lucrative high-rise condominium.
As one tenant complained to the local press “This land is worth millions
of dollars and they want us to evacuate our houses without receiving any
compensation ... we will not leave until another report comes up with the
same conclusion”. For the landlord, however, his motivation was further
sharpened in light of the fact that, following the earlier collapse of the neigh-
bouring building, its owners were afterwards charged with causing the death
of the occupants.37
The contrast between objectified and elementary modes of domination
is most clearly evident in the physical difference between those spaces still
covered by the prior, dysfunctional system of reproduction mechanisms, and
thus exposed to effects of hysteresis (Hamra, Ashrafieh, etc.), and those
spaces governed by an entirely new system of reproduction mechanisms
(BCD).
The series of transformations to legal rights and bureaucratic structures
which facilitated the redevelopment of downtown Beirut is described in de-
tail by Leenders (2012, pp. 58-64, 101-116, 209-216), Baumann (2012) and
Balanche (2012). In brief, during a lull in early fighting in 1977 the Lebanese
government passed Legislative Decree no. 5 authorising the creation of the
Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a body exempt from
usual government oversight (particularly by the Central Inspection Board of
the Civil Service), which would replace the Ministry of Planning in rebuild-
ing war-damaged Beirut.
It was not to be until 1991 when the conclusion of the Civil War would
allow rebuilding to start in earnest, and the CDR was resurrected as the
primary government vehicle for the task. Law 117 of 1991 gave the CDR
powers to “solicit, negotiate, and secure reconstruction funding from foreign
sources, issue treasury bonds, and finance infrastructure projects carried out
by a private real estate company in charge of rebuilding downtown BCD”
(Leenders, 2012, p. 102). This “private real estate company” was Solidere -
an acronym of Socie´te´ Libanaise pour le de´veloppement et la reconstruction
de Beyrouth (Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction
of Beirut) - which was formed in 1994.
37See http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2012/Mar-03/165371-
residents-of-ashrafieh-building-resist-evacuation.ashx (accessed 21/07/14).
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The CDR/Solidere division is a perfect example of an attempt to produce
that ‘visible’ distinction (noted in chapter 5) between public and private
interests. In the case of the reconstruction of Beirut, this ‘visible’ distinction,
a product of “state thought”, served to push the ‘invisible’ distinction which
in fact constituted the reconstruction project - that between the general
interest and the specific interest - to the other side of de Sousa Santos’
‘radical line’: that is, to be “produced as nonexistent” (Santos, 2007, p.
1-2), to be unrecognised.
Thus, not only was the CDR exempted from inspection by the CIB, but
appointments bypassed the Civil Service Board. As a result, “senior CDR
personnel were primarily drawn from [Rafik] Hariri’s personal entourage and
his business contacts” (Leenders, 2012, p. 105). Hariri - the Sunni Prime
Minister who had made his fortune in Saudi Arabia through his construction
firm Oger - also secured substantial shares in Solidere, and ensured he had
the same powers of patronage over senior appointments (the chairman and
general manager, for instance, was recruited from Oger).
Having achieved a monopolistic position in terms of institutional struc-
tures (doing away with both government oversight and private competition),
CDR/Solidere was empowered to liquidate all prior property rights within
the BCD area.38 They achieved this through quasi-judicial “appraisal com-
mittees” which, despite being composed of public judges, were not (accord-
ing to the Higher Justice Committee) part of the judiciary - being paid for
instead by Solidere. The decisions of these committees allowed no remedy
at law (they could in effect only be reconsidered by similar committees),
while those property owners not wishing to have their holdings absorbed by
Solidere were required to sign onerous recuperation contracts with Solidere,
which were frequently denied for spurious reasons (ibid., p. 108).39
Indeed, as Leenders has demonstrated, the whole process of liquidating
property in downtown Beirut was not so much legal as having the appearance
of legality.40 The result was the transformation of practically all property
38The area of land covered by Law 117 is highlighted in the map at the beginning of the
thesis; Solidere received a further 291,800 square metres of land on the “New Waterfront”
- a landfill comprising the (now processed) former Normandy rubbish dump - in lieu of
payment for providing public infrastructure and utilities in BCD.
39It should be noted that the only legal exceptions to the Solidere ascendancy were
religious buildings.
40The final registration of ownership transfer in the Land Registry, for instance, was
pushed through in the absence of a law by a minister bearing no responsibility for such
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rights in the BCD area from the complex 2400 share system of real property
rights covered by a mix of civil and religious law, to Solidere “A” shares,
tradable on the Beirut and London stock exchanges, and listed in dollars.41
From the perspective of the present analysis, two things about this pro-
cess and its effects should be noted: first, not only did the updating of
institutionalised reproduction mechanisms, vis a` vis property rights, enable
an objectified mode of domination to be reinstated within the BCD area (in
stark contrast to the hysteresis prevailing beyond BCD), but second, such a
process also constituted a one-off reconversion strategy, which transformed
the capital structure of agents and the state of power relations within this
particular domain of the field.42 As noted in the theoretical chapters, such
reconversion strategies are almost always conscious strategies, inspired by a
crisis in the established mode of reproduction (Bourdieu, 1994, p.6); as such,
they do not entail the same degree of misrecognition as might be expected
to prevail in a reproduction strategy the product of habitus working in sym-
pathy with the established conditions of the field - hence, the significant
degree of corruption and clientelism associated with this process.
Thus, mechanisms and power relations were both re-objectified through
the same process, with a result which is visually apparent even to the casual
observer - as figure 7.5 demonstrates. Land outside of BCD remains under
the prior system of reproduction mechanisms, and development is haphazard
and sporadic, requiring clandestine methods to succeed.43 This discontinu-
ity in reproduction mechanisms between land lying inside and outside of
BCD manifests itself in the physical attributes of the built environment,
matters (Leenders, 2012, p. 113).
41Solidere stock is divided into two classes: “A” shares are the liquidated property
rights of former owners, while “B” shares represent the working capital raised through the
company’s IPO.
42Leenders, Baumann and Balanche all seem to concur in the judgement that the recon-
struction of BCD favoured an emerging class against a declining one. Leenders (2012, p.
214) notes that ‘Harirism’ - “was as much directed against small ownership and middle-
class capitalists as it was hostile to state institutions”, while Baumann (2012, p. 128-129)
talks of ‘new contractors’ such as Hariri belonging to a faction of the “transnational
capitalist class”. Balanche (2012, p. 155-158) meanwhile makes the contrast between
a global/local class division, with BCD becoming a secure zone for a global elite. The
general conclusion would seem to be that the transformation of capitals resulted in the
prior middle-class property owners’ position declining.
43One informant involved in a civil society organisation promoting green spaces noted
that large tower developments (of the kind seen in 7.5) typically required arranging to
meet with a local politician “for coffee”, where a bribe of $20,000 would be paid to ensure
planning permission.
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and illustrates the geographical variance of the state effect, in the sense of
the varying capacity of the state - across space as much as across time - to
objectify domination.
A final effect of this reconversion strategy must also be considered, which
has the added advantage of bringing us to our last reproduction mechanism.
Which is to say, re-objectification of domination through property rights
had the effect of pushing clandestine circulation within BCD towards the
exploitation of a different reproduction mechanism: the labour market, and
hence (as already noted) to the specific interest. Ultimately, the awarding of
positions within CDR/Solidere - conforming as it did to the specific rather
than the generalised interest - came to follow the familiar pattern of devolv-
ing into a socially-efficient resource within the field of power, hence repre-
senting an elementary mode of domination, with positions awarded on the
basis of (embodied) social rather than (institutionalised) cultural capital.44
Evidently, this transformation in the dominant mechanism from property
rights to labour markets, and from institutionalised to elementary modes,
favoured the interests of the newly dominant class fractions - the ‘contractor
bourgeoisie’ and the warlords - and came at the expense of fractions which
had previously enjoyed a more elevated position in the field of power (e.g.
middle-class professionals, property-owners). We will now investigate more
closely the general structure of this mechanism.
7.1.3 The Lebanese Labour Market
The allocation of positions within the Lebanese labour market, as well as
the general structure of the division of labour, does not follow a unified,
singular system. Rather, in this section I aim to demonstrate some of the
most important mechanisms and structuring principles within the labour
market, particularly as they relate to contingent features of the Lebanese
state effect, and their translation into resources wielded (and struggled over)
within the field of power.
Some of the more pertinent of these principles have been touched upon
in the section relating to the Lebanese educational system, in particular the
44This tendency was confirmed by a respondent (12/1), who noted “I know quite a few
people who work at Solidere [. . . ] and everybody who works at Solidere tells me there
are people who work there who nobody knows what they do, because they’re not skilled,
they have no purpose, but they happen to be the niece or nephew of someone who’s quite
senior at the company, or some minister or something.”
7.1. SPECIFYING LEBANON’S STATE EFFECT 205
Figure 7.5: A Tale of Two Cities: Hysteresis and Reconversion
a) Clemenceau. Brand new condominiums (in apparent breach of zoning laws)
share an urban environment with rundown and seemingly abandoned shells. The
gaps between the towers are empty lots - after landowners have demolished the
previous building, they rent out the space as parking while waiting to secure
sufficient capital to build their own high-rise (author’s photograph).
b) Place de l’Etoile, BCD. The centre of renovated Beirut is a tightly policed
security zone, where all prior capital holdings were liquidated and reconsolidated,
and reconstruction carried out under the aegis of a private company, Solidere
(author’s photograph).
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high level of unemployment among university graduates (and the subsequent
requirement for many to emigrate to find work), and the tendency for public
sector positions to be “allocated” by Lebanon’s sectarian-based political
elites - a tendency which, in the case of Solidere, we have seen equally
obtains in some parts of the (supposedly) private sector.45
We may deepen this picture somewhat by examining the structure of
the labour market in greater detail. According to the International Labour
Organisation’s modelled estimate, the labour force participation rate in
Lebanon is 47.2% (2012). This compares favourably with fellow Arab na-
tions such as Jordan (41.3%), and indeed is similar to Tunisia (47.5%);46
however, two caveats should be added: first, the ILO’s model records par-
ticipation as significantly higher than the most recent statistics available
from CAS (which place participation at 39%, or 1.1m people),47 and sec-
ond, labour force participation in the Arab world is low by global standards,
owing principally to low levels of female participation. Thus, Lebanon’s fig-
ures are 12.5 points lower than the OECD average of 59.7%, and according
to CAS only 18.5% of women participate in the labour force (representing
24% of the total, according to the World Bank (Robalino and Sayed, 2012)).
Labour force participation is also heavily skewed toward low productivity
jobs (35% of wage employees and 61% of self-employed) and the informal
sector (50% are wage employees or self-employed).
Close examination of the statistics reveals that the Lebanese labour mar-
ket presents high barriers to entry for young people. Youth unemployment
is 34%, and first-time job seekers with no formal qualifications can expect to
spend an average of 16 months unemployed. This period diminishes, how-
ever, according to the level of qualification: for graduates the average period
is 10 months, whereas for graduates of elite universities the period is often
much shorter.48 Such a correlation suggests that institutionalised cultural
capital continues to play a strong role in determining the speed (and level)
45Leenders (2012, pp. 231-241) indeed characterises Lebanon as a state of muhasasa, or
‘allotment’ state, in which “fierce struggles over the building of state institutions coexist
with an utter disregard for the universal application of bureaucratic rules”, and where the
spoils system dominates every official appointment.
46ILO statistics are available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.
CACT.ZS/countries/LB-JO-TN-OE?display=graph (accessed 23/07/14).
47See CAS (2007, p. 239), table 79-b.
48See Robalino and Sayed (2012, p. 2) and American University of Beirut and Hariri
Foundation for Sustainable Human Development (2009, p. 35).
7.1. SPECIFYING LEBANON’S STATE EFFECT 207
of integration within the labour market - a factor which in turn suggests at
least the partial functioning of that synchronicity between educational sys-
tems and labour markets previously described by Bourdieu as representing
an objectified mode of domination.
However, to the extent that such synchronicity may also represent an
underlying mechanism of clandestine circulation (in the sense of the pos-
session of institutionalised cultural capital merely obfuscating deeper in-
equalities in embodied cultural, or even social, capital) it is important to
examine other factors contributing to labour force integration. In partic-
ular, various sources attest to the importance of social capital in finding
work. For instance, the CAS survey on living standards asked participants
to list all methods they had used in trying to find work: whereas only 4.3%
had used the national (state) hiring office, 71.5% admitted to asking help
from relatives and friends - a number exceeded only by those who presented
themselves directly at the employer’s office (80.5%), which no doubt also
implies the use of social capital in at least some instances (CAS, 2007, p.
282). Such figures are supported by research conducted by Kasparian at the
USJ, which suggested 68.1% of all salaried first-time employees obtained
their positions as a result of family or personal contacts.49 It should be
noted that the predominance of family ties in the Lebanese labour market
is further reinforced at all levels by the prevailing corporate structure: 85%
of businesses are family-owned small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
and 93.5% have fewer than 10 employees (American University of Beirut and
Hariri Foundation for Sustainable Human Development, 2009, p. 22,24).
While the use of social capital in the private sector may seem relatively
unstructured (that is, relying upon affinities of kinship or friendship, which
nonetheless - in terms of varying efficacy - express deeper structural inequal-
ities in social space), the use of social capital in the public sector follows a
structure which is much more formally apparent.
By comparison with the regional average, public sector employment in
Lebanon represents a relatively low share of the total; as of 2007, the public
sector accounted for 15.7% of total employment, or 4.7% of the total popula-
tion (175,991 people). As previously noted when discussing the educational
system, the sectarian spoils system dominates appointments to the public
49As quoted in American University of Beirut and Hariri Foundation for Sustainable
Human Development (ibid., p. 25).
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sector. This is despite article 12 of the Lebanese Constitution, which states
that every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, and that “no prefer-
ence shall be made except on the basis of merit and competence, according
to the conditions established by law”. In practice, however, the post-Ta’if
division of power between a ‘troika’ of (Maronite) president, (Sunni) prime
minister and (Shia) speaker of parliament50 merely reinforced the tendency
already inherent within the Lebanese political system, dating back to the
National Pact of 1943, to allot all senior positions on the basis of a sectarian
quota (despite the commitment to dismantling political sectarian contained
within Ta’if).
The precise mechanism through which the political class effects this pa-
tronage is - perhaps surprisingly - an under-researched phenomenon, as in-
deed is the extent to which sectarian preference has penetrated the public
administration. To give an indication of how the system functions in practice
it is worth considering the case of the Lebanese University. Between Octo-
ber 2001 and July 2014, the government failed to appoint any permanent
deans to the university’s faculties. In their growing absence, the university
council’s powers were transferred to the LU president and the education
ministry, which - as noted by local press - crippled the institution’s inde-
pendence.51 As one respondent (13/2) who had run unsuccessfully for the
position of dean in one of the LU faculties during this period noted, elec-
tions were completely politicised, and candidates who were not mad↪aum
(politically supported) stood no chance of succeeding.
Negotiations to end the deadlock and push through the official appoint-
ment of 19 new deans are highly revealing of the underlying dynamics of
Lebanon’s current system of public appointments. As the Daily Star re-
ported -
Th[e] breakthrough came after Speaker Nabih Berri held intensi-
fied contacts with Kataeb Party leader Amine Gemayel and Free
Patriotic Movement head Michel Aoun. Initially, the Kataeb
Party and the FPM had demanded that a Maronite figure loyal
to them replace Pierre Yared, the acting dean of the Faculty
50It should be emphasised that the novelty of Ta’if was in a more equal division of power
between these three offices, not the division per se: the top three posts had been divided
between these sects from 1943.
51See http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-25/265084-
lebanese-university-bill-finally-approved.ashx (accessed 25/07/14).
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of Medicine. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt
had insisted instead that Yared, a Greek Catholic, remain in his
post. In the end, a compromise was reached, by which Yared
stayed in his post and was made a fully-fledged dean, in return
for the PSP allowing the Kataeb Party to choose someone to
fill the position of the dean of the Faculty of Tourism and Hotel
Management. The Kataeb Party was also allowed to choose two
of its followers to fill the academic seats on the LU Council.52
The political horse-trading over positions demonstrates the extent to
which sectarian status has become determinant in public appointments. It is
not simply the case that candidates must be loyal to a given party, they must
also fulfil the (unwritten) sectarian criteria for that position; and whereas
changes to the party allegiance of a post may provoke imbalances within the
closed circle of political power, changing the same post’s sectarian criteria
risks provoking grievances that spill over into the wider political domain.
The complexity of the system verges on the baroque: thus, in the exam-
ple given above a Druze leader (Jumblatt) takes the cause of the Greek
Catholic community against the (Roman Catholic) Maronite community,
which is itself split between the Kataeb and the FPM (who in this case
seem to have overlooked their immediate political quarrels to unite behind a
Maronite candidate). The successful compromise saw the Maronite faction
instead awarded a less prestigious faculty, and the Kataeb two seats on the
LU Council (it is unclear what, if anything, Aoun was able to achieve in
compensation).
In such cases it is impossible to consider either the sectarian system as
autonomous from (and hence determining) the structure of political clien-
telism, or on the contrary the system of political clientelism as autonomous
from (and hence determining) the system of sectarian allotment. Rather, the
two exist in a recursive, highly iterated relationship, whereby the PSP may
simultaneously represent both an over-arching Druze interest and (owing
to the presence of a reserved Greek Catholic seat in Jumblatt’s stronghold
of Aley) a minor stake in the Greek Catholic interest, which may at times
trump that of the ‘Christian’ (yet Maronite-dominated) Kataeb and FPM
parties - the latter of whom also, incidentally, holds two Greek Catholic
52See http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jul-25/265084-
lebanese-university-bill-finally-approved.ashx (accessed 25/07/14).
210 CHAPTER 7. THE FIRST MOMENT
seats, in the Metn and Jezzine.
Nor is this spoils system restricted to the most senior positions in the
public administration. Rather, despite the continued existence of the Civil
Service Board, it is widely acknowledged that acceptance in almost any
position in the public administration requires political wasta of one kind or
another. Thus, one respondent (13/6) related his family’s attempts to obtain
a place for him at the military academy, where it would have been necessary
to pay an intermediary $20,000 to $50,000 (depending on the number of other
applicants from his sect) to obtain a place. This fee (the majority of which
would have gone to a senior political figure representing the respondent’s
sect) would have exempted the respondent from 3 of the 4 required tests.
Success, however, was still not guaranteed, so the respondent refused the
offer.53 Likewise, as a log-rolling side-deal to the LU dean agreement the
various parties also agreed to the conversion of 1,100 contract professors to
full-time posts (enabling the professors to benefit from monthly salaries and
inclusion in the government’s social security fund); prior to the conclusion
of the agreement in 2013 one informant who was working as a contract
professor noted that recruitment to full-time positions at the LU was also
heavily dependent on the same system of political/sectarian quotas.
Alongside the domestic spoils system - which tends, as with blat, to sub-
vert the objective mode of domination of a merit-based system to the elemen-
tary mode of domination of a client-based system - one must also consider
the role of migrant labour within Lebanese society. While skilled migrant
workers from Europe and North America constitute a small but significant
minority of foreign workers,54 the most significant impact in socio-economic
terms comes from unskilled, semi-skilled and domestic (i.e. household) mi-
grant labour.
In these latter categories there is a distinct geographical and gender
53Another respondent (13/9) revealed that he had attempted to become a civil defence
firefighter. His family had good relations with a former Minister of Interior, who frequented
the family’s restaurant, and whom they had helped in his electoral campaign. However,
when the respondent went to the Minister with his father and two uncles to ask for support,
the Minister responded that he “didn’t dare recruit your son, because I’m scared of X (a
prominent figure in the Shia political community)”. While the family were supporters of
X’s political party, they were not members or militia fighters, and such jobs were allegedly
reserved for those people.
54Less than 1% of first-time work permits issued in 2010 according to CAS and
the Ministry of Labour. See http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/Excel/SYB/SYB_2010/1.
%20Residents%202010.pdf (accessed 28/07/14).
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structure to migrant labour. As Chalcraft (2009) has demonstrated, a great
deal of Lebanon’s unskilled and semi-skilled labour in fields such as con-
struction, agriculture, retail and industrial production is supplied by the
long-term circular migration of Syrian males. Arriving at an accurate num-
ber of such workers is complicated by the porous regulatory framework gov-
erning Syrian labour migration;55 Chalcraft however quotes several different
sources, the more credible of which give a figure varying from around 100,000
to 250,000 in the late 1990s (ibid., p. 147). To this figure can also be added
another 20-30,000 Egyptian workers (who follow a more rigorous permit
regime, and are hence more easily quantified), suggesting a conservative to-
tal of around 300,000 low and semi-skilled migrant workers - equivalent to
around 36% of the male Lebanese labour force.56
Such large numbers of migrant workers from a poorer, neighbouring
country have had the effect of both driving down wages and increasing
the capacity for capital accumulation (via wage exploitation) among cer-
tain fractions of the Lebanese elite. Chalcraft provides numerous examples
of both these cases,57 and the situation has no doubt been amplified further
by the recent outbreak of war in Syria, and the large influx of refugees in
Lebanon.
A similar picture presents itself - across the gender divide - in the field of
domestic labour. However, whereas female Syrian workers once constituted
a small though significant share of the Lebanese migrant labour force, since
the 1970s their numbers have fallen (ibid., p. 21), as Lebanese have shifted
toward other markets to satisfy their demand for household labour.
Indeed, CAS/Ministry of Labour figures show that almost 87.7% of all
first-time work permits issued in 2010, as well as 73.3% of renewals, were
for female domestic workers, or domestiques as they are typically known
in Lebanon. The most prominent sending countries for this type of labour
are the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Ethiopia. To judge from
official statistics (based on work permits issued), there are in the region of
150,000 such domestic workers in Lebanon;58 however, the true number is
55A bilateral labour agreement was signed between Lebanon and Syria in 1994 to bring
some structure to what was previously a more-or-less “open door” system (Chalcraft,
2009, p. 141); however, in practice the regulation of Syrians at border transits remained
haphazard (ibid., p. 146).
56834,697 persons in 2007 according to CAS (CAS, 2007, p. 239).
57See Chalcraft (2009, pp. 158-161, 179-183, 188-192).
58Jureidini (2010, p. 143) estimates 160,000 based on his own research in 2005/06.
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again difficult to ascertain, as a significant proportion of female domestic
workers - as many as 20% according to estimates by Jureidini - ‘disappear’
from the system to work free-lance without official papers.59
The rationale for doing so is clear: such women are brought to Lebanon
under the kafala sponsorship system, in which employers typically pay a
recruitment company to bring a migrant worker into the country, and then
act as a guarantor for his or her work permit. Migrant workers under this
scheme are thus “tied” to their sponsor for the period of their contract, and
can only change employer with their sponsor’s permission. As might be
expected, such a system is ripe for abuse: of Jureidini’s sample of 458 do-
mestiques, 87% had had their passports confiscated by their employer, and
35% were not allowed to leave the house where they worked (International
Labour Organisation, 2005, p. 8). Even more grave is the high incidence of
death among migrant domestic workers, with Human Rights Watch report-
ing 95 deaths between January 2007 and August 2008, including 40 suicides
and 24 through falling while trying to escape (Das and Davidson, 2011, p.
315). In 2012 Alem Dechasa, an Ethiopian domestic worker, committed
suicide shortly after having been filmed being savagely beaten outside the
Ethiopian consulate in Beirut by the brother of the head of the recruitment
agency which brought her to Lebanon.60
The prevalence of such extreme and elementary domination exercised
over female domestic workers in Lebanon suggests some form of pathology
attached to this type of power relation. Indeed, several informants noted
that even among households with relatively modest income, keeping a live-in
domestique was seen as an important signifier of social status. This com-
modification of human life into a form of objectified symbolic capital is
demonstrated most starkly by the dimensions afforded to such workers in
the current production of domestic space: the “servant’s room” advertised in
most modern Lebanese apartments is typically a windowless box measuring
no more than 2 metres by 2.5.61 Nor does the officially-mandated commod-
ification of women end with domestic workers: among the more esoteric
categories of profession deemed acceptable for short-term work permits is
59See Das and Davidson (2011, p. 313-315) and International Labour Organisation
(2005, p. 8) (drawn from Jureidini’s research).
60See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17598437 (accessed 28/07/14).
61See http://www.dw.de/abuse-hardship-for-migrant-workers-in-lebanon/a-
17626130 (accessed 28/07/14).
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that of ‘artist’ - code for prostitute - which the General Security uses in reg-
ulating the migration of women, typically from Eastern Europe, who work
on three to six-month contracts in the sex trade centred on Ma↪amaltein.62
The final point to be noted about the Lebanese labour market concerns
the presence of what might be called subsidiary spaces of violence. The
high fragmentation of Lebanon’s political system into varying sectarian fac-
tions, coupled with the privatisation of certain aspects of the state’s domain
(vis a` vis Solidere in particular), has redoubled a tendency always present
within Lebanon, in which violence has been concentrated in non-state bod-
ies. Although objectively expressed through the division of labour within
Lebanese society (in the sense of militias, security firms, etc. and the agents
who comprise them), the phenomenon itself relates theoretically more to the
monopoly of violence (or rather, its absence) held by the Lebanese state. It
will thus be discussed in this connection in the following section.
7.1.4 The Monopoly of Violence (Symbolic and Physical)
The final aspect of the Lebanese state effect to be dealt with concerns the
character and extent of its monopoly of violence, understood in the Bour-
dieusian sense as both physical and symbolic.
Beginning with physical violence, there are three principle dynamics
to be noted: first, the incomplete monopoly - and fragmentation - of the
state’s disciplinary structures (including both the armed forces, the police
and the criminal justice system); second, the competing disciplinary capac-
ity of sectarian militias; and third, the ‘privatisation’ of elements of the
state’s monopoly of violence to private security groups.
These categories represent dynamics in the sense that they are not dis-
crete, bounded trends, but rather interrelated tendencies. Thus, the in-
complete monopoly of the state’s disciplinary structures lies not merely in
the presence of external competitors (in the shape of militias), but also in
their internal fragmentation, owing to the divided loyalties of the varying
branches, and indeed of the individual members constituting them.63 In the
62See http://www.executive-magazine.com/society/prostitution-the-business-
of-sex (accessed 28/07/14) for the dynamics of the Lebanese sex industry.
63For instance, following the conclusion of the Civil War several thousand former mili-
tia members were integrated into Lebanon’s security apparatus (Picard, 1999, p. 7),
with some of these apparently still owing their chief loyalty to their former warlord
(Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh, 2012, p. 181). This preference for integrating competi-
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same sense, the ‘privatisation’ of elements of the state’s monopoly of vio-
lence is manifested in the private policing of public space, which is carried
out not only by ‘legitimate’ security companies (in the sense of those hold-
ing quasi-legal contracts), but also by purely opportunistic bodies, such as
those ‘valet parking’ companies which illegitimately occupy popular sections
of town, and extort money from drivers to park on public streets.
The Lebanese state’s physical monopoly of violence is maintained by four
principal structures: the Internal Security Forces (ISF), the country’s police
force, which follows the structure of a military gendarmerie; the General
Security (SG), which is responsible for domestic intelligence (including the
monitoring and regulation of foreign nationals in Lebanon); the State Secu-
rity (ST), a second, smaller intelligence agency; and the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF), which also includes military intelligence. Together, these four
agencies have around 90,000 employees.64
In practice, the institutional capacity of Lebanon’s armed forces is insuf-
ficient to maintain a functional monopoly of violence from external or even
internal threats. The LAF played practically no role in defending Lebanon
during the 2006 war with Israel, and in operations to end fighting against
the jihadist militant group Fatah al Islam at the Palestinian refugee camp
of Nahr el Balad in 2007, the army was only able to secure victory by jury-
rigging its small fleet of helicopters to drop bombs.
This limited capacity to enforce the state’s monopoly of violence is fur-
ther compounded by internal divisions within and between security forces.
According to Lebanese law, the ISF and the SG should fall under the juris-
diction of the Interior Ministry, while the ST is under the joint jurisdiction
of the Prime Minister and President, and the LAF (including military intel-
ligence) falls under the jurisdiction of the Defence Ministry and, ultimately,
the President. In practice however, as Nashabe (2009, p. 6) notes, the ISF
tors to the state’s monopoly of violence within state institutions continues to manifest
itself, with caretaker PM Najib Mikati proposing in 2013 that armed Sunni militants
in Tripoli be integrated into the ISF (see http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/17684
accessed 01/08/14).
64Precise figures are difficult to obtain. However, CAS (2007, p. 269) reports that
93,374 individuals obtain health insurance through the armed forces and internal security
forces. Nashabe (2009, p. 8) gives the actual number of security forces employees (i.e.
ISF, SG and ST) as 32,330 for 2009, which would suggest the strength of the LAF to
be around 60,000. This figure is consistent with estimates produced by the Jaffee Centre
for Strategic Studies, and is a more realistic figure than the 130,000 suggested by some
websites and publications.
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falls under the patronage of the Sunni Prime Minister, and hence is typically
led by a Sunni Muslim; the SG falls under the patronage of the President,
and is typically headed by a Shia Muslim or Maronite Christian; the ST
is under the patronage of the Shia Speaker of Parliament, and is typically
headed by a Shia; and the LAF falls under the patronage of the President,
with a Maronite Christian always Commander.
The limited extent to which the state’s disciplinary apparatus is able to
enforce a unified monopoly of physical violence is mirrored by the similarly
limited extent to which the wider bureaucracy (including the security ap-
paratus) is able to enforce a monopoly of symbolic violence, in terms of an
adherence to the raison d’Etat.
For instance, the subordination of Lebanon’s security forces to the logic
of its sectarian political structure has had severe implications for the ca-
pacity of such institutions to constitute or represent a unified raison d’Etat.
Not only do the different agencies engage in duplication and turf wars over
competencies,65 but they also win the variable support of external patrons,66
and have become plagued by corruption and wasta (ibid., p. 4).
As an example, one informant told how a cousin caught in possession of
recreational narcotics avoided serious charges thanks to his mother’s use of
wasta with a government minister. Another acquaintance of the informant
was less lucky: when a friend with a well-connected father was caught in
possession of marijuana, the father decided that he and all his friends needed
‘teaching a lesson’ - and so the informant’s acquaintance was held in custody
for 3 weeks (including a week at Roumieh), despite the police having no
evidence against him. Needless to say, his own parents’ attempts to use
wasta were foiled by the superior connections of the friend’s father. Indeed,
such problems even reach into the criminal justice system, with the same
informant noting that a well-connected family member whose son was caught
in possession of hard narcotics was able to use wasta to continue delaying
the trial until a sufficiently corruptible judge could be found.
Another extremely common field of petty corruption concerns the award-
ing of driving licences. Among the various informants and respondents in-
65For instance, Nashabe (ibid., p. 5) notes that in 2005 the ISF developed its own
intelligence agency in competition with both the SG and the ST.
66The US, for example, refuses to provide military backing for the LAF beyond basic
equipment, but has provided 450 Dodge Chargers to the ISF (see http://www.dailystar.
com.lb/Article.aspx?id=246515 accessed 01/08/14).
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terviewed below the age of fifty, not one appeared to have obtained their
driving licence through entirely legitimate means, with bribes or influence
used (particularly by parents) to either ensure a pass or to avoid having
to take the test entirely. Indeed, one respondent (13/10) admitted to going
against his father’s will and trying to take the test without paying a bribe or
using wasta, only for the examiner to use a trick question to fail him; when
the respondent returned with his father (a well-connected individual), the
examiner was profuse in his apologies, and the second exam passed without
further incident.67
In virtually every field of bureaucracy similar stories were told, with
either connections or bribes used to speed up processes or obtain a more
favourable result.68 One respondent who worked for a company associated
with the Beirut port (12/1) revealed a highly structured system of bribes
and side payments to government officials, with the company issuing receipts
for bribes and keeping a record of unofficial payments. On one occasion com-
pany employees even received a small cash bonus of $100 when the bribe for
the government auditor arrived at $2,000 lower than anticipated. Similarly,
two separate informants whose families had construction businesses noted
that it was often cheaper and more secure to pay a bribe than to go through
the official registration procedure. One informant even noted that his fam-
ily had obtained Lebanese passports through the intervention of a powerful
politician.69





i fa‘a” (it wasn’t like an exam, he gave you the paper with no regard to the rules).
68An anti-corruption NGO, Sakker el Dekkeneh (“close the shop”) recently produced a
satirical video highlighting this very tendency. In the video a young Lebanese man enters
dekkenet el balad (“the national store”), in which forged IDs, exam papers, degree certifi-
cates, etc. are all for sale. The young man chooses his document, and even pays a bribe
to an employee to skip the large queue in front of the cash desk. However, just before pay-
ing a local warlord enters (complete with qabaday bodyguards) and pushes past everyone,
leaving the young man to cry out in frustration at the all-pervading corruption in Lebanon
(in which he himself has of course been complicit). A dekkenet el balad was in fact opened
by Sakker el Dekkeneh in May 2014 in the Gemmayze neighbourhood, to raise awareness of
their anti-corruption campaign. See https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/
547427-dekkenet-al-balad-opens-in-gemmayze (accessed 04/08/14).
69As the objectification of citizenship rights, there can be no more heavily-freighted
symbol of the rasion d’Etat than the passport. In the case of Lebanon, the ambiguity of
citizenship laws means that the awarding of citizenship frequently falls under the patronage
of political figures. In the case of the informant mentioned here, the offering of political
support was ultimately sufficient to obtain a passport (the first politician they approached
had by contrast asked for money). In another case, a well-connected informant was able to
benefit from a naturalisation decree signed by the president himself. By contrast, Lebanese
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Such petty corruption was typically explained away as a result of low
levels of pay among public sector workers. Regardless of the explanation
offered, however, the outcome is a clear absence in the capacity of the civil
state to enforce symbolic adherence to its own rules and procedures. Indeed,
Monroe (2011), in her research on mobility in Beirut and the ‘chaos’ of
traffic, noted a paradoxical attitude among many Lebanese regarding the
state: while lamenting its absence as the cause of such chaos (with the
familiar refrain of “mafee dowleh” - “there’s no state”), they also considered
“irreverence toward forms of state authority [. . . ] as a way one could express
Lebaneseness” (ibid., p. 105).
Lack of trust in the state and its institutions thus produces situations
in which disobeying the state is often considered as more legitimate than
following its rules. One respondent (13/9) related how he was stopped by
the police in Hamra one morning for driving without wearing a seat belt.70
In response the respondent threatened to beat the policeman, and the inter-
vention of the respondent’s employer (a retired army major) was needed to
de-escalate the situation. When asked why he had behaved in such a way,
the respondent replied that if he were the son of an officer or mad↪aum he
would have been let off, but as a normal citizen they would have given him
a ticket - “if the law operates for all people, I am under the law. If not, I
will use wasta.”71
In the absence of an effective monopoly of physical and symbolic violence
by the state, competing bodies enforce their own claims to adherence. Fore-
most among these are of course the sectarian and political-affiliated militias,
a number of which have survived from the Civil War period, and some of
which (for instance, those affiliated to the Druze community) can be traced
back in some form several centuries. For the purposes of the present analysis
it is not necessary to analyse in too great detail specific factions; rather, it
is more important to grasp the overall dynamic of these parallel structures.
women who marry non-Lebanese are still denied the right to automatically pass on their
Lebanese citizenship to their children, who indeed must be registered as resident foreign
nationals and pay a residency visa.
70Most likely this episode occurred during then Minister of Interior Ziad Baroud’s crack-
down on driving offences in September 2008 (see http://old.naharnet.com/domino/tn/
NewsDesk.nsf/0/775c3eafdbdfecedc22574eb001183a9, accessed 04/08/14).
71It is important to add (for reasons of habitus relating to qabaday-type agents) that
the respondent in question clarified by saying that he would use wasta only to get himself
out of jail after having first used physical coercion (as in the case detailed) to solve a
problem.
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As Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (2012) have demonstrated, Beirut is di-
vided into various ‘security zones’, the geographical location of which corre-
spond to “the constructed and perceived threats that face particular political
and economic interests and powerful social groups who are able to mobilise
and leverage a visible security presence” (ibid., p. 180). These interests
correspond not simply to public buildings (ministries, military bases, em-
bassies, etc.) or the residences of public figures (ministers and politicians),
but also to private developments (such as Solidere) and the sectarian or
political delineation of neighbourhoods. And whereas public officials may
play a role in guarding some or all of these loci (depending upon the specific
threat), private and sectarian interests are never far away.
Indeed, as already mentioned some public agents (in particular those
assigned to political figures) are selected according to their individual loy-
alty to specific politicians; on other occasions, it is the militias belonging
to political or sectarian groups which have the most visible presence in a
neighbourhood - typically indicated, as Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (ibid.,
p. 182-183) note, by the presence of men sat on plastic chairs around an
arguileh water pipe.
Fawaz, Harb, and Gharbieh (ibid., p. 188-189) specifically contrast the
fragmented security order in Beirut to that produced in the name of a “com-
mon good” - or public interest. “Those who can leverage the most muscled
argument win, poignantly showing not only the expected disregard for a
common good but actually the absence of a claim forwarded in the name of
a ‘common good’ that justifies the deployment of security”. Rather, “like
capital, security has become one more form in which existing social hierar-
chies are consolidated and/or challenged and new ones imposed” (ibid., p.
191).
In this social hierarchy, it is evidently the specific interest adhering to
sectarian groups which maintains the real monopoly of violence, as demon-
strated by the events of May 2008, in which sectarian conflict briefly re-
turned to the streets of Beirut. The “May events” (as they came to be
known) resulted from the anti-Syrian March 14 cabinet’s attempts to cur-
tail Hezbollah’s private telecommunications network. In the fighting which
followed, several of the private security companies employed to protect cer-
tain (mostly Sunni) politicians emerged as “militias in disguise” (ibid., p.
189). While the generalised interest or public good supposedly represented
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by the official security of the state stood by, the sectarian and political mili-
tias of pro-Syrian March 8 battled the “privatised” militias of March 14.
The result was a humiliating defeat for March 14, with the profit motive
proving no match for the specific interest.
The most important conclusion to draw from such analysis concerns the
effect on social space of this fragmented monopoly of violence. The widely-
remarked phenomenon of the qabadayat - or local strongman - has, according
to Kassir (2010, p. 233-234), been a feature of Beiruti life at least since the
19th century, when the “territorialization of communal rivalry was all the
more easily accomplished as the phenomenon of gang conflict [. . . ] began
to take its place within a clientelist system” (ibid., p. 234). The qabaday,
according to Johnson (1986, pp. 82-96), became a major feature of the
prevailing clientelist system in Lebanon prior to the Civil War. The word
“had positive connotations and was used to describe a man who conformed
to a particular code of honour and was brave, physically strong, quick-
witted, and possessed of supposedly masculine virtues,” however, “it also
had negative implications of bullying and aggressive behaviour” (ibid., p.
83).
It is my contention that the failure of the Lebanese state to concentrate
and monopolise both physical and overt violence within its institutions has
encouraged the perpetuation of what might be called a subsidiary space
of bodily, symbolic capitals. The phenomenon of the qabadayat is nothing
more than the manifestation, in a corps of agents, of the continued demand
for an independent capacity to exercise physical violence - that is, a capacity
not associated with the generalised interest of the state, and not produced
(and hence regulated) through its institutions. In its way, the qabadayat
phenomenon is thus little different to the reversion to parallel, non-state
structures of violence (such as mafia and organised crime) which followed
the collapse of the Soviet Union. While simplistic functionalist explanations
for such developments should be avoided, it is nonetheless the case that
- in the absence of a state effect able to monopolise the use of violence -
structures capable of enforcing a more limited adherence (in both a temporal
and geographic sense) will emerge making use of more elementary modes of
domination, and principles of circulation involving the embodied capitals of
“supposedly masculine virtues”.
220 CHAPTER 7. THE FIRST MOMENT
7.2 Capitals and Dominant Capital Structures
The structure of Lebanon’s reproduction mechanisms - while formally aspir-
ing to the objectified mode of domination of the modern, bureaucratic state,
predicated upon institutionalised cultural capital - in fact tends to facilitate
a mode of domination predicated on the clandestine circulation of embodied
social capital. It does so by virtue of the fact that the institutionalisation
of a form of (horizontal) social capital - the sect - remains the dominant
state capital. Institutionalised cultural capital, by contrast, is on the one
hand subordinate to this institutionalised social capital (in the sense of the
convertibility of capitals within the public labour market), and on the other
hand, tends to be regulated by non-state or foreign entities (in the sense of
the most dominant qualifications and institutions).
This latter aspect is significant: the state, whose inertia in the face
of overwhelming popular support for the erosion of the present mode of
domination (as demonstrated by the case of civil marriage) can represent
nothing other than the desire of those agents in the most dominant po-
sitions to maintain the monopoly of this principle of regulation, and their
monopoly over it, is yet entirely unconcerned by an absence in the monopoly
of symbolic violence in the regulation of institutionalised cultural capital.
Moreover, the ease with which the Civil Service Board has been neutralised
and circumvented, as indeed have all such similar institutions charged with
safeguarding the conversion between institutionalised cultural capital and
positions in the state labour market, further demonstrates that within the
political and bureaucratic fields institutionalised cultural capital is not the
principle resource through which power is reproduced.
Such an observation is not intended to dismiss the importance of qualifi-
cations within the Lebanese field of power, and indeed the important role of
the educational system as a reproduction mechanism. Rather, it is to give
institutionalised cultural capital its due place in the hierarchy of capitals
within the field of power: namely as a dominated capital, subordinated not
merely by a political elite which reproduces itself through the circulation of
social capital (as was also the case with blat and guanxi), but by a state ef-
fect whose symbolic violence is focussed upon the maintenance of objectified
reproduction mechanisms which (re)produce institutionalised social capital
as the legitimate principle of differentiation.
7.2. CAPITALS AND DOMINANT CAPITAL STRUCTURES 221
At the same time, however, as such mechanisms reproduce this princi-
ple of domination (and hence a dominant fraction within the field of power
whose capital structure is predicated upon maintaining the monopoly of the
clandestine circulation of such capital), there are other, subordinated mech-
anisms producing dominated fractions whose social libido is indeed adjusted
toward the accumulation and reproduction of institutionalised cultural cap-
ital (again, just as with the USSR and the nomenklatura/intelligentsia di-
vide). And yet, as we have seen, it should not be assumed that the point of
honour of such a fraction will correspond to the structure of the generalised
interest as understood in the French or British contexts. Rather, the rel-
ative inhibition with which economic capital and institutionalised cultural
capital may be transformed tends to suggest that the particular constitution
of reproduction mechanisms produced by the Lebanese state effect does not
generate a strong opposition between the profit motive and the generalised
interest.72 Further, the dominated position of cultural capital within the
field of power (specifically vis a` vis social capital) means that, even within
those fractions adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised cul-
tural capital, reproduction strategies may nonetheless entail the extensive
clandestine circulation of social capital, albeit in a less structured mode to
that prevailing in the political field.
Thus, it is more appropriate to describe the Lebanese state effect as pro-
ducing a hybrid mode of domination - one which incorporates reproduction
mechanisms predicated upon the institutionalisation of both social and cul-
tural capital, and which results in the coexistence of both elementary and
objectified modes of domination - often within the same institutions.
For instance, the educational system performs a double role within the
complete system of reproduction mechanisms of the Lebanese state effect.
On the one hand, it fulfills the ‘classical’ model of objectified domination
- i.e., enabling social reproduction through the clandestine circulation of
embodied or inherited cultural or social capital to institutionalised cultural
capital in the form of qualifications (as initially described by Bourdieu in
72Such a hypothesis may be further strengthened by the suggestions of the Civic
Influence Hub - a group of elite Lebanese businessmen led by Farid Chehab - who
propose the solution to Lebanon’s political dilemmas through the formation of a
‘Council of Wisdom’, the qualification for which is the successful accumulation of
wealth. See http://www.thecihlebanon.org/, http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/
11322 and http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/blue-gold-project-deceitful-
plan-commodify-water-lebanon (accessed 05/08/14).
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the cases of France and the UK). On the other hand, it is also clear that the
educational system performs a role in the reproduction of Lebanon’s system
of political capital (qua the clandestine circulation of institutionalised social
capital to embodied social capital): posts in the educational system become
a resource (via the labour market) to be allocated by the political elite,
and thus favour the reproduction of a more elementary mode of domination
within the field of power.
Broadly speaking, the division of these two functions follows a pub-
lic/private divide, with private educational establishments most dominant
in the conversion of cultural capital, and public establishments most dom-
inant in the conversion of social capital. The distinction, however, is one
of preponderance: that is, it would be incorrect to say that public schools
are not also engaged in the labour of converting cultural capital, and that
private schools are not also beset by nepotism.
The important conclusion to make from this observation - rather than
the reification of a largely imaginary ‘public/private’ division - regards the
division in dominant capital structures (and hence reproduction strategies)
which such a dual system implies: that is, between agents whose standing in
the social order is dependent on the continued existence of more elementary
mechanisms for the reproduction of domination, and others who rely more
heavily on objectified mechanisms.
This bifurcation - again equivalent in many senses to the nomenklatura/
intelligentsia divide in the USSR - is yet complicated by the degree of hy-
bridisation produced by the relatively uniform demands of certain fields.
For instance, the tremendous, secular increase in demand for higher educa-
tion means that agents whose trajectory places them more on the “nomen-
klatura” side will not necessarily be marked by an absence of institution-
alised cultural capital; nor, given that dealing with the public administration
is unavoidable, will agents on the “intelligentsia” side necessarily be lacking
in close social ties and the wherewithal to use them instrumentally.
Rather than a deep social cleavage, we must think instead in terms of
preponderance: the declining tendency for some agents to take certain social
games seriously, or the tendency to invest more heavily in strategies adjusted
toward certain reproduction mechanisms rather than others. Thus, while a
majority of agents may invest in university degrees, the propensity to ‘cheat’
(by paying for essays, etc.) will vary; equally, while all agents are likely to
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employ strategies to ‘get round’ bureaucracy, the nature of those strategies
(be they employing a simsar or go-between, threatening violence, using
wasta), as well as their relative efficacy, will again vary according to capital
structures.
One important adjustment - again following the principle of preponder-
ance - is arguably the increased importance within Lebanese social space of
what was identified in the theoretical chapters as objectified social capital,
in the shape of a hierarchy of goods, services, practices, etc. which demon-
strate the social position of the agent in question. Darkened car windows,
personalised mobile phone numbers, special licence plates, the possession of
a domestique, the visible consumption of luxury goods - all of these form a
relational hierarchy in which those Lebanese with the habitus adjusted to
their possession struggle and compete, frequently investing scarce economic
resources in an attempt to demonstrate an elevated position. Such practices
typically occur within spaces or fractions sharing certain characteristics, as
was demonstrated, for instance, in the case of blat, where the tendency to
employ embodied social capital in strategies of symbolic investment had the
similar effect of objectifying such hierarchies.
In the case of Lebanon, we may hypothesise that hysteresis in many of
the historic objectified modes of domination, and the countervailing preva-
lence of embodied modes of domination - specifically those modes involving
the clandestine transformation of institutionalised capitals to embodied cap-
itals - has produced this tendency toward the brute objectification of social
hierarchies in the form of such scarce goods and practices. As noted in chap-
ter 5, such objectification represents the intermediate state in fields (that
is, before the regulation of capitals by a separate entity, tending to ensure
the secure transmission of such gains as constituted by capital). In the
case of Lebanon, the recourse to objectified capitals may thus represent the
regression (or hysteresis) in the capacity of the state to institutionalise cap-
itals through (at various times) some or all of its reproduction mechanisms.
Such elaborate investment strategies no doubt also act as a limiting factor
for many agents in the accumulation of capital, a factor which appears to
bear out Graziano’s observation concerning the varying implications of di-
rect and indirect exchange, and which unifies that theory with Bourdieu, in
the sense of the additional labour involved in legitimising such capitals as a
principle of difference, which ultimately serves to limit the accumulation of
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capital.
Indeed, we may go a step further and argue that hysteresis in the Lebanese
state effect has even produced (or perhaps better, reinforced) a subsidiary,
relatively autonomous space of bodily capitals - in the sense, that is, of the
increased tendency toward certain kinds of objectification of the body it-
self. In the absence of the state’s monopoly of violence, parallel structures
(militias, private security organisations, even valet parking companies) have
emerged composed of agents whose reproduction strategies have encouraged
them to invest in their (physical) bodies as instruments of coercion and dom-
ination, in a manner not dissimilar to organised crime in post-Soviet Russia.
Across the gender divide, the mirror image of this objectification of the body
is arguably found in the significant market for female cosmetic surgery - an
objectification of the female body in keeping with the dominated position of
women within Lebanese social space (as reflected, among other things, by
their low participation in the labour market).
Given such complexity within the structure of objective resources, how
to integrate the second research moment of agents varying dispositions and
strategies? In seeking to relate the position-takings and practices of agents
to their objective position within a social space governed by the variable pos-
session of socially-efficient resources such as those prevailing in the Lebanese
context, it is necessary to measure agents’ responses across the differing
reproduction strategies they have undertaken, and to relate them to the
reproduction mechanisms (and hence capitals) involved in such strategies.
The point of honour revealed from such analysis will then have the effect
of illustrating the state of relations within the field of power (much as atti-
tudes to corruption in 19th century Britain), and the dominant mechanisms
(above all of clandestine circulation) favoured by each in the reproduction
of their position.
Perhaps the strongest measure of the importance of such a nuanced
approach is the larger rupture - in terms of practices and position-takings
- revealed through a comparison of agents whose habitus was not formed
in Lebanese social space. These “destabilised” habitus, being unadjusted
to either the particular or the uniform demands of varying fields, highlight
most clearly the extent to which some forms of clandestine circulation have
become the norm within Lebanon, and have produced adaptations to habitus
adjusted accordingly.
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Thus, in the second research moment which follows the attempt is made
to reconstruct the social space of Lebanese clandestine circulation, specif-
ically by analysing the reproduction strategies of individual agents, and
comparing these both to their subjective position-takings and the objective
resources they possess. In doing so, the role of the different forms of clan-
destine circulation within the total order of practices necessary for agents
to reproduce their social position is revealed, as well as the varying con-
stitution of the different social libidos which enables such circulation to be




Having outlined the general system of objective structures constituting Lebanese
social space - in the sense both of the dominant socially-efficient resources
structuring that space, and the reproduction mechanisms producing such
resources - we turn now to the second research moment, which is concerned
with the analysis of the second-order effects of that space: specifically, the
dispositions and position-takings manifested in the habitus of agents through
their occupation of a determinate position within a space structured by such
properties.
As noted in the theory section, from the perspective of the analysis
of clandestine circulation the relevant second-order effects are those which
manifest themselves in agents’ reproduction strategies, in the form of the
disposition toward specific practices, and the accumulation of certain capi-
tals. Further, analysis of agents’ misrecognition, as demonstrated through
the additional labour (or lack thereof) revealed through such practices, can
be used to determine the underlying distribution of the varying symbolic
forces across social space, which in turn structure the potential domain of
clandestine circulation, and the precise forms it will take.
The goal of such analysis is to reveal clandestine circulation as a struc-
tured phenomenon: that is, one related to the broader structure of power
relations prevailing within a given social space, and enabling the unequal
reproduction of that space through the variable - or even exclusive - appro-
priation of scarce, socially-efficient resources.
Thus, this second research moment is arranged in such a fashion as to
enable the investigation of that structure, through the analysis of agents’
practices and position-takings. We begin by using data gathered through
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structured interviews of agents to produce a graphical, relational represen-
tation of the space of their practices and position-takings. The dimensions
structuring this space are then interpreted in light of the qualitative data
provided by the same interviews, to give an indication of the underlying
factors differentiating agents.
The analysis is then deepened by a series of structured comparisons
of specific agents’ habitus, chosen according to the positions occupied by
them within the space revealed in the first section, but with an additional
emphasis on the varying efficacy of their strategies in reproducing the ob-
jective resources they possess. Reproduction strategies are compared and
contrasted, as well as the varying misrecognition demonstrated by agents
toward the different reproduction mechanisms of the state effect, as outlined
in the previous chapter. In this way, the contrasting point of honour of dif-
ferent agents is reconstituted, and, when added to the other data regarding
capital structures and practices, is used to uncover the underlying structure
of Lebanese clandestine circulation, in the sense both of a structured dis-
position to certain practices, and of a variable means of appropriation of
scarce, socially-efficient resources.
8.1 The Social Space of Wasta
As a socially-constructed object, wasta enjoys a double life: it exists both
as practice (i.e. in the objective sense, as disposition), and comment on
practice (i.e. in the subjective sense, as position-taking). Thus, in the same
way that the definition of corruption in 19th century Britain became a stake
in the larger struggles within the field of power (as was noted in the theory
section), so too the definition of wasta - what it does and does not constitute,
and how it is normatively evaluated - will reflect in some sense the state of
power relations within the Lebanese field.
Further, in the sense that the dispositions of habitus, as manifested in
agents’ reproduction strategies, will reflect the demands of the particular
position (and trajectory) in social space occupied by an agent, then the
analysis of agents’ practices should also reveal a distribution which in some
respects conforms to the state of power relations within the field.
To examine this hypothesis, a sample of agents living or working in the
Ras Beirut neighbourhood was interviewed concerning their practices and
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position-takings. Ras Beirut (lit. “tip of Beirut”) is a populous and rela-
tively diverse district in the western tip of the city, extending to the western
and northern shores of the area indicated on the map at the front of the
thesis.1 The neighbourhood includes two historic private universities - the
LAU and the AUB - as well as a relatively mixed sectarian population (in
comparison with neighbouring districts), and owing to these factors is con-
sidered comparatively cosmopolitan and liberal, particularly in the Hamra
area.
The neighbourhood was selected chiefly for pragmatic purposes of re-
spondent access; in comparison to other potential sites within Beirut its
class and income profile is likely to be above the average (although there
are no disaggregated statistics within the Beirut municipal area to compare
directly), and a high percentage of the population is also relatively transient.
However, it is by no means an isolated or atypical community within the
city, and indeed offers a good concentration of middle-class residents dividing
along the standard capital composition dimension (cultural/economic). Re-
garding generalisation beyond the immediate environment of urban Beirut,
it is worth bearing in mind that a number of respondents formed part of
the transient population of Ras Beirut, or indeed lived elsewhere; thus, the
greater limitation on generaliseability is not so much the geographical repre-
sentativeness of the field site, as the social representativeness of the sample,
a matter which is considered in more detail in the Appendix on Methodology.
The interview was structured according to the division of reproduction
mechanisms and socially-efficient resources outlined in the previous chapter,
with agents asked to describe any occasions in which they had needed to
call upon the help of others, either for themselves or on behalf of a third
party, in each of the relevant domains. Further, agents were asked questions
regarding the nature of their social connections and social activities, and
also a series of questions relating to their objective resources (qualifications,
occupation, parents’ occupation, household status, etc.). Finally, agents
were given the opportunity to speak freely about their thoughts on wasta,
and were particularly asked whether they thought it was a good or bad
thing, and if it was a necessity or a choice. For a complete discussion of
1The precise boundaries of Ras Beirut are as far as Ain El Tine in the south, proceeding
north to include Snoubara, Jounblat and Ain Mreisse. Technically Dar Mreisse along the
northern coast (which includes Ain Mreisse is a separate quarter; most Beirutis however
would include it in the general heading of the Ras Beirut area.
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this process, including the sample, a copy of the structured questionnaire,
a justification of the questions asked, and a table of coded results, see the
Appendix on Methodology at the end of the thesis.
A final observation concerns the sample used to construct this initial
space. This was relatively small and focussed (14 individuals), owing to
the greater demands required by the structured interview format. Further
subjective data were gathered at other stages in the fieldwork process, both
from prior interviews not conducted using the same structure, and group
events conducted in a less structured manner (and from which only limited
objective data could be obtained). Data from these have been used elsewhere
in the thesis, but have been excluded from the current section, owing to the
fact that they were not obtained using the same treatment, and hence would
weaken the robustness of the analytical method applied.
In keeping with Bourdieusian praxeology, data gathered through the
structured interviews were coded according to a distinction between ob-
jective and subjective categories, with the latter further divided between
practices and position-takings. Categories for practices were determined
according to four domains, corresponding to the labour market, the educa-
tional system, and two relating to the state: ‘fiscal’, understood as practices
involving the state bureaucracy which relate to inheritance and property
rights; and ‘violence’, understood as practices relating to those forces of
the state responsible for maintaining the monopoly of violence (i.e. army,
police, general security). Agents were coded according to whether they ad-
mitted, denied, or did not mention using connections or favours within each
domain.2
Owing to the small size of the sample, coding categories for position-
takings on wasta initially presented some difficulty. In the structured inter-
view sample all respondents considered wasta to be negative in some respect,
with the majority (nine) considering it to be corrupt, and a minority (five)
prepared to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ wasta, but nonetheless
tending to view even ‘good’ wasta as the least worst option in a bad system.
After further careful analysis and comparison between agents’ responses,
however, a dimension began to emerge regarding the degree of autonomy
2The final category, ‘did not mention’, should not be disregarded as a simple “junk”
category. Rather, because all respondents were prompted extensively for each domain,
such ‘silence’ may indicate either a purposeful demurral, or alternatively a lack of famil-
iarity with the social game.
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or coercion which agents expressed regarding their own relation to wasta.
For instance, when asked whether he chose to use wasta, one respondent
(13/4) answered firmly that he was obliged to use it, and denied he had any
choice in the matter, describing it as a “shameful” thing (she‘ mukhzee) and
“the summit of corruption” (qummat al fasad) - adding that “the Lebanese
citizen, the state is forcing him to engage in corruption”.
In a similar way, another respondent (13/3) went so far as to describe
wasta as a good thing - despite being corrupt - as it represented a “necessary
evil” which “protects us from the government”.3 What links her response
to 13/4 is the sense of absolute necessity associated with wasta - that indi-
viduals are obliged to rely upon it for survival: “it is absolutely necessary
[to use wasta] to put your foot in”, “I think it has to do with surviving”.
Perhaps the strongest expression of this tendency was found in respondent
13/10, who emphasised that he hated using wasta, because it is shaming to
ask a favour and to be made to feel small.4 Sometimes, however, “you really
have to use it”.
In contrast to these extreme expressions of necessity, several respondents
described a level of need less expressive of domination and coercion, and
which seemed to allow for a greater degree of autonomy. For instance,
respondent 13/14 claimed he would only use wasta “as it relates to my
position” - “if I do something wrong, I might ask a politician to fix it. [. . . ]
Sometimes mukhtars make mistakes, and even a small mistake they can
take the stamp away from you.” This description of a purely hypothetical
situation was tempered by an emphasis on autonomy: “I am not masnoud
[supported, or backed by a political party], I rely on people’s love. Of course,
I have connections and all the politicians know me. That’s why I don’t feel
scared [i.e. in need of protection].”
Similarly, respondent 13/9 claimed that “the only conditions I would ask
for wasta are if I went into a fight and sent [the other person] to hospital,
or shot him,” while 13/8 said he “prefers to go to the state and there is
no wasta. But sometimes they treat you unfairly and the one with wasta
3The description of wasta as a “good thing” by this particular respondent is a strong
argument against using simple value judgements to position respondents. In this case,
the respondent’s particular academic specialisation doubtless encouraged her to consider
wasta from a more objective perspective. Ultimately, however, she is making the same





aj, la wallat kilmi zaghiri.”
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is treated better.” In such situations, “if I need it [i.e. wasta], I would be
obliged to look for anyone who could oblige interest.” This sentiment was
shared by respondent 13/7, who claimed that “I only use the wasta where
no other way is possible”.
An even greater expression of autonomy came from those agents who
described wasta more in terms of choice - of being able to choose when and
when not to use it. Respondent 13/6 initially responded that he would never
use wasta, before correcting himself to add that “sometimes you need to use
it”. For instance, “when applying for a job, if I’m qualified I’ll use it to
ensure. If I’m not I won’t. Better to use wasta to get a job than stay at
home unemployed.” Equally, respondent 13/2 admitted that she would be
prepared to use wasta “if it doesn’t hurt anyone else”, but that she would
“stop at a certain point when what I need it for would hurt someone else”.
Evidently, the ability to apply some sort of moral code to when one
does or does not use favours and connections implies a greater degree of
autonomy or freedom of action. The most extreme example of such freedom
of action came from respondent(s) 13/13,5 who described the use of wasta
arising from the Sunni mukhtar’s political position as a form of charity: “he
wouldn’t do something against the word of God, mark this down please. He
wouldn’t use wasta to hurt someone. Only for charity [ah
˙
san].”
The final category concerned those agents who refused all connection
with wasta whatsoever. At the mildest end of this spectrum (and indeed
overlapping somewhat with the ‘choice’ category) was respondent 13/1, who
chose to distinguish between wasta and ‘khidme’ (favours). Whereas for her
wasta was a necessity, because “you are told, if you don’t do it this way,
there’s no way you can get through”, she herself denied ever needing to
use such wasta. Rather, she described occasionally choosing to ask for a
favour, principally to save time - “usually because I choose to, and partly
because I need to, when I don’t have time, and it’s taking way too much
time, and way too long, and it’s not gonna work out. So this is when I
use the khidme.” Respondent 13/5 also distinguished between wasta and
khidme, adding “may God put us [i.e. his family] in a position not to need
anyone”. He described wasta as a problem of “backwards” countries, adding
“I know Europe. That’s why I dream to live there. You don’t need anyone,
5The Sunni mukhtar’s brother and father, interviewed in the mukhtar’s office.
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and no-one needs you.”6
Having thus coded the respondents’ position-takings accordingly, a mul-
tiple correspondence analysis was performed on the resulting dataset.7 The
use of a small, qualitative sample as the basis for performing an MCA should
be considered as an experimental method. The purpose of its inclusion here
is to create the rudiments of a spatial (i.e, relational) representation of the
factors structuring Lebanese clandestine circulation as a social practice. Un-
like, for example, regression analysis (in which data are fitted to a model),
MCA is simply a means of diagonalising a matrix (to borrow the phrase of
Benze´cri): thus, provided categories have been chosen with a clear theoreti-
cal justification, and are not structurally weighted toward certain questions
(for example, binary or ‘dummy’ variables will have a greater weight than
questions involving four or five potential answers), then the MCA will re-
veal the structure inherent in the data, as opposed to the extent to which
data fits a pre-determined hypothesis. That being so, the MCA included
here is used as a frame or guide for a deeper qualitative investigation of
respondents’ interview responses.
Table 8.1 presents the contribution of the different active categories for
the first three dimensions revealed by the MCA, i.e. those for which prin-
cipal inertia8 meets the criteria of being greater than the average of vari-
ables/categories (16/5=3.2%). Categories whose contribution to a given di-
mension was greater than 1/k (i.e. 0.0625) are included in bold, and ranked
accordingly.
The first thing to note concerns the contribution of the three dimensions
6Indeed, 13/5 emphasised his opposition to wasta by providing an anecdote from his
younger years - “‘the only time in my life when I used wasta, and it was a big lesson for
me”. He had used a family contact to arrange a meeting with the then prime minister
at the Serail. When eventually his turn came, the prime minister came out of his office
and said “follow me”. He took him to the toilet and then asked “what can I do for you
my son?” The respondent said nothing and left. Such an experience would seem to chime
with the view of other older respondents (such as 13/4) who saw wasta as “shameful” - a
quite literally debasing experience in which you are shown to be dominated by those more
powerful than you.
7For the coded dataset and a complete table of summary statistics for the two retained
dimensions of the MCA, see the Appendix on Methodology.
8Inertia is an expression of variance within a table: the higher the inertia, the greater
the data within the table varies. In MCA the inertia is divided according to principal
axes (or dimensions), which are eigenvalues that represent, in descending order, the best
one-dimensional fit of the cloud of properties (see Le Roux and Rouanet (2010, p. 39).
They have thus tended to be used in Bourdieusian analysis to reveal latent variables, such
as (for instance) cultural capital in the case of Distinction.
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Table 8.1: Statistics for Principal Dimension Contributions by Active
Category
dim 1 (46.10%) dim 2 (24.45%) dim 3 (8.55%)
Category Coord Ctr Rank Coord Ctr Rank Coord Ctr Rank
Wasta
Never -0.321 0.003 - 1.419 0.057 - 1.398 0.064 7th
Choose 1.374 0.108 5th 1.150 0.076 6th 0.055 0.000 -
Need -1.015 0.074 7th -0.327 0.008 - -1.495 0.140 3rd
Abs need 0.075 0.000 - -1.933 0.160 2nd -1.407 0.085 5th
CCEdu
no mention 1.143 0.112 4th 0.298 0.008 - 0.556 0.026 -
denial -1.143 0.075 6th 1.285 0.094 4th -0.343 0.007 -
yes -0.572 0.019 - -1.731 0.171 1st -0.491 0.014 -
CCLab
no mention 1.007 0.044 - -1.045 0.047 - 1.690 0.122 4th
denial -0.374 0.020 - 0.643 0.059 - -0.130 0.002 -
yes 0.722 0.007 - -3.296 0.155 3rd -3.772 0.203 2nd
CCStFisc
no mention 2.609 0.194 1st 0.825 0.019 - 0.665 0.013 -
denial -1.429 0.117 3rd 0.166 0.002 - -0.288 0.005 -
yes 0.062 0.000 - -0.289 0.010 - -0.022 0.000 -
CCStViol
no mention 1.686 0.162 2nd -0.206 0.002 - -0.895 0.046 -
denial -0.683 0.033 - 1.040 0.077 5th -0.978 0.068 6th
yes -0.666 0.032 - -0.875 0.055 - 1.694 0.205 1st
to total inertia: the first dimension represents 46.1% of total inertia, the
second represents 24.45%, and the third represents 8.55%, making a cumu-
lative total of 79.11%. The fourth and fifth, by contrast, are each below 1%
(and hence the 3.2% threshold for interpretation). A much greater degree
of variance is thus projected by the first dimension, suggesting it captures
the most fundamental division structuring the data; the second axis remains
significant however, and (as we shall see), captures an important division in
its own right. The third, by contrast, captures less than a fifth of the inertia
of the first, and would thus appear to be a second order axis.
Regarding contributions, the first axis is most strongly defined by the
categories ‘no mention’ in both state domains, followed by ‘deny’ in the
fiscal/bureaucratic state domain, ‘no mention’ in the education system, and
the category ‘choose’ for position-takings on wasta. Concerning the second
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axis, the most significant contributing categories are those of ‘admit’ in the
education system and the labour market, and the category of ‘absolute need’
for wasta. For the third axis, the most significant contributions are ‘admit’
for the state violence and labour market categories, followed by ‘needing’ to
use wasta.
To deepen the analysis, figures 8.1 and 8.2 provide a projection of the two
most significant dimensions divided according to the format recommended
by Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000), i.e. between a space of prop-
erties (figure 8.1) and a space (or cloud) of individuals (figure 8.2, which
also includes the objective properties for reference).
The analysis begins with figure 8.1, which places the active properties
(i.e., those categories whose weights have contributed to the construction
of the two dimensions) in relation to each other. As previously mentioned,
in keeping with a Bourdieusian mode of analysis the active properties are
those categories relating to practices and position-takings. Other categories
relating to objective properties (gender, age, occupation, educational attain-
ment) were included as supplementary questions (see Rouanet, Ackermann,
and Le Roux (ibid., p. 9)) - that is, they do not participate in the con-
struction of the space (in terms of weights), but nonetheless have a position
within the space as constructed by the active properties. These objective
properties are included in figure 8.2, alongside the individual respondents’
positions.
Turning to the distribution of properties, we see first that there is a
distinction between the distribution of categories for practices and that of
position-takings: whereas practices are grouped in looser or tighter clus-
ters according to denial, acceptance or not mentioning, the position-takings
for wasta are distributed across the whole space. The general structure of
this grouping (i.e. clusters for practices and broad distribution for position-
taking) is in fact a product of the design of the questionnaire: four questions
with three exclusive categories and one question with four exclusive cate-
gories. However, the specific distribution of categories and the shaping of
clusters is the result of the structure of individual responses.
Comparing the distribution of position-takings with practices is useful:
‘never’ using wasta is - as might be expected - closely associated with denying
participating in wasta-like practices; by contrast, not mentioning wasta-like
practices is clustered closest to the position-taking of ‘choose’ - that is, to
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those who see wasta as a choice rather than a necessity. The categories for
admitting to using wasta-like practices, meanwhile, are found closest to the
position-takings of ‘need’ and ‘absolute need’.
Thus, in general terms the MCA tells us that those who admit to using
wasta-like practices tend to associate wasta itself with varying degrees of
necessity and compulsion, rather than with a free choice. By contrast, those
who associate wasta with a degree of agency are less likely to either admit
or deny making use of such practices themselves, but rather to demur, or to
speak in generalised terms. Finally (as might be expected), those who deny
being involved in wasta-like practices are also most closely associated with
firmly dissociating themselves from wasta in general.
This interpretation can be deepened by analysis of the distribution of
the different domains in which wasta may be used. To aid in this analysis,
structuring factors have been drawn around the category clusters to give an
indication of the general shape of their distribution.9 Thus, we see that the
cluster representing the space of denial is both quite tightly grouped and
equally distributed between the two principle axes. By contrast, the space
of admission and the space of not mentioning are both more loosely grouped
and tilt toward specific axes.
From this we may determine that there is limited variance in terms of
denial of wasta-like practices (that is, an agent who denies using wasta in
one sphere of life is likely to deny using it in all spheres); when it comes to
admitting to using wasta-like practices, however, there is a clear structure:
admitting to using such practices within the state proper (in terms of both
fiscal/bureaucratic domains and security forces) is positioned most closely
to the space of denial, whereas admitting to using wasta-like practices in the
domains of education and the labour market are both significantly further
away from this space. Similarly, among those who don’t mention, education
and the labour market are closer to the denial space than both state domains
respectively.10
I would argue that this structuring of categories demonstrates Bourdieu’s
9See Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux (2000, p. 9). A more typical use of such
structuring factors is to group individuals; for the purposes of the present analysis however,
it is the structure of categories which is of immediate interest.
10The inversion of ordering between ‘no mention’ and ‘admit’ categories vis a` vis the
two state domains is also to some extent an artefact of the questionnaire design, in the
sense that such single option responses are correlated.
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principle of the symbolic force associated with symbolic capital in action,
and in particular the additional labour associated with the conversion of
successfully misrecognised capitals. Put simply, the greater proximity to
the general space of denial of the two categories of admission specifically
representing the state domain, reflects the limited misrecognition associated
with the clandestine circulation of capitals in such contexts.11 In this re-
spect, admitting to the clandestine circulation of social or economic capital
in the state domain (bureaucratic or security) is not so different to denying
using it, which suggests that the “cost” of doing so - understood in terms of
the additional labour of misrecognition to maintain the symbolic force asso-
ciated with such capitals - is low. By contrast, the symbolic force associated
with the educational system and the labour market (that is, as reproduction
mechanisms producing a legitimate principle of differentiation) is sufficiently
greater, such that it pushes the categories representing the admission of clan-
destine circulation in those contexts into a more extreme position vis a` vis
the general space of denial. This observation will be expanded upon further
in the analysis of the practices of individual agents.
Moving to the second figure, analysis of the cloud of individuals and sup-
plementary categories (here objective data such as age, gender, educational
attainment and employment) can be used to deepen, and in some respects
qualify, insights gained from the cloud of position-takings and practices,
and in particular to interpret which specific qualities the two axes are dis-
tinguishing between.
First, the objective categories are quite closely clustered around the
centre, suggesting that few of the objective categories coded in interview
correlate strongly with the structure of differences recorded in subjective
position-takings.12 There are however some exceptions. First, educational
attainment: the baccalaureate is opposed to higher degrees, with the former
associated with the space of denial, and the latter the space of “no mention”
(between “choose” and “absolute necessity” in position-takings). Next, oc-
cupation: working for a private corporation is associated with the space
11Again, this is due to the fact that MCA is a relational mode of analysis: it positions
categories (here, practices) which are more closely related closer together, and categories
which are less related (or even unrelated) further apart.
12It should be noted here that the scaling of the two diagrams varies slightly, owing
to some individual agents occupying more extreme outlying positions. The dimensions of
figure 8.1 are highlighted in figure 8.2 for reference. The different scaling does not affect
the conclusion regarding the clustering of objective categories.
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of denial, and is opposed to working within a family business (associated
with the space of admission and necessity) or academia (associated with not
mentioning and absolute necessity). Finally age: those over 60 are more
likely to deny using wasta than those below; meanwhile, those below 35 are
distinguished from those above according to the second axis vis a` vis 35 to
59, and both the first and second vis a` vis over 60.13 It should be further
noted that most of these objective categories seem to describe a structure of
difference captured most strongly by the first dimension, with less difference
captured by the second.
To add insight to this distribution we move to the analysis of the struc-
ture of individual positions. By analysing the differing backgrounds (trajec-
tories) and current situations (positions) of the various agents, it is possible
to hypothesise what kind of objective difference each dimension may be cap-
turing. Table 8.2 provides a list of the squared correlations of individuals
for the first and second dimensions, which gives an indication of the quality
of fit between an agent’s position as projected in that dimension, and his or
her complete profile. Agents are ranked according to degree of correlation,
with those passing the threshold of 1/k in bold (the first dimension featured
8 individuals passing this threshold, the second 9).
Turning to the interpretation of agents’ specific positions, the more sig-
nificant x-axis appears to distinguish between established (or stable) agents,
and those in a position of rupture.14 Thus, on the left hand (negative) side
of the axis we find in the furthest positions the security guard (13/9), the
Orthodox mukhtar (13/14) and the three retired company workers (13/5,
13/8 and 13/4) - all five of these individuals having also a squared correlation
above 1/k in this dimension.
What unites these agents is their position of stability within their re-
spective trajectories: the retired workers may be considered as having, in a
sense, completed their trajectory, and to be no longer involved in the day-to-
day exigencies of the field; the security guard, in finding a comfortable job
at a private university which affords him and his family financial stability
and health insurance, has likewise insulated himself from many of the uncer-
tainties of the wider field; while the Orthodox mukhtar, having in his earlier
13Academia, correlating as it does precisely with the educational category “higher edu-
cation”, is not shown in the diagram.
14That is (to emphasise) it does not reflect a power hierarchy, either within specific
fields or in social space in general.
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Table 8.2: Squared Correlations of Individuals in Principal Dimensions
1st dim 2nd dim
Ind. sq corr rank sq corr rank
1 0.069 8th 0.05 10th
2 0.008 14th 0.209 5th
3 0.056 9th 0.794 1st
4 0.127 7th 0.047 11th
5 0.223 5th 0.296 2nd
6 0.033 11th 0.115 6th
7 0.01 13th 0.004 14th
8 0.142 6th 0.079 8th
9 0.306 3rd 0.011 13th
10 0.038 10th 0.211 4th
11 0.02 12th 0.260 3rd
12 0.873 1st 0.015 12th
13 0.592 2nd 0.105 7th
14 0.235 4th 0.064 9th
life sustained a potentially damaging rupture to his trajectory (his father
died when he was young, leaving him unable to afford to attend university
and obtain an expected degree), has nonetheless corrected that trend and,
in becoming mukhtar, recovered the recognition within the cultural/political
field which he believed to be his birthright.15
By contrast, those agents in the centre of this dimension may be under-
stood as being in transition: perhaps their trajectory is established but only
in the initial stages, and hence uncertain (such as the young degree students
13/7, 13/11, 13/10 and 13/6); or perhaps they are further along their tra-
jectory but, due to the struggles and uncertainties within their particular
field, they continue to feel insecure (such as the two female professors, 13/2
and 13/3). It should be noted (in support of this transitional argument)
15This sense of regained position (and the previously ruptured trajectory it implies)
was immediately apparent in interview: when asked about his educational attainment,
the mukhtar said he had obtained the upper baccalaureate - itself not a low qualification
considering his age (60), and the structure of the cohort effect in Lebanese educational
attainment demonstrated in the previous chapter. He immediately added however that
he had “self culture”, and was careful to associate himself with family members who had
achieved esteemed positions in medicine and academia. This diligence toward institution-
alised forms of cultural capital was neatly summarised in an anecdote he described (off the
record), which revolved around his displeasure at a renowned private cultural institution
not treating his office of mukhtar with sufficient respect, by sending a low level delegation
to deal with him over a matter of symbolic importance.
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that all 6 agents in this position have a low squared correlation in the first
axis - suggesting their transitional nature leaves them a relatively ‘loose fit’
within this dimension.
Moving further across, we find those agents whose trajectory has taken
them in a perhaps unanticipated direction (such as the Sunni mukhtar ’s
family 13/13, who came from a modest background), or who are perhaps
in transition to a different trajectory (such as 13/10, the younger brother
who seemed more inclined toward civil society or public engagement than
his older brother, and indeed than their family business background, would
perhaps suggest). The most extreme cases of such “rupture” are of course
those agents who have entered the field late, having perhaps grown up or
spent most of their lives in a different social space, and who thus experience
a sense of alienation within the Lebanese field - the “disrupted” habitus
described by Bourdieu. Agents 13/6, 13/1 and 13/12 fit this category, with
13/12 (the male professor in his mid-60s) the most extreme case, and thus
to be found at the furthest extent of the dimension.
The y-axis is somewhat harder to articulate. In the previous diagram,
this axis distinguished between, on the one hand, those who never use wasta
or choose to use it, and on the other, those who felt they needed or absolutely
needed to use wasta. In the sense of having a recourse to wasta as practice, it
is also this dimension which most strongly distinguished between the space
of denial and the space of admission. Considering the responses of agents,
this axis seems to contrast at different points between defensiveness and
reflexivity; between agents possessing a point of honour which the line of
questioning followed by the interview provoked them to defend, and those
who felt comfortable in a degree of frankness; it also seems to reveal a
distinction between autonomy and coercion - between agents who feel they
can ‘take or leave’ wasta and the obligations it implies, and those who feel
they have no other choice.
Thus, when this distinction is interpreted in light of the first axis, it
would seem to suggest a division structured around two or three related
factors: the quality of an agent’s investment in the particular field or social
game in which they are found; the extent of misrecognition an agent displays
toward the use of wasta; and the degree of reflexivity they display toward
analysis of their own motives or position within the broader social game.
One reason such an axis is so difficult to interpret is the covariance
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these different factors will naturally hold according to an agent’s position
along the first axis - that is, according to the stability of an agent’s position
in the field. The nature of this covariance can be grasped by analysis of
the structure of position-takings toward wasta, which is expressed in both
dimensions. Whereas the first dimension is structured according to the
degree of exigency (more stable positions being more likely to completely
disregard wasta, or take a certain distance from it by restricting its use only
to necessity, while more ruptured positions are either more likely to see in
it the requirement of absolute necessity to maintain a position, or choice
in advancing a position), the second dimension distinguishes more directly
between agents who are relatively autonomous from the struggles of the field
(‘never’, ‘choose’) and those caught up in them (characterised by varying
degrees of necessity).
Thus, the combination of these two dimensions produces four principle
poles, which tend to elide into each other at their extremes. It is perhaps
better, therefore, to interpret this second axis in light of the first, and to
speak in terms of quadrants of space.
For instance, the top left quadrant would seem to indicate a space of
“exit”, occupied by agents whose relative stability is coupled with a lack of
interest, or indeed a reflexive distancing, from the necessities of the social
game - agents whose stability has perhaps encouraged them to withdraw
from the social game, and who are hence stable and disengaged.
It is thus in this space that are to be found the two retirees who most
distanced themselves from wasta (13/5, who dreamed of living in Europe,
and 13/8, who claimed that “nothing would oblige me to use wasta except
if the matter concerns health [. . . ] I consider it to be wrong”); likewise,
respondent 13/9 (the security guard), who claimed that as a result of his
position within the university (which provided health insurance for the whole
family) he “didn’t need wasta any more”. Alongside this objective distance
from necessity should also be added a subjective preference for maintain-
ing balanced relations (tawazan) - indeed, the respondent added that he
had turned down an invitation to a cousin’s wedding at a prestigious hotel
precisely because he couldn’t afford a sufficiently expensive present, and “I
don’t like to be put down”.16
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agents in positions which might be deemed stable and engaged - that is,
whose stability enables a degree of security or perhaps even reflexivity, but
who have not withdrawn from or rejected the social game. The Orthodox
mukhtar 13/14, for instance, is still very much engaged, yet from a position
of stability, while the two young male students most likely to stably repro-
duce their parents’ social trajectory (13/11 and 13/7) are also found in this
space. Also in this quadrant is respondent 13/4, the retired draftsman, who
was more equivocal concerning the use of connections, and showed himself
more open to using them to help others. Indeed, after the recorder had been
turned off he recounted in detail two particular instances in which he had
paid significant bribes to both civil and religious officials with regards to
inheritance and property rights.
On the right side of the axis, we find that the upper quadrant is occupied
predominantly by respondents who had experienced some form of hysteresis
(typically having spent their formative years outside of Lebanon), and hence
display some form of disengagement - or even unfamiliarity - with the ‘rules
of the game’, such as derives from occupying a position of rupture. Hence,
this quadrant may be described as in rupture and disengaged. Respondent
13/1, for instance (who grew up in Nigeria), described herself as having
difficulty in managing reciprocity in social exchange: she would offer help
freely - “sometimes I feel I overdo it” - but at the same time be reticent
in asking favours for herself - “even though I have this expectation, I still
don’t do it [. . . ] I hold myself back [. . . ] I offer help more than I request
[and] I’m very careful how I request.” Similarly, respondent 13/6 (who
grew up in the US), mentioned his general opposition to wasta, while also
recounting several occasions in which the opportunity to gain an advantage
through bribes or connections had presented itself. On such occasions the
willingness to consider such methods, coupled with the wariness of being
cheated which eventually resulted in turning them down, suggests not so
much a moral or ethical opposition as a less developed ‘feel for the game’
(i.e. less confidence in being able to play it well).
Alternatively, such disengagement as represented by this quadrant may
be the result not of hysteresis but of occupying a privileged position within
the social order, enabling an agent to engage in arbitrage between capitals
and fields. For instance, the Sunni mukhtar’s family (13/13) is, in structural
terms, similarly placed to the blat meister or tolkachi in Soviet Russia: com-
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ing from a relatively modest background, they have risen to a position where
they are able to benefit from converting political capital to social capital,
and vice versa - choosing to see in this privileged ability the operation not
of domination but rather the principle of charity (ah
˙
san).
Finally, moving to the lower right quadrant we find agents who are both
in rupture and engaged. While this is the least populated quadrant (thus
perhaps demonstrating the strong tendency of habitus toward reproduction),
this interpretation may be demonstrated through a comparison of respon-
dents 13/6 and 13/10, who are opposed on the second axis while occupying
ostensibly the same position on the first. To draw out this distinction it is
useful to contrast their respective experiences in taking their driving test:
whereas 13/6 decided to pay extra to make his exam “secure”,17 13/10 went
specifically against his father’s wishes to try to pass the test without paying
an additional bribe or using connections. We may argue that 13/10 did not
so much lack a feel for the game (he knew very well what was required), but
was rather expressing his specific form of engagement : that is, his interest
in a form of civic engagement approximating the generalised interest - an
interest also manifested in his earlier involvement in overseas volunteering,
his general opposition to wasta, and his preference for merit. Such a form
of engagement nonetheless places him in a position of rupture vis a` vis his
anticipated trajectory, hence his position on the first axis further to the
right of his brother (13/11, who had admitted unrepentingly that his father
had used a contact at the Ministry of Education to have a teacher take his
school exam for him), and in more or less the same position as 13/6. We
may thus consider this quadrant as occupied by agents in more transitional
positions, or perhaps in less stable positions within fields where struggles
are more pronounced (such as, arguably, respondent 13/3).
In a similar mode to the comparison of respondents 13/6 and 13/10 (who
occupied corresponding positions on the first axis and opposing positions on
the second), we may further our interpretation of the effects of covariance
by contrasting respondents 13/12 and 13/9, who occupy corresponding po-
17Respondent 13/6 took his licence in Nabatieh (southern Lebanon), owing to the fact
that then Interior Minister Ziad Baroud had imposed a 3 month ban on driving exams in
Beirut due to corruption. He paid ll 500,000, as opposed to ll 450,000 for a “non-secure”
test (the official cost should have been in the region of ll 300,000). Interestingly, he then
tried to take a female friend to the same examiner, who refused to examine her as she
was a Sunni - another indication perhaps of the respondent’s less developed ‘feel for the
game’.
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sitions on the second and opposing positions on the first. Both are to a
mild extent disengaged from the struggles of the field, yet the quality of
their disengagement varies radically: whereas 13/9 (the security guard) is
disengaged by choice, having sought out a stable position in an international
institution that would protect him from the exigencies of struggles within
the field, the US professor is disengaged by disposition: that is, he lacks
a ‘feel for the game’, the result of occupying a ruptured position, in turn
producing a “destabilised” habitus.18
The final observation to make concerning the distribution of individuals
relates to the opposition uncovered between agents who might otherwise
be expected (based purely upon their occupation) to hold similar positions
within the two dimensions. There are essentially two such cases: the two
female professors (13/2 and 13/3) and the two mukhtars (13/14 and 13/13),
the first of whom are predominately separated by the second axis (though
also in a more limited sense by the first) and the latter of whom are separated
predominately by the first axis (though again to a lesser extent also by the
second). Such results may seem initially surprising (particularly in light of
the relatively close grouping of, for example, the retirees and the students);
however, they serve to remind us that the positions and practices of agents
are not determined purely by their occupation (which is a poor proxy for
expressing all the possible variations in capital structures and trajectory),
but are rather the product of their complete social history, as embodied in
habitus and objectified in a determinate trajectory in social space.
Before concluding this section it is worth briefly discussing the third axis,
and how it may contribute to our understanding of the principles revealed
by the first two axes. Table 8.3 summarises the axis by presenting the main
categories and individuals contributing to it (i.e. those whose contribution
or squared correlation is greater than 1/k), and lists them in order from left
to right on the factorial plane.
As can be seen, the third axis distinguishes strongly between those who
admit to using wasta in the labour market, and those who admit to using
18For instance, 13/12 noted several instances of uncertainty regarding the appropriate
way to proceed in social interactions which mingled the general and specific interests. On
one occasion a student brought him an expensive gift for having allowed him to resit a
paper on compassionate grounds; the professor faced the dilemma of accepting the gift and
then feeling obliged to award a high grade, or refusing the gift and offending the student
(and his family). Ultimately he accepted the gift and awarded a low grade.
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Table 8.3: Summary of Third Axis
Cat/Ind. coord ctr/sq corr rank
Lab. Mark (admit) -3.772 0.203 2nd
4 -3.532 0.155 4th
5 -3.469 0.149 5th
Wasta (never) -1.495 0.064 11th
Wasta (abs. need) -1.407 0.085 7th
State viol. (admit) 1.694 0.205 1st
14 2.342 0.068 9th
9 2.499 0.078 8th
7 3.749 0.175 3rd
it in the domain of the state monopoly of violence, with the individual
fitting this axis the most being respondent 7, who is placed closest to the
latter and furthest from the former. This will prove an important finding,
as the following section on habitus elaborates more clearly the particular
nature of respondent 7’s dispositions and position-takings regarding these
two categories. Thus, despite being a second order axis, the third axis
nonetheless provides useful information which can aid in the interpretation
of the social space of clandestine circulation, and it is also worth adding
that it is in this axis (i.e., the one most strongly opposing the state and
the labour market) that the squared correlation of respondent 7’s profile is
highest - having been relatively low in the first and second axes.
To conclude this section of the analysis, we have seen through a combi-
nation of quantitative and qualitative methods, interpreted in light of the
theoretical categories developed previously, that both agents’ dispositions
and position-takings vary consistently according to their objective situa-
tion along two axes. Thus, it would seem that both the disposition toward
wasta-like practices and position-takings toward wasta are (at least to some
extent) a structured phenomenon. Further, according to our interpretation
of these two axes revealed by MCA, the structuring principles according to
which both practices and position-takings vary are the stability of an agent
and the quality of their engagement within their given field.
The most obvious manifestation of these axes falls within the natural life
course of individual agents: thus, agents begin in a position of low stability
but high engagement (being motivated to succeed in whichever field they
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are struggling in), and gradually move to a position of greater stability
but less engagement. Indeed, this is the trajectory demonstrated by the
distribution of age cohorts across the two axes (which follow an upward,
left-leaning curve). Such a distribution suggests that (endogenous) agents
naturally tend to rely more heavily on strategies of clandestine circulation
the younger they are in order to establish themselves within the field, and
also tend to see in such strategies the imperatives of necessity, rather than a
free choice. As agents grow older, it would also appear they are more likely
to distance themselves from such practices, despite perhaps still requiring
to make use of them, particularly as regards the inheritance of property.
The exception to both cases would appear to be those agents somehow in
positions of rupture (either by disposition or choice), and who, in the most
extreme positions of arbitrage, see in such circulation principles of charity
which reflect positively upon themselves - a clear expression of the specific
interest, and the elementary mode of domination.
It is clear, however, that age should not be understood as the ‘inde-
pendent variable’ which constitutes or explains an agent’s position on the
stability index (and hence his or her tendency to rely on the clandestine
circulation of capital). Rather, ‘stability’ must be understood as the prod-
uct of those more general properties structuring Lebanese social space, as
described in the previous chapter, some of whose effects are also expressed
through the function of age.
It should also be noted that, while such analysis is highly useful in re-
vealing the general distribution of practices and position-takings relating
to clandestine circulation, as well as the underlying dimensions structuring
such a distribution, the axes revealed through the analysis of practices and
position-takings do not position agents within an objective power hierarchy
(in the sense of the absolute volume of capital possessed by respondents in
relation to each other). This is owing to several factors, not least the fact
(noted in the theory chapter) that the subjective effects of misrecognition
associated with an agent’s own practices are frequently autonomous from
the distributional effects of field.
Thus, the relational analysis of practices and position-takings presented
here may reveal the disposition toward practices of clandestine circulation,
and variation in the types of clandestine circulation practiced (in the sense
of the reproduction mechanisms they relate to), as well as the general, re-
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lational structure of misrecognition relating to such practices. It does not
reveal, however, the varying extent to which specific agents objectively ben-
efit from such clandestine circulation as a means of appropriation, above
and beyond the similar strategies of less fortunately placed agents.
Rather, to achieve such a goal we must reintegrate the insights gained on
the distribution of practices and position-takings to the objective resources
possessed by agents within a hierarchical social space. Such an analysis
may be effected as part of the more detailed comparison of specific agents’
habitus which follows on from this section. The aim of such structured
comparisons is thus to deepen the insights gained from this preliminary,
relational investigation of clandestine circulation, and to reveal the impli-
cations of such structuring at the level of objective resources, in terms of
the distribution (and efficacy) of particular strategies, the manner in which
they are misrecognised, and the varying appropriation resulting from them.
8.2 The Structure of Habitus
In seeking to analyse in detail agents’ habitus regarding clandestine circula-
tion, it is useful to begin with an agent who may be considered to represent
a good point of comparison with respect to all others. Turning once more
to the distribution of respondents revealed in figure 8.2, we find that the
respondent occupying the most central position in relation to both axes is
13/7. We thus begin with an analysis of his habitus, in terms both of the
precise nature and efficacy of his reproduction strategies (relating to the
dispositions of habitus) and of the point of honour reconstructed through
his responses (relating to the position-takings of habitus, and the specific
constitution of the social libido produced by the objective configuration of
social space).
Respondent 13/7 is a 21-year-old male political science graduate of an
elite (private) Lebanese university. Prior to university he had been pri-
vately educated at a preparatory school, and at the time of interview he
was preparing to undertake a graduate degree in law in Europe (for which
he had received offers from several different universities). His father is a
relatively well-connected shop owner in Ras Beirut, and his mother is the
country director of a significant international organisation in a nearby Arab
country. He has one older brother who works in a leading Middle Eastern
250 CHAPTER 8. THE SECOND MOMENT

















-1.2 -1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Labour Market
law firm, which he himself hopes to join after completing his studies. He
has studied in France and also undertaken internships in prestigious inter-
national organisations. He holds a Lebanese diplomatic passport by virtue
of his mother’s status. He has a relatively closed social circle of around 8
friends, and doesn’t like “a lot of strangers partying with us”.
Figure 8.3 is an enlargement of the specific portion of space occupied
by respondent 13/7, and is intended specifically to illustrate his relation to
the structure of the distribution of categories for admitting to using wasta-
like practices. Also included as a reference are the two respondents 13/11
and 13/10 (both male students at the same university), and the two closest
position-takings regarding wasta (‘need’ and ‘absolute need’).
The first thing to note concerns the positioning of respondent 13/7 rela-
tive to the categories of clandestine circulation in the various reproduction
mechanisms. He is closest (and indeed equidistant) to the two categories re-
lating to the state, more distant from the category relating to the education
system, and furthest from the category relating to the labour market. He
8.2. THE STRUCTURE OF HABITUS 251
is also closer to the ‘need’ category than ‘absolute need’ regarding position-
takings on wasta. By contrast, respondents 13/11 and 13/10 are both closer
to ‘absolute need’, and regarding practices 13/10 is more or less equidistant
from all domains, while 13/11 is relatively close to clandestine circulation
in the education system (reflecting his aforementioned lack of reticence in
admitting to cheating during his exams), somewhat close to clandestine cir-
culation in the state security apparatus, and further (and equidistant) to
clandestine circulation in the state bureaucracy and labour market.19
These apparently minor differences in fact reflect a substantial difference
in terms of the precise constitution of each respondent’s point of honour -
that is, the point or perspective they must defend or promote, as revealed
through interview. This point of honour, as discussed in the theory section,
is nothing more than the structure of misrecognition resulting from a habitus
involved in the accumulation and transformation of capitals in a determinate
position of a particular social space. Any such position will produce its own
social libido, the constitution of which will vary according to the forms
and guises of capitals necessary to be transacted through the reproduction
strategies which accord to that position, and to the broader state of relations
within and between fields which results from the distribution of such capitals
across the totality of social space. In the case of older agents, their point
of honour may also be the product of a social libido embedded in a habitus
reflecting a prior historical state of such relations (the ‘Don Quixote’ effect,
as Bourdieu described it) - habitus being also the embodiment of history.
Thus, what figure 8.3 demonstrates is the varying point of honour of
the three respondents 13/7, 13/10, and 13/11 as it relates to clandestine
19It is important to note that the scaling of the second (y) axis on figure 8.3 has been
curtailed, which gives the impression of respondent 13/10 being closer to clandestine
circulation in the labour market than he in fact is. While 13/10 is - paradoxically -
closer to the ‘admit’ categories for the education system and labour markets than he is for
the two state domains (having in reality admitted to using clandestine circulation in the
latter and not mentioned it in the former), this is owing to the stronger contribution of
‘absolute need’ as a category in the second axis, a category in which respondent 13/10 is
contained. However, rather than weakening the argument for the use of MCA to position
respondents, the case of respondent 13/10 in fact strengthens it, as it has positioned him in
a substantially different space to respondent 13/7, despite their coded responses differing
in only two categories (‘absolute need’ as opposed to ‘need’ in wasta position-taking, and
‘no mention’ as opposed to ‘deny’ regarding clandestine circulation in the labour market).
As we have seen, such a positioning is both justified and more than borne out when
considering 13/10’s ‘ruptured’ trajectory. It reminds us, however, that MCA presents a
structure of relations that must be interpreted, rather than variables which determine
causality (Rouanet, Ackermann, and Le Roux, 2000, p. 7).
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circulation in the Lebanese context. Specifically, what it demonstrates vis a`
vis respondent 13/7 - the respondent who is also, according to the structure
revealed by MCA, the agent occupying the mean or most typical position
in this social space of clandestine circulation - is a point of honour adjusted
toward the defence of the general interest (i.e. the principal of merit) as it
pertains to the (private) labour market and educational system, and toward
the denigration of the same interest as it pertains toward the institutions
of the state. It is furthermore a point of honour which considers in wasta
not the utility maximising preferences of a free choice, but the structurally
determined constraints of necessity.
Turning to the interview itself, we see such an analysis entirely borne
out. When asked how he would describe wasta, rather than immediately
providing a normative judgement, the respondent instead emphasised its
importance -
How would you describe wasta? Is it good, bad? I think if it
could be abolished, totally abolished for everyone, I think that
would be better for everyone. But since it is not? But since it
is not I think it is of vital importance in Lebanon. To survive?
Yes, but the ideal picture would be no wasta at all, it’s based on
merits and qualifications, everything would work, and everyone
should be under the law. So, but, er, due to the circumstances
that we live in in Lebanon, I think it’s of vital importance.
The positioning of an ‘ideal picture’ based on merit and qualifications
and the rule of law is of course an idealised expression of the generalised
interest. The respondent identifies himself with such an interest without
committing himself to its normative implications, emphasising instead the
“circumstances that we live in”. Indeed, he later repeats this justification
when asked the question in a more pointed way (one designed specifically
to confront the point of honour associated with the generalised interest) -
So, in that context you wouldn’t call it a corrupt thing, because
it’s a needed practice, like I mean you can’t do without it in
Lebanon. [Slightly uncertain] It is a corrupt thing. Er, I’m sure it
is corrupt, and it’s part of what makes the corruption in Lebanon
so large. But, er, due to the circumstances, because everyone
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has wasta, and without wasta stuff would be very hard to do. In
circumstances, er. I think that is important.
This denial of agency is emphasised again toward the end of the inter-
view, when the interviewer addresses a question directly toward the respon-
dent’s point of honour - his own behaviour:
Ok. So, whenever you used wasta, did you use it because you
needed to, or because you chose to? No, it was because I needed
to. I told you earlier, I only use wasta when, in times where no
other way is possible.
The degree of insistence here (answering ‘no’ to an open question; em-
phasising “I told you earlier”) is indicative of the degree of pressure under
which the interviewer has placed the respondent’s point of honour. Despite
the fact that all the instances in which the respondent had referred to using
wasta had seemed to imply a considerable amount of agency or choice (as
will be demonstrated below), the respondent must emphasise the coercive,
dominating aspect of the system in which wasta occurs, in order to defend
the symbolic force associated with his capital structure. Indeed, this insis-
tence even goes so far as a denial that use of such wasta implies in any way
a form of power:
Alright, and normally when you use wasta - you already I think
answered this question but I’ll ask again - is your wasta a friend,
family member [etc.] No, it’s usually one of my parents, or one
of my friends who has his dad, or his connections, but not per-
sonally. It’s neither my dad not [sic.] mom personally nor my
friends. They personally don’t have power in their lives.
Again, the respondent begins his answer to this open-ended question
with a negation, emphasising his opposition to the (perceived) implication,
which (from the rest of his response) we must believe to be the insinuation
that he or his family form an integral part of the wasta-system which he
has previously described, and in doing so benefit from it. The effort to
emphasise such a distance even takes curious semantic proportions: the
word ‘personally’ (associated with the specific interest) is used three times,
each as a negation. Indeed, on three earlier occasions in the interview he
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uses the same word in relation to himself to emphasise his own distance
from such practices (whilst simultaneously recounting his role in them): “I
personally don’t know anyone”; “I personally don’t know anyone that I’m
maintaining a connection with to keep my wasta going”; and, “I only use the
wasta when. . . in times where no other way is possible, one of my parents or
one of my friends who has his dad or has connections but. . . not personally.”
Why does respondent 13/7’s point of honour take such contours? As
noted above, his background places him within a relatively elite fraction of
the bourgeoisie: not only has he been privately educated all his life, but his
parents are also prosperous and well-connected. Regarding his own invest-
ment strategies, he was proud of having worked as a coach and volunteer for
several years, something which he said was “now very useful for my CV”,
and despite the head of the organisation where he interned being a friend
of his mother, he insisted that such a connection did not benefit him, and
that he “just applied” after the organisation had visited his school. Thus, in
terms of his background and current trajectory, respondent 13/7 is evidently
possessed of a habitus adjusted toward the accumulation of institutionalised
cultural capital.
On the other hand, his inherited position and trajectory have also equipped
him with a significant volume of embodied social capital, in the sense of the
quality of social relations upon which he can draw for assistance. When
asked to describe his social circle, he claimed to have around eight or nine
close friends, the majority of which (six) he had attended school with. When
asked if he made any special effort to maintain certain relationships, par-
ticularly with powerful or well-connected people, he claimed there were no
particular individuals he maintained good relations with simply for the sake
of “keep[ing] my wasta going”, although he would like to keep a good rela-
tionship with his brother’s employer (who is also a friend of his mother), to
potentially get a job after his graduate degree.
However, despite this disavowal of any instrumental motivation regarding
his social relations (be it even for necessity), and indeed despite an apparent
emphasis on the opposite - i.e. of making no special effort to keep such
friendships going - it is clear that these relations furnish him with a useful
stock of social capital. For instance, one friend’s father works in the customs
department at the airport, which enabled him to get excess baggage through
for free on his trip to France, and another’s father is a brigadier in the police
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- a connection he considered might be helpful in the future.
It is interesting, indeed, that both the respondent and his friends appear
able to draw fairly freely on each other’s parents to deal with problems or
smooth the way - functions which would ordinarily be considered as wasta
by most objective observers. Indeed, the most spectacular examples of such
assistance are provided by the respondent himself when asked if he had ever
been in a position to help anyone. In one case he told how his girlfriend was
stopped by the police at a checkpoint, where they were “being very rough on
her because she forgot her driving licence”. The respondent was able to solve
the problem by making a call to his father, who used his connections in the
police to have her released. A second case was even more notable: a friend
had been involved in a car accident under the influence of alcohol, causing a
significant amount of damage. The friend asked the respondent’s help, and
his father was able to intervene to prevent the friend from being tested for
alcohol by the police - hence enabling him to claim on the insurance for the
damage.
When asked why he had provided such help, the respondent answered
“first of all, because he asked me to, and he’s a very close friend. Second of
all, because the accident was obviously very expensive. . . to fix the car it was
obvious that a lot of money needed to be put in, so if he had been caught
that he had been under the influence of alcohol he wouldn’t have gotten
the amount from the insurance company.” Such justifications are obviously
expressive of the specific interest, which in this case clearly trumped the
contrasting claims of the rule of law, otherwise expressive of the generalised
interest.
It is interesting to contrast the varying degrees of misrecognition across
the different domains in which this generalised interest may be expressed.
Whereas the respondent was careful to emphasise that his parents’ connec-
tions had played no role either in the transition to the labour market (his
mother’s friendship with both the head of the agency he interned in and
the company at which his brother works being for him in no way the deter-
minant factor), or in the legitimacy of his institutionalised cultural capital,
when it came to the more specific domains of the state (the security and
bureaucratic/fiscal apparatuses), the respondent displayed no compunction
whatsoever in admitting either to employing affective relations, or indeed
the more brute effects of vertical or economic domination in order to achieve
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the desired result.
While the use of the father’s connections to assist his friends would fall
under this former category of affective relations (and hence involve a degree
of misrecognition under the specific interest), the respondent also gave ex-
amples of the latter, more overt domination in other of his dealings with the
state, which involved no such misrecognition. For example, it became ap-
parent that the family has for a long time (some 25 years) employed a driver
as a kind of all-purpose factotum. The respondent described this person as
“my driver”, in a manner expressive of a similar kind of objectification to
the domestique phenomenon noted in the previous chapter. Whenever the
respondent received a parking ticket, he would give it to the driver, who
would take it to someone and “cancel” it.20 When pressed further, the re-
spondent (who seemed uninterested in the precise mechanism) said that the
driver’s son worked in the mukhabarat (intelligence), and that this probably
had something to do with it.
Indeed, the complete absence of a generalised interest associated by the
respondent with the apparatus of the state is confirmed by his account of the
process behind acquiring his driving licence. According to the respondent,
“my mom has some principles that she doesn’t break”; hence, she would not
allow him to drive before his 18th birthday. Two days after, however, she
simply paid off the relevant agency, without even obliging him to go through
the charade of taking the official exam. The somewhat jarring juxtaposition
between bribing a government agency to obtain a licence and nonetheless
being a person of unbreakable principles appears to hinge on the ambiguity
contained in the word “some”: his mother has some principles; they have
nothing to do with the state.
In total, in the course of being interviewed respondent 13/7 mentioned
8 specific instances of clandestine circulation, understood in the restricted
sense of the use of economic or social capital (the clandestine circulation of
cultural capital being already implied in the agent’s academic trajectory).
Figure 8.4 provides a spatial representation of this use of clandestine circu-
lation in the total labour of social reproduction. It attempts to integrate five
perspectives: symbolic forces (misrecognition); capitals; power relations; re-
production mechanisms (relating to the specific structure of the Lebanese
state effect); and reproduction strategies.
20The initial arabic expression used was ‘zbout
˙
a’, or ‘adjust’.
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Each specific instance of clandestine circulation has been positioned
within this space, and is numbered accordingly: 1 refers to the mother’s
role in obtaining a position for her son(s) in the labour market (implied by
her social relation to the owner of the company); 2 refers to her role in ob-
taining the internship (again implied by her social relation to the head of the
organisation); 3 has not yet been mentioned, and refers to the mother’s use
of her office to obtain extra seats for the respondent’s graduation; 4 refers
to the respondent’s father helping his girlfriend at the checkpoint; 5 refers
to the respondent’s father helping his friend after the car crash; 6 refers to
the respondent using his friend’s father to obtain extra baggage allowance
at the airport; 7 refers to the cancelled parking tickets; and 8 refers to the
driving licence.
The space is organised hierarchically, from strategies of greatest impor-
tance in reproducing the respondent’s position in social space (closer to the
centre), to those of least importance (closer to the periphery); the most rele-
vant agents and groups of agents are then positioned according to their role
in this labour (again with the most important closest to the centre, and the
least important toward the periphery).21 The arrows identify the specific
capitals circulated (and reproduced) between and by the respondent and the
agents in these various labours, and the particular power relations or social
structures that relate the respondent to the agent(s) in question.
The brackets toward the bottom of the figure indicate the approximate
bounds of the different reproduction mechanisms within this space. Accord-
ing to the structure of the Lebanese state effect, for this particular agent
both the labour market and the educational system are regulated by repro-
duction mechanisms which fall outside of the formal institutions of the state;
they are thus indicated as lying within a space of capitals institutionalised
by the economic field (e.g. private universities, private corporations, etc.)
Those remaining reproduction mechanisms falling within formal state
institutions (and hence the space of capitals institutionalised by the state)
are labelled according to the typology used in the MCA of state fiscal and
21It should be noted in this respect that agents are positioned according to their most
important role - for instance, the respondent’s mother also assisted the respondent obtain-
ing his driving licence by paying off the examiner, a labour which would fall somewhere in
the periphery; however, it is unlikely she would have done this personally, and her much
more fundamental role in integrating her son in the labour market ultimately positions
her closest to the centre.
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security apparatus. They thus include interactions with the bureaucracy
and with those institutions responsible for maintaining the state’s monopoly
of violence (or the ‘raison d’Etat ’). For respondent 13/7 this includes the
avoidance of fines, the circumvention of bureaucratic regulations concerning
car registration, driving tests, circumventing police or army checkpoints, etc.
though not (considering his low age) mechanisms relating to inheritance laws
and property rights. In this sense, the driving licence may be considered as
something of a proxy, requiring as it does a similar kind of bureaucratic
interaction.
The dashed circles delineate the general space of specific reproduction
strategies within the total schema, and thus overlap both varying reproduc-
tion mechanisms and varying social relations. While succession strategies
and educational strategies (being of greatest importance to this respondent)
are closest to the centre and match closely with the labour market and the
educational system, less important strategies are both further out and of
a more vague extent. In the case of clandestine circulation involving the
police or customs, such practices (while occasionally seeming mundane) are
nonetheless included within the broader context of reproduction strategies
owing to the symbolic value accorded to the circumvention of such rules: the
ability (or inability) to avoid bureaucratic entanglements (i.e., the extent to
which the symbolic and actual violence of the state does or does not apply
to them) serves to position agents hierarchically, and is hence expressive of
the possession of social capital, as was seen in the theoretical chapters in the
cases of blat and guanxi. In this sense it is also worth comparing respondent
13/7 to the Orthodox mukhtar (13/14), who described using a simsar to
deal with the public administration not to save time, but because “it’s not
nice for someone like me to do it myself”. This shared desire of both re-
spondents to maintain social distance from the state bureaucracy contrasts
markedly with, for instance, the security guard (13/9), who seemed to take
pride in handling such matters personally. It would thus appear to relate
more particularly to the point of honour of elite agents, and specifically
those adjusted toward the accumulation of cultural capital.
Finally, the shading indicates the degree of misrecognition (or conversely,
the strength of the symbolic force) of the capitals involved. Once again this
moves from weakest at the periphery to strongest at the centre (represented
by the respondent’s “point of honour” in the very centre).
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A very cursory analysis of the figure thus reveals that the lowest mis-
recognition (and the weakest symbolic force) corresponds to the area of
space represented by the capitals and reproduction mechanisms of the state.
Here, when reproduction involves the assistance of a parent, such assistance
does not even require post-facto justification, whereas assistance provided
by non-family members (even if corresponding to the broader household) is
stated in terms of more or less naked domination (“my driver”), with nei-
ther justification offered nor any attempt to describe the relation in affective
terms. It is here also that the clandestine circulation of economic capital
may occur, the enabling factor being the low symbolic force attached to
capitals institutionalised by the state.
As we move closer to the centre, we gradually enter the territory of social
and symbolic investment - that is, strategies geared toward the maintenance
of a circle of useful friends and the gathering of symbolic resources with a
value in the wider symbolic market. It is in this somewhat intermediary
space - that is, between relatively unimportant and absolutely fundamental
strategies - that agents invest in the kind of practices that will position
them as possessors of high levels of embodied social capital, and which thus
tends to lead toward the objectification of such social capital in a market of
objectively trivial yet symbolically meaningful goods and practices. While
respondent 13/7 mentions relatively few such examples (the excess baggage
being a rather mundane instance), for other respondents of his age and
background it is in this space that would be found strategies for gaining
access to (and being seen in) the most fashionable nightclubs, or (among
slightly older respondents) maintaining, for example, a car with smoked
windows, which requires sufficient wasta to overcome the inevitable police
checkpoints and mecanique inspections.
As the figure demonstrates, the respondent’s strategies (capitals ex-
changed and contacts called upon) vary according to the degree of impor-
tance which each practice holds in the total labour of reproduction; further,
the degree of misrecognition demonstrated by the respondent also varies
according to the same measure. Analysis of the interview revealed that
practices could be positioned along a matrix moving from least important
(practices related to convenience and prestige) to most important (practices
related to the protection of capitals/status and, most critically, reproduc-
ing an advanced level of insertion in the labour market). Misrecognition is,
8.2. THE STRUCTURE OF HABITUS 261
naturally, found to be at its strongest the closer one approaches strategies
related to the reproduction of the respondent’s core capital structure. In
this case, as the respondent is expecting to transition from the university to
an elevated position in the labour market - specifically, a role in the same
leading commercial law firm as his brother - it is here that the greatest mis-
recognition is displayed. It is also here that the labour of reproduction is
most circumscribed within the household: there would appear to be a com-
plete reliance on the mother’s social or professional connections to effect this
transition.
For respondent 13/7 “wasta”, it would seem, includes only those prac-
tices of clandestine circulation falling within the middle, transitional part
of this diagram: i.e. 4, 5 and 6. These were practices involving either the
father or friends’ fathers, and involving the reproduction mechanisms or se-
curity apparatus (relating to the monopoly of violence) of the state. These
practices generally had to do with prestige or protection, and were in most
cases capable of being presented as altruistic. By contrast, clandestine circu-
lation closer to the core reproduction strategies was entirely misrecognised,
while clandestine circulation at the most peripheral positions (and which
tended to involve the state bureaucracy and the subversion of the state’s
monopoly of symbolic violence) was unrecognised, i.e. seen as purely doxic
or taken-for-granted.
The specificity of such a habitus produced within the social space of
Lebanese clandestine circulation can best be evoked through comparison
with an agent whose habitus was formed outside of such a space, and who
has subsequently had to adjust to the demands of the Lebanese field. The
effects of hysteresis which emerge from this adjustment can be used in a
comparative sense to highlight all those aspects of the smooth functioning of
a habitus in its natural environment which often become ‘taken-for-granted’
by the agent - and hence missed by the analyst - as well as the comparatively
greater efficacy of reproduction strategies employed by endogenous habitus.
For current purposes the best point of comparison is arguably respondent
13/1, a (Lebanese) female research assistant in her early thirties who was
raised in Nigeria and educated to graduate level in the US. At the time of
interview she had been living in Lebanon for four years with her mother
and sister, and was working part-time at a private university. Her social
circle is quite small (around ten people), acquired mostly through “random
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meet-ups” via other friends, or through “volunteering and activism”. In
contrast to 13/7, who claimed he could call on all eight of his close friends
in difficulty, respondent 13/1 believed there was only one such person she
could call on.
In terms of dispositions and attitudes respondent 13/1 differs from 13/7
in a number of important respects - particularly when considering the oth-
erwise quite similar nature of their objective positions, in terms of family
background and educational attainment.
For instance, the families of both respondents employ a male driver as
a general factotum. However, whereas for 13/7 “my” driver was referred
to dismissively, for 13/1, “our” driver is described in more human terms as
“there to help my mum, to not have her deal with everything.” According to
the respondent, having such a recourse “sort of became part of our lifestyle”
- “our driver is always available as a mechanism to ease the process of doing
something that would otherwise take a long time.” In contrast to respondent
13/7 though, she seemed somewhat embarrassed by this situation, and even
slightly resentful at the limitation to her autonomy which it occasionally
implied:
The driver, because he got so used to his role, decided that it’s
ok to take the car and wash it without my permission. So I got
really mad and I told him, from now on if you want to take the
car and go and do service, tell me where you do it and how you
do it, and I will do it.” Such defiance has its limits however,
as the respondent admitted: “I realised very quickly that’s not
going to be possible whatsoever, because there’s already a way
of doing things. And as right as he is, I am too busy, and it’s a
privilege and it’s wonderful actually when you have someone to
help you out with this.
This tension between the awareness that “there’s already a way of do-
ing things” from which she implicitly benefits, and a desire to maintain
some autonomy or independence regardless, was a constant theme for this
respondent, and arguably reflects aspects of destabilised habitus. For in-
stance, when the respondent began having problems with her electricity bill
she refused the driver’s offer of assistance, despite the fact that “there’s al-
ways an offer” for such help. Instead, she “got to know” a woman on the
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5th floor of her building, and through her fixed the problem with the head
of the building.
This preference for autonomous action is indeed strongest when it re-
gards close family, from whose benign (if perhaps overbearing) assistance
she claims to have consciously withdrawn. With her father still working
in Nigeria, the male family presence in Lebanon is represented by two un-
cles, who are the individuals (alongside her mother) whom she would call
upon with significant problems. However, she emphasised that in this re-
spect both her sister’s and her mother’s connection was stronger (they had
both remained in Lebanon for longer), while she rather chose to define her-
self against such connections: “I think my parents would know more about
these cases [i.e. wasta-like practices] than I would, only because I’ve pulled
myself away from. . . and my connection to my uncle is not as strong as, let’s
say to a friend or to the driver, who has helped us since we were kids”.
This distancing from family relations, and especially their use for in-
strumental ends, was emphasised twice by the respondent. On the other
occasion she introduced a further distinction regarding her own use of such
connections: “personally, my connection is not that strong, and I’m more
focussed on not using those tools unless it’s like soft tools. I don’t use the
hard tools.”
This distinction between “soft” and “hard” tools was, upon further ques-
tioning, revealed to be equivalent to the one she had previously made (noted
in the previous section) between wasta and khidme (a favour or service). For
13/1 khidme falls under the category of acceptable assistance, and an exam-
ination of the definition of such assistance is particularly useful in drawing
out the distinction with 13/7. For instance, when asked if her family or
friends had ever helped her with regard to finding work, she corrected an
earlier statement that her parents might talk to someone they know on her
behalf to the more neutral role of “spreading of information” - “my dad will
just keep his eyes open”. She also emphasised that her own career path was
sufficiently different to her father’s that he could be of little direct help to
her. Rather, when it came to her own career “everything has been done on
my own through acceptance [i.e. of a formal application]”.
Even assistance from a friend in finding a job was described in similar
terms: “I spread the word and a friend of mine basically sent me an e-mail
and told me ‘hey I have a job for you at X for editing and writing’.” The
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friend forwarded an e-mail, and she obtained the post after being interviewed
by the head of the organisation. Again, without it being made clear, the
implication is that the friend had no direct influence in her receiving the job,
but had rather assisted through the “soft tool” of “spreading of information”.
Indeed, the respondent’s discussion of her social connections and the
kinds of assistance upon which she has called remind strongly of Granovet-
ter’s “strength of weak ties” theory (Granovetter, 1973) - itself arguably
reflecting the social dispositions of habitus within highly institutionalised
structures. In this sense, the respondent’s preference for diffuse ‘network-
ing’ strategies reflects her conscious identification with the US model of
professional relations, and the continuing embodiment, within habitus, of a
state effect in which institutionalised capitals are more heavily relied upon.
Indeed, at one point in the interview (while attempting to define wasta) the
respondent directly contrasted Lebanon with the US - explicitly identifying
herself with the latter at the expense of the former:
[a]s opposed to in the US, you know wasta quote unquote exists
if you want to see it in a good term, but we call it connections,
we call it making the extra effort to ensure your application is
taken into consideration. So when I think of wasta I see it as a
very negative Lebanese overdone form.
Indeed, in contrast to 13/7, respondent 13/1’s point of honour identifies
much more strongly with the generalised interest in all domains - including
those of the state. Thus, when describing her driving test she was the
only respondent to voice disapproval at having benefitted from the corrupt
system, and emphasised that her parents bribed the examiner without her
knowledge:
My parents ended up - interestingly behind my back because I
would have refused it - to pay off the driver who’s teaching me,
in order to ensure that if I make a tiny mistake they won’t have
to cancel it off [and repeat the test].
The attempt to both distance herself from (“behind my back”) and down-
play the significance of (“tiny mistake”) this event is expressive of the unifi-
cation of the generalised interest within the respondent’s point of honour -
that is, between not only qualifications awarded by the educational system,
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but also those awarded by the state. In much the same way that the young
Lebanese professional mentioned in the opening anecdote was physically un-
able to bribe a bureaucrat (expressive of the same unification through the
effects of body hexis), respondent 13/1 is subjectively unable to associate
herself with the conscious subversion of this generalised interest. Again,
as with the young Lebanese professional, we must assume these effects of
habitus to be the result of hysteresis - the continuing embodiment of subjec-
tive categories arising from earlier (and more determinant) exposure to the
differing configurations of reproduction mechanisms and social libidos of a
contrasting state effect. This is particularly so when one considers the fact
that no other endogenous respondents - whatever their other attitudes - felt
the need to apologise for the corrupt manner in which they had obtained
their driving licence.
Not only does respondent 13/1 differ from 13/7 in terms of her subjective
attitude toward social relations, she also seems to differ from him objectively
in terms of social capital. It has been mentioned earlier that 13/1 struggled
to manage reciprocity among her friendship group (admitting that she felt
she held herself back from asking favours of others, while being too quick to
offer assistance herself). A close comparison of the nature of both respon-
dents’ social capital (in the sense of the effectiveness with which each uses
the social resources available to them in the labour of social reproduction)
in fact demonstrates significant differences in habitus - differences which
are arguably attributable to respondent 13/1’s late entry into the Lebanese
field. These differences render her apparently less capable (or less willing) to
leverage her social relations toward instrumental ends relating to her repro-
duction strategies - even when accounting for the effects of misrecognition
associated with such usage.
As figure 8.5 illustrates, while the quality of social resources upon which
respondents 13/1 and 13/7 may draw upon does not radically vary (they
are from a similar, relatively elite background, have a family employee to
call upon, and well-connected relatives), the use which they make of these
potential resources differs radically. For instance, it seems 13/7 and his peer
cohort rely less upon direct, small favours among each other than 13/1, who
noted several instances of ‘khidme’ (as she defined it) among her friendship
group. Rather, for the kind of reproduction strategies (specifically labour
market integration) for which 13/1 relies upon the ‘networking’ or ‘soft tools’
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(such as ‘spreading of information’) among her friendship group, 13/7 re-
lies more directly upon the misrecognised (and, in the terminology of 13/1,
‘harder’) assistance of close kin relations. By contrast, 13/1 mentions specif-
ically pushing away from the use of such ‘hard tools’,22 and in particular
it would seem she lacks the bridging connection to other, older and well-
connected individuals which 13/7 and his peer cohort are able to access,
through the mutual assistance of each other’s parents.
Hence, as figure 8.5 demonstrates, respondent 13/7 has in effect much
greater embodied social capital than respondent 13/1: not in the sense that
the quality of his social relations is significantly greater, but in the sense
that the dispositions both of his own and his peer group’s habitus enable
those relations to be put to much more effective use in the labour of social
reproduction. In effect, respondent 13/7’s network of social relations forms
a dense cluster of mutually reinforcing ties, drawing upon kinship, economic
and social links to achieve concrete advances in the social game, and tending
to exclude the entry of newcomers.
By contrast, 13/1’s destabilised or “tormented” habitus (Tabar, Noble,
and Poynting, 2010) consciously limits her use of social connections to the
“soft tools” of ‘khidme’: she is much less inclined to use social or kinship
relations for purely instrumental ends, and demonstrates no interest whatso-
ever in the kind of intermediary strategies of symbolic investment in objec-
tified social capital which might position her to others as potentially useful.
Rather, quite the opposite: her habitus is adjusted toward the maintenance
of weak ties among professional networks (hence she mentions buying flow-
ers for the sister of a friend who had given birth, and who was very much
involved in the activist community, admitting “I might have done it for
that [. . . ] to keep that connection”), and most lamenting the fact that her
current work does not provide her with a business card to exchange with
potential contacts (the business card expressing a form of institutionalised
social capital). She is also more adjusted toward what might be described
as ‘institutionalised’ forms of social activities: activism and volunteering -
themselves the expressions of an impulse toward the generalised, rather than
22Indeed, if the driving licence story is to be believed it would seem her family are
only able to use such ‘hard tools’ behind her back - which also demonstrates in a more
general sense the extent to which some agents may indirectly benefit from clandestine
circulation while subjectively distancing themselves from it (and hence the importance of
distinguishing between position-takings and practices in the labour of social reproduction).
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the specific, interest.
The result for respondent 13/1 is a mode of integration within Lebanese
social space which positions her - both objectively and subjectively - in a pe-
ripheral position: as a self-defining member of the ‘activist community’, and
someone who, perhaps making a virtue of necessity in the manner noted by
Bourdieu (1990c, p. 54), distances herself from the “very negative Lebanese
overdone form” of social relations. It is important to note that a minor,
though significant, portion of Lebanese social space exists to support such
position-takings, and is occupied by what might be considered a disaffected
fraction of the cultural elite. However, as ever it is important to distin-
guish practices from position-takings: although respondent 13/1 has found
a (subjective) home for herself within this fraction of space, the limited
(objective) success with which she pursues her strategies of advancement
within it is arguably the result of the mis-firings of displaced habitus - a
habitus ill-adjusted to the general requirements of Lebanese social space,
which express themselves to some extent even in the most peripheral posi-
tions, and which prompt reproduction strategies which make extensive use
of the clandestine circulation of social capital even among significant holders
of institutionalised cultural capital, such as 13/1.
Having established these differences marking habitus exogenous or en-
dogenous to Lebanese social space, and of the varying efficacy in terms of
social reproduction to which these differences lead, what of variations in
habitus produced within that social space? The objective positioning of re-
spondents 13/10 and 13/11 vis a` vis 13/7 has already been noted in passing.
In light of the further discussion of respondent 13/7’s point of honour, and
the specific nature of his reproduction strategies, it is useful now to directly
compare these agents’ habitus.
Respondents 13/10 and 13/11 are brothers from a coastal town in south-
ern Lebanon. They are aged 19 and 23 respectively, and are both junior
students in business at an elite private university in Beirut. They share the
same social circle of around a dozen close friends, with whom (like 13/7)
they claim to make no special effort to maintain their relationship; however,
they did emphasise that these friends “support each other for everything”,
and also made reference to a greater use of small favours among each other
than had 13/1. They have no additional nationality, and mentioned only
one relative who worked abroad (a cousin).
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The brothers’ father is a well-connected businessman, employing around
200 workers in a factory based in their home town, while their mother does
not work. They also have two other brothers, aged 22 and 13, and the three
older brothers live together in a rented apartment in Beirut. The family has
strong connections with a local political dynasty (the father is rad
˙
a↪, or milk
brother, to a former local MP), and during the resistance (against Israel)
they would hide weapons in the family home - something which seems to
have earned the family significant local prestige.
It is clear from analysis of their interview responses that respondents
13/10 and 13/11 differ in small but substantial ways from 13/7, while also
differing from each other in ways which perhaps reflect a growing divergence
in trajectories. The most substantial difference evidently concerns capital
structure: while all three respondents are attending the same elite university,
this coincidence arguably has more to do with the secular tendency, noted
in the previous chapter, toward higher education as a uniform reproduction
strategy across the elite - that is, no longer marking a divide between spe-
cific capital structures. Rather - again, as noted in the previous chapter -
differences in capital structure are more accurately discerned by the level
of individual investment which agents demonstrate toward the educational
system, and the extent to which such investment is misrecognised.
In this sense, it is clear that respondents 13/11 and 13/7 in particular
are opposed. Whereas respondent 13/7’s habitus was evidently adjusted
toward the accumulation of institutionalised cultural capital, and tended
to misrecognise those strategies of clandestine circulation associated with
such accumulation, respondent 13/11 by contrast had been suspended from
university for two years for poor grades and attendance, and had also noted
during interview that he had failed 7th, 8th and 9th grade (brevet); indeed,
he freely admitted that he only passed the brevet because his father asked
a contact at the Ministry of Education to ‘look after’ him during the exam.
Thus, for several papers he was allowed to copy the answers, while for maths
a teacher was brought in who sat the exam for him.
Equally, there was evidence that - in contrast to 13/7 - the wider family
had a weaker affinity with the private educational sector than the state
administration. Although in common with the majority of the Lebanese the
brothers were privately educated, respondent 13/11 was nonetheless forced
to take his exams as an auditor (that is, not in the name of the school),
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while they noted that a cousin had previously failed in his attempts to
obtain a place for his daughter at a prestigious private school in Beirut.
According to the brothers this was due to a lack of political backing, with
another friend apparently having enjoyed success following the support of
a leading Shia politician. However, another respondent (13/2) believed her
own eventual success in obtaining a place for her children at a prestigious
private school in Beirut had more to do with affinities of class (i.e., as a
professional academic), having previously failed at a different school when
attempting to use wasta.
Indeed, it was clear that what power or influence the family had within
the private school they attended was not related to the misrecognised affini-
ties of a shared capital structure (as would seem to have been the case with
respondent 13/7), but rather the somewhat more disenchanted dominance
arising from economic power.23 The brothers recounted how - owing to the
fraudulent behaviour of an employee at the school - the school had owed
their father a significant amount of money through his business; it seems he
gained significant influence by not taking them to court for the debt, and
instead allowing the money to be paid back over a period of time.
Their father’s business background indeed seems to be the factor most
distinguishing the two brothers from respondent 13/7; despite 13/7’s own
father being a (small) businessman, much more determinant in that respon-
dent’s core reproduction strategies appeared to be the mother’s orientation
toward the liberal professions, which seems to have prompted that respon-
dent’s greater and more consistently misrecognised investment in institution-
alised cultural capital. By contrast, the two brothers clearly identified their
father’s power with the economic field, and with a much less institution-
alised form of symbolic capital - they described him as having “charisma”,
of not needing to use politicians, and of the business community dictating
more than politicians in Lebanon.
Widespread awareness of their father’s wealth and power seems at var-
ious times to have caused unwelcome attention for the brothers, with both
noting that teachers and fellow students had attempted to go through them
to make use of their father’s connections, or even to obtain money. The need
to manage such attention seems to have contributed toward a habitus much
23Compare the example of the effects of varying class affinities demonstrated by Rivkin-
Fish (2005) in the post-Soviet healthcare system, as noted in chapter 6.
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more attuned toward the potentially instrumental uses of social capital, and
particularly the need to take a nuanced approach toward social relations.24
As respondent 13/10 noted (who seemed more sensitive to attempted op-
portunism) “half the talk of Lebanese is lying, like ‘my dear’, or ‘my life’,
or ‘my brother’.”25 When faced with an ambitious teacher looking for his
father’s patronage, 13/10 preferred to dissimulate. He didn’t tell his father
that the teacher had asked his help to secure a promotion, but when asked
by the teacher he said he had. Why? “I don’t like such things, and neither
would my father.” The respondent was aware that in failing to do so “my
relation with the teacher changed, he became against me,” but appeared to
accept these consequences calmly.
His brother, by slight contrast, seemed more attuned (in keeping with
his somewhat differing trajectory) to the potential for losing out in the
wasta game: that is, to being exposed to shame or ingratitude after having
ventured one’s assistance - “if someone asks you for wasta, later he needs
to do something for you in return. If he’s able to and he doesn’t do it, it’s
as if he steps on you and keeps on walking - who are you? you’re alone, he
doesn’t know you.”26 For him, wasta is like a “sword” - “it can help you
and damage you”.
While aware of this potential for damage, 13/11 also seemed more open
than his younger brother to maintaining a useful network of contacts: “I
prefer to have open contacts with all, not just one. You always need these
connections in case you’re in trouble.” Such connections inevitably involved
the public administration, with the brothers admitting to using a simsar to
avoid dealing with bureaucracy, and to using the family business to exchange
favours with the police - “at the end of the day it’s like one for one - khidme
khidme”. At the same time though the older brother was careful to firmly
24This seems to coincide with the trend noted by Huxley (1978, p. 115) during his
research on wasta in Lebanon before the Civil War (and mentioned in the theoretical
section). Huxley found younger and more elite respondents “tended to find economic
[rather than affective] senses of meaning” for wasta-transactions, which in a Bourdieusian
framework suggests lower misrecognition, and a tendency (no doubt embedded in habitus)
to distinguish more clearly between instrumental and non-instrumental exchange.




aki libnani innu kazzab, mitl h
˙
abibi wa khayyi
wa. . . yukoun tatkon innu s
˙














a. . . ↪am ’iltil al wast
˙
a, bil ma bi’a lazim b↪adeen ↪amilak











wa d↪aeen ↪am yud↪ais, ↪am yud↪ais ↪alaikon, meen inta? ma h
˙
addak ma ↪arifak.”
272 CHAPTER 8. THE SECOND MOMENT
distinguish between such connections and friendship, noting for example
that he was closer friends with the son of a political rival than with the son
of their ally. Finally, in keeping with the much lower misrecognition which
this respondent attached toward institutionalised cultural capital, it would
seem that among his close circle of friends were some who assisted him with
his university work.
Thus, in contrast to respondent 13/7, both brothers appear more sen-
sitive toward inequalities that may arise through the elementary mode of
domination - that is, through the unequal circulation of embodied capitals.
They not only appear to directly engage in more of such circulation them-
selves, but they are also aware of the importance of emphasising and main-
taining social distance through such exchange: in particular of not wanting
to be made to feel small, but also in some sense of wanting to distinguish
themselves, horizontally, from other elite fractions.27
In keeping with this tendency, and in contrast with respondent 13/7, it
would seem that the two brothers invest more heavily in the kind of inter-
mediate strategies involving objectified social or symbolic capital identified
previously, with a corresponding reliance on clandestine circulation to accu-
mulate and maintain such capitals. Thus, the younger brother noted using
his father’s connections to extricate himself from a police checkpoint, where
he had been stopped for having smoked windows on his car; equally, the
older brother noted how they relied on their cousin’s wasta to go, usually
once a month, to an elite nightclub. The cousin maintained his wasta there
through paying extravagant tips (for instance $100 for valet parking), and
the brothers were able to benefit vicariously from such largesse to boost
their own social standing, for instance by reserving tables and obtaining
admission for girls below the age of 18.
However, in keeping with the double-edged nature of wasta noted by
13/11, such strategies of symbolic investment are not without their own
risks: the brothers noted how on one occasion they had attempted to
broaden their intimate social circle by inviting three new girls along to join
them at the club. At the end of the evening when the (rather large) bill
came, the newcomers refused to contribute. As 13/10 recalled “normally we
pay for girls, but the way they said it - ma mu↪awadeen yidfa↪a” - ‘we’re
27As respondent 13/11 described his family (in English) - “we are simple people, we
treat people simple. I hate to be sophisticated and false.”
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not accustomed to paying’. As ever, the logic of challenge and riposte as-
sociated with embodied capitals and elementary domination carries with it
the greater risk of failure and loss.
Such differences in subjective attitudes and objective practices between
the two brothers and respondent 13/7, while occasionally subtle, nonetheless
reveal a reliance on contrasting reproduction strategies, and hence an invest-
ment in different capitals and different forms of clandestine circulation. As
we have seen, respondent 13/7 is adjusted toward the accumulation of insti-
tutionalised cultural capital, and toward an integration in the labour market
in a skilled professional role. His own and his family’s strategies of clandes-
tine circulation are thus adjusted toward this core goal, with subsidiary and
more peripheral strategies assisting in maintaining an elevated position in
social space more generally. The two brothers, by contrast, are evidently
more adjusted toward the economic and political fields, and toward the re-
production of their father’s elevated position in both. This evidently entails
a greater reliance on symbolic and social investment strategies, as the core
capital structure in both fields would appear to rely more heavily on embod-
ied social and symbolic capital (as outlined in the previous chapter), and
less heavily on institutionalised capitals of whatever guise. Such variations
in trajectory and capital structure would thus appear to be the cause of the
differing points of honour exhibited by the respondents: while all three were
opposed to 13/1 concerning their lack of identification of a generalised in-
terest with the specific reproduction mechanisms associated with the state,
respondents 13/7 and 13/11 were by contrast more subtly opposed, with the
latter’s commensurately reduced identification with the generalised interest
in the domains of the educational system and the labour market demonstrat-
ing his different capital structure, and particularly his substantially reduced
reliance on institutionalised cultural capital.
A structured, focussed comparison of respondents’ practices and position-
takings across the various strategies they must engage in can thus reveal both
the specificity of habitus adjusted to the general requirements of Lebanese
social space, as well as variance between habitus according to specific trajec-
tories within that space. In this light, the clandestine circulation of capitals
is revealed not as a singular phenomenon (as might otherwise be implied by
the spontaneous or unthinking transposition of a folk-term such as ‘wasta’
into a theoretical concept), but rather as a complex, structured phenomenon,
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involving not only a wide variety of practices, but also significant variation
in misrecognition, depending upon the precise manner and extent to which
such circulation relates to the reproduction of an agent’s core capital struc-
ture.
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8.3 Conclusion: Clandestine Circulation in Lebanon
The investigation of Lebanese clandestine circulation conducted in this em-
pirical section has attempted both to identify specific reproduction strate-
gies which make use of such circulation, and to differentiate those strategies
according to the position of agents within a relational social space. The
underlying intention has been to demonstrate clandestine circulation as a
structured phenomenon - structured, that is, in two senses: first, in the
sense that clandestine circulation relates to reproduction strategies which
are themselves the response of habitus to the configuration of objective re-
production mechanisms and socially-efficient resources structuring Lebanese
social space; and second, in the sense that the nature of such reproduction
strategies varies (in terms both of the strategies themselves and the efficacy
with which they are employed as variable or exclusive means of appropria-
tion) according to the positioning of agents within that social space.
It has also attempted to demonstrate that the principles structuring clan-
destine circulation - including, but not limited to, the phenomenon of wasta
itself - are thus not to be understood or explained theoretically according
to the utility maximising preferences of rational actors, or as the adherence
to an ‘unwritten rule’ or informal institution, still less to the precepts of
culture when understood as a timeless ‘value-system’. Rather, the analysis
has attempted to proceed on the basis of the precepts laid out in the first
two sections of the thesis, a basis neatly summarised by Bourdieu:
In order to construct a model of the game, which will not be the
mere recording of explicit norms, nor a statement of regularities,
while synthesising both norms and regularities, one has to reflect
on the different modes of existence of the principles of regula-
tion and the regularity of different forms of practice. (Bourdieu,
1990b, p. 65)
At the level of ‘principles of regulation’, it was demonstrated how the
reproduction mechanisms of the Lebanese state effect produced an objec-
tive social space structured according to the variable possession of specific
species of capital. The precise structure of those reproduction mechanisms,
coupled with the incomplete monopoly of symbolic and physical violence
of the Lebanese state, created the objective conditions for the clandestine
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circulation of such capitals. Next, at the level of ‘the regularity of different
forms of practice’, it was demonstrated how the need to reproduce these ob-
jective resources encouraged agents toward specific reproduction strategies.
These strategies indeed involved varying forms of clandestine circulation;
however, both practices and position-takings toward such practices were re-
vealed to be structured, with the two principle dimensions of such structure
identified as the stability and engagement of agents within their given field.
How do these dimensions relate to the objective structuring principles
of social space identified in the first empirical chapter? In the theoretical
section it was hypothesised that clandestine circulation may take different
forms according to the guises of capital involved: i.e., the clandestine circu-
lation of cultural capital may be used as a variable means of appropriation as
readily as the clandestine circulation of social or economic capital, depend-
ing ultimately upon the specific configuration of reproduction mechanisms.
The most relevant dimension structuring clandestine circulation in general,
however, regarded the form of capital: the factor unifying the varying types
of clandestine circulation being always translations of capital along an axis
moving from embodied to objectified to institutionalised, or vice versa.
We have seen in the first empirical chapter how variance in the Lebanese
state effect - understood as the capacity of “that something we call the state”
to institutionalise capitals, and in doing so to successfully maintain the
monopoly of physical and symbolic violence - produced differing strategies
of clandestine circulation, strategies so apparent as to be identifiable even at
the objective level through traces left in the built environment. Empirical
analysis in this chapter has arguably demonstrated that, in social spaces
such as Lebanon, where the institutionalisation of capital is variable and may
differ radically across time and space, the effects of such institutionalisation
as a dimension structuring clandestine circulation are expressed more at the
level of field (and in terms of correspondence between fields), than at the
level of individual agents within a larger social space (i.e. as an expression
of their individual capital structures).
The axis of stability can thus be seen as the translation of these broad ef-
fects of institutionalisation (or lack thereof) to the level of individual agents,
as restructured by the effects of field. As such it reflects variously both the
stability of agents within their given field, and the relative stability of fields
within social space - factors which may in some sense be understood as
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proxies for the general capacity of the various reproduction mechanisms to
institutionalise capital. Some caution is however necessary here, as it may
equally be the case that a (relatively) stable field is reproduced through
embodied or even objectified capitals (as is arguably the case with the po-
litical field and aspects of the economic field). In this case, the interest (and
misrecognition) generated through such kinds of stability will of course be
quite different, approximating more closely that of the ‘King’s House’ than
the ‘Reason of State’.
At any rate, it is vital to note that the dimensions revealed through
MCA analysis reflect those which are most relevant in positioning individual
agents in a general space of practices and position-takings toward clandestine
circulation. The MCA does not, in other words, produce a hierarchical social
space structured according to the possession of objective resources; rather, in
a space of practices and position-takings, agents possessing quite different
volumes (and even guises) of capital might be found close to each other,
owing to the fact that the necessities of the different field struggles they are
engaged in provoke similar responses in terms of habitus.
Thus, in order to make sense of the significance of the distribution of
these subjective structures at the level of the distribution and reproduction
of objective resources, it was necessary to reintegrate them into the first mo-
ment of analysis. It is at this point that the detailed analysis and comparison
of individual respondents’ habitus and capital structures proved most use-
ful: only through such analysis can agents’ positions within an objective
hierarchy (understood in terms of the volume and structure of their capi-
tal) be related to the use of clandestine circulation within their individual
reproduction strategies. In this sense, not only were agents endogenous to
Lebanese social space revealed to have markedly differing habitus to exoge-
nous agents, but the diversity of strategies of clandestine circulation which
Lebanese agents engaged in were revealed to be both highly complex and
involving a variety of different capitals and reproduction mechanisms, as
analysis of respondent 13/7 in particular demonstrated.
Thus, in the total labour of social reproduction, the objective configu-
ration of Lebanese social space encourages agents to invest in a hierarchy
of different strategies of clandestine circulation, including those of periph-
eral, intermediate and core importance. Moreover, the specific hierarchy of
those strategies, as well as the misrecognition which agents exhibit towards
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the varying forms of clandestine circulation which constitute such strategies,
will vary according to the agent’s point of honour (expressing his or her core
capital structure as it relates to the wider state of relations in social space).
In the same spirit, it is important to distinguish in terms of analytical
significance between the absolute recourse to clandestine circulation, and the
efficacy of such circulation for different agents. While there is evidently some
room for individual skill (in the sense of an agent’s ‘feel for the game’) in
determining the extent to which the successful application of such strategies
will result in the appropriation of capital (as would appear to have been
the case with the Sunni mukhtar, for instance), it is also apparent that
the capacity for such strategies to serve as a variable or exclusive means
of appropriation is much more readily effected by those already possessing
higher volumes of such socially-efficient resources.
It is also clear that the ultimate appropriation which such established
agents will secure will be of a different nature, and tend toward different
types of misrecognition, than that of the parvenu. For instance, while the
political capital secured by the Sunni mukhtar is misrecognised as charity
under the specific interest, and hence involves a conversion into embodied
social capital, for the Orthodox mukhtar, his strategies are adjusted much
more strongly toward the conversion of such political capital into embodied
cultural capital. Thus, his office provokes in him a kind of pride which re-
bounds on his established family name, and does not encourage the same
justification through charitable impulses.28 For respondent 13/7, of course,
the most important strategies of clandestine circulation are entirely mis-
recognised through the generalised interest, as the legitimate conversion of
institutionalised cultural capital (in the form of qualifications) to institu-
tionalised social capital (in the form of an elevated position in the labour
market). Finally, for the two brothers, an additional investment in objec-
tified social or symbolic capital (in the form of a conversion of social or
economic capital into a visible hierarchy of goods and practices), helps to
enhance, and thus secure the misrecognition of, the more charismatic em-
bodied social capital which - alongside economic capital - would appear to
be the basis of their father’s elevated position.
28Indeed, when given the opportunity to identify himself or his office with such charitable
impulses, the Orthodox mukhtar specifically identified himself against such motivations:
“it’s a shame to say it, but there are some people who can’t afford certificates, and I pay
for them [. . . ] it doesn’t mean the role of the mukhtar is charity.”
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To conclude, therefore, the study of clandestine circulation in the Lebanese
context has revealed a complex and complicated system of practices and
position-takings, but one which nonetheless yields some of its complexities to
a mode of analysis structured around the two research moments of Bourdieu-
sian praxeology. In particular, I hope it has been possible to demonstrate
that the complete labour of social reproduction (and hence, at the aggregate
level, of social domination) is seldom effected either through the exclusive
use of objectified mechanisms, or the exclusive reliance on elementary modes
of domination. Rather, in the struggle between agents within social space
to maintain or obtain an advantage, the convertibility of the different forms
of capital can offer a permanent advantage within the social game, provided
that the dispositions of habitus exist to take maximum advantage of that
convertibility, and to shape from it mechanisms of clandestine circulation
which assist in its exclusive appropriation.





This thesis began with an observed paradox: by what principles can practice
be regulated, when it is consistently opposed to the normative (and legally
expressed) intentions of the modern state? From this first question arose a
second: if there are indeed principles regulating such practices, what might
their effects be, in terms of the reproduction of an unequal social order?
To answer these questions as comprehensively as possible, the thesis
was designed according to the research methodology proposed by Pierre
Bourdieu. This involved, essentially, three steps: a reappraisal of concepts,
the development of a new theory, and the application of that theory to an
empirical setting.
First, in chapter 2 a conceptual analysis was undertaken of the epistemo-
logical foundations of current academic reasoning concerning the research
object. This analysis challenged the “epistemological unconscious” lying
behind certain academic categories, in order to lay the foundations for the
radical break in conceptual reasoning which followed.
Four research paradigms in particular were examined: clientelism; cor-
ruption; state formation; and institutional theory. The strengths and weak-
nesses of each approach were identified, and in some cases compared and
contrasted. It was argued in particular that the same or similar questions
ultimately arose within each paradigm, typically concerning the ultimate
predicates of social practice. What does it mean to follow a rule?
In chapter 3 the attempt was made to resolve these problems by reassess-
ing them from the perspective of a Bourdieusian conceptual framework. This
framework consisted essentially of a relational approach to human social
practice, involving the ‘conceptual tools’ of habitus, field and capital, and
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a division of the research process into two ‘moments’ - objective resources,
and the ‘second-order’ objectivity of symbolic systems of classification.
The new research object which arose from this break was termed clan-
destine circulation, and was based upon the understanding that agents en-
gage in struggles over the accumulation of socially-efficient resources. These
struggles are the expression of habitus adjusted not only toward the symbolic
appreciation of such resources (in the sense of their social libido), but also
toward the ‘feel for the game’ necessary to compete for them. The “dead
structure” of rule-bound approaches is thus replaced with the “improvised
regularity” (or regularised improvisation) of the strategies of habitus, and
the level of analysis shifts from the specification of functions to the investiga-
tion of the genesis of the objective and subjective structures which regulate
such circulation, and their distribution in terms of systems of more or less
stable relations.
Following an overview of the empirical field site in chapter 4, chapters 5
and 6 were devoted toward the elaboration of the implications of this new ap-
proach within a rigorous Bourdieusian framework. In chapter 5 the historical
genesis of the objective and subjective structures responsible for the emer-
gence of the ‘public’ (or generalised) interest were traced, and considered
in light of the historical trajectory of the dominant capital structure within
social space. The analysis focussed in particular on the historical transition
of the mode of domination (within the western context) from one predi-
cated on the possession of embodied, social capital, accumulated through
the elementary mode of domination, to one predicated on the possession of
objectified and (eventually) institutionalised cultural capital, accumulated
and reproduced through an objectified mode of domination based upon in-
stitutionalised mechanisms - specifically the educational system. The state
effect - the social effects of the state, and hence the object through which the
state should be analysed - was thus understood as the structuring effect pro-
duced on social space by the specific configuration of these mechanisms, in
terms both of the production and distribution of objective resources (forms
and guises of capital) and the production and distribution of symbolic cat-
egories (the varying social libidos).
In chapter 6 the implications of this historical genesis were considered in
light of contemporary social practice, with the units of analysis in particular
shifted toward the dialectical relation between reproduction mechanisms (a
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product of the state effect) and reproduction strategies (a product of habitus
adjusted toward the state effect). It was suggested that, depending upon
the dominant division of capital structures produced by a given state effect,
different strategies of clandestine circulation may emerge within different
fractions of social space. Alongside the clandestine circulation of embodied
or inherited cultural capital to institutionalised cultural capital (the initial
specification provided by Bourdieu in the case of France and the UK), the
clandestine circulation of embodied or inherited social capital, as well as
economic capital, were also theorised, with empirical examples considered
in the forms of blat, guanxi and wasta.
Following this analysis of the objective structures determining the form
of clandestine circulation, the thesis shifted toward a consideration of the
subjective factors (in the sense of symbolic categories) structuring and lim-
iting clandestine circulation in practice. In particular, the symbolic force
associated with misrecognised capitals was proposed as the principle factor
both structuring and limiting the practice of clandestine circulation - a factor
expressed through the additional labour performed by social agents to pro-
tect that force. It was hypothesised that in instances where misrecognition
is lower (and hence the symbolic force associated with capital less great), the
clandestine circulation of capital would require significantly less additional
labour; by contrast, the higher the symbolic force, the greater the labour
(in terms of denying the material nature of such exchange). The theoretical
section concluded by considering the structural implications of this misrecog-
nition, in terms of the distribution, within social space, of position-takings
relating to the different forms of clandestine circulation, and in particular
the special care which must be taken in relying on such position-takings
when undertaking empirical research.
The thesis then moved on to the elaboration of these theoretical princi-
ples within the empirical context of Lebanon, and specifically the Lebanese
capital Beirut. The basic history and social structure of Lebanon was out-
lined in chapter 4, including the widespread prevalence of social practices
which would fall under the remit of clandestine circulation, and a highly
unequal social order which would appear to be reproduced according to the
appropriation enabled through such circulation. Chapters 7 and 8 thus at-
tempted to relate the principles outlined in the theoretical section to the
empirical context of high inequality, low mobility, corruption, and social
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insecurity outlined in chapter 4 - including (but not restricted to) the phe-
nomenon of wasta.
The empirical analysis (following Bourdieusian praxeology) was divided
into two research ‘moments’. Chapter 7 covered the first ‘moment’ of ob-
jective structures, understood in the context of clandestine circulation as
beginning with the precise configuration of reproduction mechanisms of the
Lebanese state effect. These reproduction mechanisms were considered in
the sense both of producing a determinate hierarchy of socially-efficient re-
sources (forms and guises of capital), as well as a subjective (or second-order)
objectivity of systems of symbolic classification - considered in the sense of
the symbolic force associated with the different species of capital, and the
domain of their legitimate transformation.
It was seen in particular how the Lebanese state effect produces a hy-
brid mode of domination, in which the division of capitals within the field
of power leads to varying forms of clandestine circulation. Similarly to the
case of Soviet blat, the sectarian political system produces a form of insti-
tutionalised social capital, which is conducive to being transformed into an
exclusive means of appropriation owing to the fact that - unlike institution-
alised cultural capital - it is not reproduced through an objective hierarchy
of merit, but rather through the reproduction of a non-hierarchical system
of communal division.
The fundamental importance of this principle to the dominant fraction of
the field of power is demonstrable through the specific reproduction mecha-
nisms over which it maintains the fiercest monopoly: the sectarian system of
inheritance laws is robustly defended from encroachment by any civil prin-
ciple of social reproduction (i.e. in the form of civil marriage), whereas the
educational system - qua principle of reproducing institutionalised cultural
capital - is neglected or ignored, except when of use within the sectarian
spoils system as a co-opted principle for reproducing institutionalised so-
cial capital in the form of permanent posts. The neglected character of the
educational system is further emphasised by the fact that - as a principle
for reproducing institutionalised cultural capital - the monopoly of symbolic
violence (in the sense of legitimating the qualifications awarded) is held by
foreign regulatory bodies, with the most elite institutions being accredited
by US and French agencies.
The structure of reproduction mechanisms within the Lebanese context
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also leads to the failure to produce a unification of the generalised interest
(or public interest) within the point of honour of the dominated fraction of
the field of power (i.e. that fraction of the bourgeoisie identifying its interest
in the accumulation of cultural capital). In other words, the private regula-
tion of institutionalised cultural capital, and its separation from the raison
d’Etat, tends toward the degradation of the state’s capacity to enforce its
monopoly of symbolic violence. In this way it becomes possible for members
of the bourgeoisie to, for instance, justify acts as ‘principled’ despite going
against the state, and in more general terms to consider principled action as
autonomous of the state - thus leading to strategies of household sociodicy
(particularly demonstrable in the case of acquiring driving licences) that
also encourage offspring to denigrate the state’s symbolic legitimacy (which
is after all autonomous to the reproduction of their core capitals).
Furthermore, the failure of the Lebanese state to concentrate the accu-
mulation of capitals within its own reproduction mechanisms - and hence to
establish an objectified mode of domination - has resulted in the prevalence
of intermediate modes of objectification not regulated by the state. In this
sense, the high salience of objectified symbolic or social goods - forming a
hierarchy of recognition among agents adjusted toward their accumulation
- results from the same underlying causes as the continued existence of the
qabadayat phenomenon - a hierarchy of objectified violence, of bodily and
symbolic capitals, autonomous of the state.
What sociologists such as Khalaf (2012) cite as symptoms of Lebanon’s
‘anomie’ - a lack of respect for public space and the norms of civic interac-
tion, coupled with a corresponding predilection for kitsch and conspicuous
consumption - can thus be understood as the responses of habitus to a social
environment in which, first, the generalised interest has no firm objective
basis, and second, mechanisms for the institutionalised reproduction of hi-
erarchy have been eroded (a trend further emphasised by the redistributive
outcomes of the reconstruction of BCD, which seem to have favoured politi-
cal and parvenu economic capital against established cultural and economic
capital). In such conditions, the expression of hierarchy through what might
be called ‘brute’ objectification can be seen as the expression of a state effect
which has devolved toward a more elementary mode of domination.
The additional investment required by such strategies, and the corre-
sponding reduction in accumulation which they presuppose, would seem to
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unify the Bourdieusian model of domination with Graziano’s observations
concerning the developmental effects of clientelism: namely, that such forms
of social relations reduce the accumulation of capital within a society, in
the sense of limiting the capacity for actions with a delayed reward. Such
effects must be understood in the aggregate however, as it is obvious that
the structure of social relations within Lebanon also enables some agents to
accumulate capital in spectacular fashion. Again, the hybrid nature of the
Lebanese state effect is the most important factor: the imperfect capacity
to concentrate capitals should not be taken to imply the complete absence
of such a capacity. Rather, as was seen in chapter 8, successful social repro-
duction in Lebanon requires a habitus adjusted toward strategies capable at
various points of taking advantage of both objectified and elementary modes
of domination.
Chapter 8 thus attempted to analyse in greater detail the specificity of
these various reproduction strategies, and in particular their structured na-
ture, as the expression of habitus adjusted toward the varying demands of
Lebanese social space. It was here that comparative analysis of structured
interviews was used to construct a relational space of practices and position-
takings toward clandestine circulation, and specifically wasta. This analysis
revealed that the key factors structuring agents’ general propensity toward
clandestine circulation was the degree of stability within their given field,
and the level or quality of their engagement with the social game. It was
argued that the first of these dimensions could be understood as demon-
strating empirically the main principle structuring clandestine circulation
as outlined in the theoretical section: i.e., the distinction between the two
fundamental modes of domination, and between capital structures adjusted
toward embodied or institutionalised capitals.
In keeping with a Bourdieusian mode of analysis predicated on the ef-
fects of field, it was thus appropriate that empirical analysis should reveal
that the effects of the institutionalisation of capital as a dimension structur-
ing clandestine circulation as a social practice were expressed most strongly
in terms of the correspondence between fields, rather than at the more ag-
gregated level of social space as a whole (i.e. with agents possessing more
embodied capital being opposed to agents possessing more institutionalised
capital).
In a similar way, it is also possible to see how the second dimension re-
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vealed through analysis - engagement - equally corresponds with principles
elaborated in the theoretical section, particularly those relating to the sym-
bolic dimensions of clandestine circulation. Agents with a greater degree
of engagement were more likely to admit to using strategies of clandestine
circulation, but in a way that emphasised necessity or absolute necessity.
The close proximity of these practices and position-takings would seem to
support the hypothesis that the symbolic force associated with successfully
misrecognised capitals leads agents to see their actions (or such kinds of ac-
tions in general) much more strongly in terms of immanent necessity. Again,
empirical analysis shows the effects of clandestine circulation are expressed
much more strongly in terms of the correspondence of fields (i.e. agents
in corresponding positions within different fields, rather than within social
space as a whole); necessity is thus the expression of the restructuring effects
of field, whereas agents who express more autonomy (denying using wasta
or seeing in it a degree of choice or agency) are much less firmly embedded
and ‘taken-up’ by the struggles of field.
Finally, the second moment of practices and position-takings was rein-
tegrated into the first moment of objective structures through a detailed
analysis of agents’ habitus and capital structures. The varying efficacy of
practices, as well as variations in reproduction strategies, were considered
according to agents’ core capital structures, and hence their position in wider
Lebanese social space. Although with the data available it was not possible
to visually represent the precise structure of that space, it was nonetheless
possible to identify clear structural differences in strategies between agents.
It was demonstrated in particular that agents endogenous to Lebanese
social space shared certain characteristics across reproduction mechanisms
which served to distinguish them from agents exogenous to that space, in
particular regarding those mechanisms most closely associated with the rai-
son d’Etat. Closer analysis of the reproduction strategies of agents from
within Lebanese social space further revealed a distinction between those
whose strategies were more adjusted toward the accumulation of institu-
tionalised cultural capital, and those more adjusted toward the accumula-
tion of economic and political capital, which in turn corresponded to the
core division within the field of power identified in chapter 7.
In particular, not only did the strategies employed by agents vary, but the
degree of misrecognition which agents attributed toward their own practices
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differed according to the relation of such strategies toward the reproduction
of their core capitals. In the case of agents adjusted toward the accumulation
of political and economic capital, such differences were expressed in terms
of their attitude toward social relations, specifically through a heightened
sensitivity to the potential for social exchange to produce unequal power re-
lations and effects of domination. Agents adjusted toward the accumulation
of institutionalised cultural capital meanwhile tended to display greater mis-
recognition toward the clandestine circulation of capital within the domains
of the educational system and the labour market.
Returning to the research questions which guided this thesis, I believe
that the combination of theoretical and empirical analysis summarised above
has managed to successfully address the main points raised concerning clan-
destine circulation as a social phenomenon. In particular, the elaboration
of clandestine circulation provided in the theoretical chapters has served to
define and differentiate it as a social practice according to the capitals and
reproduction mechanisms involved, and to trace its genesis in terms of the
emergence of the state, as well as transformations to the dominant capital
structure(s) within the field of power. It has also been demonstrated how
particular features of a given state effect may make clandestine circulation
more or less determinant in social reproduction, as mechanisms of variable
or exclusive appropriation emerge to take advantage of the convertibility of
capital within specific reproduction mechanisms. Moreover, hysteresis of the
state effect was also demonstrated as a frequent factor in determining the
emergence of clandestine circulation (or, in times of greater crisis, reconver-
sion strategies), as agents attempt to defend their previously accumulated
capital, or to take advantage of new possibilities for accumulation.
Turning to the general implications of this research, the thesis has, I
believe, provided a contribution in three main areas: conceptual, theoretical
and empirical.
In conceptual terms, I hope to have demonstrated the utility of applying
a Bourdieusian framework to the study of the informal exchange of illicit
favours in the context of the modern state. In particular, I hope that the
reconceptualisation of the research object which I have undertaken has en-
abled the mitigation of those effects of “state thought”, in terms both of
normative assumptions and academic categorisations, on the study of prac-
tices which ‘go against’ the state (as identified in chapter 2). By extension,
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I hope instead to have developed a mode of analysis which - to paraphrase
Anders and Nuijten (2007) - rather than simply reifying such practices by
treating them as a dependent variable, may instead reflect the structural
power relations implied in even the pettiest forms of corruption. The ap-
plication of Bourdieusian conceptual tools attempted here - presaged by
both Anders and Nuijten, as well as Graaf (2007), yet with little by way of
prior rigorous application - has thus hopefully demonstrated their potential
for developing “new ways of thinking” about the phenomena of corruption,
clientelism and informal exchange within the context of the modern state,
and to consider these in relation to the total order of practices necessary for
agents to reproduce their position in the social order.
At the theoretical level, the thesis has hopefully also made a specific
contribution to the field of Bourdieusian theory, in particular by highlighting
the somewhat under-theorised role of the convertibility of the forms (rather
than guises) of capital, the limiting factors to such convertibility, and their
potential role in social reproduction. It is true that Bourdieu himself set
the example for such a line of research through his initial specification of
the clandestine circulation of cultural capital. However, post-Bourdieu, the
tendency within research has, unfortunately, erred toward the fragmentation
of the unified concepts of field, capital and habitus. It has thus been a main
preoccupation during the writing of this thesis to ensure that the theory
of clandestine circulation which I proposed would remain consistent with
all the conceptual postulates underlying Bourdieusian praxeology. At times
this has proved laborious, and indeed it resulted in a number of dead-ends
owing to my own mistaken readings; I do not consider the theory contained
within this thesis to be by any means the final word on the matter, but I do
at least hope I am currently wrong in the right ways.
Finally, at the empirical level the thesis has hopefully contributed in
some way to the analysis of Lebanese society, and in a manner which does
justice to its complexities. I never wished to write a thesis about Lebanese
sectarianism (a subject which has been more than amply dealt with in the
literature), but I hope that the focus on the concrete effects of the Lebanese
state contained within this thesis has presented a new way of thinking about
Lebanon, which takes seriously the problem of sectarianism, yet without
reifying it. Indeed, reading through the empirical chapters again I found it
striking the extent to which the sectarian system, which plays such a role
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in structuring the objective resources available to Lebanese, plays yet so
peripheral a role in their day-to-day reproduction strategies, other than as
a fact of life to be unsentimentally worked around. In this sense, Lebanese
political sectarianism would seem to be not so different to Soviet communism
or, in central Asia, post-Soviet neo-clanism (as analysed by Collins (2006)):
a structuring feature of the state effect whose primary importance lies not in
its ideological content, but (in the words of Roy) of encouraging a particular
relation to the political. That relation, as we have seen, lies mainly in
the objective resources which it produces and circulates: embodied social
capital, which becomes the basis of institutionalised political capital. In such
cases, the affective group structure which the political system reproduces is
less important than the power relations through which it produces them. If
such power relations in the Lebanese context are less than totally dominant,
it is only because both economic capital and institutionalised cultural capital
exist in sufficient quantities to act as alternative socially-efficient resources,
hence leading (as mentioned previously) to a hybrid mode of domination -
each with its own mechanisms of clandestine circulation.
The last comment concerns omissions and potential directions for future
research. For a fully comprehensive empirical account of clandestine circula-
tion in a specific empirical context, it would have been preferable to include
a section charting the historical genesis of the field. This would have in-
volved tracing not only the development of the state effect as a variable over
both time and space, but also the dominant capital division(s) structuring
the field of power. In this way it would have been possible to demonstrate
how reproduction strategies developed over time, and how the monopolisa-
tion of different reproduction mechanisms became more or less important
for different class fractions at different points. The clandestine circulation
of capital could then be seen more clearly as a historically (rather than cul-
turally) contingent set of practices, relating to transformations in the state
effect more generally. While it was possible in the theoretical section to
trace some of these processes in the other contexts discussed, in the case
of Lebanon it was only possible to give a fairly limited indication of the
historical genesis of the field in chapters 4 and 7. I hope, however, that the
decision to pay greater attention to the nuances of the contemporary state
of the field has nonetheless been vindicated in terms of the greater level of





The material upon which the empirical sections of this thesis were based
was obtained during three periods of field work totaling around five months,
and was further informed by the experiences and contacts I had acquired
whilst living in Lebanon between 2008 and 2009, as well as other visits I
subsequently made before commencing my PhD.
In keeping with a theory-building research design, research methodology
was initially shaped toward a more generative model, involving explorative
methods such as semi-structured interviews, group events, participant obser-
vation and analysis of media and other secondary material. These data were
used to establish a speculative model of the structuring principles relating
to clandestine circulation within the Lebanese context.
Upon returning to the field half-way through my third year, the same
explorative methods were again used, but this time in conjunction with
structured interviews targeted toward gathering information from specific
positions in social space.
These interviews were divided into three sections: the first to gather
objective data (such as age, gender, educational attainment, etc.); the second
to capture elements of practice and subjective attitudes toward personalised
exchanges; and the third to capture position-takings (prises de position)
specifically concerning wasta. A copy of the question sheet is included in
this appendix alongside a list of all recorded interviews (including those
conducted during the first stage of field work). Interviews were primarily
conducted in Arabic, with my research collaborator Professor Paul Tabar
acting as lead interviewer (in some cases alone).
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Reliability
It should be emphasised that the use of traditional sociological methods
(such as interviews) in the study of phenomena such as clandestine circula-
tion is more than usually fraught with difficulty. Not only are individuals
often reticent to talk about such matters, but more significantly the power
relations between interviewer and respondent can become determinant in
shaping responses - particularly in a formal, recorded interview environ-
ment. To be frank, sometimes people lie. The tendency to shape one’s
answers in order to position oneself in the best light is not unheard of in
qualitative research, but in dealing with practices which bear directly on the
respondent’s point of honour it was not unusual to find respondents contra-
dicting themselves, or stating things contrary to what both they, and the
interviewer, knew to be true.
Thus, a distinction should be emphasised between the methodology used
to build a general picture of the research object (in terms of social practices),
and that used to measure individual agents’ position-takings and practices
for the purposes of building a social space - a distinction equivalent to the
first and second moments of Bourdieusian praxeology respectively.
Concerning the structured interviews (which represented the latter),
analysis of interview material was weighted against the knowledge that as
interviewers both myself and Paul Tabar would - as academic researchers -
be considered by respondents as possessing high levels of institutionalised
cultural capital. Further, the formal interview setting naturally produces re-
sponses that will differ from more informal, off-the-record settings. Hence,
responses to our questions often took on the character of position-takings
in relation to our own (supposed) positions, and to the academic field in
general. While being sensitive to such factors can not compensate for a de-
liberate untruth or misrepresentation, considering responses in a relational
sense and in light of the methods used in the first moment can nonetheless
help reveal the general structure of misrecognition.
Through combining these various methods in a manner consistent with
Bourdieusian praxeology, I believe it has been possible to present a fairly
accurate qualitative model of the social space of Lebanese clandestine circu-
lation, and to demonstrate in a nuanced, differentiated manner the particular
effects which clandestine circulation can have on the reproduction of a given
social structure.
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A.1 Questionnaire for Structured Interviews
A Objective Data (Field)
1. Age
2. Gender
3. Educational attainment (highest qualification; school attended)
4. Occupation








(c) Family members abroad?
(d) Time spent abroad?
7. Languages spoken
8. Own/rent property?
9. Transport: Own car/use servis [taxi] or public transport?
B Practice and Strategies (Habitus, dispositions)
1. Have you ever needed to call on help from someone for something. . . (see
what is volunteered, and then prompt in order) :-
(a) Family/Children: Education? e.g. admission to a particular school;
asking for a reduction in school fees; Healthcare? e.g. treatment
in a hospital
(b) Household/Bureaucracy : Problems with property? e.g. old rent,
construction permits, etc.; Driving licence? Fines (or legal prob-
lems)? Government services? e.g. paying fees, registration of a
new property, etc.
(c) Work : Finding a job? Winning new business? e.g. contracts, etc.
For each case ask also:
i. who helped (nature of relation)
ii. any expectation in return (money, gift, future obligation)
iii. motivation (absolutely necessary; to speed things up; purely
optional)
2. Have you ever been in a position to help others? Ask in particular:
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(a) Who (family; friends; clients)?
(b) How often?
(c) In what way? (Explain in details)
(d) How do you feel about it?
3. Number and quality of social relations:
(a) Roughly how many people do you know socially?
(b) What efforts did you make to have these connections?
(c) If you ever needed help, how many friends do you think you could
call on?
(d) Are there some relationships you feel you need to maintain (for
example politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats, police, army) to
get by or to avoid future problems? Why?
4. Time invested on social capital :
(a) In the last six (to twelve) months, how many and what kind of
social events have you taken part in? (e.g. weddings, funerals,
etc.)
(b) What did they involve? (gifts, meetings, wreaths, etc.)
C Subjective position-takings concerning wasta (Habitus, perceptions)
1. How would you describe wasta? Include:
(a) Is it a good thing or a bad thing?
(b) Is it like a favour?
(c) Is it corrupt?
(d) Is it selfish or self-interested?
2. Do you use wasta personally? What for? If no, are there any situations
that would force you? If so, which?
3. If you do use wasta, is it because: you need to; you choose to?
4. If you do use wasta, is your wasta:
(a) a friend?
(b) a family member?
(c) a patron or superior (e.g. a politician, leader, etc.)?
(d) a business associate or acquaintance (i.e. less than a friend)?
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Note on Questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed according to material gathered during the
first stage of field work regarding the objective structures and socially-
efficient resources which constitute the major oppositions within Lebanese
social space. The majority of these are self-explanatory, and would hold
for most developed economies: age and gender, educational attainment, oc-
cupation (and the occupation of other family members), and a proxy to
determine economic assets (“do you own or rent your apartment/house?”).
Three further objective determinants were also included derived from
experience of the Lebanese field: nationality (including most importantly
any additional citizenship, any family members abroad, and any time spent
abroad); languages spoken; and mode of transport most commonly used. In
the first case, not only does Lebanon have a history of high rates of migra-
tion, but the presence of family members overseas, or a second passport, or
having obtained qualifications from a foreign university, can all be impor-
tant factors in modifying an agent’s position in social space, as discussed
in the empirical chapters. Likewise, the (successful) acquisition of French
and/or English remains a key indicator of cultural capital, and is used by
agents to position themselves and others. Mode of transport was considered
as a measure of autonomy, however within the sample it did not ultimately
constitute a significant opposition.
The second part of the questionnaire was designed to examine agents’
practices and dispositions, specifically in relation to their reproduction strate-
gies. For this section it was intended to avoid prior mention of the term
wasta, however in practice this was seldom possible. However, the section
was nonetheless interested in capturing the precise dynamics of clandestine
circulation as they applied to different agents, rather than their position-
takings.
To encourage agents to be as open as possible, questioning in this section
was presented in a neutral, even altruistic manner (“have you ever needed to
call on help from someone for something..?”), and typically began with as-
sistance solicited on behalf of another (family or children, for example). For
each respondent, an attempt was made to cover all the various reproduction
strategies to which wasta may be applied (education, health, bureaucracy,
business, etc.) as well as proxies for the different types of relations (and
hence capitals) involved. Respondents were also asked whether they had
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ever used connections to help another. To complete this part of the profile,
some general questions about the number and quality of social relations were
also asked (to determine type and structure of social capital).
Finally, a third section was designed to discover specific position-takings
about wasta itself as a social practice. Is it a good thing or a bad thing? Is it
corrupt? In this section wasta was referred to specifically, and agents asked
directly whether or not they used it, the extent to which they felt compelled
to use it, and the types of social relations which qualify as a wasta.
Owing to constraints presented by specific respondents (some were reluc-
tant to proceed with questioning in certain directions), not all areas could be
covered in every interview; in general however, respondents were given the
opportunity to give as complete a record as possible of their practices and
opinions. In a few limited cases respondents subsequently revealed informa-
tion off-the-record which contradicted their on-the-record statements. Such
contradictions were interpreted in a manner in keeping with Bourdieusian
precepts on position-taking and misrecognition.
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A.2 List of Recorded Interviews and Group Events
As noted above, fieldwork was divided into three periods, with the first two
periods being for primarily explorative and generative purposes, and the
third involving more targeted data collection for the purposes of structured
comparison. In the first and second periods interviews were carried out en-
tirely by myself, in either English or (less commonly) Arabic, and followed
a semi-structured format in which respondents were asked primarily about
their experiences of wasta, as well as some subsidiary information concerning
their objective background (occupation of parents, academic qualifications,
etc.) In these initial periods of fieldwork two larger-scale discussions (involv-
ing 15-30 participants) were also recorded, in which discussion was guided
toward attitudes about wasta.
In the third period of fieldwork the structured questionnaire presented
above was used to interview a limited, targeted sample of respondents, con-
sidered as occupying exemplary positions in social space. These interviews
were held in either Arabic or English (sometimes both), and were generally
conducted (for language purposes and reasons of informant access) by my
research partner Professor Paul Tabar of the Lebanese American University,
in some instances with my participation.
The sampling method for determining respondents was based on a com-
bination of heuristic and pragmatic considerations. As already mentioned,
owing to the nature of the research object, pre-existing power relations be-
tween interviewer and respondent may significantly affect the outcome of
an interview. To begin with, I thus chose interview respondents who were
either known to me or who could be introduced to me through a contact,
believing such a method might achieve greater openness. Toward the end of
the second fieldwork period some respondents (the mukhtars in particular)
were - in the absence of intermediary contacts - approached “cold”. In gen-
eral, while a prior relation or link to a respondent may have some bearing
on the quality of the material gathered, I believe that the more significant
effects of the respondent’s habitus (as a reflection of his or her position in
social space) emerged, to a greater or lesser degree, regardless.
Once the general outline of the questionnaire had been established, and
the broad principles structuring the social space of clandestine circulation
hypothesised, a list of ‘ideal type’ respondents was drawn up based upon the
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positions such agents were assumed to occupy (i.e., their capital structure)
in that space. The list was relatively broad, and included businessmen,
professors, bureaucrats, teachers, students, labourers, qabadayat, simsars,
and mukhtars.
The list was not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to guide the se-
lection of respondents. Ultimately, it was not possible to find respondents
matching every position in the list, however gaps in some areas (business-
men, lawyers, bankers) could be filled to some extent through the position-
takings noted in the group sessions. Other weaknesses in the achieved sample
are a bias toward male respondents and a limited representation of the most
heavily dominated fractions.
These weaknesses aside, it is my strong belief that the study of practices
of clandestine circulation requires quality rather than quantity in terms of
data gathering. As Yang’s critique of Guthrie (1999) demonstrated (Yang,
2002), a methodology with “all the trappings of scientific sociological method,
complete with elaborate sampling techniques and statistical charts and graphs”
was entirely undermined by a failure to attend to something as simple as
context.
Finally, the list below includes only those interviews or group events/public
discussions which were recorded and followed a structured format. It does
not include the much greater number of meetings with informants which
were conducted on an informal basis, and which often yielded the great-
est (and ironically most reliable) insight in terms of anecdotal accounts of
clandestine circulation as a social practice. While some such encounters took
place before the commencement of my PhD studies, all those which occurred
during the course of my field work were annotated in a field diary.
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First and Second Periods (February - April 2012)
Recorded Interviews:
1. 10/03/12 (English)
Manager, Shipping Firm, male, 30 (expatriate) (12/1)
2. 12/04/12 (English)
Small Business Owner, male, mid-30s (expatriate, married to Lebanese)
(12/2)
3. 16/04/12 (Arabic)
Teacher (private school), female, late-20s (12/3)
4. 17/04/12 (English/Arabic)
Senior Research Officer, anti-corruption NGO, male, late-20s (12/4)
Recorded Group Events:
1. 13/03/12 (English)
British Business Council Meeting, Presentation on Wasta by AUB
Professor, present: 20-30 Lebanese and expatriate businessmen and
women of mixed ages.
2. 23/04/12 (English)
Lecture on Wasta given by author to mixed group of social science
faculty and students, present: 15-20 men and women, Lebanese, other
Arab and expatriates.
Third Period (April - May 2013)
1. 25/04/13 (English)
Research Assistant (part-time), female, 32 (13/1)
2. 25/04/13 (Arabic)
Professor (state university), female, 44 (13/2)
3. 26/04/13 (English)
Professor (private university), female, 52 (13/3)
4. 28/04/13 (Arabic)
Draftsman (retired), male, 69 (13/4)
5. 29/04/13 (Arabic)
Manager, Liban Post (retired), male, 78 (13/5)
6. 02/05/13 (Arabic/English)
First year BSc Student (private university), male, 20 (13/6)
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7. 02/05/13 (English)
Final year BA Student (private university), male, 21 (13/7)
8. 02/05/13 (Arabic)
Accountant (retired) and company owner, male, 60 (13/8)
9. 04/05/13 (Arabic)
Security Guard, male, 43 (13/9)
10. 07/05/13 (Arabic/English)
Younger brother, Junior Student (private university), male, 19 (13/10)
11. 07/05/13 (Arabic/English)
Older brother, Junior Student (private university), male, 23 (13/11)
12. 07/05/13 (English)
Professor (private university), male, 66 (expatriate) (13/12)
13. 11/05/13 (Arabic)
Sunni Mukhtar’s brother (and father), male, 45 (13/13)
14. 13/05/13 (Arabic/English)
Greek Orthodox Mukhtar, male, 60 (13/14)
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A.3 Note on Coding and Analysis
Interview material was coded according to objective (capital structure) and
subjective (position-taking) categories, with a further analysis extracting
data relating to practices (i.e., in which situations did the respondent discuss
using social connections?)
The extracted (qualitative) data was then used to create a simple con-
tingency table, following the individuals by categories format. A number of
preliminary multiple correspondence analyses were then run on these data,
with different types of coding (in the sense of qualitative categories) ex-
plored. In keeping with Bourdieusian methodology, for all MCAs objective
data were included as supplementary questions (Rouanet, Ackermann, and
Le Roux, 2000, p. 9), with only data on position-takings and practices used
to construct the space.
The final table on which the MCAs used in this thesis were based is
included below, and reflects a balance between theoretical and methodolog-
ical concerns. In particular, it is important when using MCA analysis to
include questions with roughly the same number of categories, in order to
prevent those with fewer categories playing a too determinant role in the
construction of the space.
Thus, the relatively small sample of respondents (by statistical stan-
dards) precluded any coding which attempted too nuanced a distinction
within categories. Moreover, in some categories the relative uniformity
among respondents prevented them from being used as effective measures of
difference. Rather, categories were chosen on the basis of a good distribu-
tion among respondents, allied to a firm theoretical justification. Categories
which remained important but which were of a binary nature and some-
what skewed (gender being a good example) were added as supplementary
variables.
Thus, age was coded in three groups, roughly corresponding to three
general stages in agents’ reproduction strategies: below 35 (acquiring one’s
place in the labour market, typically requiring the intervention of inher-
ited social capital); 35-59 (establishing one’s own family; progressing in the
labour market; dealing with inheritance of economic assets); and above 60
(retirement, affording a different perspective on the previous strategies and
also, in respect to hysteresis of the state effect within the Lebanese context
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resulting from the civil war, potentially a habitus conforming to a prior state
of the field). These groups were fairly evenly distributed among the sample.
Educational attainment was coded in 4 categories: “low” (signifying be-
low baccalaureate); baccalaureate; degree; and higher degree. The sample
was skewed somewhat toward those with degrees and higher degrees. Ow-
ing to the nature of historical changes in Lebanon, education level is also
strongly correlated with age such that, for instance, a baccalaureate ob-
tained in the 1960s or 1970s represented (at the time) a similar position to
that of a degree now.
The decision was made to code occupation in three categories: “corpo-
rate”, to represent a large organisation (public or private sector) not owned
by the respondent’s family; “family” to represent a family-owned business;
and “academia”. There were several reasons for this: on the one hand,
some respondents had worked in several fields; on the other, coding those
who were currently students produced a very strong correlation with the
category of “degree” in educational attainment. Hence, students were re-
coded according to their current, likely future or desired future occupation
as indicated in the interview.
Position-takings on wasta were reduced to a single question with four cat-
egories, related (in theoretical terms) to the specific perspective, i.e. “under
what condition would you use wasta”, or “do you use wasta?” Coding this
dimension proved difficult, as respondents would position their own prac-
tice selectively (typically along the lines of “there are two kinds of wasta;
I would only ever use the good kind”). Nonetheless, a division among four
categories covered the majority of responses fairly well: never, representing
a complete disavowal of the practice (which, given that this question was
asked toward the end of interviews was perhaps not unsurprisingly limited
to only two respondents); responses emphasising an element of choice (either
to save time; providing the respondent had the right qualifications; as an act
of charity, or providing it would not hurt another); responses emphasising
being obliged to use wasta or needing to use it; and responses emphasising
a rare recourse based only on absolute necessity. The latter two categories
were disambiguated following the large number of respondents who indi-
cated some degree of necessity. In one case the response was inferred based
upon the respondent’s own description of his practice.
Finally, data were extracted from the interviews based upon the par-
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ticular strategies for which respondents admitted using wasta or wasta-like
practices. These were divided into varying domains (education, labour mar-
ket, bureaucracy, police, prestige, health) and coded according to whether
the respondent admitted to using wasta or social connections, denied using
them, or made no reference. A number of MCAs were performed on these
data. Taking into account the theoretical relation of the varying domains to
the nature of the Lebanese state effect (in the sense of reproduction mech-
anisms and sociodicy), it was ultimately decided to include four questions:
the labour market, education, and two kinds of state (fiscal/bureaucratic
and public order).
In presenting the results of the MCA geometrically the two most impor-
tant dimensions were used, representing 70.55% of total inertia; statistics
relating to the MCA (which was run using STATA) are included below. Ow-
ing to the limitations of STATA in visually representing MCAs, coordinate
data was exported to MS Excel to create the charts used, with structuring
factors applied manually. In light of the extreme position of individual 13/3
on the second axis, the analysis was rerun excluding observations relating to
that individual. The results primarily altered the constitution of the second
axis, with not mentioning wasta in the labour market, admitting in using
wasta in the domain of state violence, and denying in education and state
violence now the principal contributors to that dimension. Total inertia fell
to 0.379, while the percentage of inertia for the first axis rose to 59.37%, and
for the second fell to 19.77%. The results did not radically alter the stabil-
ity of the overall space however, with the same distribution of the various
clusters apparent, and the same positioning of individuals along the axes.
This application of MCA to a small, qualitative dataset is somewhat
experimental (see Habib et al. (2012) for a similar instance in the field of
architecture), and was intended purely as an interpretive aid to a theory-
driven model: that is, the MCA enables the structure of the information
derived from interviews to be demonstrated visually, and in particular to
place specific respondents in spatial relation to one another. This informa-
tion was then used to conduct further analysis of the interview material,
and to compare and contrast practices and position-takings not included in
the MCA.
As chapter 8 has hopefully demonstrated, the utility of such a method in
drawing out structural oppositions (in terms of practices, position-takings
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and their objective correlates) is invaluable, and indeed the two principle
dimensions revealed through MCA ultimately corresponded (though with
interesting modifications) to hypotheses I had originally generated concern-
ing the dimensions structuring clandestine circulation during my first period
of fieldwork. It goes without saying, however, that no claims are made re-
garding the statistical significance of the MCA.
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Coded Dataset and MCA Statistics
Table A.1: Coded Dataset of Structured Interviews
Resp. Edu. Occ. Wasta CCEdu CCLab CCStFisc CCStViol
1 hdeg acad never no ment deny yes no ment
2 hdeg acad choose deny deny yes deny
3 hdeg acad abs need yes yes yes no ment
4 low corp abs need yes deny deny deny
5 bacc corp never deny deny deny deny
6 deg fam choose no ment deny yes deny
7 deg corp need no ment deny yes yes
8 deg corp need deny deny yes deny
9 low corp need deny deny deny yes
10 deg fam abs need no ment no ment yes yes
11 deg fam need yes no ment yes yes
12 hdeg acad choose no ment no ment no ment no ment
13 low fam choose no ment no ment no ment no ment
14 bacc fam need yes deny deny yes
Multiple/Joint correspondence analysis Number of obs = 14
Total inertia = .4068889
MethodBurt/adjusted inertias Number of axes = 2
Principal Cumul
Dimension Inertia Percent Percent
dim 1 .1875818 46.10 46.10
dim 2 .0994994 24.45 70.56
dim 3 .0347891 8.55 79.11
dim 4 .0006017 0.15 79.25
dim 5 .0000686 0.02 79.27
Total .4068889 100.00
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Table A.2: Statistics for Column Categories in Standard Normalization
overall dimension 1 dimension 2
Categories mass quality %inert coord sqcorr contrib coord sqcorr contrib
Wasta
Never 0.029 0.503 0.031 -0.321 0.044 0.003 1.419 0.459 0.057
Choose 0.057 0.818 0.083 1.374 0.597 0.108 1.150 0.222 0.076
Need 0.071 0.587 0.061 -1.015 0.556 0.074 -0.327 0.031 0.008
Abs need 0.043 0.671 0.059 0.075 0.002 0.000 -1.933 0.669 0.160
CCEdu
no mention 0.086 0.822 0.065 1.143 0.793 0.112 0.298 0.029 0.008
denial 0.057 0.901 0.064 -1.143 0.539 0.075 1.285 0.361 0.094
yes 0.057 0.804 0.063 -0.572 0.137 0.019 -1.731 0.667 0.171
CCLab
no mention 0.043 0.653 0.048 1.007 0.415 0.044 -1.045 0.237 0.047
denial 0.143 0.837 0.028 -0.374 0.326 0.020 0.643 0.510 0.059
yes 0.014 0.501 0.083 0.722 0.042 0.007 -3.296 0.459 0.155
CCStFisc
no mention 0.029 0.785 0.120 2.609 0.745 0.194 0.825 0.040 0.019
denial 0.057 0.780 0.069 -1.429 0.774 0.117 0.166 0.006 0.002
yes 0.114 0.370 0.007 0.062 0.030 0.000 -0.289 0.340 0.010
CCStViol
no mention 0.057 0.757 0.100 1.686 0.751 0.162 -0.206 0.006 0.002
denial 0.071 0.638 0.054 -0.683 0.286 0.033 1.040 0.352 0.077
yes 0.071 0.427 0.066 -0.666 0.223 0.032 -0.875 0.204 0.055
age
below35 0.357 0.130 0.287 0.306 0.054 -0.502 0.077
35 to 59 0.286 0.077 0.209 0.348 0.077 -0.004 0.000
above 60 0.357 0.363 0.216 -0.584 0.260 0.505 0.103
sex
male 0.786 0.047 0.199 -0.143 0.037 0.102 0.010
female 0.214 0.126 0.273 0.524 0.099 -0.373 0.027
Edu
low 0.214 0.043 0.251 -0.181 0.013 0.378 0.030
bacc 0.143 0.714 0.344 -1.849 0.654 0.770 0.060
deg 0.357 0.079 0.287 -0.189 0.020 -0.440 0.059
hdeg 0.286 0.951 0.233 1.296 0.947 -0.118 0.004
Occupation
family 0.357 0.256 0.224 0.401 0.118 -0.594 0.138
academia 0.286 0.951 0.233 1.296 0.947 -0.118 0.004
corp 0.357 1.330 0.287 -1.438 1.185 0.688 0.144
respno
1 0.071 0.119 0.492 1.014 0.069 1.182 0.050
2 0.071 0.218 0.492 -0.353 0.008 2.427 0.209
3 0.071 0.850 0.492 0.911 0.056 -4.727 0.794
4 0.071 0.174 0.492 -1.378 0.127 -1.151 0.047
5 0.071 0.519 0.492 -1.825 0.223 2.886 0.296
6 0.071 0.148 0.492 0.703 0.033 1.801 0.115
7 0.071 0.015 0.492 -0.392 0.010 -0.349 0.004
8 0.071 0.221 0.492 -1.456 0.142 1.490 0.079
9 0.071 0.317 0.492 -2.137 0.306 0.565 0.011
10 0.071 0.249 0.492 0.749 0.038 -2.438 0.211
11 0.071 0.280 0.492 -0.546 0.020 -2.706 0.260
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12 0.071 0.888 0.492 3.611 0.873 0.648 0.015
13 0.071 0.697 0.492 2.973 0.592 1.718 0.105
14 0.071 0.299 0.492 -1.873 0.235 -1.347 0.064




(Symbolic) Capital Capital, in the Bourdieusian mode of analysis, is un-
derstood in the general sense as any socially-efficient resource. In order
for capital to function as a socially-efficient resource however, it must
be recognised by social agents as having value, which is why Bourdieu
tends to speak in terms of symbolic capital, or the symbolic effects of
capital - that is, capital which is recognised as legitimate. Capital in its
most elementary form is human labour time, but it may pass through
symbolic transformations (through the effects of domination and field)
to take on different forms and guises. The forms of capital are em-
bodied, objectified and institutionalised, which refer in broad terms
to how objectively a socially-efficient resource may be possessed and
transmitted; the guises of capital are many, but the most significant
are economic, cultural and social. All guises of capital are typically
produced by a specific field, with the exception of social capital, which
is relatively irreducible to a specific field, but tends to be produced by
all fields and forms of social relations, and has a multiplier effect on
the efficacy of the other guises of capital possessed by an agent.
Doxa The state of correspondence, or homology, between external, objec-
tive structures (field, social space) and internal, subjective structures
(habitus, illusio) such that what would otherwise be seen as arbitrary
in the social world takes on the appearance of self-evidence. Impor-
tantly, doxa does not imply blind obedience to the established order,
but rather the mediation of objective inequalities into symbolic strug-
gles over symbolic capitals.
Field “A patterned system of objective forces (much in the manner of a
magnetic field), capable of producing its own logic among the agents
engaged within it.” Fields re-structure objective, general necessities
into specific forms of power relations, interests (illusio), and resources
(capitals), such that “the external determinations that bear on agents
situated in a given field [. . . ] never apply to them directly”. They
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are spaces of forces and struggles, specifically opposed to the ‘dead
structures’ approach to domination of structuralists such as Althusser.
Habitus The perceptions and dispositions of a socialised agent. “A set of
relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies in the form of mental
and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action.” It
is understood as resulting from an agent’s occupation of a particular
position and trajectory within social space.
Illusio In order for social agents to accept the demands placed upon them
by a given field, they must be ‘caught up’ in its specific logic. ‘Illusio’
is the name given to the interest produced by fields (and, by extension,
capitals) which makes them ‘worth the candle’ for the agents engaged
in them.
Misrecognition The transformation of objective power relations into sym-
bolic relations. For instance, a given power relation may be considered
as successfully misrecognised when the objective inequality underlying
it is denied (in good faith) by the parties involved. While the concept
of misrecognition is dependent upon accepting a mode of analysis pred-
icated on the existence of an objective, material basis to all inequality,
it does not contain any implicit normative or moral judgement regard-
ing the nature of affective relations. It is frequently confounded with
the (functionalist) Marxist concept of false consciousness, with which
it in fact has almost nothing in common.
Reproduction Mechanisms The system of mechanisms for regulating so-
cial reproduction which prevails in a particular social structure. Re-
production mechanisms tend to be regulated by the state (where such
a thing exists), or by whatever principle constitutes the legitimate so-
cial or political order. They fall under four classes: inheritance laws,
the labour market, property rights and the educational system.
Reproduction Strategies The system of strategies deployed by the pre-
vailing minimal social unit (i.e. typically the family, however it is
constituted) in order to reproduce or advance its position within the
broader social order. They fall under four classes: biological invest-
ment, succession strategies, educational strategies, and investment
strategies.
Social Reproduction The tendency for a general structure of objective
power relations and symbolic representations to reproduce itself. Given
that in Bourdieusian theory fields comprise “systems of relations that
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are independent of the populations which these relations define”, so-
cial reproduction does not necessarily imply that the same families or
individuals must reproduce their position in the social order; rather,
Bourdieusian theory allows for the fact that - being engaged in field
struggles - individual agents and families will rise and fall in the social
order.
Social Space A relational framework for understanding and illustrating
the different effects of field (including capitals and power relations)
prevailing in a given, theoretically-defined context. The concept of so-
cial space is primarily heuristic, enabling as it does different agents, so-
cial practices and dispositions to be placed in a geometrical relation to
one another. A social space must be constructed through theoretically
robust criteria, and can be visually represented through multivariate
statistical methods such as geometric data analysis (GDA).
Symbolic Violence “The violence which is exercised upon a social agent
with his or her complicity”. It is a fundamental tenet of Bourdieusian
theory that the ‘fit’ between objective structures and mental structures
can produce durable inequalities, precisely because such inequality be-
comes unrecognised or taken for granted. As Bourdieu noted “I call
misrecognition the fact of recognising a violence which is wielded pre-
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